农业上市公司募集资金投资行为与效果
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摘要
本文是在产业链的分析框架下,对农业上市公司募集资金投资选择的理论与实证研究。农业上市公司是资本市场中一个比较特殊的群体,一方面,作为农业产业化龙头享受国家扶持农业发展的优惠政策,承担带动农业发展的社会责任;另一方面,作为追求利润最大化的企业,面临背离“弱势”农业的经济诱惑。农业弱势性与资本逐利性之间的矛盾导致了农业上市公司不同寻常的发展道路。现实中,农业上市公司究竟有没有起到龙头作用?有没有发挥融资优势带动农业发展?如何带动农业产业化的发展?都是值得关注的问题。
本文将农业上市公司的融资优势作为研究的切入点,在产业链的框架下,从理论上剖析公司的募集资金在农业产业链和非农产业链中的投资动机,并通过实证研究考察募集资金投资行为与效果。研究中,借鉴委托代理理论、博弈论、交易费用理论、产权理论等现代经济学理论,构造符合中国农业产业链特征的博弈模型,从理论上分析了龙头企业在产业链内投资的动机及农业产业化模式演变路径。同时,从公司价值、盈利能力、发展能力三方面综合考察募集资金的投资效果,并结合典型案例分析农业产业链投资的优势。全文按照“动机——行为——效果”的逻辑线索展开。各部分的具体研究内容如下:
第一部分(第一章至第三章)是研究的理论基础和现实基础。第一章介绍了研究背景、现实意义和理论意义,并界定了研究范围,阐明了研究框架。第二章文献综述是全文研究的理论基础,这一章系统阐述了国外以契约理论为基础的纵向一体化和多元化两个领域的研究状况,以及国内产业化的理论与实证研究进展,提出了本文基于产业链的理论研究思路。第三章对农业上市公司发展与募集资金投资状况的分析是全文研究的现实基础,这一章首先分析了农业上市公司的龙头作用,之后从财政、税收、补贴等方面分析了农业上市公司发展的制度背景,最后对农业上市公司募集资金特征进行分析,发现资金主要用于农业产业链投资,但后期变更现象非常普遍,这为后文的理论和实证研究做好了铺垫。
第二部分(第四章和第五章)是募集资金在不同产业链的投资动机和行为研究。第四章分别构造交易成本和专业性投资影响下的农业产业化动态博弈模型,指出纵向一体化的演进能够增加企业下游市场份额,并带动农户增加收益,从理论上解释了龙头企业在农业产业链内进行纵向一体化投资的动机。第五章则从多元化经营角度考察农业上市公司在非农产业链的投资动机,发现农业上市公司募集资金投资决策中有效利用资源动机比较明显,分散风险动机和防御性动机不是非常明显。
第三部分(第六章和第七章)是募集资金投资效果实证研究与典型案例分析。第六章在第四章和第五章理论分析的基础上提出了研究假说,并构造回归模型检验募集资金投资对公司价值、盈利能力、发展能力的影响,从总体上考察募集资金投资的效果。发现募集资金变更行为的影响非常显著,而在农业产业链内的投资影响不显著,与农业弱质性的特征相符。第七章以三家乳业上市公司作为典型案例进行研究,指出农业上市公司应该利用融资优势进行产业链投资,并通过产业链整合巩固龙头地位,最终借助龙头地位带动农业发展。
第四部分(第八章)是全文总结和展望。这一章在前面研究的基础上得出了全文的主要结论,并提出了发展农业上市公司的相关政策建议,最后指出了论文研究的局限性及今后研究的方向。
本文研究发现:(1)农业上市公司在产业化发展过程中起到了不可替代的龙头作用。农业上市公司无论在资产规模还是盈利能力方面,都处于行业内的领先地位。而不可比拟的融资优势,拓展了未来发展的空间,这使得农业上市公司的发展趋势对整个行业的发展方向起到了举足轻重的影响。(2)农业上市公司通过产业链的纵向一体化投资可以增加市场份额,同时带动上游农业生产者增加收益。这从理论上解释了企业在产业链内进行纵向一体化投资的动机。实证研究也发现农业上市公司确实热衷于进行纵向一体化投资,并且大多数公司在纵向投资的同时也进行了横向投资,与理论预期一致。(3)农业上市公司多元化经营的利用资源动机最为明显。农业上市公司在2002年之后主营业务趋于集中,整体多元化经营的程度在不断降低,并且农业对公司收入的贡献越来越大,一定程度上验证了有效利用资源动机。(4)农业上市公司募集资金投向变更现象突出。农业上市公司募集资金使用主要投向了农业领域,但是募集资金投向变更现象非常突出,变更比例高于市场平均水平,而且这种变更主要集中于农业投资项目向其他投资项目的变更中。(5)从公司价值、盈利能力和发展能力三个方面检验了募集资金的投资效果,发现:募集资金投资项目的频繁变更行为降低了市场投资者对公司的认可,使公司的市值账面比降低;但是投资项目变更行为显著提高了公司的净资产收益率和主营业务收入增长率。(6)案例研究表明集中于产业链纵向投资的农业上市公司更容易适应经济环境的变化,保持长期竞争优势。
基于上述研究,本文的创新点有:(1)研究思路上,创新性的提出基于产业链的投资行为分析框架。目前,对农业上市公司投资行为的系统研究尚不多见,本文从产业链的角度对投资进行划分,分别考察农业产业链内纵向投资和产业链外多元投资,形成清晰的研究思路。并以上市公司的融资优势作为切入点,全面考察募集资金投资的行业特征和投资效果。(2)理论研究中,将我国农业产业链的市场特征引入模型。产业链上游的农户分散经营是中国农业的重要特征,对农业产业链内投资的理论研究必须考虑到这一特征。本文分别构造了龙头企业纵向一体化决策模型和龙头企业竞争模型,从理论上解释了龙头企业在农业产业链内投资动机及产业化模式的演变。(3)实证研究中,从公司价值、盈利能力、发展能力三个方面全面检验了募集资金投资的效果。本文选取的指标分别代表了投资者的认识、企业短期盈利水平和企业长远发展前景,对投资效果的研究更加全面、透彻。
