股权激励适用性研究
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摘要
鉴于国外实施股权激励制度的成功经验，国内很多人将建立股权激励制度作为解决当前国企改革面临的问题的希望所在。事实上，股权激励制度并不能解决国企的产权制度问题，而且国内现有的不成熟环境也极大程度的限制了股权激励制度功效的发挥。究竟ST公司年薪收入最高、高管人员高昂的职位消费等这些怪现象产生的内在原因是什么，完全是由于激励不足造成的吗?本文试图从近年来理论界研究成果的基础上，结合上市公司的年报数据的实证研究结果，对上述问题进行分析，同时建立股权激励条件模型，希望能够为企业选择股权激励提供建议和帮助。
本文的创新点集中在第一章理论分析部分和第三章股权激励条件模型的建立和条件分析部分。
在理论分析部分，对当前理论界作为股权激励支持理论的代理理论、企业家理论和人力资本理论以及X效率理论等进行是阐述和内涵要求和条件分析。最后得出了结论：各种理论所蕴涵的治理结构、人才市场，业绩标准等在中国企业中还不完全具备，中国企业发展良莠不齐，目前在中国企业界全面提倡和推行股权激励的时机还不成熟，可以在条件成熟的企业中试点进行。
在实证分析部分，首先分析了我国经营者持股的演进过程，对我国上市公司决策机制、控制机制和约束机制现状进行了分析，通过实证，总结了上市公司治理结构中存在的问题和严重缺陷。进一步重申了建立和完善公司内部治理结构和外部约束机制，是在公司实行股权激励的必要前提和重要保证。同时还总结了中国近年实行股权激励的七种模式，并进行了利弊分析和在实践中经济效益。
最后，在上述理论分析和实证分析的基础上，从公司治理结构、人才选聘机制、绩效考核制度和业绩标准方面构建了股权激励条件模型，同时分析了中国目前法律体制方面存在着许多阻碍股权激励的因素。
Whereas Stock Incentive System had successful experience in western countries, many people expect it could solve the problems of State-Owned Enterprises in the reform process in China as well.
In fact, Stock Incentive System can not ravel out problems in Property Right System of State-Owned Enterprises. Moreover, the performance of Stock Incentive System is limited by the existing immature environment of China.
What are the intrinsic factors of expensive cost in senior management level that has the highest income in ST Company? Is it just because of lacking motivation? Based on latest academic theories of the economist, this thesis analyses the statistics from annual report of listed company in Stock market in a simulated Stock Incentive System and I hope it could provide a clearer idea to the enterprise when they want choose Stock Incentive System as strategic tool.
The innovative parts of this thesis are Chapter One, theoretical analysis and chapter three, conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System and analysis.
The theoretical analysis emphasizes on illustrating and deep-analyzing the theories such as: Supported theories of Share Incentive Theory; Entrepreneur Theory; Human Resource Capital Theory; X Effect Theory. By conclusion, the Chinese enterprise does not possess the fundamental conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System implied in those theories in aspects of social structure, labor market, achievement standard etc. Due to the big gap in the development of Chinese enterprises, it is no the right time to conduct Stock Incentive System in all the enterprises in China. The feasible plan is make experiment in the qualified enterprises which meets most of the theoretical conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System.
In the argument and analysis part, it analyzes the evolution process of MBO (management buy-out) and then the current status of decision-making mechanism, control mechanism, restriction mechanism of listed company in Chinese stock market. Via the foregoing information, I found out that there are many serious problems and vices existing in management mechanism of listed companies in China. The integrated management mechanism and restriction mechanism from outside are the
prerequisites and necessary conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System. The thesis also concludes the seven incentive modes in Stock Incentive System and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages in aspect of economic effect.
According to the analysis above, eventually, the thesis establishes an incentive mode from four parts: management structure, recruitment mechanism, performance assessment and achievement mechanism and also analyzes legal obstacles of Stock Incentive System.
