中国上市公司治理结构与成长性
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摘要
发展中国资本市场是国家战略任务,而上市公司作为我国社会主义市场经济中最重要的微观主体,是中国资本市场的基石,成为推动并决定国民经济发展速度和水平的中坚力量。然而我国上市公司却频频因为各种治理问题严重阻碍了其成长性,有的甚至中途夭折、过早退出历史舞台,已经影响到我国资本市场乃至整个国民经济的健康发展!公司治理结构作为上市公司运行的基础,对上市公司的稳定、持续和健康发展具有决定性的作用,对上市公司的成长具有重要的影响。因此,本文选择我国上市公司治理结构与成长性作为研究课题对于有效构建具有中国特色的上市公司治理结构、整体提高我国上市公司成长性具有时代紧迫性和重要的理论与现实意义。
本研究采用理论与实践相结合、规范研究与实证分析相结合的研究方法,以经济学、管理学、实证会计学以及计量经济学理论为指导,在充分把握公司治理和企业成长领域内相关的理论和实证文献资料的基础上,以转轨时期中国上市公司为研究对象,动态地对我国上市公司治理结构与成长性的内在作用关系进行深入、系统的分析研究,以期发现从根本上整体提高我国上市公司成长性的公司治理结构并付诸于实践。
首先,本文系统回顾了国内外有关公司治理结构、企业成长的理论与实证研究文献,并对本文采用的公司治理结构、企业成长性等概念进行了界定。在回顾总结现有企业成长性评价方法优缺点的基础上,提出将主成分分析法等计量经济学的研究成果应用于我国上市公司成长性的综合评价,建立了由1个一级指标、4个二级指标和12个三级指标构成的上市公司成长性综合评价体系和模型,并根据2001～2005年连续五年的成长性综合得分排序,得出高、低不同成长性公司并通过市场检验。
其次,依托经济学的委托代理理论和基于资源和能力的企业成长理论,结合我国资本市场和上市公司的特征,着重从股权结构、董事会治理和管理层激励等三个维度对我国上市公司治理结构与公司成长性的内在作用机理进行了深入、系统的理论分析。然后,以本文采用主成份分析法得出的不同成长性上市公司为研究样本,在控制了公司规模、行业属性、财务杠杆等因素的前提下,运用计量统计方法对上市公司治理结构与成长性关系进行了实证研究,得到以下结论：
在股权结构与公司成长性方面,国有股比例与成长性存在负相关关系但不显著,法人股比例对公司成长性具有明显的促进作用,而流通股比例与公司的成长性显著负相关；同时,第一大股东持股比例与公司成长性负相关但不显著,前五大股东持股比例、第二至第五大股东持股数之和与第一大股东持股数的比例对公司成长性构成显著的正向作用。
在董事会治理与公司成长性方面,研究发现董事会规模、董事受教育程度对公司成长性构成明显的积极影响,独立董事比例以及董事会会议次数、董事会专业委员会设立状况与公司成长性存在较弱的正相关关系,而董事长与总经理两职状态对公司成长性并不构成显著影响。
在管理层激励与公司成长性关系方面,研究发现上市公司管理层年薪水平对公司成长性具有十分明显的促进作用,表明在我国上市公司中年薪是目前较为重要的管理层激励因素；而管理层持股比例对公司成长性有积极影响,但其激励效应并未完全突显。
最后,本文根据研究结果并结合我国实际国情,从股权治理、董事会治理、管理层激励以及外部治理环境等方面提出了健全和完善上市公司治理结构、提高上市公司整体成长性的对策建议。通过本文研究,能够有效弥补国内外在该领域研究的不足,有利于公司治理理论和企业成长理论的丰富和发展；同时,为我国上市公司建立良好公司治理结构、实现可持续成长提供现实指导。
The development of Chinese capital market is a national strategic task. As the most important micro-management bodies of Chinese socialist market economy, listed companies are the cornerstone of Chinese capital market, and become the backbone which promotes and decides the development of Chinese national economy. However, Chinese listed companies exist various corporate governance problems and block the growth seriously, some even die too early, thus affected the healthy development of Chinese capital market and the national economy! As operating foundation, corporate governance structure plays decisive role in the stable growth of listed companies in China. So the paper chooses a popular topic and has both theoretical and realistic significance.
