退市制度对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响研究
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摘要
上市公司的盈余管理已经成为证券市场的一个顽症，我国证券市场上大量的盈余管理乃至财务舞弊行为，其根本动因在于达到相关证券监管要求，实现股权融资目的。从这点来说，证券市场上一些不尽合理的制度规定成了上市公司盈余管理的诱因。我国的退市制度起步较晚，自1998年实行“特别处理”制度以来上市公司的退市机制不断演变和发展，在其执行过程中也出现不少问题，例如现行的退市规定直接将公司股票的上市资格与利润指标相联系，一些本应退市的公司通过操纵利润指标就可以保住其上市资格。
在此背景下，本文结合盈余管理的基本知识，利用深沪两地上市公司公开披露资料，采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法，检验我国证券监管部门陆续出台的退市规定对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响，并结合研究结论提出了完善我国退市监管制度的建议。本文内容分为四部分：
第一部分阐述盈余管理的基本理论。首先对国内外学术界关于盈余管理定义的代表性观点进行评述，得出本文对于盈余管理的定义，在此基础上分析盈余管理的特征及其必然性，然后阐述了盈余管理产生的理论基础——契约理论和信息不对称理论，及其对盈余管理理论的影响。
第二部分分析我国退市制度与盈余管理的关系。首先通过对较成熟证券市场退市规定和我国退市制度的分析比较，揭示我国现行退市制度的不足。然后，用规范研究方法分析退市制度对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响。主要探讨了我国的退市规定对上市公司利益相关者的影响，通过上市公司的数据统计分析退市制度颁布后被处理上市公司情况，以及上市公司撤销特别处理的主要措施，得出为了应对退市制度上市公司可能存在盈余管理行为的初步结论，并在此基础上提出退市制度对上市公司盈余管理行为影响的初步假设。
第三部分实证分析退市制度对上市公司盈余管理的影响，是体现本文创新的主要部分。我们根据第二部分的研究，将退市制度的演进过程分为三个阶段，分阶段分析退市制度的演变对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响。实证研究分成两部分进行，第一部分选取1998～2002年的102家被特别处理的公司作为样本，分析1998年和2001年出台的退市规定对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响；第二部分选取2002～2005年的160家亏损上市公司作为样本，分析2003年出台的有关退市的补充规定对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响。
第四部分结论。给出全文的研究结论，并且结合实证分析结论提出完善我国退市监管制度的建议。
与前人的研究相比本文主要有如下创新与特色：
1、本文研究了退市制度的变化对于上市公司盈余管理的影响，属于盈余管理动机研究领域，前人对于盈余管理动机的研究多集中于IPO公司，增配股公司或者亏损上市公司，很少涉及退市制度对上市公司盈余管理的影响，既使涉及也仅限于规范分析鲜见实证研究。
2、本文中退市制度对上市公司盈余管理行为影响的研究按退市制度的演进过程分三个阶段进行，结合各阶段退市制度的演变实证分析上市公司盈余管理行为的变化。分阶段进行研究，可以更清晰的揭示退市制度的演变对上市公司盈余管理的影响。
3、本文不仅采用了规范分析方法还结合了应计利润分析方法和迪安戈罗模型采用了描述性统计分析、t检验、Mann-Whitney U检验等实证分析方法，研究方法的综合运用可以更好的分析退市制度对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响。
Earnings management of the listed company has already become a stubborn illness on the stock market. The basic agent of the massive earnings management and even the finance default on our stock market lays in meeting the correlation supervising and managing requirements to realization equity financing goal. From this standpoint, some unreasonable supervisory laws and regulations in the stock market is one of the reasons, which lead to the earning management of the listed company. The quitting regulations of our securities market start to be later. The regulations has unceasingly developed from the regulation of ST(Special Treatment) of the public listed companies putted into practice since 1998, and some problems were found in process of government supervision. For example present quitting regulations directly relates the qualifications to the profit target, some company which should quit the stock market keep their qualifications through operated the profit target.
Under this background, with some basic knowledge of earnings management this paper using the public material of some listed company in China starts an investigation on the influence of the quitting regulations, which appears one after another in China's security market. This paper focuses on the influence of the evaluative quitting regulations to earnings management of some listed company in China. The thesis is made up of the following four parts:
The partⅠ: Introduced the earnings management elementary theory. Firstly comment on the representative viewpoint about the earnings management definition in domestic and foreign academic circles, obtains our definition about earnings management. Then it analyzed the characteristic and the inevitability of the earnings management, elaborated the contract theory and the no-asymmetrical information theory and its influence to earnings management theory.
