复杂装备主制造商-供应商超界博弈模型及其均衡实现机制设计
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- 英文论文题名：Super-bound Game and Equilibrium Realizable Mechanism the Complex Equipment in the Mode of Main Manufacture-supplier
- 论文作者：方志耕 ; 杨晓钰 ; 曹颖赛 ; 芮菡萏
- 英文论文作者：FANG Zhi-geng ; YANG Xiao-yu ; CAO Ying-sai ; RUI Han-dan ; College of Economics and Management ; Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院;
- 论文关键词：主制造商-供应商 ; 超界博弈 ; 均衡 ; 机制设计
- 英文论文关键词：main manufacturer-supplier ; super-bound game ; equilibrium ; mechanism design
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：F274
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：5
- 文件大小：335k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
主制造商-供应商模式下,参与主体之间的利益竞争关系错综复杂,均衡关系种类繁多。本文对主制造商与不同级别供应商之间的利益竞争关系进行了梳理,构建了基于博弈均衡子系统的超界博弈模型并分析了均衡的实现条件。最后从主制造商的角度出发设计了基于奖惩因子的超界均衡的实现机制。通过算例表明了所提模型的有效性和实用性。
In the main manufacture-supplier mode,the competition among the participants is complicated,thus forming various types of equilibrium.In this paper,the relationship of competition between the main manufacturer and different levels of supplier has been sorted out.The super-bound game has been constructed on the basis of subsystems of equilibrium.Based on the factors of reward and punishment,the mechanism of super-bound equilibrium has been designed as well.The validity and practicability of the model proposed are verified by a case at last.
In the main manufacture-supplier mode,the competition among the participants is complicated,thus forming various types of equilibrium.In this paper,the relationship of competition between the main manufacturer and different levels of supplier has been sorted out.The super-bound game has been constructed on the basis of subsystems of equilibrium.Based on the factors of reward and punishment,the mechanism of super-bound equilibrium has been designed as well.The validity and practicability of the model proposed are verified by a case at last.
引文
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[2]安彤.VMI模式下供应链的Pareto改进研究[D].天津:天津大学,20n.
[3]桂华明,马士华.运输能力柔性约束的供应链Pareto优化策略[J].工业工程与管理,2006,11(5):23-27.
[4]吕芹,霍佳震,高峻峻.VMI模式下3PL介入的供应链Shapley利益分配机制[J].计算机集成制造系统,2013,19(11):2877-2883.
[5]郑鑫,朱晓曦,马卫民.基于Shapley值法的三级闭环供应链收益分配模型[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(4):17-22.
[6]Wu Guodong,Pu Yong.Research on the incentive contract based on Rubinstein bargaining[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2010,24(4):110-114.
[7]叶飞,李怡娜.基于Stackelberg模型与Nash协商模型的供应链回购契约机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(3):39-43.
[8]陈洪转,何利芳,方志耕,等.“主制造商-供应商”协同利益主体超冲突均衡设计[J].管理世界,2012(3):180-181.
[9]陈洪转,刘思峰,何利芳.“主制造商-供应商”协同主体双重努力最优合作协调[J].系统工程,2012(7):30-34.
[10]陶良彦,刘思峰,方志耕,等.基于多层次GERT的复杂产品研制进度规划“超冲突均衡”博弈模型[J].控制与决策,2014(11):2002-2010.
[11]Govindan K,Popiuc M.Reverse supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contract:A case for the civilaircraft industry[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2014,233(2):326-336.
[12]俞建.博弈论与非线性分析[M].科学出版社,2008.