恐怖主义动荡弧:基于体系视角的解读
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摘要
有关恐怖主义的研究,不仅可以从组织、观念层面入手,而且需从体系层面进行解读。作为体系的恐怖主义动荡弧,是基于组成体系的各单元及其互动关系形成的。这些单元包括全球性恐怖组织、区域性恐怖组织、"独狼"。其互动类型涉及竞争、合作、联盟,互动内容包含人员、资金往来,以及观念的分享。恐怖主义动荡弧体系在形成后具备一种整体性特征,核心表现是"反馈"效应。其中,正反馈推动体系的变化和发展,负反馈保证了体系的稳定。从体系格局上看,恐怖主义动荡弧是不稳定的,在较短时间内经历了"单极→两极→单极"的快速嬗变。从体系机制上看,尽管缺乏明确的法律、条约规定,但恐怖主义动荡弧体系已出现了要素自由流动机制与内在奖惩机制。从体系文化上看,恐怖主义动荡弧已形成一套将外部信息扭曲化处理并加以自我形塑的封闭性文化场域。这类信息会固化内部成员的认知模式与过程,内化他们的恐怖身份,最终使其成为恐怖主义动荡弧体系的坚实维护者。针对该体系,国际社会在反恐过程中,既要对恐怖组织进行系统的综合打击,也要切断外部世界对动荡弧体系的支持,方可从根本上破解恐怖主义痼疾。
The study of instability can not only start from organizational and conceptual level,but also from the system level.As a system,the formation of terrorism arc of instability is based on the units and their interaction.These units include global terrorist organizations,regional terrorist organizations,and "lone wolves".Their interaction involves competition,cooperation,and alliances.The interactive content includes personnel movements,financial flows,and sharing of ideas.The terrorism arc of instability has a holistic character after its formation,and its core nature is the "feedback" effect.Among them,positive feedback promotes the change and development of the system,and negative feedback ensures the stability of the system.From the perspective of configuration,the terrorism arc of instability is unstable.It has experienced a rapid transformation of "uni-polarity and bipolarity" in a short period of time.From the perspective of mechanism,despite the lack of laws and treaties,mechanism of the free movement of units and other mechanism of the internal reward and punishment have emerged.From the perspective of culture,the terrorism arc of instability has formed a closed cultural field that distorted external information and shaped itself.Such information will solidify the cognitive patterns and processes of internal members,internalizing their terrorist identity,and ultimately making them a solid defender of the system.In response to the terrorism arc of instability system,the international community should not only take comprehensive countermeasures against terrorism,but also cut off the support from the external world,so as to fundamentally eradicate terrorism.
The study of instability can not only start from organizational and conceptual level,but also from the system level.As a system,the formation of terrorism arc of instability is based on the units and their interaction.These units include global terrorist organizations,regional terrorist organizations,and "lone wolves".Their interaction involves competition,cooperation,and alliances.The interactive content includes personnel movements,financial flows,and sharing of ideas.The terrorism arc of instability has a holistic character after its formation,and its core nature is the "feedback" effect.Among them,positive feedback promotes the change and development of the system,and negative feedback ensures the stability of the system.From the perspective of configuration,the terrorism arc of instability is unstable.It has experienced a rapid transformation of "uni-polarity and bipolarity" in a short period of time.From the perspective of mechanism,despite the lack of laws and treaties,mechanism of the free movement of units and other mechanism of the internal reward and punishment have emerged.From the perspective of culture,the terrorism arc of instability has formed a closed cultural field that distorted external information and shaped itself.Such information will solidify the cognitive patterns and processes of internal members,internalizing their terrorist identity,and ultimately making them a solid defender of the system.In response to the terrorism arc of instability system,the international community should not only take comprehensive countermeasures against terrorism,but also cut off the support from the external world,so as to fundamentally eradicate terrorism.
引文
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(89)Marc Sageman,Leaderless Jihad:Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century,Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press,2008,p.88.
(90)Anne Speckhard,“The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists”,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol.31,No.11,2008,p.1002.
