人类的故事与后人类的挑战
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摘要
当下后人类的科技前景挑战了我们过去对于历史的理解,但同时又激发我们以新的方式去认识历史。一方面,将后人类作为一个新的时代,表明时代转变的历史要求;另一方面,后人类假设一种新的、优于人类的主体将在这个新的时代诞生,由此消解了现代西方历史认知中的人类主体。本文试图以人类的故事为参照从而理解后人类,并考察在三个连续的阶段中作为历史中心主体的人类之命运:首先,探究古典历史哲学如何通过发明人类这一主体从而获得宏大历史叙事(亦即人类的故事)本身的完整性;第二,叙述近半个世纪的后殖民与性别研究是如何猛烈抨击这个中心主体的,而其批评针对的是人类故事的普世性;第三,分析后人类如何挑战人类的故事及后殖民与性别批评。后殖民与性别批评使史学变得碎片化,但保留了小范围内历史叙事的可能性。与此不同的是,后人类并不质疑人类故事的可行性,因其要求以优于人类的主体取代人类,所以必然会唤醒作为整体的"人类"。此外,作者认为后人类代表了对现代西方历史学现状和历史叙事可能性——小历史抑或大历史,碎片的抑或普世的——的根本挑战。
Today's technological-scientific prospect of posthumanity simultaneously evokes and defies historical understanding. On the one hand,it implies a historical claim of an epochal transformation concerning posthumanity as a new era. On the other,by postulating the birth of a novel,better-than-human subject for this new era,it eliminates the human subject of modern Western historical understanding. In this article,I attempt to understand posthumanity as measured against the story of humanity as the story of history itself. I examine the fate of humanity as the central subject of history in three consecutive steps: first,by exploring how classical philosophies of history achieved the integrity of the greatest historical narrative of history itself through the very invention of humanity as its subject; second,by recounting how this central subject came under heavy criticism by postcolonial and gender studies in the last half-century,targeting the universalism of the story of humanity as the greatest historical narrative of history; and third,by conceptualizing the challenge of posthumanity against both the story of humanity and its criticism. Whereas criticism fragmented history but retained the possibility of smaller-scale narratives,posthumanity does not doubt the feasibility of the story of humanity. Instead,it necessarily invokes humanity,if only in order to be able to claim its supersession by a better-than-human subject. In that,it represents a fundamental challenge to the modern Western historical condition and the very possibility of historical narratives-small-scale or large-scale,fragmented or universal.
Today's technological-scientific prospect of posthumanity simultaneously evokes and defies historical understanding. On the one hand,it implies a historical claim of an epochal transformation concerning posthumanity as a new era. On the other,by postulating the birth of a novel,better-than-human subject for this new era,it eliminates the human subject of modern Western historical understanding. In this article,I attempt to understand posthumanity as measured against the story of humanity as the story of history itself. I examine the fate of humanity as the central subject of history in three consecutive steps: first,by exploring how classical philosophies of history achieved the integrity of the greatest historical narrative of history itself through the very invention of humanity as its subject; second,by recounting how this central subject came under heavy criticism by postcolonial and gender studies in the last half-century,targeting the universalism of the story of humanity as the greatest historical narrative of history; and third,by conceptualizing the challenge of posthumanity against both the story of humanity and its criticism. Whereas criticism fragmented history but retained the possibility of smaller-scale narratives,posthumanity does not doubt the feasibility of the story of humanity. Instead,it necessarily invokes humanity,if only in order to be able to claim its supersession by a better-than-human subject. In that,it represents a fundamental challenge to the modern Western historical condition and the very possibility of historical narratives-small-scale or large-scale,fragmented or universal.
引文
(1)Marc Bloch,The Historian's Craft,trans.Peter Putnam,Manchester:Manchester University Press,1992,p.23.
(2)Michel Foucault,The Order of Things:An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,London and New York:Routledge,2002,p.422.
(1)Michel Foucault,The Order of Things:An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,p.422.
(2)Ian Hacking,The Social Construction of What?Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1999,pp.6-19.
