政府—冷链食品企业质量安全监管博弈分析
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- 英文论文题名：Cold-chain Food Quality and Safety Supervision Game Analysis between Government and Cold-chain Food Enterprise
- 论文作者：朱立龙 ; 郭鹏菲
- 英文论文作者：ZHU Li-long ; GUO Peng-fei ; School of Business ; Shandong Normal University ; School of Management ; Shandong University
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：山东师范大学商学院;山东大学管理学院;
- 论文关键词：冷链食品 ; 质量安全 ; 监管 ; Nash均衡
- 英文论文关键词：cold-chain food ; quality and safety ; supervision ; Nash equilibrium
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：F224.32;F274;F426.82
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：6
- 文件大小：478k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
基于博弈论,构建了政府和冷链食品企业之间的纯战略博弈模型和混合战略博弈模型,并对博弈模型中的纯战略Nash均衡、占优战略Nash均衡和混合战略Nash均衡进行了分析,探讨了两者间的博弈关系以及不同情况下各自的最优策略选择,揭示了影响政府积极监管或消极监管、冷链食品企业提供高质量或低质量食品的关键因素。通过本文分析,研究结果表明:政府积极监管概率与冷链食品企业提供高质量冷链食品的成本、提供低质量冷链食品的成本、冷链食品所处温度和政府监管部门对冷链食品企业的惩罚力度有关;冷链食品企业提供高质量冷链食品的概率与政府监管成本、对冷链食品企业的惩罚力度和上级对政府监管部门失职行为的惩罚力度有关。最后,提出了政府和冷链食品企业共同提高食品质量安全的对策与建议。
In this paper,based on the game theory,the game model of pure strategy and mixed strategy between government supervision department and cold-chain food enterprise are established,the pure strategy Nash equilibrium,dominant strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the theory game models are aanalyzed,and the game relationship between them and their optimal strategy choice are disussed.Meanwhile the key factors that influence the government actively supervise or negatively supervise,cold-chain food enterprises,provision of high quality or low quality cold-chain food are revealed.The research results show that,cost of cold-chain food enterprises' provision of high quality cold-chain food or low quality of cold-chain food,cold-chain food temperature,government supervision department penalties to the cold-chain food enterprise influence the probability of government actively supervise;government regulatory cost,penalties for cold-chain food enterprises,and the superior penalties for the behavior of the government's dereliction of duty influence the probability of enterprises' provision high quality cold-chain food.Finally,many suggestions are prvided to improve the quality and safety of cold-chain food.
In this paper,based on the game theory,the game model of pure strategy and mixed strategy between government supervision department and cold-chain food enterprise are established,the pure strategy Nash equilibrium,dominant strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the theory game models are aanalyzed,and the game relationship between them and their optimal strategy choice are disussed.Meanwhile the key factors that influence the government actively supervise or negatively supervise,cold-chain food enterprises,provision of high quality or low quality cold-chain food are revealed.The research results show that,cost of cold-chain food enterprises' provision of high quality cold-chain food or low quality of cold-chain food,cold-chain food temperature,government supervision department penalties to the cold-chain food enterprise influence the probability of government actively supervise;government regulatory cost,penalties for cold-chain food enterprises,and the superior penalties for the behavior of the government's dereliction of duty influence the probability of enterprises' provision high quality cold-chain food.Finally,many suggestions are prvided to improve the quality and safety of cold-chain food.
引文
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[3]黄敏芳,张源凯,胡祥培.有机蔬菜B2C直销的配送方案智能生成方法[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(5):600-607.
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[7]曹倩,邵举平,孙延安.基于改进遗传算法的生鲜农产品多目标配送路径优化[J].工业工程,2015(1):71-76.
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[9]刘磊,乔忠,刘畅.农超对接模式中的合作博弈问题研究[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(4):100-106.
[10]张国权,彭竟,李春好.基于演化博弈理论的“农超对接”模式研究[J].财经问题研究,2013,(8):113-118.
[11]Kang Y S,Lee Y H.Development of generic RFID traceability services[J].Computers in Industry,2013,64(5):609-623.
[12]茆翠红,钱钢.食品安全问题中的政府监管部门和企业的演化博弈分析[J].工业技术经济,2009,28(5):95-97.
[13]浦徐进,吴亚,路璐.企业生产行为和官员监管行为的演化博弈模型及仿真分析[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(S1):390-396.
[14]朱立龙,于涛,夏同水.政府-企业间质量监管博弈分析[J].软科学,2013,27(1):47-49.
[15]熊峰,彭健,金鹏,等.生鲜农产品供应链关系契约稳定性影响研究——以冷链设施补贴模式为视角l-J].中国管理科学,2015,23(8):102-111.
[16]王淑云,姜樱梅,王宪杰.农产品冷链三级库存一体化策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):108-114.
[2]Kuo J C.Chen Muchen.Developing an advanced multitemperature joint distribution system for the food cold chain[J].Food Control,2010,21(4):559-566.
[3]黄敏芳,张源凯,胡祥培.有机蔬菜B2C直销的配送方案智能生成方法[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(5):600-607.
[4]杨珍花,赖平仲,汤洋.冷藏车多车型混合配送调度优化[J].系统工程,2015,(10):28-36.
[5]Osvald A,Stirn L Z.Vehicle routing algorithm for the distribution of fresh vegetables and similar perishable food[J].Journal of Food Engineering,2008,85(2),285-295.
[6]Song B D,Ko Y D.A vehicle routing problem of both refrigerated-and general-type vehicles for perishable food products delivery[J].Journal of Food Engineering,2016,169:61-71.
[7]曹倩,邵举平,孙延安.基于改进遗传算法的生鲜农产品多目标配送路径优化[J].工业工程,2015(1):71-76.
[8]Reardon T.Barrett C B.Berdegue J A,et al.Agri-food industry transformation and small farmers in developing countries[J].World Development,2009,37(11):1717-1727.
[9]刘磊,乔忠,刘畅.农超对接模式中的合作博弈问题研究[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(4):100-106.
[10]张国权,彭竟,李春好.基于演化博弈理论的“农超对接”模式研究[J].财经问题研究,2013,(8):113-118.
[11]Kang Y S,Lee Y H.Development of generic RFID traceability services[J].Computers in Industry,2013,64(5):609-623.
[12]茆翠红,钱钢.食品安全问题中的政府监管部门和企业的演化博弈分析[J].工业技术经济,2009,28(5):95-97.
[13]浦徐进,吴亚,路璐.企业生产行为和官员监管行为的演化博弈模型及仿真分析[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(S1):390-396.
[14]朱立龙,于涛,夏同水.政府-企业间质量监管博弈分析[J].软科学,2013,27(1):47-49.
[15]熊峰,彭健,金鹏,等.生鲜农产品供应链关系契约稳定性影响研究——以冷链设施补贴模式为视角l-J].中国管理科学,2015,23(8):102-111.
[16]王淑云,姜樱梅,王宪杰.农产品冷链三级库存一体化策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):108-114.