(91)See Quintan Wiktorowice,Joining the Cause:Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam:Presented at the Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference,Yale:Yale University Press,2004,pp.1-5;Andrew H.Kydd and Barbara F.Walter,“The Strategies of Terrorism”,International Security,Vol.31,No.1,2006,pp.49-80;Jessica Stern,“Mind Over Martyr:How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.89,No.1,2010,pp.95-108;Marko Rakic and Dragisa Jurisic,“Wahhabism as a Militant Form of Islam on Europe’s Doorstep”,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol.35,No.9,2012,pp.650-663;Joshua Kilberg,“A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure”,Studies in Conflict& Terrorism,Vol.35,No.1,2012,pp.813-814.
(92)阎学通、杨原:《国际关系分析》,北京大学出版社,2013年版,第37页。
(93)“伊斯兰国”溃败后全球反恐形势发展,参见王震:《后“伊斯兰国”时代的全球反恐态势略论》,载《西亚非洲》2018年第1期,第3～26页。
(94)UNDP,Journey to Extremism in Africa:Drivers,Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment,New York:United Nations Development Programme,2017,p.4.
(95)FAFT,Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,Paris:The Financial Action Force,October 2016,p.16;Patrick Blannin,“Islamic State’s Financing Sources,Methods and Utilisation”,Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,Vol.9,No.5,2017,pp.13-22.
(96)参见马丽蓉、李景然:《宗教极端主义思想根源与“去极端化”领域国际合作》载《西亚非洲》2016年第3期,第18～40页;刘中民、俞海杰:《伊斯兰国的极端主义意识形态探析》,载《西亚非洲》2016年第3期,第41～61页。
(97)包澄章、刘中民:《对中东变局以来中东教派主义的多维透视》,载《西亚非洲》2015年第5期,第44页。
(2)[英国]巴里·布赞、[丹麦]奥利·维夫、[荷兰]迪·怀尔德:《新安全论》,朱宁译,浙江人民出版社,2003年版,第179～180页。
(3)Nathan Brant Hamilt and David H.Gray,“Decentralized Terrorism:Ramifications for a Centralized International System”,Global Security Studies,Vol.3,No.2,2012,pp.24-26.
(4)Michael C.Horowitz and Philip B.K.Potter,“Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality”,The Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.58,No.2,2014,pp.199-200.
(5)欧朝敏、谭跃进:《九一一事件后国际恐怖主义活动的发展动态——基于ARMA干预模型的分析》,载《世界经济与政治》2011年第12期,第132～133页;姜鹏:《伊斯兰世界U型认同与恐怖组织类型关联性研究》,载《国际安全研究》2018年第1期,第132页。
(6)李伟:《“伊斯兰国”溃败对国际恐怖主义生态的影响》,载《现代国际关系》2017年第8期,第44～45页。
(7)若以李少军对体系结构三要素——“体系”“单元”“互动”的界定为标准,那么恐怖主义动荡弧已具备一种体系结构的特点。参见李少军:《国际政治学概论》,上海人民出版社,2013年版,第126页。
(8)[美国]肯尼思·华尔兹:《国际政治理论》,信强译,上海人民出版社,2008年版,第77～82页。
(9)朱永彪曾探讨了当前国际社会结构压力会对恐怖组织的策略选择产生的影响。参见朱永彪、武兵科:《结构压力、资源动员与极端组织的攻击策略》,载《世界经济与政治》2016年第9期,第97～99页。但此文未注意到恐怖主义自身体系结构的存在及影响。
(10)Department of Defense,Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,Washington,DC:U.S.Department of Defense,September 30,2001,p.4.
(11)Security Council,“‘Arc of Instability’ across Africa,If Left Unchecked,Could Turn Continent into Launch Pad for Larger-Scale Terrorist Attacks,Security Council Told”,United Nations,May 13,2013,https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11004.doc.htm 2018-10-12;Yonah Alexander,Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2013,Arlington:Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies,January 2014,pp.4-5;Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya,“Terrorism,Agenda 2063 and the Challenges of Development in Africa”,South African Journal of International Affairs,Vol.23,No.2,p.189.
(12)John Russell,“The Geopolitics of Terrorism:Russia’s Conflict with Islamic Extremism”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,Vol.50,No.2,2009,p.185;Brian L.Losey,“Conflict Prevention in East Africa:The Indirect Approach”,PRISM,Vol.2,No.2,2011,p.81;Claire Metelits,“Challenging U.S.Security Assessments of Africa”,African Security,Vol.9,No.2,2016,p.96.
