政府采购中腐败的影响机理分析——基于拍卖理论视角
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- 英文论文题名：The Impact Mechanism of Corruption in Government Procurement——Based on the Auction Theory
- 论文作者：徐兰 ; 李晓萍
- 英文论文作者：XU Lan ; LI Xiao-ping ; School of Economics and Management ; Jiangsu University of Science and Technology ; School of Economics and Management ; Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：江苏科技大学经济管理学院;南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院;
- 论文关键词：政府采购 ; 腐败 ; 影响机理 ; 拍卖理论
- 英文论文关键词：government procurement ; corruption ; impact mechanism ; auction theory
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：F812.45
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：5
- 文件大小：387k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
政府采购中的质量问题至关重要,为了保障国家的利益和公民的权益,必须高度关注政府采购的质量属性,同时,政府采购的成本问题也须尤为关注。本文基于拍卖理论框架,分析了腐败对政府采购中所采购产品的质量及采购价格的影响。结果表明:(1)官员的腐败行为直接导致所采购产品或服务质量水平的下降,腐败程度越高,所采购产品(或服务)的质量越差;(2)给定腐败水平,该官员在索取回扣谈判中能力大小不影响采购产品(或服务)质量,但是更大的谈判能力则会导致采购成本的上升。
In the process of government procurement,as the issue of quality is of paramount importance,due care must be taken to safeguard our country's interest and citizens' rights.Meanwhile,since resources are scarce,much effort should also be made to bring down the cost in government procurement.The impact of corruption on quality and price in government procurement is analyzed based on auction theory.Our result shows that:(1)The politician's corruption will always lead to lower quality in the product or service procured.Thee higher of corruption level,the poorer of the quality;(2)Given a level of corruption,changes in the politician's bargaining power won't impact the quality of the product or service procured.However,higher bargaining power will Inevitably result in higher price,thus increasing the cost in government procurement.
In the process of government procurement,as the issue of quality is of paramount importance,due care must be taken to safeguard our country's interest and citizens' rights.Meanwhile,since resources are scarce,much effort should also be made to bring down the cost in government procurement.The impact of corruption on quality and price in government procurement is analyzed based on auction theory.Our result shows that:(1)The politician's corruption will always lead to lower quality in the product or service procured.Thee higher of corruption level,the poorer of the quality;(2)Given a level of corruption,changes in the politician's bargaining power won't impact the quality of the product or service procured.However,higher bargaining power will Inevitably result in higher price,thus increasing the cost in government procurement.
引文
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[11]Asker J,Cantillon E.Procurement when price and quality matter[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,2010,41(1):1-34.
[12]Nishimura T.Optimal design of scoring auction with multidimensional quality[J].Review of Economic Design,2015,19(2):117-143.
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[15]殷红,王先甲.政府采购招标的最优机制设计[J].系统管理学报,2008,17(4):365-370.
[2]刘小川.政府采购腐败的机理分析及其防范措施[J].中国流通经济.2008,(8):8-11.
[3]卢冰.政府采购中的腐败问题与政府采购透明化制度建设[D].北京:国际关系学院.2011.
[4]宋潇.政府采购腐败问题研究[D].大连:东北财经大学,2014.
[5]刘树林,王明喜.多属性采购拍卖理论与应用评述[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(1):183-192.
[6]Che Y K.Design competition through multidimensional auctions[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1993,24(4):668-680.
[7]周乐欣,王先甲.基于多属性第二评分拍卖模型的物流交易研究[J].技术经济,2009,28(5):123-128.
[8]汪磊,王先甲.基于多属性逆向拍卖模型的物流服务交易机制设计[J].武汉理工大学学报(交通科学与工程版),2012,36(2):270-275.
[9]Branco F,The design of multidimensional auctions[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1997,28(1):63-81.
[10]Asker J,Cantillon E.Properties of scoring auctions[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,2008,39(1):69-85.
[11]Asker J,Cantillon E.Procurement when price and quality matter[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,2010,41(1):1-34.
[12]Nishimura T.Optimal design of scoring auction with multidimensional quality[J].Review of Economic Design,2015,19(2):117-143.
[13]王宏,陈宏民,杨剑侠.多维信息招投标中的最优机制及其实施[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(8):1-14.
[14]Dastidar K G,Mukherjee D.Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2014,35:122-127.
[15]殷红,王先甲.政府采购招标的最优机制设计[J].系统管理学报,2008,17(4):365-370.