银行特许权价值和稳健性的关系研究
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摘要
银行特许权价值是国家通过对银行业的市场准入、利率定价等方面设置的限制,为银行创造了垄断竞争市场,银行在这种垄断竞争的市场上通过自身的经营而获取的超额垄断利润的净现值。2006年底《中华人民共和国外资银行管理条例》的推出,标志着中国银行业已进入全面开放的新时期。外资银行的进入以后与国内银行展开全面竞争,它们通过“摘樱桃”效应吸引优质客户,导致国内银行特许权价值的降低,不利于银行体系稳健性。与国外的商业银行监管政策不同的是,中国的商业银行长期处于国家的隐性保护之下,这种保护不可避免地会增加银行的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”激励,导致商业银行长期被不良资产问题所困扰。如果忽视了强化稳健经营的动机,那么银行的竞争力与银行体系的安全性,乃至整个国家的金融系统的安全将受到严重挑战。因此,在当前的形势下对比中美两国商业银行特许权价值自律效应的不同,特别是吸取国外商业银行的经营过程中的教训,对于提高银行特许权价值,增加银行稳健性具有重大的理论和现实意义。
围绕这个主题,根据研究目的以及独特的研究视角,本文将以特许权价值和银行稳健性的关系为主线,重点研究以下主要内容：
(一)特许权价值和银行稳健性的度量。银行特许权价值一般包含两部分内容：一部分是政府的特许所获得市场相关的垄断收益；另一部分是由于银行自己的经营效率所获得的收益。托宾Q值不仅包含了因自身优势而导致的竞争优势租金,而且还包含了政府特许而产生的租金,可以用来度量特许权价值。影响银行稳健性的因素很多,既有制度与体制因素,又有经营环境因素,同时还有银行客户的心理与行为因素,因此衡量银行稳健性的指标应该全面反映这些因素。但是考虑指标的可得性和可行性,以及风险监管是我国银行业稳健经营的核心问题,本文从稳定性指标中选取贷款损失准备金率、不良贷款率,从健康类指标中选取净资产收益率作为衡量银行稳健性的指标。
(二)特许权价值和银行稳健性关系的理论基础及形成机理分析。在对金融约束理论、租金激励理论、内生激励的监管理论分析的基础上,从不同角度阐述了特许权价值的自律效应的原理。同时还介绍了苑素静的“价值—危机’模型,Keeley的状态偏好模型和Park两阶段模型的内容。然后对Park两阶段模型进行改进,推导特许权价值和银行稳健性的多阶段模型,得出特许权价值长期能够促进银行稳健经营的结论。
(三)中美商业银行特许权价值与稳健性的实证检验。通过运用14家中国上市银行2000—2009年的以及美国44家上市银行2003—2009年的面板数据,以贷款损失准备金比率、不良贷款率、净资产收益率来衡量的银行稳健性为被解释变量,用基于托宾Q值计算各上市银行的特许权价值及资产规模、财务杠杆、资本杠杆等为解释变量,对中国上市银行以政府监管、隐性保险为虚拟变量,构建多元回归模型进行实证分析,得出以下结论：中美两国商业银行特许权价值的自律作用都存在,特许权价值能够促进银行的稳健经营；中美两国的银行规模与银行稳健性存在正相关关系；中国的隐性保险制度削弱了特许权价值对银行稳健性的影响；美国商业银行比较善于利用资本杠杆和经营杠杆,提高银行的特许权价值。
(四)基于特许权价值影响因素的银行稳健性预警。特许权价值和银行稳健性之间存在着正相关关系,银行的特许权价值越高,银行的稳健性越好。因此,根据对银行特许权价值的影响因素的分析,从市场相关硬因素和银行自身相关的软因素选取16个指标,构建商业银行稳健性评价指标体系,并基于改进BP神经网络建立商业银行稳健性预警模式。选取美国商业银行2003—2009年的数据(2003-2007年的指标数据,2009年银行稳健性的状态)作为训练样本进行模拟,然后用中国商业银行2005—2009年的数据作为检验样本进行检验,发现中国商业银行整体的稳健性较好。但是由于中国商业银行受到国家“隐性保险”照顾,稳健性较好是国家帮助的结果,而要真正做到稳健经营,必须依靠自身的经营。因此中国商业银行有必要采取措施,提高特许权价值,增加银行稳健性。
(五)提高特许权价值,增加我国商业银行稳健性的对策建议。银行要提高自身的特许权价值,增加银行稳健性,既要注重“银行相关部分”(银行核心竞争力)各个因素的提高,又要注重“市场相关部分”(政府对银行设置的监管政策)各个因素的提高。因此应该从提升商业银行的经营效率；拓展商业银行业务范围；完善商业银行内控制度等方面提高银行的核心竞争力。还可以通过实行“渐进式”的金融自由化政策；加强对银行的有效监管；建立显性保险制度；建立以特许权价值为核心的银行稳健性预警机制来完善现有的监管制度。
在前人研究的基础上,本文在以下几个方面进行了创新：
(1)在Park两阶段模型基础上进行改进,推导特许权价值和银行稳健性的多阶段模型,得出特许权价值长期能够促进银行稳健经营的结论。
(2)构建中国银行特许权价值和银行稳健性的计量经济模型,然后用2000-2009年14个中国上市商业银行的数据进行实证分析,验证特许权价值和银行稳健性的相关关系。
(3)构建美国银行特许权价值和银行稳健性的计量经济模型,用2003-2009年44家美国商业银行的数据进行实证分析,并把结果跟中国商业银行进行比较,发现两国商业银行内部控制和外部监管的不同,为提高中国商业银行特许权价值,增加银行稳健性提供对策建议。
(4)以特许权价值的影响因素作为预警指标,构建基于改进BP神经网络的银行稳健性预警模式。
本文最终希望达到一个目的：通过对影响银行特许权价值的因素的分析和思考,采取各种措施提高银行特许权价值以抑制其风险动机,实现银行的稳健经营,促进我国银行业的健康规范发展,保护储户的切身利益,有效配置银行的各类资源,提高银行的经营效率,积极应对金融全球化和次贷危机的对于银行业的影响。