(13)Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari and Sadia Sulaiman,“The Swat Conflict:An Arc of Instability Spreading from Afghanistan to Central Asia and Xinjiang”,Terrorism Monitor,Vol.7,No.13,2009,pp.8-10;J.Peter Pham,“Perilous Desert:Insecurity in the Sahara edited by Fredric Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars”,The Journal of the Middle East and Africa,Vol.51,No.1,2014,pp.83-84.
(14)Jennifer G.Cooke and Thomas M.Sanderson,Militancy and the Arc of Instability:Violent Extremism in the Sahel,Lanham:Center for Strategic & International Studies,2016,pp.1-3,15-28.
(15)Abdoulaye Mar Dieye,Current Threats in Nigeria,the Great Lake Region,Mali,Somalia and East Africa;and International Development Responses,Washington DC:United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Instability in Africa,May 2016,p.2.
(16)Ejaz Haider,“Arc of Instability”,The World Today,Vol.59,No.8/9,2013,p.25.
(17)Yahia H.Zoubir,“The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security”,International Affairs,Vol.85,No.5,September 2009,p.992.
(18)Byung-Kook Kim,“Between China,America,and North Korea:South Korea’s Hedging”,in Robert S.Ross and Zhu Feng eds.,China’s Ascent:Power,Security,and the Future of International Politics,New York:Cornell University Press,2008,p.199.
(19)Nick Turse,The Changing Face of Empire:Special Ops,Drones,Spies,Proxy Fighters,Secret Bases,and Cyberwarfare,Chicago:Haymarket Books,2012,pp.79-80.
(20)高祖贵:《美国在“动荡弧”的战略利益分析》,载《美国研究》2005年第3期,第82页。
(21)不过,2015年以来,约纳·亚历山大不再单纯将恐怖主义动荡弧视为恐怖组织的活动场所,进一步发展出动荡弧是恐怖主义跨国网络的观点。孙德刚也意识到,全球圣战网络正发展为“动荡弧”,已具有将动荡弧视为一种结构的意识,但并未对此问题作进一步深入研究。See Yonah Alexander,Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2014,Arlington:Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies,2015,p.3;Yonah Alexander,Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2016,Arlington:Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies,March 2017,p.7;Degang Sun,“China and the Global Jihad Network”,The Journal of the Middle East and Africa,Vol.1,No.2,2010,p.196.
(22)华尔兹认为结构通过奖励某些行为,同时对某些行为进行惩罚来进行选择。参见[美国]肯尼思·华尔兹:前引书,第77～78页。
(23)华尔兹认为,结构可以将结果控制在一个狭小范围内。参见[美国]肯尼思·华尔兹:前引书,第77页。卡尔·多伊奇(Karl Deutsch)、戴维·辛格(J.David Singer)、布莱恩·巴里(Brian Barry)也提出了类似的看法,认为体系具有“自我调控”(Self-regulation)或“自我平衡”(Homeostatic)的能力。See Karl Deutsch and J.David Singer,“Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability”,in James N.Rosenau ed.,International Politics and Foreign Policy:A Reader in Research and Theory,New York:Free Press,1969,pp.315-317;Brian Barry,Sociologists,Economists and Democracy,Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1978,pp.169-170.
(24)[法国]雷蒙·阿隆:《和平与战争:国际关系理论》,朱孔彦译,中央编译出版社,2013年版,第96页;Stanley Hoffman,“International Systems and International Law”,in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba eds.,The International System,Theoretical Essays,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1961,pp.207-209.
(25)周明、曾向红:《适当性逻辑的竞争:“基地”与“伊斯兰国”的架构叙事》,载《世界经济与政治》2016年第4期,第81页。
(26)王涛、秦名连:《索马里青年党的发展及影响》,载《西亚非洲》2013年第4期,第71页。
(27)George Michael,Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance,Nashville:Vanderbilt University Press,2012,p.1.
(28)钱雪梅:《基地的“进化”:重新审视当代恐怖主义威胁》,载《外交评论》2015年第1期,第133～134页。
(29)王涛、宁彧:《萨拉菲主义的多维透视——兼论萨拉菲主义与恐怖主义的关系》,载《俄罗斯东欧中亚研究》2018年第1期,第112～113页。
(30)曾向红、梁晨:《从“基地”组织到“伊斯兰国”——国际恐怖主义组织结构的演化》,载《中东问题研究》2016年第1期,第56～57页。
(31)Abdoulaye Mar Dieye,op.cit.,p.2.