(3)Reinhart Koselleck,Futures Past:On the Semantics of Historical Time,trans.Keith Tribe,NewYork:Columbia University Press,2004;Odo Marquard,“Indicted and Unburdened Man in Eighteenth-Century Philosophy,”in Odo Marquard,Farewell to Matters of Principle:Philosophical Studies,trans.Robert M.Wallace with the assistance of S.Bernstein and J.I.Porter,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1989,pp.38-63.
(1)参见近几十年有关历史叙事理论的研究:William Dray,“On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography,”History and Theory,Vol.10,No.2(1971),pp.153-171;Hayden White,“The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,”in Hayden White,The Content of the Form:Narrative discourse and Historical Representation,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1987,pp.1-25;Morton White,Foundations of Historical Knowledge,New York:Harper&Row,1965.
(2)Hayden White,“The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,”p.24.
(3)与大多数人文学者不同,我的兴趣并不在批判性的后人类主义上面。我将后人类看作一个未来潜在的时期,按照字面上理解,就是人类之后(post human),在这一时期,非人类主体将取代人类成为自我想象的历史中心主体。而与此不同的是,其他人文学者一般将后人类理解为以批判性思维对人类中心主义与物种主义的解构,旨在积极构建一个包括人类与非人类的全体地球生命的可持续社会(ecotopia)。参见Rosi Braidotti,The Posthuman,Cambridge:Polity Press,2013;Ewa Domanska,“Ecological Humanities,”Teksty Drugie(Special Issue-English Edition),Vol.1(2015),pp.186-210;Donna J.Haraway,When Species Meet Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,2008;Cary Wolfe,What is Posthumanism?Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,2010.尽管这种批判性的后人类主义时常在其反人类中心主义的论点中也会谈到科技前景,因此其与科技前景式的后人类主义之间的区分不是很明确,但指出二者之间最本质的差异似乎很关键。人文学中的批判性的后人类主义旨在克服人类中心主义,由此开始一个仍旧是人类的后人类,作为人类思想的一个新模式。与此相反,技术前景式的后人类主义关注人类特有的能力,控制非人类从而超越人类在一些领域内的终极成就,这标志着比人类更为杰出的非人类思想的可能出现。
(4)Reinhart Koselleck,Futures Past:On the Semantics of Historical Time,pp.33-36.
(1)Marquis de Condorcet,Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind,Philadelphia:Lang and Ustick,1796,pp.10-11.
(2)Immanuel Kan,t“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,”in H.S.Reiss,ed.,Kant:Political Writings,trans.H.B.Nisbet,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1991[1784],pp.42,50.
(3)Johann Gottfried Herder,Another Philosophy of History and Selected Political Writings,trans.I.D.Evrigenis and D.Pellerin,Indianapolis:Hackett,2004[1774].
(4)Johann Gottfried Herder,Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man,trans.T.Churchill,New York:Bergman,1800[1784-1791],p.450.
(1)Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,“Manifesto of the Communist Party,”in R.C.Tucker,ed.,The Marx-Engels Reader,New York:W.W.Norton&Company,1978[1848],p.489.此处译文依据[德]马克思、恩格斯著,中共中央编译局译:《共产党宣言》,中央编译出版社2005年版,第44页。
(2)Immanuel Kan,t“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,”p.44.
(3)Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,Lectures on the Philosophy of the World History.Vol.1:Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822-3,trans.R.F.Brown and P.C.Hodgson with the assistance of W.G.Geuss,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011[1837],p.88.
(4)Mary Pickering,August Comte:An Intellectual Biography,Vol.II,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2009,pp.453-515.
(5)August Comte,The Positive Philosophy of August Comte,Vol.I,trans.H.Martineau,London:George Bell&Sons,1896[1830-1842],pp.1-2.
(1)Daniel Bell,The End of Ideology:On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties,New York:Free Press,1960;Judith N.Shklar,After Utopia:The Decline of Political Faith,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1957;更宏观的变化趋势,可参见罗素·雅各比(Russell Jacoby)的简要回顾。Russell Jacoby,The End of Utopia:Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy,New York:Basic Books,1999,pp.1-27.