The state creates a monopolistic competition market by limiting banking market access and interest rate price, net present value of excess monopoly profits that the bank obtains through its own operations from such a competitive market is franchise value. Franchise value generally consists of two parts:one is market-related revenue that obtains from the government license; the other part is the revenue that obtains from their own business efficiency. From the meaning of franchise value we can see: the origin of franchise value is from external environment and internal mechanisms. Franchise value is the excess return of bank's advantages, the specific advantages include monopoly advantages, liabilities of business advantage, information advantage, transaction cost advantage and reputation advantages.
By the end of 2006, "Regulations of foreign banks of the People's Republic of China" had been published, which means China's banking industry has entered a new opening up period. Foreign banks compete with domestic banks, they attract quality customers by "cherry effect", which resulted in lower bank franchise value, is not conducive to the stability of the banking system. Different from foreign commercial banks, in Chinese commercial banks are under long hidden the protection of the country, such protection inevitably would increase the banks' "adverse selection" and "moral hazard", which would result in non-performing loans, so the bank's stability is relatively poor. If we neglect to strengthen the motive of the stability operation, then the competitiveness of the banks, the security of the banks'and the whole finance system will be seriously challenged. Therefore, in the current situation, comparing franchise value self-regulation effect of Sino-US commercial bank is important to increase franchise value and increase the stability of the banks.
On this theme, based on the purpose and a unique research perspective, this article will take franchise value and bank relationships as the main line, focus on the following main contents:
(1) The measure of franchise value and bank stability. Franchise value generally consists of two parts:one is market-related revenue that obtains from the government license; the other part is the revenue that obtains from their own business efficiency. Tobin Q value includes the two parts, so it can be used to measure the franchise value. There are many factors affecting the stability of banks, such as system and institutional factors, the business environment factors, banking customers the psychological and behavioral factors, the measure of bank stability should fully reflect these factors. However, given the available and feasibility of the index, this article selects LRR, NPL and ROE to measure the bank stability.
