具有超级支配者的主制造商-供应商利益冲突均衡模型
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- 英文论文题名：Benefit Conflict Equilibrium Model for Manufacturer and Suppliers with Super Dominator
- 论文作者：刘勇 ; 熊晓旋 ; 钱吴永 ; 王育红
- 英文论文作者：LIU Yong ; XIONG Xiao-xuan ; QIAN Wu-yong ; WANG Yu-hong ; School of Business ; Jiangnan University
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：江南大学商学院;
- 论文关键词：利益冲突 ; 生产函数 ; 超冲突 ; Nash均衡 ; Shapely均衡
- 英文论文关键词：benefit conflict ; production function ; super conflict ; nash equilibrium ; shapely equilibrium
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：F274
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：8
- 文件大小：594k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
为有效描述和解决主制造商和供应商间的利益冲突问题,本文利用柯布·道格拉斯生产函数和博弈论,构建了具有超级支配者的利益冲突均衡模型,并给出不同情形下各利益主体的最优物质资本和人力资本的解析解,最后,以案例验证了模型的有效性与合理性。结果表明,具有超级支配者的超冲突均衡模型能够描述介于Nash均衡和Shapely均衡之间的状态,并能有助于实现复杂装备生产系统协同研制和保证主制造商与供应商长期有效合作。
In order to effectively describe and deal with the benefit conflict problem between the main manufacturer and suppliers,production function and game theory is utilized to establish a novel super conflict equilibrium model with super dominator,and then the analytic solutions of the optimal human capital and physical capital of the main manufacturer and suppliers are given in different conditions.Finally,an example of the collaborative development of civil aircraft landing gear verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.The results show that the proposed model can depict the super conflict equilibrium state between Nash equilibrium and Shapely equilibrium,and realize collaborative development of the production system for complex product and guarantee the effective long-term cooperation between main manufacturer and suppliers.
In order to effectively describe and deal with the benefit conflict problem between the main manufacturer and suppliers,production function and game theory is utilized to establish a novel super conflict equilibrium model with super dominator,and then the analytic solutions of the optimal human capital and physical capital of the main manufacturer and suppliers are given in different conditions.Finally,an example of the collaborative development of civil aircraft landing gear verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.The results show that the proposed model can depict the super conflict equilibrium state between Nash equilibrium and Shapely equilibrium,and realize collaborative development of the production system for complex product and guarantee the effective long-term cooperation between main manufacturer and suppliers.
引文
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[3]Teng Bingsheng.Collaborative advantage of strategic alliances:Value creation in the value net[J].Journal of General Management,2003,29(2):1-22.
[4]Hallikas J,Puumalainenk,Vesterinen T,et al.Riskbased classification of supplier relationships[J].Journal of Purchasing&Supply Management,2005,11(2):72-82.
[5]Chopra S,Meindt P.Supply chain management:Strategy,planning and operation[M].New Jersey,US:Prentice Hall,2001.
[6]田厚平,郭亚军.主从对策中一类主方激励从方合作的诱导方法[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2004,(3):291-294.
[7]周雄伟,马费成.需求不确定环境下的供应链信息共享激励模型[J].管理工程学报,2010,24(4):122-126.
[8]朱立龙,尤建新.非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):109-118.
[9]孟庆峰,盛昭瀚,李真.基于公平偏好的供应链质量激励机制效率演化[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(11):2394-2403.
[10]曹柬,吴晓波,周根贵.不对称信息下绿色采购激励机制设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(1):106-116.
[11]应丹丰,马士华,关旭.双重供货模式下的装配系统协调机制设定与优化[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(3):691-700.
[12]李雷,杨怀珍.基于确定需求的上游层面VMI模式的利益分配机制[J].控制与决策,2012,27(3):441-446.
[13]Naini S G J,Aliahmadi A R,Eskandari M J.Designing a mixed performance measurement system for environmental supply chain management using evolutionary game theory and balanced scorecard:A case study of an auto industry supply chain[J].Resources,Conservation and Recycling,2011,55(6):593-603.
[14]Ghosh D,Shah J.A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures[J].International Journal of Production Economies,2012,135(2):568-583.
[15]和征,陈菊红,姚树俊.产品服务化供应链信息共享激励的博弈分析[J].中国机械工程,2014,25(3):346-351.
[16]Banerjee S,Lin P.Vertical research joint ventures[J].International Journal of Indusrial Organization,2001,19(1):285-302.
[17]Claycomb C,Frankwick G L.The dynamics of buyer's perceived costs during a relationship development process:An empirical assessment[J].Journal of Business Research,2005,58(12):1662-1671.
[18]Paksoy T,Pehlivan N Y.A fuzzy linear programming model for the optimization of multi-stage supply chain networks with triangular and trapezoidal membership functions[J].Journal of the Franklin Institute,2012,349(1):93-109.
[19]Lida T.Coordination of cooperative cost-reduction efforts in a supply chain partnership[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,222(2):180-190.
[20]Sajadieh M S,Fallahnezhad M S,Khosravi M.A joint optimal policy for a multiple-suppliers multiple-manufacturers multiple-retailers system[J].International Journal Production Economics,2013,146(2):738-744.
[21]陈洪转,方志耕,刘思峰,等.复杂产品主制造商-供应商协同合作最优成本分担激励研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):98-104.
[22]Eatwell J,Milgate M,Newman P.The new Palgrave:A dictionary of economics[M].Houndmills,Basingstoke,Hampshire,UK:The Macmillan Press Limited,1987.