This thesis focuses on action and effect of stock financing investment in agricultural listed companies with a framework of industry chain. Agricultural listed companies are special in china. On the one hand, the companies get preferential treatments from government and bear social responsibilities for agricultural industrialization. On the other hand, they want to keep away from“weak”agriculture to maximize the profit. The conflict above makes agricultural listed companies pass a different way. This thesis will answer the following investment questions: whether agricultural listed companies keep ahead in industrialization, whether they take the advantage of financing to develop agriculture, and how to help agricultural industrialization come true.
Beginning with a brief background of financing advantange of agricultural listed companies, this thesis provides both theoretical and empirical studies on investment projects in different industry chains. This thesis also provides some dynamic game models in agricultural industrial chain with academic elements of agent theory, game theory, transaction cost theory and property right theory to find out the motivation of investment. And the investment effect is tested through three approaches, namely firm value, earning power profitability and growth power with regression models and case study in detail. This thesis follows the key of“motivation-action-effect”and is organized as follows:
Part One (from chapter 1 to chapter 3) introduces the theoretical and realistic foundations. Chapter 1 is introduction, explaining the research background, theoretical and practical significance, framework and possible innovations. Chapter 2 provides literature review, which serves as the theoretical foundation of the research. The literature review abroad focuses on vertical integration and diversification based on contract theory. While that in China focuses on industrialization, diversification and change of stock financing investment projects. With the summary above, it provides the theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter 3 is puts forward the realistic foundation of stock financing investment projects in agricultural listed companies, by briefly summarizing the institutional background such as financial support, preferential tax and subsidy in the development of agricultural listed companies, and by analyzing the investment characters in agricultural listed companies.
Part Two (chapter 4 and chapter 5) provides the theoretical analysis of motivation and action both in agriculture and other industries. Chapter 4 puts forward dynamic games models with transaction cost and special investment to find out the motivation of investment in agricultural chain, meaning vertical integration will increase downstream parties’market share and upstream parties’profit. Chapter 5 is theoretical and empirical study of investment in other industry chains and points out the key motivation of diversification is to make use of resource effectively.
