存在竞争性制造商的需求预测信息的共享研究
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- 英文论文题名：Demand Forecast Sharing in a Supply Chain with Competing Manufacturers
- 论文作者：陈琳 ; 李田
- 英文论文作者：CHEN Lin ; LI Tian ; School of Business Administration ; East China University of Science and Technology
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：华东理工大学商学院;
- 论文关键词：信息共享 ; 需求信息预测 ; 推断效应 ; 价格竞争
- 英文论文关键词：information sharing ; demand forecast ; price competition ; inference effect
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：F224.32;F424;F724.2
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：7
- 文件大小：693k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
本文针对两个竞争性制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,考虑各制造商拥有需求预测信息,信息共享如何影响批发价格和零售价格的问题,在完全信息共享、部分信息共享、无信息共享的情形下,基于价格竞争,通过建立博弈模型,分析了信息精度、竞争强度对批发价格和零售价格的影响,对比预期均衡利润,进而得出制造商的信息共享决策和信息共享成立条件。研究表明:制造商不信息共享时,零售商可以从批发价格推断信息,从而产生定价扭曲,使零售商受益却使制造商受损,制造商间的横向竞争能够减轻这种影响但并不能完全抵消,因而制造商都会选择信息共享来避免推断效应的不利影响,当且仅当信息共享时能够提高供应链的运作效率降低零售商的成本来弥补它的损失,信息共享协议才会成立。最后,通过算例对研究结论进行了直观考察和说明。
Large-scale manufacturers often face highly uncertain demand when launching new products or expanding into new markets.Thus,information sharing in a distribution channel where both manufacturers possess better demand-forecast information than the downstream retailer is studied.Three information-sharing scenarios:full information sharing,partial information sharing,and no information sharing,are examined.How information precision and competition intensity influence the equilibrium prices is analyzed.Then the equilibrium outcomes under the three sharing formats are characterized and the firms' preferences over these scenarios are investigated.It is shown that,in the absence of information sharing,the retailer is able to use the wholesale price to infer the manufacturer's private signal.This creates a pricing distortion which benefits the retailer.Sharing the information with the retailer of the manufacturer's private signal eliminates this distortion.In general,manufacturers benefit from more information sharing at the loss of downstream retailer.Hence,information sharing arrangements in equilibrium require sufficient cost savings(e.g.,reduced inventory costs).
Large-scale manufacturers often face highly uncertain demand when launching new products or expanding into new markets.Thus,information sharing in a distribution channel where both manufacturers possess better demand-forecast information than the downstream retailer is studied.Three information-sharing scenarios:full information sharing,partial information sharing,and no information sharing,are examined.How information precision and competition intensity influence the equilibrium prices is analyzed.Then the equilibrium outcomes under the three sharing formats are characterized and the firms' preferences over these scenarios are investigated.It is shown that,in the absence of information sharing,the retailer is able to use the wholesale price to infer the manufacturer's private signal.This creates a pricing distortion which benefits the retailer.Sharing the information with the retailer of the manufacturer's private signal eliminates this distortion.In general,manufacturers benefit from more information sharing at the loss of downstream retailer.Hence,information sharing arrangements in equilibrium require sufficient cost savings(e.g.,reduced inventory costs).
引文
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[8]Gal-Or E.Geylani T,Dukes A.Information sharing in a channel with partially informed retailers[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(4)-.642-658.
[9]Jiang Baojun,Tian Li,Xu Yifan.et al.To share or not to share:Demand forecast sharing in a distribution channel[J].Marketing Science,2016.
[10]Shang Weixing.Ha A Y,Tong Shilu.Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer[J].Management Science,2015,62(1):245-263.
[11]颜波,刘艳萍,李鸿媛.成本信息不对称下零售商主导的混合渠道供应链决策分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(12):124-134.
[12]王文宾,陈琴,达庆利.奖惩机制下制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):57-63.
[13]Singh N.Vives X.Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1984,15(4):546-554.
[14]Shin H.Tunca T I.Do firms invest in forecasting efficiently?The effect of competition on demand forecast investments and supply chain coordination[J].Operations Research,2010,58(6):1592-1610.
[15]Li L.Cournot oligopoly with information sharing[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1985,16(4):521-536.
[2]Garro A.New product demand forecasting and distribution optimization:A case study at Zara[D].Cambridge:Massachusetts Institute of Technology,2011.
[3]Li L.Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition[J].Management Science,2002,48(9):1196-1212.
[4]Li L.Zhang Hongtao.Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination[J].Management Science,2008,54(8):1467-1481.
[5]Ha Y A.Tong Shilu,Zhang Hongtao.Sharing imperfect demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies[J].Management Science,2011,57(3):566-581.
[6]He Chaan,Marklund J,Vossen T,Vertical information sharing in a volatile market[J],Marketing Science,2008,27(3):513-530.
[7]Mukhopadhyay S K,Yue Xiaohang,Zhu Xiaowei.A Stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2011,134(2),424-433.
[8]Gal-Or E.Geylani T,Dukes A.Information sharing in a channel with partially informed retailers[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(4)-.642-658.
[9]Jiang Baojun,Tian Li,Xu Yifan.et al.To share or not to share:Demand forecast sharing in a distribution channel[J].Marketing Science,2016.
[10]Shang Weixing.Ha A Y,Tong Shilu.Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer[J].Management Science,2015,62(1):245-263.
[11]颜波,刘艳萍,李鸿媛.成本信息不对称下零售商主导的混合渠道供应链决策分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(12):124-134.
[12]王文宾,陈琴,达庆利.奖惩机制下制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):57-63.
[13]Singh N.Vives X.Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1984,15(4):546-554.
[14]Shin H.Tunca T I.Do firms invest in forecasting efficiently?The effect of competition on demand forecast investments and supply chain coordination[J].Operations Research,2010,58(6):1592-1610.
[15]Li L.Cournot oligopoly with information sharing[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1985,16(4):521-536.