(2)Bonnie Smith,The Gender of History:Men,Women,and Historical Practice,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1998.关于从1969年到20世纪末性别史研究的历史,可参见约翰娜·阿尔伯蒂(Johanna Alberti)在Gender and the Historian(Harlow:Pearson Education,2002)中对性别与历史问题诸多研究方法的回顾,亦可参见琼·瓦拉赫·斯科特(Joan Wallach Scott)为性别史研究奠定理论的经典之作。Joan W.Scot,t“Gender:A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,”American Historical Review,Vol.91,No.5(Dec.1986),pp.1053-1075.
(3)Christina Crosby,The Ends of History:Victorians and“The Woman Question”,New York andLondon:Routledge,1991,p.1.
(4)Ashis Nandy,“History's Forgotten Doubles,”History and Theory,Vol.34,No.2(May 1995),p.46.
(5)Ashis Nandy,“History's Forgotten Doubles,”p.53.
(1)Gayatri C.Spivak,“Can the Subaltern Speak?”in C.Nelson and L.Grossberg,eds.,Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,Chicago:University of Illinois Press,1988,pp.271-313;Dipesh Chakrabarty,“Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History:Who Speaks for‘Indian’Pasts?”Representations,Vol.37,Special Issue(Winter 1992),pp.1-26.
(2)Gayatri C.Spivak,“Explanation and Culture:Marginalia,”in G.C.Spivak,In Other Worlds:Essays in Cultural Politics,New York:Methuen,1987,p.107.
(3)Dipesh Chakrabarty,“Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History:Who Speaks for‘Indian’Pasts?”p.23.
(4)一个简短的范例,参见Nick Bostrom,Superintelligence:Paths,Dangers,Strategies,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2014;David J.Chalmers,“The Singularity:A Philosophical Analysis,”Journal of Consciousness Studies,Vol.17,No.9-10(2010),pp.7-65;Mark Coeckelbergh,Human Being@Risk:Enhancement,Technology,and the Evaluation of Vulnerability Transformations,Dordrecht:Springer,2013;Tamar Sharon,Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology:The Case for Mediated Posthumanism,Dordrecht:Springer,2014.
(5)如果读者对这样的讨论感兴趣,可参见拙作“History Begins in the Future:On Historical Sensibility in the Age of Technology,”in S.Helgesson and J.Svenungsson,eds.,The Ethos of History:Time and Responsibility,New York:Berghahn,2018,pp.192-209.
(1)Nick Bostrom,“A History of Transhumanist Thought,”Journal of Evolution and Technology,Vol.14,No.1(April 2005),pp.1-25.
(2)Max More,“The Philosophy of Transhumanism,”in Max More and Natasha Vita-More,eds.,The Transhumanist Reader,Malden:Wiley-Blackwell,2013,pp.3-17.
(3)Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2014.
(4)Michael Hauskeller,Mythologies of Transhumanism,Cham:Palgrave,2016,pp.168-171.
(5)这里作者所谈的“积极”(proactionary)指的是超人类主义思想家马克斯·莫尔所提出的“积极原则”(“proactionary principle”),强调对保护新技术发展的积极心态。与“积极原则”相对的是“预防原则”(“precautionary principle”),后者强调对技术发展潜在危险的评估与防范。马克斯·莫尔认为,“面对新技术的发展与展开,我们需要做出明智的决策”,并且尤其“需要保护技术的实验与进步”,而非毫无依据地假设这些新技术对人类与环境有着不确定的危害,扼杀科技的创新。参见Max More,“The Proactionary Principle:Optimizing Technological Outcomes,”in Max More and Natasha Vita-More,eds.,The Transhumanist Reader,pp.258-267(译者注).
(6)Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,p.129.
(7)James Hughes,Citizen Cyborg:Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future,Cambridge:Westview Press,2004.
(8)James Hughes,“Contradictions from the Enlightenment Roots of Transhumanism,”Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,Vol.35,No.6(Dec.2010),p.622.