(32)Peter Ekeh,“Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa:A Theoretical Statement”,Comparative Studies in Society and History,Vol.17,No.1,1975,pp.91-112.
(33)贾春阳:《当前中东“外国恐怖主义战斗人员”问题探析》,载《现代国际关系》2015年第10期,第25页。
(34)陈宗权:《国际关系互动理论初探》,载《国际观察》2008年第2期,第62页。
(35)Robert A.Dahl,Who Governs?Democracy and Power in an American City,New Haven:Yale University Press,1961,p.7.
(36)王涛、曹峰毓:《伊斯兰马格里布基地组织产生的背景、特点及影响》,载《西亚非洲》2016年第3期,第89页。
(37)李捷、杨恕:《“伊斯兰国”的意识形态:叙事结构及其影响》,载《世界经济与政治》2015年第12期,第11～18页;周明、曾向红:前引文,第80～111页。
(38)Daveed Gartenstein-Ross,Jason Fritz,Bridget Moreng and Nathaniel Barr,Islamic State VS.Al-Qaeda:Strategic Dimensions of a Patricidal conflict,Washington DC:New America,2015,p.3.
(39)Daveed Gartenstein-Ross,Nathaniel Barr and Bridget Moreng,The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy,Hague:International Centre for Counter Terrorism,2016,p.4.
(40)王涛、赵跃晨:《泛索马里主义的历史渊源与流变——兼论泛索马里主义与恐怖主义的关系》,载《世界民族》2018年第4期,第50～51页。
(41)Hekmatullah Azamy,“Will the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Trade the Taliban for ISIS”,Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,Vol.7,No.6,2015,p.30.
(42)王磊:《无政府状态下的国际合作——从博弈论角度分析国际关系》,载《世界经济与政治》2001年第8期,第12～13页。
(43)曾向红、陈亚洲:《恐怖主义的组织结构:类型辨析及其影响》,载《世界经济与政治》2016年第8期,第101～102页。
(44)Raffaello Pantucci and Sasha Jesperson,From Boko Haram to Ansaru:The Evolution of Nigerian Jihad,London:Royal United Services Institute,April 2015,p.27.
(45)Jacob Zenn,“Demystifying al-Quida in Nigeria Cases from Boko Haram’s Founding,Launch of Jihad and Suicide Bombings”,Perspectives on Terrorism,Vol.11,No.6,2017,pp.177-178.
(46)Meah Mostafiz,Syrian Conflict,Dilemmas and Challenges in Peaceful Settlement,Stadtschlaining:European Peace University,July 2013,pp.4-6.
(47)参见[美国]戴维·莱克:《国际关系中的等级制》,高婉妮译,上海人民出版社,2013年版,第95页。
(48)Ricardo René Larémont,“Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb:Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel”,Africa Security,Vol.4,No.4,2011,pp.242-245.
(49)Harleen Gambhir,ISIS Global Intelligence Summary,Washington D.C.:The Institute for the Study of War,May 2015,pp.2-9.
(50)Alexander Thurston,Boko Haram:The History of an African Jihadist Movement,Princeton:Princeton university Press,2018,p.276.
(51)Manni Crone,“Islamic State’s Incursion into North Africa and Sahel A Threat to al-Qaeda?”,Connections,Vol.16,No.1,2017,p.69.
(52)Paul Gill,John Horgan,Samuel T.Hunter and Lily D.Cushenbery,“Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist Organizations”,The Journal of Creative Behavior,Vol.47,No.2,2013,p.125.
(53)Hussein Solomon,Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa:Fighting Insurgency from Al-Shabaab,Ansar Dine and Boko Haram,London:Palgrave Macmillan,2015,pp.76,88.
(54)Amanda Erickson,“How the Islamic State Got a Foothold in Afghanistan”,The Washington Post,March 21,2018,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/03/21/how-the-islamic-state-got-a-foothold-in-afghanistan/?utm_term=.009c41cbf933,2018-06-18.
(55)Kim Cragin and Sara A.Daly,The Dynamic Terrorist Threat:An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World,Santa Monica:RAND Corporation,2004,pp.54-57.
(56)Jason Burke,“Al-Qaida Moves into Recruit From Islamic State and Its Affiliates”,The Guardian,January 19,2018,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/19/al-qaida-recruit-from-islamic-state-affiliates-isis,2018-04-18.