With economics, management and econometrics theory as a guide, the paper uses the research methods of combining theory with practice, normative research and empirical analysis to study systematically and dynamically inner relationship between the corporate governance structure listed companies in China and their growth on the basis of fully grasping theoretical and empirical literature of the corporate governance and enterprise growth, in order to find good corporate governance structure during the transitional period which improves fundamentally overall growth of listed companies in China and put into practice.
The author defines the corporate governance structure and firm growth in this paper after reviewing related literatures systematically and establishes a comprehensive evaluation system and model of the growth of listed companies, which having one first-level indicator, four second-level indicators and twelve third-level indicators based on the analysis of principal component and empirically studies the growth.
Based on the principal-agent theory and the enterprise growth theory of the resource-ability, the paper theoretically studies internal mechanism of the corporate governance structure and the growth of Chinese listed companies from three dimensions of ownership structure, the board governance and the management incentive. Then we empirically study the relationship between corporate governance structure and the growth of Chinese listed companies, and reach conclusions as following.
1. The proportion of state-owned shares is negatively related to the growth but not significant, the proportion of corporate shares is significantly positive related to the growth, the proportion of tradable shares is significantly negative related to the growth; share proportion of the largest shareholder is negatively related to the growth but not significant, share proportion of the top five shareholders is significantly positive related to the growth, and the proportion of the shares of the second to the fifth largest shareholders among the top five shareholders is significantly positive related to the growth.
2. Both the board size and directors' knowledge are significantly positive related to the growth, duality of COB and CEO is positively related to the growth but not significant, the ratio of independent directors is positively related to the growth but not significant, both the board meetings and whether the board consists of professional committees are positively related to the growth but not significant.
3. The study on the management incentive finds that the annual salary of management is significantly positive related to the growth, and the share proportion of management is positively related to firm growth but not significant.
Finally, this paper provides with some advice which sound and complete corporate governance structure to improve the overall growth of Chinese listed companies. Theoretically the study will make up for the lack of researches on the theme, perfect and develop governance theory and the growth theory. Practically it will help provide guidance to establish good corporate governance structure and promote the growth of Chinese listed companies.
本研究采用理论与实践相结合、规范研究与实证分析相结合的研究方法,以经济学、管理学、实证会计学以及计量经济学理论为指导,在充分把握公司治理和企业成长领域内相关的理论和实证文献资料的基础上,以转轨时期中国上市公司为研究对象,动态地对我国上市公司治理结构与成长性的内在作用关系进行深入、系统的分析研究,以期发现从根本上整体提高我国上市公司成长性的公司治理结构并付诸于实践。
首先,本文系统回顾了国内外有关公司治理结构、企业成长的理论与实证研究文献,并对本文采用的公司治理结构、企业成长性等概念进行了界定。在回顾总结现有企业成长性评价方法优缺点的基础上,提出将主成分分析法等计量经济学的研究成果应用于我国上市公司成长性的综合评价,建立了由1个一级指标、4个二级指标和12个三级指标构成的上市公司成长性综合评价体系和模型,并根据2001～2005年连续五年的成长性综合得分排序,得出高、低不同成长性公司并通过市场检验。
其次,依托经济学的委托代理理论和基于资源和能力的企业成长理论,结合我国资本市场和上市公司的特征,着重从股权结构、董事会治理和管理层激励等三个维度对我国上市公司治理结构与公司成长性的内在作用机理进行了深入、系统的理论分析。然后,以本文采用主成份分析法得出的不同成长性上市公司为研究样本,在控制了公司规模、行业属性、财务杠杆等因素的前提下,运用计量统计方法对上市公司治理结构与成长性关系进行了实证研究,得到以下结论：
在股权结构与公司成长性方面,国有股比例与成长性存在负相关关系但不显著,法人股比例对公司成长性具有明显的促进作用,而流通股比例与公司的成长性显著负相关；同时,第一大股东持股比例与公司成长性负相关但不显著,前五大股东持股比例、第二至第五大股东持股数之和与第一大股东持股数的比例对公司成长性构成显著的正向作用。
在董事会治理与公司成长性方面,研究发现董事会规模、董事受教育程度对公司成长性构成明显的积极影响,独立董事比例以及董事会会议次数、董事会专业委员会设立状况与公司成长性存在较弱的正相关关系,而董事长与总经理两职状态对公司成长性并不构成显著影响。
在管理层激励与公司成长性关系方面,研究发现上市公司管理层年薪水平对公司成长性具有十分明显的促进作用,表明在我国上市公司中年薪是目前较为重要的管理层激励因素；而管理层持股比例对公司成长性有积极影响,但其激励效应并未完全突显。