The partⅡ: Introduced the relations of quitting regulations and the earnings management in our country. Firstly compared our quitting regulations with the promulgates in the mature stock market, opened out the insufficiency of our quitting regulations, studied the influence which the quitting regulation on the listed company's earnings management with the standard analysis method, mainly discussed the influence of quitting rules on the listed companies' benefit correlation in our country. By gathering the data of the listed companies we analysis the situation of the listed companies after promulgate the quitting rules, as well the main measure of the listed companies which has been special threatened abolish specially processes. Obtained in order to reply the quitting regulations the listed companies have the earnings administrative action. In this foundation we proposed the preliminary supposition of the influence that the quitting regulations have on the earnings management action of the listed companies.
The partⅢ: Analyzed the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company by the real diagnosis. This part is the main part which manifests the article innovates. According to the second part of research, we divide the analysis into three stages as the evolution process of the quitting regulations. The real diagnosis research divides into two parts to carry on, the first part selects 102 ST Corporation to take the sample from 1998 to 2002, analyzes the influence of quitting regulations which promulgated in 1998 and 2001 on the company earnings administrative action; The second part selects 160 loss companies from 2002 to 2005 to take the sample, analyzes the influence of the additional regulations for the quitting regulations which promulgated in 2003 on the earnings management action of the listed company.
The partⅣ. is conclusion of the paper, give the conclusion of the analysis and in the above findings foundation proposed the suggestion to consummates the quitting regulations of our country.
Comparing this article with predecessor's research have the following innovation and characteristic:
1st, this article belongs to the research of earnings management motive and researches the change of quitting regulations' influence on the earnings management of the listed company. The predecessor concentrates regarding the earnings management motive research to IPO Corporation and increases the share matching company or loses company. The research in the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company is very little and is only restricted in the standard analysis.
2nd, in this article we divide the analysis into three stages as the evolution process of the quitting regulations, unifies the evolution of various stages real diagnosis analysis the change of the earnings management action of the listed company, and discuss the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company.
3rd, research technique synthesis utilization: This article not only used the standard analysis method but also to unify the description analysis, should-countingprofit analysis method, DeAngelo model, the T examination, Mann-Whitney U examination and so on, analyzing the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company.
在此背景下，本文结合盈余管理的基本知识，利用深沪两地上市公司公开披露资料，采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法，检验我国证券监管部门陆续出台的退市规定对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响，并结合研究结论提出了完善我国退市监管制度的建议。本文内容分为四部分：
第一部分阐述盈余管理的基本理论。首先对国内外学术界关于盈余管理定义的代表性观点进行评述，得出本文对于盈余管理的定义，在此基础上分析盈余管理的特征及其必然性，然后阐述了盈余管理产生的理论基础——契约理论和信息不对称理论，及其对盈余管理理论的影响。
第二部分分析我国退市制度与盈余管理的关系。首先通过对较成熟证券市场退市规定和我国退市制度的分析比较，揭示我国现行退市制度的不足。然后，用规范研究方法分析退市制度对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响。主要探讨了我国的退市规定对上市公司利益相关者的影响，通过上市公司的数据统计分析退市制度颁布后被处理上市公司情况，以及上市公司撤销特别处理的主要措施，得出为了应对退市制度上市公司可能存在盈余管理行为的初步结论，并在此基础上提出退市制度对上市公司盈余管理行为影响的初步假设。
第三部分实证分析退市制度对上市公司盈余管理的影响，是体现本文创新的主要部分。我们根据第二部分的研究，将退市制度的演进过程分为三个阶段，分阶段分析退市制度的演变对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响。实证研究分成两部分进行，第一部分选取1998～2002年的102家被特别处理的公司作为样本，分析1998年和2001年出台的退市规定对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响；第二部分选取2002～2005年的160家亏损上市公司作为样本，分析2003年出台的有关退市的补充规定对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响。
第四部分结论。给出全文的研究结论，并且结合实证分析结论提出完善我国退市监管制度的建议。
与前人的研究相比本文主要有如下创新与特色：
1、本文研究了退市制度的变化对于上市公司盈余管理的影响，属于盈余管理动机研究领域，前人对于盈余管理动机的研究多集中于IPO公司，增配股公司或者亏损上市公司，很少涉及退市制度对上市公司盈余管理的影响，既使涉及也仅限于规范分析鲜见实证研究。
2、本文中退市制度对上市公司盈余管理行为影响的研究按退市制度的演进过程分三个阶段进行，结合各阶段退市制度的演变实证分析上市公司盈余管理行为的变化。分阶段进行研究，可以更清晰的揭示退市制度的演变对上市公司盈余管理的影响。
3、本文不仅采用了规范分析方法还结合了应计利润分析方法和迪安戈罗模型采用了描述性统计分析、t检验、Mann-Whitney U检验等实证分析方法，研究方法的综合运用可以更好的分析退市制度对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响。
Earnings management of the listed company has already become a stubborn illness on the stock market. The basic agent of the massive earnings management and even the finance default on our stock market lays in meeting the correlation supervising and managing requirements to realization equity financing goal. From this standpoint, some unreasonable supervisory laws and regulations in the stock market is one of the reasons, which lead to the earning management of the listed company. The quitting regulations of our securities market start to be later. The regulations has unceasingly developed from the regulation of ST(Special Treatment) of the public listed companies putted into practice since 1998, and some problems were found in process of government supervision. For example present quitting regulations directly relates the qualifications to the profit target, some company which should quit the stock market keep their qualifications through operated the profit target.