(57)David A.Snow,E.Burke Rochford,Jr.Steven K.Worden and Robert D.Benford,“Frame Alignment Processes,Micromobilization,and Movement Participation”,American Sociological Review,Vol.51,No.4,1986,pp.467-469.
(58)Martha Crenshaw,“Decisions to Use Terrorism:Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning”,in Donatella della Porta ed.,Social Movement and Violence:Participation in Underground Organizations,Greenwich:JAI Press,1992,pp.29-42.
(59)David A.Snow,E.Burke Rochford,Jr.Steven K.Worden and Robert D.Benford,“Frame Alignment Processes,Micromobilization,and Movement Participation”,American Sociological Review,Vol.51,No.4,1986,pp.469-472.
(60)刘中民:前引文,第4页。
(61)Burcu Pinar Alakoc,“Competing to Kill:Terrorist Organizations Versus Lone Wolf Terrorists”,Terrorism and Political Violence,Vol.29,No.3,2017,p.516.
(62)Robert Jervis,“Systems Theories and Diplomatic History”,in Paul Gordon Lauren ed.,Diplomacy:New Approaches in History,Theory,and Policy,New York:Free Press,1979,p.212.
(63)[美国]罗伯特·杰维斯:《系统效应:政治与社会生活中的复杂性》,李少军等译,上海人民出版社,2008年版,第149页。
(64)周明、曾向红:前引文,第80～111页。
(65)1996年,本·拉登发布了第一份警告美国撤出阿拉伯半岛、否则将对美“宣战”的“巴彦”(公开宣言)。1998年,美国驻坦桑尼亚和肯尼亚大使馆几乎同时遭遇汽车炸弹袭击,2000年又在也门对美国“科尔号”军舰发动了袭击,它们最终被认定是“基地”组织协同东非与也门本地恐怖分子所为,表明恐怖组织已出现了广泛联系的特征。参见[美国]小阿瑟·戈尔德施密特、劳伦斯·戴维斯:《中东史》,哈全安、刘志华译,东方出版中心,2015年版,第457页。
(66)Martin Rudner,“Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan:The Current Phase of Global Terror”,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol.36,No.12,2013,p.956.
(67)Joshua Kilberg,Organizing for Destruction:How Organizational Structure Affects Terrorist Group Behaviour,Ottawa:Carleton University Norman Paterson School of International Affairs,2011,p.37.
(68)Angel Rabasa,Peter Chalk,Kim Cragin,Sara A.Daly,Heather S.Gregg,Theodore W.Karasik,Kevin A.O’Brien and William Rosenau,Beyond al-Qaeda:Part 1,The Global Jihadist Movement,Santa Monica:RAND Corporation,2006,p.xxii.
(69)Daniel Byman,Al Qaeda,The Islamic State,and the Global Jihadist Movement,New York:Oxford University Press,2015,pp.168-169.
(70)Jacob Zenn,“Boko Haram’s Conquest for the Caliphate:How Al Qaeda Helped Islamic State Acquire Territory”,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol.41,No.3,2018,pp.1-24.
(71)刘乐:《“伊斯兰国”与“基地”组织关系探析》,载《阿拉伯世界研究》2017年第2期,第32页。
(72)Jasminder Singh,The 2017 Marawi Attacks:Implications for Regional Security,Singapore:S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies,June 15,2017,pp.1-3;Jason Warner,“Sub-Saharan Africa’s Three ‘New’ Islamic State Affiliates”,CTC Sentinel,Vol.10,No.1,2017,p.30.
(73)Barry Buzan,From International to World Society?English School Theory and Social Structure of Globalization,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004,p.180.
(74)Xavier Raufer,“Al Qaeda:A Different Diagnosis”,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol.26,No.6,2003,p.393.
(75)Lucky E.Asuelime and Ojochenemi J.David,Boko Haram:The Socio-Economic Drivers,New York:Springer,2015,p.78.
(76)Peter B.Clark and James Q.Wilson,“Incentives Systems:A Theory of Organizations”,Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.6,No.2,1961,pp.134-136.
(77)FATF,Financing of Recruitment for Terrorist Purposes,Paris:Financial Action Task Force,January 2018,p.21.
(78)“Boko Haram Pays N500000 to Niger Recruits- Gang Members”,Vanguard,April 24,2014,https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/04/boko-haram-pays-n500000-niger-recruits-gang-members,2018-06-18;ICG,Cameroon:Confronting Boko Haram,Brussels:International Crisis Group,November 2016,p.14.