(9)Braden Allenby,“Technology and Transhumanism:Unpredictability,Radical Contongency,and Accelerating Change,”in H.Tirosh-Samuelson and K.L.Mossman,eds.,Building Better Humans?Refocusing the Debate on Transhumanism,Frankfurt am Main:Peter Lang,2012,pp.441-463.
(1)Rosi Braidott,i“Posthuman Critical Theory,”in D.Banerji and M.R.Paranjape,eds.,Critical Posthumanism and Planetary Futures,New Delhi:Springer India,2016,pp.16-19;Cary Wolfe,What is Posthumanism?pp.xiii-xv.
(2)Nick Bostrom,The Transhumanist FAQ:A General Introduction,World Transhumanist Association,2003,p.4.Retrieved 8 March2017.http://www.nickbostrom.com/views/transhumanist.pdf.
(1)David Roden,Posthuman Life:Philosophy at the Edge of the Human,London and New York:Routledge,2015.罗登所谓“推测性的后人类主义”,是一种相对于超人类主义而言较为谨慎的立场,尝试去猜想后人类也许会是怎样的(might be),而不是预言未来将会怎样(ought to be)。或者说,“推测性的后人类主义主张有可能出现后人类,但并不认为后人类一定会超越人类”。对罗登所说的“分离的关系”有兴趣的读者,还可参见David Roden,“The Disconnection Thesis,”in A.Eden,J.H.Sraker,E.Steinhart&A.H.Moore,eds.,The Singularity Hypothesis:A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment,Springer,2012,pp.281-298.https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-32560-1_14#citeas(译者注).
(2)我认为力求超越人类是技术后人类的特征,但指的并不是在道德上超越人类。在上面的语境当中,说比人类“更好”仅仅指超人类主义普遍将后人类想象成是超越人类的。在这个意义上,优于人类的存在比人类“更好”,是因为它被认为拥有比人类更强的能力。
(3)Zoltán Boldizsár Simon,“History Manifested:Making Sense of Unprecedented Change,”EuropeanReview of History,Vol.22,No.5(2015),pp.819-834.
(4)Zoltán Boldizsár Simon,“History Begins in the Future:On Historical Sensibility in the Age ofT echnology,”in S.Helgesson and J.Svenungsson,eds.,The Ethos of History:Time and Responsibility,New York:Berghahn,2018,pp.192-209.
(1)参见前文提到的叙事历史哲学的范畴:William Dray,“On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography,”pp.153-171;Hayden White,“The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,”pp.1-25;Morton White,Foundations of Historical Knowledge.
(2)罗西·布拉伊多蒂的批判性的后人类主义非常清楚上述的悖论---通过后人类结束人类,反过来使得一种人类的普遍观念得以形成。不过,布拉伊多蒂只是将其看作“一个消极的范畴,因共同的脆弱性与对消亡的恐惧而形成”,却没有考虑到或许“对消亡的恐惧”是正在浮现的对人类的全新理解的重要特征之一。
(1)Patrick Manning,Big Data in History,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2013,p.23.
(2)参见Ian Hesketh,“The Story of Big History,”History of the Present,Vol.4,No.2(Fall 2014),pp.171-202.
(3)Yuval N.Harari,Homo Deus:A Brief History of Tomorrow,New York:Harper,2017.
(4)Michael S.Burdett,Eschatology and the Technological Future,New York:Routledge,2015;Elaine Graham,“Manifestations of the Posthuman in the Postsecular Imagination,”in J.B.Hurblut and H.Tirosh-Samuelson,eds.,Perfecting Human Futures:Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations,Wiesbaden:Springer VS,2016,pp.51-72;Hava Tirosh-Samuelson,“Transhumanism as a Secularist Faith,”Zygon,Vol.47,No.4(Dec.2012),pp.710-734;Tracy Trothen and Calvin Mercer,eds.,Religion and Human Enhancement:Death,Values,and Morality,Cham:Palgrave,2017.
(5)Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2014;Yuval N.Harari,Homo Deus:A Brief History of Tomorrow.
(6)Julian Huxley,“Transhumanism,”Journal of Humanistic Psychology,Vol.8,No.1(Jan.1968),p.73.
