基于博弈论的食品冷链均衡研究
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摘要
摘要：食品冷链对于保证易腐食品从生产到消费过程中的质量安全具有重要的作用,同时易腐食品的质量也影响到食品冷链的运作。易腐食品在流通过程中特殊的低温要求及由此带来的管理难度,促使食品冷链中的参与者通过协同的方式组成合作整体参与食品冷链的运作,以降低运营成本、提高效益。因此,在食品冷链中的参与者组成合作整体的前提下,考虑食品质量随时间变化对食品冷链产生的影响,确定食品流通过程中合适的食品数量和价格,以顺利完成食品从生产到消费的过程,并使食品冷链各参与者均获得自己满意的利益,最终达到食品冷链均衡状态的研究是非常有意义的。
本文利用博弈论研究了食品冷链中供应商与销售商通过协同补货方式组成合作整体(供销整体)时的食品冷链均衡问题。根据本文研究内容的特点,在考虑食品质量对冷链产生影响的前提下,将食品冷链均衡研究分为两个阶段：首先分析研究供销整体与消费者通过非合作博弈达到利益最大化的均衡状态；接着在考虑供应商与销售商最大利益策略的基础上,分析研究两者通过合作博弈的讨价还价策略实现利益分配的均衡状态,最终确定了食品在供应商、销售商、消费者之间流通的数量和价格,各参与者获得满意利益,食品冷链达到均衡状态。实证与灵敏度分析验证了本文模型的科学性及有效性。
ABSTRACT:The food cold chain plays an important role in assuring the quality and safety of perishable food from production to consumption, meanwhile the perishable food quality will affect the food cold chain operation in turn. Due to the strict requirement and high cost of food cold chain, its participators are willing to form a cooperative entirety to reduce the cost and make more benefit. So it's very significance to research the problems of the food cold chain equilibrium under the condition of cooperative entirety and the influence of food quality to determine the appropriate food quantity and price to maximize the participator's benefit.
This dissertation applies the game theory to research the problems of food cold chain equilibrium when a supplier and a retailer form an entirety through collaborative replenishment. Considering the research characteristics and the affection of perishable food quality, first this dissertation discusses that the cooperative entirety and consumers reach the benefit maximization equilibrium under noncooperative game; second this dissertation discusses that the supplier and retailer reach the benefit distribution equilibrium under cooperative game. The empirical and sensitivity analysis have proved the scientific and effective of the proposed model.
This dissertation includes 16 figures,10 tables and 74 references.
本文利用博弈论研究了食品冷链中供应商与销售商通过协同补货方式组成合作整体(供销整体)时的食品冷链均衡问题。根据本文研究内容的特点,在考虑食品质量对冷链产生影响的前提下,将食品冷链均衡研究分为两个阶段：首先分析研究供销整体与消费者通过非合作博弈达到利益最大化的均衡状态；接着在考虑供应商与销售商最大利益策略的基础上,分析研究两者通过合作博弈的讨价还价策略实现利益分配的均衡状态,最终确定了食品在供应商、销售商、消费者之间流通的数量和价格,各参与者获得满意利益,食品冷链达到均衡状态。实证与灵敏度分析验证了本文模型的科学性及有效性。
ABSTRACT:The food cold chain plays an important role in assuring the quality and safety of perishable food from production to consumption, meanwhile the perishable food quality will affect the food cold chain operation in turn. Due to the strict requirement and high cost of food cold chain, its participators are willing to form a cooperative entirety to reduce the cost and make more benefit. So it's very significance to research the problems of the food cold chain equilibrium under the condition of cooperative entirety and the influence of food quality to determine the appropriate food quantity and price to maximize the participator's benefit.
This dissertation applies the game theory to research the problems of food cold chain equilibrium when a supplier and a retailer form an entirety through collaborative replenishment. Considering the research characteristics and the affection of perishable food quality, first this dissertation discusses that the cooperative entirety and consumers reach the benefit maximization equilibrium under noncooperative game; second this dissertation discusses that the supplier and retailer reach the benefit distribution equilibrium under cooperative game. The empirical and sensitivity analysis have proved the scientific and effective of the proposed model.
This dissertation includes 16 figures,10 tables and 74 references.
引文
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[17]百度百科. 博奕均衡 http://baike.baidu.com/view/1643490.htm.
[18]丁红红.基于博弈论的供应链管理中企业合作问题的研究[J].石家庄铁道学院学报(社会科学版),2009,3(3)：20-24.
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[20]张凌燕,池洁,黄曼.供应链联盟的博弈分析及模型构建研究[J].价值工程,2008,27(4)：70-73.
[21]庄浩,李博.关于物流企业战略联盟的博弈分析[J].商场现代化,2009,(6)：142.
[22]Jean-Claude Henneta, Yasemin Arda. Supply chain coordination:A game-theory approach [J]. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence,2008,21:399-405.
[23]徐菁鸿,贲立欣.基于Stackelberg均衡决策的三阶段逆向供应链决策与仿真应用[J].科技 信息,2010,6：12.
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[26]Yugang Yu, George Q, Huang Liang. Stackelberg game-theoretic model for optimizing advertising, pricing and inventory policies in vendor managed inventory (VMI) production supply chains [J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering,2009,57:368-382.
[27]邱映贵,程国平.供应链企业的均衡策略：基于完全竞争市场下的研究[J].商业研究,2010,2：19-22.
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