(2) The foundation theory of the self-regulation effect of franchise value. Basing on financial constraints theory, rent incentive theory and endogenous incentives supervision theory, this part introduces the theory of the self-regulation effect from different point of view, finds that the franchise value can lead the bank to control risks and encourage banks'stability operation. This part also introduces "value-the crisis" model, Park's two-stage model and Keeley's preference model. And then the article derive multi-stage model of franchise value and the bank stability, found that: franchise value can contribute to the long-term stable operation of banks
(3) The Sino-US comparative analysis of the relationship between franchise value and bank stability. we construct the econometric model of franchise value and bank stability, use uses the 14 listed banks'unbalanced panel data from 2000 to 2009 and 44 listed banks panel data from 2003 to 2009 to test econometric model. Found that:commercial banks in China and the U.S. all have self-regulatory effect of franchise value; Sino-US bank size and banking stability are positively correlated; China's implicit insurance system weakened the franchise value effect of bank stability; U.S. commercial banks make better use of capital leverage and operating leverage increasing franchise value of banks.
(4) Bank stability correcting mechanism based on the factors of franchise value. There is a positive correlation between franchise value and bank stability, the bank's franchise value higher, the better the stability of banks. Therefore, based on the affective factors of franchise value, we select 16 indexes from the market factors and the bank factors, to construct stability of the banks evaluation index system, and construct commercial banks early warning mechanism by BP neural network. And then select the data of U.S. commercial banks 2003-2009 as training samples to simulate, use commercial bank of China data from 2005-2009 as the test samples, and discovers that the stability of China's commercial banks is worse.
(5) Suggestions of enhancing the franchise value and increase the stability of China's commercial banks. If banks want to improve their own franchise value, increase the stability of the banks, that is, not only to pay attention to "the relevant part of the bank" (Bank of core competencies), but also pay attention to "the relevant parts of the market" (the government's supervision of banks set policy). So we could increase the core competitiveness of the banks, appropriate to introduce competition mechanism to prevent excessive monopoly, introduce explicit insurance system to increase bank franchise value and enhance the stability of the banks.
Based on previous research, this paper innovates in the following aspects:
(1) Based on park's model, the article derive multi-stage model of franchise value and the bank stability, found that:franchise value can contribute to the long-term stable operation of banks
(2) This article constructs the econometric of model franchise value and bank stability, then use the data of Chinese Commercial Bank from 2000-2009 to test the econometric of model, verify the positive correlation of franchise value and bank stability.
(3) And then this article use the data of U.S. Commercial Bank from 2003-2009 to test the econometric of model, and the results were compared with commercial banks in China, found that internal control and external regulation is different from each other, which provide countermeasures to enhance the franchise value of Chinese commercial banks and increase the stability of the banks.