Under this background, with some basic knowledge of earnings management this paper using the public material of some listed company in China starts an investigation on the influence of the quitting regulations, which appears one after another in China's security market. This paper focuses on the influence of the evaluative quitting regulations to earnings management of some listed company in China. The thesis is made up of the following four parts:
The partⅠ: Introduced the earnings management elementary theory. Firstly comment on the representative viewpoint about the earnings management definition in domestic and foreign academic circles, obtains our definition about earnings management. Then it analyzed the characteristic and the inevitability of the earnings management, elaborated the contract theory and the no-asymmetrical information theory and its influence to earnings management theory.
The partⅡ: Introduced the relations of quitting regulations and the earnings management in our country. Firstly compared our quitting regulations with the promulgates in the mature stock market, opened out the insufficiency of our quitting regulations, studied the influence which the quitting regulation on the listed company's earnings management with the standard analysis method, mainly discussed the influence of quitting rules on the listed companies' benefit correlation in our country. By gathering the data of the listed companies we analysis the situation of the listed companies after promulgate the quitting rules, as well the main measure of the listed companies which has been special threatened abolish specially processes. Obtained in order to reply the quitting regulations the listed companies have the earnings administrative action. In this foundation we proposed the preliminary supposition of the influence that the quitting regulations have on the earnings management action of the listed companies.
The partⅢ: Analyzed the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company by the real diagnosis. This part is the main part which manifests the article innovates. According to the second part of research, we divide the analysis into three stages as the evolution process of the quitting regulations. The real diagnosis research divides into two parts to carry on, the first part selects 102 ST Corporation to take the sample from 1998 to 2002, analyzes the influence of quitting regulations which promulgated in 1998 and 2001 on the company earnings administrative action; The second part selects 160 loss companies from 2002 to 2005 to take the sample, analyzes the influence of the additional regulations for the quitting regulations which promulgated in 2003 on the earnings management action of the listed company.
The partⅣ. is conclusion of the paper, give the conclusion of the analysis and in the above findings foundation proposed the suggestion to consummates the quitting regulations of our country.
Comparing this article with predecessor's research have the following innovation and characteristic:
1st, this article belongs to the research of earnings management motive and researches the change of quitting regulations' influence on the earnings management of the listed company. The predecessor concentrates regarding the earnings management motive research to IPO Corporation and increases the share matching company or loses company. The research in the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company is very little and is only restricted in the standard analysis.
2nd, in this article we divide the analysis into three stages as the evolution process of the quitting regulations, unifies the evolution of various stages real diagnosis analysis the change of the earnings management action of the listed company, and discuss the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company.
3rd, research technique synthesis utilization: This article not only used the standard analysis method but also to unify the description analysis, should-countingprofit analysis method, DeAngelo model, the T examination, Mann-Whitney U examination and so on, analyzing the influence of the quitting regulations on the earnings management of the listed company.
引文
① 该定义引自Shipper K. Commentary: earnings management. Accounting Horizons. 1989 December:91～102.
① 魏明海 谭劲松 林舒．盈利管理研究[M]．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000：10～11．
① 根据《中华人民共和国证券法》2005年10月27日修订公布，自2006年1月1日起执行。
① 李斌．中国上市公司退市制度研究[D]．安徽：安徽大学经济法学，2003．
① 夏立军．国外盈余管理的计量方法述评[J]．外国经济与管理，2002(10)：34～37．
② 陆建桥等．中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[M]．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2002，8．
① 李吉栋．上市公司盈余管理分析[M]．北京：经济管理出版社，2006：44～51．
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① 魏明海 谭劲松 林舒．盈利管理研究[M]．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000：10～11．
① 根据《中华人民共和国证券法》2005年10月27日修订公布，自2006年1月1日起执行。
① 李斌．中国上市公司退市制度研究[D]．安徽：安徽大学经济法学，2003．
① 夏立军．国外盈余管理的计量方法述评[J]．外国经济与管理，2002(10)：34～37．
② 陆建桥等．中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[M]．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2002，8．
① 李吉栋．上市公司盈余管理分析[M]．北京：经济管理出版社，2006：44～51．
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