(7)所谓“指向性进化”是超人类主义者常用的一个概念,用来指运用生化技术中的指向性进化法(比如通过基因编辑技术剔除不良基因)从而控制人类的进化。超人类主义者认为,“我们进入了人类进化的一个新阶段。在这一阶段,人类成为自我命运的主宰者。权力从自然那里转交到了科学手中”。但反对者们认为,指向性进化将会毁灭人类自身。参见Maxwell J.Mehlman,“Will Directed Evolution Destroy Humanity,and If So,What Can We Do About It?”Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law&Policy,Vol.3,No.1(2009),pp.93-122(译者注).
(8)Nick Bostrom,“The Future of Human Evolution,”in Charles Tandy,ed.,Two Hundred Years After Kant,Fifty Years After Turing,Palo Alto:Ria University Press,2004,pp.339-371;Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2014;Yuval N.Harari,Homo Deus:A Brief History of Tomorrow;Harris,J.,Enhancing Evolution:The Ethical Case for Making Better People,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2007.
(1)Ellen M.McG ee,“Bioelectronics and Implanted Devices,”in B.Gordijn and R.Chadwick,eds.,Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity,Dordrecht:Springer,2008,pp.207-224.
(2)Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu,“Unfit for the Future?Human Nature,Scientific Progress,andthe Need for Moral Enhancement,”in J.Savulescu,R.ter Meulen,and G.Kahane,eds.,Enhancing Human Capacities,Malden:Wiley-Blackwell,2011,pp.486-500.
(3)Andrew Askland,“The Misnomer of Transhumanism as Directed Evolution,”International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society,Vol.9,No.1(2011),pp.71-78.
(4)Lynn Hun,t“Globalization and Time,”in C.Lorenz and B.Bevernage,eds.,Breaking up Time:Negotiating the Borders between Present,Past and Future,G9ttingen:Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht,2013,p.213.
(2)Michel Foucault,The Order of Things:An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,London and New York:Routledge,2002,p.422.
(1)Michel Foucault,The Order of Things:An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,p.422.
(2)Ian Hacking,The Social Construction of What?Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1999,pp.6-19.
(3)Reinhart Koselleck,Futures Past:On the Semantics of Historical Time,trans.Keith Tribe,NewYork:Columbia University Press,2004;Odo Marquard,“Indicted and Unburdened Man in Eighteenth-Century Philosophy,”in Odo Marquard,Farewell to Matters of Principle:Philosophical Studies,trans.Robert M.Wallace with the assistance of S.Bernstein and J.I.Porter,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1989,pp.38-63.
(1)参见近几十年有关历史叙事理论的研究:William Dray,“On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography,”History and Theory,Vol.10,No.2(1971),pp.153-171;Hayden White,“The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,”in Hayden White,The Content of the Form:Narrative discourse and Historical Representation,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1987,pp.1-25;Morton White,Foundations of Historical Knowledge,New York:Harper&Row,1965.
(2)Hayden White,“The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,”p.24.
(3)与大多数人文学者不同,我的兴趣并不在批判性的后人类主义上面。我将后人类看作一个未来潜在的时期,按照字面上理解,就是人类之后(post human),在这一时期,非人类主体将取代人类成为自我想象的历史中心主体。而与此不同的是,其他人文学者一般将后人类理解为以批判性思维对人类中心主义与物种主义的解构,旨在积极构建一个包括人类与非人类的全体地球生命的可持续社会(ecotopia)。参见Rosi Braidotti,The Posthuman,Cambridge:Polity Press,2013;Ewa Domanska,“Ecological Humanities,”Teksty Drugie(Special Issue-English Edition),Vol.1(2015),pp.186-210;Donna J.Haraway,When Species Meet Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,2008;Cary Wolfe,What is Posthumanism?Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,2010.尽管这种批判性的后人类主义时常在其反人类中心主义的论点中也会谈到科技前景,因此其与科技前景式的后人类主义之间的区分不是很明确,但指出二者之间最本质的差异似乎很关键。人文学中的批判性的后人类主义旨在克服人类中心主义,由此开始一个仍旧是人类的后人类,作为人类思想的一个新模式。与此相反,技术前景式的后人类主义关注人类特有的能力,控制非人类从而超越人类在一些领域内的终极成就,这标志着比人类更为杰出的非人类思想的可能出现。
(4)Reinhart Koselleck,Futures Past:On the Semantics of Historical Time,pp.33-36.