(4) This article constructs improved BP neural network of early warning models of bank stability based on the franchise value of factors.
The propose of this article is:based on the influence factors of bank franchise value analysis and reflection, take various measures to enhance the franchise value of banks in order to achieve the banking stability, and promote the health development of Chinese banking, and protect the vital interests of depositors, effectively allocate the resources of banks, improve operational efficiency of banks, actively respond to the influence of financial globalization and sub-debt crisis.
围绕这个主题,根据研究目的以及独特的研究视角,本文将以特许权价值和银行稳健性的关系为主线,重点研究以下主要内容：
(一)特许权价值和银行稳健性的度量。银行特许权价值一般包含两部分内容：一部分是政府的特许所获得市场相关的垄断收益；另一部分是由于银行自己的经营效率所获得的收益。托宾Q值不仅包含了因自身优势而导致的竞争优势租金,而且还包含了政府特许而产生的租金,可以用来度量特许权价值。影响银行稳健性的因素很多,既有制度与体制因素,又有经营环境因素,同时还有银行客户的心理与行为因素,因此衡量银行稳健性的指标应该全面反映这些因素。但是考虑指标的可得性和可行性,以及风险监管是我国银行业稳健经营的核心问题,本文从稳定性指标中选取贷款损失准备金率、不良贷款率,从健康类指标中选取净资产收益率作为衡量银行稳健性的指标。
(二)特许权价值和银行稳健性关系的理论基础及形成机理分析。在对金融约束理论、租金激励理论、内生激励的监管理论分析的基础上,从不同角度阐述了特许权价值的自律效应的原理。同时还介绍了苑素静的“价值—危机’模型,Keeley的状态偏好模型和Park两阶段模型的内容。然后对Park两阶段模型进行改进,推导特许权价值和银行稳健性的多阶段模型,得出特许权价值长期能够促进银行稳健经营的结论。
(三)中美商业银行特许权价值与稳健性的实证检验。通过运用14家中国上市银行2000—2009年的以及美国44家上市银行2003—2009年的面板数据,以贷款损失准备金比率、不良贷款率、净资产收益率来衡量的银行稳健性为被解释变量,用基于托宾Q值计算各上市银行的特许权价值及资产规模、财务杠杆、资本杠杆等为解释变量,对中国上市银行以政府监管、隐性保险为虚拟变量,构建多元回归模型进行实证分析,得出以下结论：中美两国商业银行特许权价值的自律作用都存在,特许权价值能够促进银行的稳健经营；中美两国的银行规模与银行稳健性存在正相关关系；中国的隐性保险制度削弱了特许权价值对银行稳健性的影响；美国商业银行比较善于利用资本杠杆和经营杠杆,提高银行的特许权价值。
(四)基于特许权价值影响因素的银行稳健性预警。特许权价值和银行稳健性之间存在着正相关关系,银行的特许权价值越高,银行的稳健性越好。因此,根据对银行特许权价值的影响因素的分析,从市场相关硬因素和银行自身相关的软因素选取16个指标,构建商业银行稳健性评价指标体系,并基于改进BP神经网络建立商业银行稳健性预警模式。选取美国商业银行2003—2009年的数据(2003-2007年的指标数据,2009年银行稳健性的状态)作为训练样本进行模拟,然后用中国商业银行2005—2009年的数据作为检验样本进行检验,发现中国商业银行整体的稳健性较好。但是由于中国商业银行受到国家“隐性保险”照顾,稳健性较好是国家帮助的结果,而要真正做到稳健经营,必须依靠自身的经营。因此中国商业银行有必要采取措施,提高特许权价值,增加银行稳健性。
(五)提高特许权价值,增加我国商业银行稳健性的对策建议。银行要提高自身的特许权价值,增加银行稳健性,既要注重“银行相关部分”(银行核心竞争力)各个因素的提高,又要注重“市场相关部分”(政府对银行设置的监管政策)各个因素的提高。因此应该从提升商业银行的经营效率；拓展商业银行业务范围；完善商业银行内控制度等方面提高银行的核心竞争力。还可以通过实行“渐进式”的金融自由化政策；加强对银行的有效监管；建立显性保险制度；建立以特许权价值为核心的银行稳健性预警机制来完善现有的监管制度。
在前人研究的基础上,本文在以下几个方面进行了创新：
(1)在Park两阶段模型基础上进行改进,推导特许权价值和银行稳健性的多阶段模型,得出特许权价值长期能够促进银行稳健经营的结论。
(2)构建中国银行特许权价值和银行稳健性的计量经济模型,然后用2000-2009年14个中国上市商业银行的数据进行实证分析,验证特许权价值和银行稳健性的相关关系。
(3)构建美国银行特许权价值和银行稳健性的计量经济模型,用2003-2009年44家美国商业银行的数据进行实证分析,并把结果跟中国商业银行进行比较,发现两国商业银行内部控制和外部监管的不同,为提高中国商业银行特许权价值,增加银行稳健性提供对策建议。
(4)以特许权价值的影响因素作为预警指标,构建基于改进BP神经网络的银行稳健性预警模式。
本文最终希望达到一个目的：通过对影响银行特许权价值的因素的分析和思考,采取各种措施提高银行特许权价值以抑制其风险动机,实现银行的稳健经营,促进我国银行业的健康规范发展,保护储户的切身利益,有效配置银行的各类资源,提高银行的经营效率,积极应对金融全球化和次贷危机的对于银行业的影响。
The state creates a monopolistic competition market by limiting banking market access and interest rate price, net present value of excess monopoly profits that the bank obtains through its own operations from such a competitive market is franchise value. Franchise value generally consists of two parts:one is market-related revenue that obtains from the government license; the other part is the revenue that obtains from their own business efficiency. From the meaning of franchise value we can see: the origin of franchise value is from external environment and internal mechanisms. Franchise value is the excess return of bank's advantages, the specific advantages include monopoly advantages, liabilities of business advantage, information advantage, transaction cost advantage and reputation advantages.