最后,本文根据研究结果并结合我国实际国情,从股权治理、董事会治理、管理层激励以及外部治理环境等方面提出了健全和完善上市公司治理结构、提高上市公司整体成长性的对策建议。通过本文研究,能够有效弥补国内外在该领域研究的不足,有利于公司治理理论和企业成长理论的丰富和发展；同时,为我国上市公司建立良好公司治理结构、实现可持续成长提供现实指导。
The development of Chinese capital market is a national strategic task. As the most important micro-management bodies of Chinese socialist market economy, listed companies are the cornerstone of Chinese capital market, and become the backbone which promotes and decides the development of Chinese national economy. However, Chinese listed companies exist various corporate governance problems and block the growth seriously, some even die too early, thus affected the healthy development of Chinese capital market and the national economy! As operating foundation, corporate governance structure plays decisive role in the stable growth of listed companies in China. So the paper chooses a popular topic and has both theoretical and realistic significance.
With economics, management and econometrics theory as a guide, the paper uses the research methods of combining theory with practice, normative research and empirical analysis to study systematically and dynamically inner relationship between the corporate governance structure listed companies in China and their growth on the basis of fully grasping theoretical and empirical literature of the corporate governance and enterprise growth, in order to find good corporate governance structure during the transitional period which improves fundamentally overall growth of listed companies in China and put into practice.
The author defines the corporate governance structure and firm growth in this paper after reviewing related literatures systematically and establishes a comprehensive evaluation system and model of the growth of listed companies, which having one first-level indicator, four second-level indicators and twelve third-level indicators based on the analysis of principal component and empirically studies the growth.
Based on the principal-agent theory and the enterprise growth theory of the resource-ability, the paper theoretically studies internal mechanism of the corporate governance structure and the growth of Chinese listed companies from three dimensions of ownership structure, the board governance and the management incentive. Then we empirically study the relationship between corporate governance structure and the growth of Chinese listed companies, and reach conclusions as following.
1. The proportion of state-owned shares is negatively related to the growth but not significant, the proportion of corporate shares is significantly positive related to the growth, the proportion of tradable shares is significantly negative related to the growth; share proportion of the largest shareholder is negatively related to the growth but not significant, share proportion of the top five shareholders is significantly positive related to the growth, and the proportion of the shares of the second to the fifth largest shareholders among the top five shareholders is significantly positive related to the growth.
2. Both the board size and directors' knowledge are significantly positive related to the growth, duality of COB and CEO is positively related to the growth but not significant, the ratio of independent directors is positively related to the growth but not significant, both the board meetings and whether the board consists of professional committees are positively related to the growth but not significant.
3. The study on the management incentive finds that the annual salary of management is significantly positive related to the growth, and the share proportion of management is positively related to firm growth but not significant.
Finally, this paper provides with some advice which sound and complete corporate governance structure to improve the overall growth of Chinese listed companies. Theoretically the study will make up for the lack of researches on the theme, perfect and develop governance theory and the growth theory. Practically it will help provide guidance to establish good corporate governance structure and promote the growth of Chinese listed companies.
引文
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