(1)Marquis de Condorcet,Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind,Philadelphia:Lang and Ustick,1796,pp.10-11.
(2)Immanuel Kan,t“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,”in H.S.Reiss,ed.,Kant:Political Writings,trans.H.B.Nisbet,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1991[1784],pp.42,50.
(3)Johann Gottfried Herder,Another Philosophy of History and Selected Political Writings,trans.I.D.Evrigenis and D.Pellerin,Indianapolis:Hackett,2004[1774].
(4)Johann Gottfried Herder,Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man,trans.T.Churchill,New York:Bergman,1800[1784-1791],p.450.
(1)Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,“Manifesto of the Communist Party,”in R.C.Tucker,ed.,The Marx-Engels Reader,New York:W.W.Norton&Company,1978[1848],p.489.此处译文依据[德]马克思、恩格斯著,中共中央编译局译:《共产党宣言》,中央编译出版社2005年版,第44页。
(2)Immanuel Kan,t“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,”p.44.
(3)Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,Lectures on the Philosophy of the World History.Vol.1:Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822-3,trans.R.F.Brown and P.C.Hodgson with the assistance of W.G.Geuss,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011[1837],p.88.
(4)Mary Pickering,August Comte:An Intellectual Biography,Vol.II,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2009,pp.453-515.
(5)August Comte,The Positive Philosophy of August Comte,Vol.I,trans.H.Martineau,London:George Bell&Sons,1896[1830-1842],pp.1-2.
(1)Daniel Bell,The End of Ideology:On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties,New York:Free Press,1960;Judith N.Shklar,After Utopia:The Decline of Political Faith,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1957;更宏观的变化趋势,可参见罗素·雅各比(Russell Jacoby)的简要回顾。Russell Jacoby,The End of Utopia:Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy,New York:Basic Books,1999,pp.1-27.
(2)Bonnie Smith,The Gender of History:Men,Women,and Historical Practice,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1998.关于从1969年到20世纪末性别史研究的历史,可参见约翰娜·阿尔伯蒂(Johanna Alberti)在Gender and the Historian(Harlow:Pearson Education,2002)中对性别与历史问题诸多研究方法的回顾,亦可参见琼·瓦拉赫·斯科特(Joan Wallach Scott)为性别史研究奠定理论的经典之作。Joan W.Scot,t“Gender:A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,”American Historical Review,Vol.91,No.5(Dec.1986),pp.1053-1075.
(3)Christina Crosby,The Ends of History:Victorians and“The Woman Question”,New York andLondon:Routledge,1991,p.1.
(4)Ashis Nandy,“History's Forgotten Doubles,”History and Theory,Vol.34,No.2(May 1995),p.46.
(5)Ashis Nandy,“History's Forgotten Doubles,”p.53.
(1)Gayatri C.Spivak,“Can the Subaltern Speak?”in C.Nelson and L.Grossberg,eds.,Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,Chicago:University of Illinois Press,1988,pp.271-313;Dipesh Chakrabarty,“Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History:Who Speaks for‘Indian’Pasts?”Representations,Vol.37,Special Issue(Winter 1992),pp.1-26.
(2)Gayatri C.Spivak,“Explanation and Culture:Marginalia,”in G.C.Spivak,In Other Worlds:Essays in Cultural Politics,New York:Methuen,1987,p.107.
(3)Dipesh Chakrabarty,“Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History:Who Speaks for‘Indian’Pasts?”p.23.
(4)一个简短的范例,参见Nick Bostrom,Superintelligence:Paths,Dangers,Strategies,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2014;David J.Chalmers,“The Singularity:A Philosophical Analysis,”Journal of Consciousness Studies,Vol.17,No.9-10(2010),pp.7-65;Mark Coeckelbergh,Human Being@Risk:Enhancement,Technology,and the Evaluation of Vulnerability Transformations,Dordrecht:Springer,2013;Tamar Sharon,Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology:The Case for Mediated Posthumanism,Dordrecht:Springer,2014.