By the end of 2006, "Regulations of foreign banks of the People's Republic of China" had been published, which means China's banking industry has entered a new opening up period. Foreign banks compete with domestic banks, they attract quality customers by "cherry effect", which resulted in lower bank franchise value, is not conducive to the stability of the banking system. Different from foreign commercial banks, in Chinese commercial banks are under long hidden the protection of the country, such protection inevitably would increase the banks' "adverse selection" and "moral hazard", which would result in non-performing loans, so the bank's stability is relatively poor. If we neglect to strengthen the motive of the stability operation, then the competitiveness of the banks, the security of the banks'and the whole finance system will be seriously challenged. Therefore, in the current situation, comparing franchise value self-regulation effect of Sino-US commercial bank is important to increase franchise value and increase the stability of the banks.
On this theme, based on the purpose and a unique research perspective, this article will take franchise value and bank relationships as the main line, focus on the following main contents:
(1) The measure of franchise value and bank stability. Franchise value generally consists of two parts:one is market-related revenue that obtains from the government license; the other part is the revenue that obtains from their own business efficiency. Tobin Q value includes the two parts, so it can be used to measure the franchise value. There are many factors affecting the stability of banks, such as system and institutional factors, the business environment factors, banking customers the psychological and behavioral factors, the measure of bank stability should fully reflect these factors. However, given the available and feasibility of the index, this article selects LRR, NPL and ROE to measure the bank stability.
(2) The foundation theory of the self-regulation effect of franchise value. Basing on financial constraints theory, rent incentive theory and endogenous incentives supervision theory, this part introduces the theory of the self-regulation effect from different point of view, finds that the franchise value can lead the bank to control risks and encourage banks'stability operation. This part also introduces "value-the crisis" model, Park's two-stage model and Keeley's preference model. And then the article derive multi-stage model of franchise value and the bank stability, found that: franchise value can contribute to the long-term stable operation of banks
(3) The Sino-US comparative analysis of the relationship between franchise value and bank stability. we construct the econometric model of franchise value and bank stability, use uses the 14 listed banks'unbalanced panel data from 2000 to 2009 and 44 listed banks panel data from 2003 to 2009 to test econometric model. Found that:commercial banks in China and the U.S. all have self-regulatory effect of franchise value; Sino-US bank size and banking stability are positively correlated; China's implicit insurance system weakened the franchise value effect of bank stability; U.S. commercial banks make better use of capital leverage and operating leverage increasing franchise value of banks.
(4) Bank stability correcting mechanism based on the factors of franchise value. There is a positive correlation between franchise value and bank stability, the bank's franchise value higher, the better the stability of banks. Therefore, based on the affective factors of franchise value, we select 16 indexes from the market factors and the bank factors, to construct stability of the banks evaluation index system, and construct commercial banks early warning mechanism by BP neural network. And then select the data of U.S. commercial banks 2003-2009 as training samples to simulate, use commercial bank of China data from 2005-2009 as the test samples, and discovers that the stability of China's commercial banks is worse.
(5) Suggestions of enhancing the franchise value and increase the stability of China's commercial banks. If banks want to improve their own franchise value, increase the stability of the banks, that is, not only to pay attention to "the relevant part of the bank" (Bank of core competencies), but also pay attention to "the relevant parts of the market" (the government's supervision of banks set policy). So we could increase the core competitiveness of the banks, appropriate to introduce competition mechanism to prevent excessive monopoly, introduce explicit insurance system to increase bank franchise value and enhance the stability of the banks.
Based on previous research, this paper innovates in the following aspects:
(1) Based on park's model, the article derive multi-stage model of franchise value and the bank stability, found that:franchise value can contribute to the long-term stable operation of banks
(2) This article constructs the econometric of model franchise value and bank stability, then use the data of Chinese Commercial Bank from 2000-2009 to test the econometric of model, verify the positive correlation of franchise value and bank stability.
(3) And then this article use the data of U.S. Commercial Bank from 2003-2009 to test the econometric of model, and the results were compared with commercial banks in China, found that internal control and external regulation is different from each other, which provide countermeasures to enhance the franchise value of Chinese commercial banks and increase the stability of the banks.
(4) This article constructs improved BP neural network of early warning models of bank stability based on the franchise value of factors.
The propose of this article is:based on the influence factors of bank franchise value analysis and reflection, take various measures to enhance the franchise value of banks in order to achieve the banking stability, and promote the health development of Chinese banking, and protect the vital interests of depositors, effectively allocate the resources of banks, improve operational efficiency of banks, actively respond to the influence of financial globalization and sub-debt crisis.
引文
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