考虑建议零售价的双渠道供应链批发价格模式选择
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摘要
对由制造商网络直销渠道和零售商传统渠道构成的双渠道供应链系统进行研究。首次在建议零售价背景下研究了批发价格模式选择问题,运用制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈,得出了供应链各成员的价格均衡策略。综合考虑零售商谈判能力和消费者对渠道的偏好度,对比分析了不同批发价谈判模式下的制造商利润、零售商利润和供应链利润。结果表明,制造商可通过建议零售价调整市场价格;从供应链总体或者零售商角度,以直销价格为基准确定批发价格是最优的;制造商倾向于单独确定批发价格,但当零售商谈判能力较弱,且网络渠道基本市场份额偏大时,也可接受以网络直销价为基准确定批发价格。
The dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer's network direct sales channel and a retailer's traditional channel was researched. Firstly,this paper studied the choice of the wholesale price model under the background of the suggested retail price( SRP),and obtained the price equilibrium strategy of each member in the supply chain with the Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer. In addition,it compared the manufacturers' profit,retailers' profit and supply chain profit in different wholesale price negotiation modes considering the retailer's bargaining power and the channel preferences of consumers. The results show that the manufacturer can adjust the market price according to the SRC. Meanwhile,it is optimal to determine the wholesale price based on the online direct price from the viewpoint of the supply chain or the retailer. Furthermore,the manufacturer prefers to determine the wholesale price separately. However,when the retailer's bargaining power is small and the basic market share of online channels is large,the manufacturer can accept the online direct price as the benchmark to decide the wholesale price.
The dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer's network direct sales channel and a retailer's traditional channel was researched. Firstly,this paper studied the choice of the wholesale price model under the background of the suggested retail price( SRP),and obtained the price equilibrium strategy of each member in the supply chain with the Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer. In addition,it compared the manufacturers' profit,retailers' profit and supply chain profit in different wholesale price negotiation modes considering the retailer's bargaining power and the channel preferences of consumers. The results show that the manufacturer can adjust the market price according to the SRC. Meanwhile,it is optimal to determine the wholesale price based on the online direct price from the viewpoint of the supply chain or the retailer. Furthermore,the manufacturer prefers to determine the wholesale price separately. However,when the retailer's bargaining power is small and the basic market share of online channels is large,the manufacturer can accept the online direct price as the benchmark to decide the wholesale price.
引文
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[15]吴正祥,李宝库.基于营销努力的双渠道供应链批发价格制定模式选择[J].中国流通经济,2017,31(4):46-55.(Wu Zheng-xiang,Li Baoku. Selection of wholesale pricing model for dual channelsupply chain based on marketing efforts[J]. China CirculationEconomy,2017,31(4):46-55.)
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[19]刘家国,周笛,刘咏梅,等.搭便车行为影响下制造商渠道选择研究[J].系统工程学报,2014,29(6):813-823.(Liu Jiaguo,ZhouDi,Liu Yongmei,et al. Research on channel selection of manufactu-rers influenced by hitchhiking behavior[J]. Journal of Systems En-gineering,2014,29(6):813-823.)
[2] Fibich G,Gavious A,Lowengart O. Explicit solutions of optimizationmodels and differential games with nonsmooth(asymmetric)reference-price effects[J]. Operations Research,2003,51(5):721-734.
[3] Nasiry J,Popescu I. Dynamic pricing with loss averse consumers andpeak-end anchoring[J]. Operations Research,2011,59(6):1361-1368.
[4] Hsieh T P,Dye C Y. Optimal dynamic pricing for deteriorating itemswith reference price effects when inventories stimulate demand[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,262(1):136-150.
[5] Zhang Juan,Gou Qinglong,Liang Liang,et al. Supply chain coordina-tion through cooperative advertising with reference price effect[J].Omega,2013,41(2):345-353.
[6] Dye C Y,Yang C T. Optimal dynamic pricing and preservation tech-nology investment for deteriorating products with reference priceeffects[J]. Omega,2016,62(7):52-67.
[7]浦徐进,李栋栋,王执杰.考虑参照价格效应的双渠道供应链协调机制设计[J].控制与决策,2017,32(7):1273-1278.(Pu Xujin,Li Dongdong,Wang Zhijie. Design of coordination mechanism for dualchannel supply chain considering price effect[J]. Control and Deci-sion,2017,32(7):1273-1278.)
[8]林志炳.基于制造商建议零售价的供应链定价策略[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(11):153-161.(Lin Zhibing. Supply chain pricingstrategy based on manufacturer’s recommended retail price[J]. Chi-na Management Science,2016,24(11):153-161.)
[9] Iyer G,villasboas J M. A bargaining theory of distribution channels[J]. Journal of Marketing Research,2003,40(1):80-100.
[10] Dukes A J,Galor E,Srinivasan K. Channel bargaining with retailerasymmetry[J]. Journal of Marketing Research,2006,43(1):84-97.
[11]艾兴政,唐小我.基于讨价还价能力的竞争供应链渠道结构绩效研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(2):123-125.(Ai Xingzheng,Tang Xiaowo. Research on the channel structure performance of com-petitive supply chain based on bargaining power[J]. Journal ofManagement Engineering,2007,21(2):123-125.)
[12]安彤,赵道致. VMI模式下基于讨价还价能力的竞争供应链绩效分析[J].软科学,2010,24(11):123-126.(An Tong,ZhaoDaozhi. Performance analysis of competitive supply chain based onbargaining power under VMI model[J]. Soft Science,2010,24(11):123-126.)
[13]李海,崔南方.基于讨价还价能力的双渠道供应链定价模式选择[J].计算机应用研究,2013,30(8):2323-2326,2348.(Li Hai,Cui Nanfang. Pricing model selection of dual channel supply chainbased on bargaining power[J]. Application Research of Compu-ters,2013,30(8):2323-2326,2348.)
[14]李海,崔南方,徐贤浩,等.基于讨价还价能力的双渠道供应链批发价谈判模式[J].管理工程学报,2015,29(4):124-132.(LiHai,Cui Nan,Xu Xianhao,et al. The wholesale price negotiationmodel of double channel supply chain based on bargaining ability[J]. Journal of Management Engineering,2015,29(4):124-132.)
[15]吴正祥,李宝库.基于营销努力的双渠道供应链批发价格制定模式选择[J].中国流通经济,2017,31(4):46-55.(Wu Zheng-xiang,Li Baoku. Selection of wholesale pricing model for dual channelsupply chain based on marketing efforts[J]. China CirculationEconomy,2017,31(4):46-55.)
[16]Mittelstaedt R A. Sasquatch,the abominable snowman,free riders andother elusive beings[J]. Journal of Macro Marketing,1986,6(2):25-35.
[17]Pu Xujin,Gong Lei,Han Xiaohua. Consumer free riding:coordinatingsales effort in a dual-channel supply chain[J]. Electronic Com-merce Research and Applications,2017,22(3-4):1-12.
[18]Krishnan H,Kapuuscinski R,Butz D A. Coordinating contracts for de-centralized supply chains with retailer promotional effort[J].Management Science,2004,50(1):48-63.
[19]刘家国,周笛,刘咏梅,等.搭便车行为影响下制造商渠道选择研究[J].系统工程学报,2014,29(6):813-823.(Liu Jiaguo,ZhouDi,Liu Yongmei,et al. Research on channel selection of manufactu-rers influenced by hitchhiking behavior[J]. Journal of Systems En-gineering,2014,29(6):813-823.)