(5)如果读者对这样的讨论感兴趣,可参见拙作“History Begins in the Future:On Historical Sensibility in the Age of Technology,”in S.Helgesson and J.Svenungsson,eds.,The Ethos of History:Time and Responsibility,New York:Berghahn,2018,pp.192-209.
(1)Nick Bostrom,“A History of Transhumanist Thought,”Journal of Evolution and Technology,Vol.14,No.1(April 2005),pp.1-25.
(2)Max More,“The Philosophy of Transhumanism,”in Max More and Natasha Vita-More,eds.,The Transhumanist Reader,Malden:Wiley-Blackwell,2013,pp.3-17.
(3)Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2014.
(4)Michael Hauskeller,Mythologies of Transhumanism,Cham:Palgrave,2016,pp.168-171.
(5)这里作者所谈的“积极”(proactionary)指的是超人类主义思想家马克斯·莫尔所提出的“积极原则”(“proactionary principle”),强调对保护新技术发展的积极心态。与“积极原则”相对的是“预防原则”(“precautionary principle”),后者强调对技术发展潜在危险的评估与防范。马克斯·莫尔认为,“面对新技术的发展与展开,我们需要做出明智的决策”,并且尤其“需要保护技术的实验与进步”,而非毫无依据地假设这些新技术对人类与环境有着不确定的危害,扼杀科技的创新。参见Max More,“The Proactionary Principle:Optimizing Technological Outcomes,”in Max More and Natasha Vita-More,eds.,The Transhumanist Reader,pp.258-267(译者注).
(6)Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,p.129.
(7)James Hughes,Citizen Cyborg:Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future,Cambridge:Westview Press,2004.
(8)James Hughes,“Contradictions from the Enlightenment Roots of Transhumanism,”Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,Vol.35,No.6(Dec.2010),p.622.
(9)Braden Allenby,“Technology and Transhumanism:Unpredictability,Radical Contongency,and Accelerating Change,”in H.Tirosh-Samuelson and K.L.Mossman,eds.,Building Better Humans?Refocusing the Debate on Transhumanism,Frankfurt am Main:Peter Lang,2012,pp.441-463.
(1)Rosi Braidott,i“Posthuman Critical Theory,”in D.Banerji and M.R.Paranjape,eds.,Critical Posthumanism and Planetary Futures,New Delhi:Springer India,2016,pp.16-19;Cary Wolfe,What is Posthumanism?pp.xiii-xv.
(2)Nick Bostrom,The Transhumanist FAQ:A General Introduction,World Transhumanist Association,2003,p.4.Retrieved 8 March2017.http://www.nickbostrom.com/views/transhumanist.pdf.
(1)David Roden,Posthuman Life:Philosophy at the Edge of the Human,London and New York:Routledge,2015.罗登所谓“推测性的后人类主义”,是一种相对于超人类主义而言较为谨慎的立场,尝试去猜想后人类也许会是怎样的(might be),而不是预言未来将会怎样(ought to be)。或者说,“推测性的后人类主义主张有可能出现后人类,但并不认为后人类一定会超越人类”。对罗登所说的“分离的关系”有兴趣的读者,还可参见David Roden,“The Disconnection Thesis,”in A.Eden,J.H.Sraker,E.Steinhart&A.H.Moore,eds.,The Singularity Hypothesis:A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment,Springer,2012,pp.281-298.https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-32560-1_14#citeas(译者注).
(2)我认为力求超越人类是技术后人类的特征,但指的并不是在道德上超越人类。在上面的语境当中,说比人类“更好”仅仅指超人类主义普遍将后人类想象成是超越人类的。在这个意义上,优于人类的存在比人类“更好”,是因为它被认为拥有比人类更强的能力。
(3)Zoltán Boldizsár Simon,“History Manifested:Making Sense of Unprecedented Change,”EuropeanReview of History,Vol.22,No.5(2015),pp.819-834.