(79)曾向红:《为何而战?为谁二战?——恐怖主义、暴力与承认斗争》,载《世界经济与政治》2018年第2期,第21～48页。
(80)Assaf Moghadam,“Motives for Martyrdom:Al-Qaida,Salafi Jihad,and the Spread of Suicide Attacks”,International Security,Vol.33,No.3,2008,pp.51-52.
(81)Damien McElroy,“Al-Qaeda’s Scathing Letter to Troublesome Employee Mokhtar Belmokhtar Reveals Inner Workings of Terrorist”,The Telegraph,May 29,2013,https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10085716/Al-Qaedas-scathing-letter-to-troublesome-employee-Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-reveals-inner-workings-of-terrorist-group.html,2018-03-14.
(82)“Al-Zarqawi’s Wife:Al-Qaida Sold Him Out”,China Daily,July 4,2006,http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-07/04/content_632521.htm,2018-03-14.
(83)AFP,“AQIM Islamists Say Killed Two Men For Spying For France”,Mail Online,November 27,2015,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3336943/AQIM-Islamists-say-killed-two-men-spying-France.html,2018-03-14.
(84)Herbert J?er and Lorenz B?llinger,“Thesen zur weiteren Diskussion des Terrorismus”,in Herbert J?er,Gerhard Schmidtchen and Lieselotte Süllwold eds.,Lebenslaufanalysen,Leverkusen:Westdeutscher Verlag,1981,pp.232-242.
(85)刘中民:前引文,第9～10页。
(86)刘中民、郭强:《伊斯兰哈里发制度:从传统理想到现实困境》,载《世界经济与政治》2018年第3期,第112～113页。
(87)Klaus Wasmund,“The Political Socialization of West German Terrorist”,in Peter H.Merkl ed.,Political Violence and Terror:Motifs and Motivations,Berkeley:University of California Press,1986,p.215.
(88)Friedhelm Neidhardt,“Soziale Bedingungen Terroristischen Handelns,Das Beispiel der ‘Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe’(RAF)”,in Wanda von Baeyer-Katte,Dieter Claessens,Hubert Feger and Friedhelm Neidhardt eds.,Gruppenprozesse,Leverkusen:Westdeutscher Verlag,1982,p.357.
(89)Marc Sageman,Leaderless Jihad:Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century,Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press,2008,p.88.
(90)Anne Speckhard,“The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists”,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol.31,No.11,2008,p.1002.
(91)See Quintan Wiktorowice,Joining the Cause:Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam:Presented at the Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference,Yale:Yale University Press,2004,pp.1-5;Andrew H.Kydd and Barbara F.Walter,“The Strategies of Terrorism”,International Security,Vol.31,No.1,2006,pp.49-80;Jessica Stern,“Mind Over Martyr:How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.89,No.1,2010,pp.95-108;Marko Rakic and Dragisa Jurisic,“Wahhabism as a Militant Form of Islam on Europe’s Doorstep”,Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,Vol.35,No.9,2012,pp.650-663;Joshua Kilberg,“A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure”,Studies in Conflict& Terrorism,Vol.35,No.1,2012,pp.813-814.
(92)阎学通、杨原:《国际关系分析》,北京大学出版社,2013年版,第37页。
(93)“伊斯兰国”溃败后全球反恐形势发展,参见王震:《后“伊斯兰国”时代的全球反恐态势略论》,载《西亚非洲》2018年第1期,第3～26页。
(94)UNDP,Journey to Extremism in Africa:Drivers,Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment,New York:United Nations Development Programme,2017,p.4.
(95)FAFT,Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,Paris:The Financial Action Force,October 2016,p.16;Patrick Blannin,“Islamic State’s Financing Sources,Methods and Utilisation”,Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,Vol.9,No.5,2017,pp.13-22.
(96)参见马丽蓉、李景然:《宗教极端主义思想根源与“去极端化”领域国际合作》载《西亚非洲》2016年第3期,第18～40页;刘中民、俞海杰:《伊斯兰国的极端主义意识形态探析》,载《西亚非洲》2016年第3期,第41～61页。
(97)包澄章、刘中民:《对中东变局以来中东教派主义的多维透视》,载《西亚非洲》2015年第5期,第44页。