基于共享节约合同的网购供应链ITIO决策模式比较研究
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- 英文论文题名：A Comparative Study Based on Shared Savings Contracts Online Shopping Supply Chain ITIO Decision Mode
- 论文作者：陈莹 ; 李富昌 ; 卢玮
- 英文论文作者：CHEN Ying ; LI Fu-chang ; LU Wei ; School of Economics and Management ; Yunnan Normal University
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：云南师范大学经济与管理学院;
- 论文关键词：共享节约 ; 第三方物流 ; 外包 ; 博弈
- 英文论文关键词：shared savings ; third-party logistics ; outsourcing ; game
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：F224.32;F253;F274;F713.36
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：7
- 文件大小：534k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
在网购供应链中,网络零售商要求供应商通过第三方物流服务提供商直接向消费者发货,以减少中途的运输环节,最大限度的节约物流费用,但是由于第三方物流服务提供商的收入增长依赖于网络零售商物流费用的增长,所以积极配合零售商优化网购供应链的意愿不高。常见的物流合同难以有效的协调第三方物流服务提供商和网络零售商之间的利益冲突,本文在运用博弈模型分析常见的物流外包合同的基础上,引入共享节约合同,设计一种有效的内在激励机制,以达到激励双方共同努力节约物流成本的目的。并通过实例分析验证了这一共享节约合同的有效性,指出其能使合作双方利润都得以优化,有利于达到系统最优,实现帕累托改进。
In the online shopping supply chain,online retailers require suppliers to ship directly to consumers through third-party logistics service providers i order to reduce the midway transport links and save logistics costs to the hilt.However,because revenue growth of the third-party logistics service provider depends on the growth of online retailers' logistics costs,the will of active cooperation with retailers to optimize the supply chain of omline shopping is not high.Common logistics contracts are difficult to effectively coordinate the conflict of interests between the third-party logistics service providers and network retailers.On the basis of use of common logistice outsourcing contract in the game,the shared savings contract is introduced to design an effective internal incentive in order to encourage both sides to work together to save the logistics cost.Furthermore,the validity of the shared savings vontrave is verified through case analysis,noting that it can optimize the dual profits and assist in achieving the system optimization to realize Pareto improvement.
In the online shopping supply chain,online retailers require suppliers to ship directly to consumers through third-party logistics service providers i order to reduce the midway transport links and save logistics costs to the hilt.However,because revenue growth of the third-party logistics service provider depends on the growth of online retailers' logistics costs,the will of active cooperation with retailers to optimize the supply chain of omline shopping is not high.Common logistics contracts are difficult to effectively coordinate the conflict of interests between the third-party logistics service providers and network retailers.On the basis of use of common logistice outsourcing contract in the game,the shared savings contract is introduced to design an effective internal incentive in order to encourage both sides to work together to save the logistics cost.Furthermore,the validity of the shared savings vontrave is verified through case analysis,noting that it can optimize the dual profits and assist in achieving the system optimization to realize Pareto improvement.
引文
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[12]李宏宽,李忱.跨链间同级库存协调下集群式供应链协调分析[J].计算机集成制造系统,2015,21(12):3282-3291.
[13]项甜甜,孙绍荣.基于收益分配契约的供应链协调策略博弈分析[J].陕西理工学院学报(自然科学版),2015,31(6):67-72.
[14]Taylor T A.Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects[J].Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007.
[15]SUN Yu-ling,HONG Mei-na,SHI Kui-ran.Revenue Sharing Contract of Supply Chain for Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Fairness Concerns[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2015,24(6):103-111.
[2]李富昌.共享节约下的库存与运输联合优化研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2016,(1):18-22.
[3]吴庆,但斌.低值易逝品的第三方物流收入共享协调合同研究[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(3):40-44.
[4]杨志林,李擎卿,林冠男.随机需求下单供应商与多零售商的生产—库存—运输联合优化模型[J].大学数学,2015,31(5):12-18.
[5]Tian Jun,Ge Yongling,Hou Congcong.Governmentdriving emergency supplies procurement model based on real option contract[J].Systems Engineering Theory&Practices,2014,34(10):2582-2590.
[6]Li Lin,Fan Tijun.Comparison and analysis on pricing policies for fresh agricultural produce supply chain with dominant retailer[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2015,23(12):113-123.
[7]杨春,但斌,吴庆,等.考虑保鲜努力的生鲜农产品零售商与物流服务商的协调合同[J].技术经济,2010,29(12):122-126.
[8]刘宇熹,谢家平.再制造下租赁产品服务系统节约共享契约研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(3):99-108.
[9]陈敬贤,孟庆峰.应对突发事件的库存共享策略[J].中国管理科学.2015,23(5):65-72.
[10]Krishnan H,Kapuscinski R,Butz D A.Coordinating contracts for decentralized supply chains with retailer promotional effort[J].Management Science,2004,50(1):48-63.
[11]常宏建,张体勤,李国锋.项目利益相关者协调度测评研究[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(1):85-94.
[12]李宏宽,李忱.跨链间同级库存协调下集群式供应链协调分析[J].计算机集成制造系统,2015,21(12):3282-3291.
[13]项甜甜,孙绍荣.基于收益分配契约的供应链协调策略博弈分析[J].陕西理工学院学报(自然科学版),2015,31(6):67-72.
[14]Taylor T A.Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects[J].Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007.
[15]SUN Yu-ling,HONG Mei-na,SHI Kui-ran.Revenue Sharing Contract of Supply Chain for Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Fairness Concerns[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2015,24(6):103-111.