(4)Zoltán Boldizsár Simon,“History Begins in the Future:On Historical Sensibility in the Age ofT echnology,”in S.Helgesson and J.Svenungsson,eds.,The Ethos of History:Time and Responsibility,New York:Berghahn,2018,pp.192-209.
(1)参见前文提到的叙事历史哲学的范畴:William Dray,“On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography,”pp.153-171;Hayden White,“The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,”pp.1-25;Morton White,Foundations of Historical Knowledge.
(2)罗西·布拉伊多蒂的批判性的后人类主义非常清楚上述的悖论---通过后人类结束人类,反过来使得一种人类的普遍观念得以形成。不过,布拉伊多蒂只是将其看作“一个消极的范畴,因共同的脆弱性与对消亡的恐惧而形成”,却没有考虑到或许“对消亡的恐惧”是正在浮现的对人类的全新理解的重要特征之一。
(1)Patrick Manning,Big Data in History,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2013,p.23.
(2)参见Ian Hesketh,“The Story of Big History,”History of the Present,Vol.4,No.2(Fall 2014),pp.171-202.
(3)Yuval N.Harari,Homo Deus:A Brief History of Tomorrow,New York:Harper,2017.
(4)Michael S.Burdett,Eschatology and the Technological Future,New York:Routledge,2015;Elaine Graham,“Manifestations of the Posthuman in the Postsecular Imagination,”in J.B.Hurblut and H.Tirosh-Samuelson,eds.,Perfecting Human Futures:Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations,Wiesbaden:Springer VS,2016,pp.51-72;Hava Tirosh-Samuelson,“Transhumanism as a Secularist Faith,”Zygon,Vol.47,No.4(Dec.2012),pp.710-734;Tracy Trothen and Calvin Mercer,eds.,Religion and Human Enhancement:Death,Values,and Morality,Cham:Palgrave,2017.
(5)Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2014;Yuval N.Harari,Homo Deus:A Brief History of Tomorrow.
(6)Julian Huxley,“Transhumanism,”Journal of Humanistic Psychology,Vol.8,No.1(Jan.1968),p.73.
(7)所谓“指向性进化”是超人类主义者常用的一个概念,用来指运用生化技术中的指向性进化法(比如通过基因编辑技术剔除不良基因)从而控制人类的进化。超人类主义者认为,“我们进入了人类进化的一个新阶段。在这一阶段,人类成为自我命运的主宰者。权力从自然那里转交到了科学手中”。但反对者们认为,指向性进化将会毁灭人类自身。参见Maxwell J.Mehlman,“Will Directed Evolution Destroy Humanity,and If So,What Can We Do About It?”Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law&Policy,Vol.3,No.1(2009),pp.93-122(译者注).
(8)Nick Bostrom,“The Future of Human Evolution,”in Charles Tandy,ed.,Two Hundred Years After Kant,Fifty Years After Turing,Palo Alto:Ria University Press,2004,pp.339-371;Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska,The Proactinonary Imperative:A Foundation for Transhumanism,Basingstoke:Palgrave,2014;Yuval N.Harari,Homo Deus:A Brief History of Tomorrow;Harris,J.,Enhancing Evolution:The Ethical Case for Making Better People,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2007.
(1)Ellen M.McG ee,“Bioelectronics and Implanted Devices,”in B.Gordijn and R.Chadwick,eds.,Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity,Dordrecht:Springer,2008,pp.207-224.
(2)Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu,“Unfit for the Future?Human Nature,Scientific Progress,andthe Need for Moral Enhancement,”in J.Savulescu,R.ter Meulen,and G.Kahane,eds.,Enhancing Human Capacities,Malden:Wiley-Blackwell,2011,pp.486-500.
(3)Andrew Askland,“The Misnomer of Transhumanism as Directed Evolution,”International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society,Vol.9,No.1(2011),pp.71-78.
(4)Lynn Hun,t“Globalization and Time,”in C.Lorenz and B.Bevernage,eds.,Breaking up Time:Negotiating the Borders between Present,Past and Future,G9ttingen:Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht,2013,p.213.