本文的创新点集中在第一章理论分析部分和第三章股权激励条件模型的建立和条件分析部分。
在理论分析部分，对当前理论界作为股权激励支持理论的代理理论、企业家理论和人力资本理论以及X效率理论等进行是阐述和内涵要求和条件分析。最后得出了结论：各种理论所蕴涵的治理结构、人才市场，业绩标准等在中国企业中还不完全具备，中国企业发展良莠不齐，目前在中国企业界全面提倡和推行股权激励的时机还不成熟，可以在条件成熟的企业中试点进行。
在实证分析部分，首先分析了我国经营者持股的演进过程，对我国上市公司决策机制、控制机制和约束机制现状进行了分析，通过实证，总结了上市公司治理结构中存在的问题和严重缺陷。进一步重申了建立和完善公司内部治理结构和外部约束机制，是在公司实行股权激励的必要前提和重要保证。同时还总结了中国近年实行股权激励的七种模式，并进行了利弊分析和在实践中经济效益。
最后，在上述理论分析和实证分析的基础上，从公司治理结构、人才选聘机制、绩效考核制度和业绩标准方面构建了股权激励条件模型，同时分析了中国目前法律体制方面存在着许多阻碍股权激励的因素。
Whereas Stock Incentive System had successful experience in western countries, many people expect it could solve the problems of State-Owned Enterprises in the reform process in China as well.
In fact, Stock Incentive System can not ravel out problems in Property Right System of State-Owned Enterprises. Moreover, the performance of Stock Incentive System is limited by the existing immature environment of China.
What are the intrinsic factors of expensive cost in senior management level that has the highest income in ST Company? Is it just because of lacking motivation? Based on latest academic theories of the economist, this thesis analyses the statistics from annual report of listed company in Stock market in a simulated Stock Incentive System and I hope it could provide a clearer idea to the enterprise when they want choose Stock Incentive System as strategic tool.
The innovative parts of this thesis are Chapter One, theoretical analysis and chapter three, conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System and analysis.
The theoretical analysis emphasizes on illustrating and deep-analyzing the theories such as: Supported theories of Share Incentive Theory; Entrepreneur Theory; Human Resource Capital Theory; X Effect Theory. By conclusion, the Chinese enterprise does not possess the fundamental conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System implied in those theories in aspects of social structure, labor market, achievement standard etc. Due to the big gap in the development of Chinese enterprises, it is no the right time to conduct Stock Incentive System in all the enterprises in China. The feasible plan is make experiment in the qualified enterprises which meets most of the theoretical conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System.
In the argument and analysis part, it analyzes the evolution process of MBO (management buy-out) and then the current status of decision-making mechanism, control mechanism, restriction mechanism of listed company in Chinese stock market. Via the foregoing information, I found out that there are many serious problems and vices existing in management mechanism of listed companies in China. The integrated management mechanism and restriction mechanism from outside are the
prerequisites and necessary conditions to conduct Stock Incentive System. The thesis also concludes the seven incentive modes in Stock Incentive System and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages in aspect of economic effect.
According to the analysis above, eventually, the thesis establishes an incentive mode from four parts: management structure, recruitment mechanism, performance assessment and achievement mechanism and also analyzes legal obstacles of Stock Incentive System.
引文
1、上海证券交易所研究中心，《公司治理：国际经验与中国实践》 2001
2、潘敏 《资本结构、金融契约与公司治理》 2002 中国经济出版社
3、(美)安妮．布鲁金(赵洁平译) 《第三资源 智力资本及其研究》 1998 东北财大出版社
4、赵小雷 《现代公司产权理论与实务》，上海财经大学出版社，1997年3月。
5、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《股票期权实证研究》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
6、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《股票期权激励制度法规政策研究报告》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
7、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《公司薪酬制度概论》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
8、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《美国企业的股票期权计划》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
9、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《可变薪酬体系原理与应用》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
10、(美)迈克儿．比尔 《管理人力资本》 1998 华夏出版社
11、叶民 《双赢策略与制度激励》 2002 社会科学出版社
12、王阳、李斌 《从员工持股到MBO》 2001 机械工业出版社
2、潘敏 《资本结构、金融契约与公司治理》 2002 中国经济出版社
3、(美)安妮．布鲁金(赵洁平译) 《第三资源 智力资本及其研究》 1998 东北财大出版社
4、赵小雷 《现代公司产权理论与实务》，上海财经大学出版社，1997年3月。
5、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《股票期权实证研究》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
6、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《股票期权激励制度法规政策研究报告》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
7、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《公司薪酬制度概论》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
8、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《美国企业的股票期权计划》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
9、陈清泰、吴敬琏主编 《可变薪酬体系原理与应用》 2001年 中国财政经济出版社。
10、(美)迈克儿．比尔 《管理人力资本》 1998 华夏出版社
11、叶民 《双赢策略与制度激励》 2002 社会科学出版社
12、王阳、李斌 《从员工持股到MBO》 2001 机械工业出版社