中央与地方政府权力关系探讨——财政激励、绩效考核与政策执行
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摘要
1949年后,中央与地方政府权力关系的变迁可以从三个方面归纳:财政制度、人事制度,以及政策执行的模式。然而,这三个方面并非相互独立。建立在对财政与人事制度变迁的分析基础上,我们能够理解在财政激励与绩效考核的双重作用下,被地方政府所提倡、转化或限制的政策的行为逻辑。其中,人事制度和财政体系能够通过绩效评估与财政激励影响到中央和地方政府的互动关系。同时,绩效评估与财政激励引起的政策的选择性执行的逻辑,同样能够强化现行的人事制度和中央与地方的财政关系的模式特征,从而形成了一个内生的循环。同时,地方官员在官僚体系中存在某种程度的集体身份和相互制约的关系。
Since 1949,China's central and local relationships can be described in three aspects:the financial,the personnel,and the mode of policy implementation.These three aspects are not independent of one another.From the analysis of the financial and personnel systems,we can see the logic of advocating,converting and restricting policies.In the same fashion,the policies and their selective implementations can affect the operation of the personnel and financial systems.The interactions of these three systems together define China's central and local relations.
Since 1949,China's central and local relationships can be described in three aspects:the financial,the personnel,and the mode of policy implementation.These three aspects are not independent of one another.From the analysis of the financial and personnel systems,we can see the logic of advocating,converting and restricting policies.In the same fashion,the policies and their selective implementations can affect the operation of the personnel and financial systems.The interactions of these three systems together define China's central and local relations.
引文
Daniel A.Mazmanian and Paul A.Sabatier.(1989).Implementation and Public Policy.Lanham:University Press of America.
Hehui Jin,Yingyi Qian,T,Barry,R.Weingast.(2005).Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives:federalism,Chinese style.Journal of Public Economics,89,1719-1742.
Kevin J.O'Brien and Lianjiang Li.(1999).Selective policy implementation in rural China.Comparative Politics,31(2),167-186.
Le-Yin Zhang(1999).Chinese central-provincial fiscal relationships,budgetary decline and the impact of the1994 fiscal reform:an evaluation.The China Quarterly,157,115-141.
Li,L.C.(2010).Central-local relations in the People's Republic of China:trends,processes and impacts for policy implementation.Public Administration,30,177-190.
Paul A.Sabatier,(1986).Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research.Journal of Public Policy,6.
Richard E.Matland.(1995).Synthesizing the implementation literature.Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,5,150.
Roy Bahl.(2000).Fiscal policy in China:taxation and intergovernmental fiscal relations.Publics,30(2),113-115.
Smith,G.(2009).Political machinations in a rural country.The China Journal,(62),29,5.
Thomas Heberer,Gunter Schubert.(2012).County and township cadres as a strategic group,A new approach to political agency in China's local state.Journal of Chinese Political Science,17(3),221-249.
Thomas Heberer,Rene Trappel.(2013).Evaluation processes,local cadres'behavior and local development processes.Journal of Contemporary China,22,84;1048-1066.
Tsui Kai-yuen,Wang Youqiang.(2008).Decentralization with political trump:vertical control,local accountability and regional polarization.China Economic Review,2008,19(1),18-31.
刘承礼.(2008).理解当代中国的中央与地方关系.当代经济科学,5,26-36.
王美今,林建浩,余壮雄.(2010).中国地方政府财政竞争行为特性识别:“兄弟竞争”与“父子争议”是否并存.管理世界,3,22-31.
郁建兴,高翔.(2012).地方发展型政府的行为逻辑及制度基础.中国社会科学,5,95-112.
①中国的财政系统在政府中有五个层级:(1)中央;(2)省级;(3)市级;(4)县级;(5)乡级(Jin,Qian and Weingast,2005)。
①“街头官僚”的术语被Lipsky所推广,具体可参见Michael Lipsky.(1980).Street-Level Bureaucracy.New York:Russell Sage Foundation。
①事实上,卖给招商引资而建设工厂的土地价格很低,为的是吸引更多的投资者来本地区建厂,而商品房土地价格较高。
①上述的三个解释来自以下论文呈现的研究中所得到的启示:Thomas Heberer&Rene Trappel.(2013).Evaluation Processes,Local Cadres Behavior and Local Development Processes,Journal of Contemporary China,22(84),1048-1066。
Hehui Jin,Yingyi Qian,T,Barry,R.Weingast.(2005).Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives:federalism,Chinese style.Journal of Public Economics,89,1719-1742.
Kevin J.O'Brien and Lianjiang Li.(1999).Selective policy implementation in rural China.Comparative Politics,31(2),167-186.
Le-Yin Zhang(1999).Chinese central-provincial fiscal relationships,budgetary decline and the impact of the1994 fiscal reform:an evaluation.The China Quarterly,157,115-141.
Li,L.C.(2010).Central-local relations in the People's Republic of China:trends,processes and impacts for policy implementation.Public Administration,30,177-190.
Paul A.Sabatier,(1986).Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research.Journal of Public Policy,6.
Richard E.Matland.(1995).Synthesizing the implementation literature.Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,5,150.
Roy Bahl.(2000).Fiscal policy in China:taxation and intergovernmental fiscal relations.Publics,30(2),113-115.
Smith,G.(2009).Political machinations in a rural country.The China Journal,(62),29,5.
Thomas Heberer,Gunter Schubert.(2012).County and township cadres as a strategic group,A new approach to political agency in China's local state.Journal of Chinese Political Science,17(3),221-249.
Thomas Heberer,Rene Trappel.(2013).Evaluation processes,local cadres'behavior and local development processes.Journal of Contemporary China,22,84;1048-1066.
Tsui Kai-yuen,Wang Youqiang.(2008).Decentralization with political trump:vertical control,local accountability and regional polarization.China Economic Review,2008,19(1),18-31.
刘承礼.(2008).理解当代中国的中央与地方关系.当代经济科学,5,26-36.
王美今,林建浩,余壮雄.(2010).中国地方政府财政竞争行为特性识别:“兄弟竞争”与“父子争议”是否并存.管理世界,3,22-31.
郁建兴,高翔.(2012).地方发展型政府的行为逻辑及制度基础.中国社会科学,5,95-112.
①中国的财政系统在政府中有五个层级:(1)中央;(2)省级;(3)市级;(4)县级;(5)乡级(Jin,Qian and Weingast,2005)。
①“街头官僚”的术语被Lipsky所推广,具体可参见Michael Lipsky.(1980).Street-Level Bureaucracy.New York:Russell Sage Foundation。
①事实上,卖给招商引资而建设工厂的土地价格很低,为的是吸引更多的投资者来本地区建厂,而商品房土地价格较高。
①上述的三个解释来自以下论文呈现的研究中所得到的启示:Thomas Heberer&Rene Trappel.(2013).Evaluation Processes,Local Cadres Behavior and Local Development Processes,Journal of Contemporary China,22(84),1048-1066。