Part Three (chapter 6 and chapter 7) is empirical and case study of investment effect. Chapter 6 provides some hypotheses based on the analysis of chapter 4 and chapter 5, and builds regression models to test the investment results from firm value, earning power profitability and growth power. Chapter 7 analyses investment projects in three listed companies of dairy products industry, and draws conclusions that agricultural listed companies should invest in agriculture chain with financing advantage to lead agricultural industrialization.
Part Four (chapter 7) is the conclusion and prospect, presenting main conclusions from previous chapters and proposing a series of suggestions on how to develop agricultural listed companies. Also, the weakness and the further study is touched upon.
Findings of thesis:
(1) Agricultural listed companies keep ahead in industrialization with financing advantage. (2) The most important motivation of invest in vertical integration is to increase market share in downstream market. And the empirical study shows that most agricultural listed companies have invested both in vertically and horizontally integration. (3) The key motivation of diversification is to make use of resource effectively. (4) Most agricultural listed companies have changed the content of the original investment projects. It is popular to change from agricultural industry to other industries. While vice versa is rare. (5) The change of original investment projects increases earning power and growth power, but reduces firm value, which means the action depresses the investors in trust. (6) Case study shows vertical integration will help listed companies keep competitive edge in different economic circumstances.
Based on the study above, the innovations include:
(1) In research system, it brings forth new ideas of industrial chain to analyze different investment projects. Within the framework the new classification of investment choices, namely vertical integration in agricultural chain and diversification in non-agricultural chain, makes the research system more clear, and brings a comprehensive study of action and effect. (2) Regarding the theoretical study, it applies the characteristics of agricultural chain to analysis, and builds up companies’vertical integration decision models and competition models. The dynamic game models are based on the farmers’small-scale production to find the invest motivation and evolution of industrialization. (3) It chooses a comprehensive indicator system including firm value, earning power profitability and growth power to test investment results. The indicators reflect the investors’attitude and the companies’earning power in the short term and the companies’growth power in the long term.
本文将农业上市公司的融资优势作为研究的切入点,在产业链的框架下,从理论上剖析公司的募集资金在农业产业链和非农产业链中的投资动机,并通过实证研究考察募集资金投资行为与效果。研究中,借鉴委托代理理论、博弈论、交易费用理论、产权理论等现代经济学理论,构造符合中国农业产业链特征的博弈模型,从理论上分析了龙头企业在产业链内投资的动机及农业产业化模式演变路径。同时,从公司价值、盈利能力、发展能力三方面综合考察募集资金的投资效果,并结合典型案例分析农业产业链投资的优势。全文按照“动机——行为——效果”的逻辑线索展开。各部分的具体研究内容如下:
第一部分(第一章至第三章)是研究的理论基础和现实基础。第一章介绍了研究背景、现实意义和理论意义,并界定了研究范围,阐明了研究框架。第二章文献综述是全文研究的理论基础,这一章系统阐述了国外以契约理论为基础的纵向一体化和多元化两个领域的研究状况,以及国内产业化的理论与实证研究进展,提出了本文基于产业链的理论研究思路。第三章对农业上市公司发展与募集资金投资状况的分析是全文研究的现实基础,这一章首先分析了农业上市公司的龙头作用,之后从财政、税收、补贴等方面分析了农业上市公司发展的制度背景,最后对农业上市公司募集资金特征进行分析,发现资金主要用于农业产业链投资,但后期变更现象非常普遍,这为后文的理论和实证研究做好了铺垫。
第二部分(第四章和第五章)是募集资金在不同产业链的投资动机和行为研究。第四章分别构造交易成本和专业性投资影响下的农业产业化动态博弈模型,指出纵向一体化的演进能够增加企业下游市场份额,并带动农户增加收益,从理论上解释了龙头企业在农业产业链内进行纵向一体化投资的动机。第五章则从多元化经营角度考察农业上市公司在非农产业链的投资动机,发现农业上市公司募集资金投资决策中有效利用资源动机比较明显,分散风险动机和防御性动机不是非常明显。
第三部分(第六章和第七章)是募集资金投资效果实证研究与典型案例分析。第六章在第四章和第五章理论分析的基础上提出了研究假说,并构造回归模型检验募集资金投资对公司价值、盈利能力、发展能力的影响,从总体上考察募集资金投资的效果。发现募集资金变更行为的影响非常显著,而在农业产业链内的投资影响不显著,与农业弱质性的特征相符。第七章以三家乳业上市公司作为典型案例进行研究,指出农业上市公司应该利用融资优势进行产业链投资,并通过产业链整合巩固龙头地位,最终借助龙头地位带动农业发展。
第四部分(第八章)是全文总结和展望。这一章在前面研究的基础上得出了全文的主要结论,并提出了发展农业上市公司的相关政策建议,最后指出了论文研究的局限性及今后研究的方向。
本文研究发现:(1)农业上市公司在产业化发展过程中起到了不可替代的龙头作用。农业上市公司无论在资产规模还是盈利能力方面,都处于行业内的领先地位。而不可比拟的融资优势,拓展了未来发展的空间,这使得农业上市公司的发展趋势对整个行业的发展方向起到了举足轻重的影响。(2)农业上市公司通过产业链的纵向一体化投资可以增加市场份额,同时带动上游农业生产者增加收益。这从理论上解释了企业在产业链内进行纵向一体化投资的动机。实证研究也发现农业上市公司确实热衷于进行纵向一体化投资,并且大多数公司在纵向投资的同时也进行了横向投资,与理论预期一致。(3)农业上市公司多元化经营的利用资源动机最为明显。农业上市公司在2002年之后主营业务趋于集中,整体多元化经营的程度在不断降低,并且农业对公司收入的贡献越来越大,一定程度上验证了有效利用资源动机。(4)农业上市公司募集资金投向变更现象突出。农业上市公司募集资金使用主要投向了农业领域,但是募集资金投向变更现象非常突出,变更比例高于市场平均水平,而且这种变更主要集中于农业投资项目向其他投资项目的变更中。(5)从公司价值、盈利能力和发展能力三个方面检验了募集资金的投资效果,发现:募集资金投资项目的频繁变更行为降低了市场投资者对公司的认可,使公司的市值账面比降低;但是投资项目变更行为显著提高了公司的净资产收益率和主营业务收入增长率。(6)案例研究表明集中于产业链纵向投资的农业上市公司更容易适应经济环境的变化,保持长期竞争优势。
基于上述研究,本文的创新点有:(1)研究思路上,创新性的提出基于产业链的投资行为分析框架。目前,对农业上市公司投资行为的系统研究尚不多见,本文从产业链的角度对投资进行划分,分别考察农业产业链内纵向投资和产业链外多元投资,形成清晰的研究思路。并以上市公司的融资优势作为切入点,全面考察募集资金投资的行业特征和投资效果。(2)理论研究中,将我国农业产业链的市场特征引入模型。产业链上游的农户分散经营是中国农业的重要特征,对农业产业链内投资的理论研究必须考虑到这一特征。本文分别构造了龙头企业纵向一体化决策模型和龙头企业竞争模型,从理论上解释了龙头企业在农业产业链内投资动机及产业化模式的演变。(3)实证研究中,从公司价值、盈利能力、发展能力三个方面全面检验了募集资金投资的效果。本文选取的指标分别代表了投资者的认识、企业短期盈利水平和企业长远发展前景,对投资效果的研究更加全面、透彻。
This thesis focuses on action and effect of stock financing investment in agricultural listed companies with a framework of industry chain. Agricultural listed companies are special in china. On the one hand, the companies get preferential treatments from government and bear social responsibilities for agricultural industrialization. On the other hand, they want to keep away from“weak”agriculture to maximize the profit. The conflict above makes agricultural listed companies pass a different way. This thesis will answer the following investment questions: whether agricultural listed companies keep ahead in industrialization, whether they take the advantage of financing to develop agriculture, and how to help agricultural industrialization come true.
Beginning with a brief background of financing advantange of agricultural listed companies, this thesis provides both theoretical and empirical studies on investment projects in different industry chains. This thesis also provides some dynamic game models in agricultural industrial chain with academic elements of agent theory, game theory, transaction cost theory and property right theory to find out the motivation of investment. And the investment effect is tested through three approaches, namely firm value, earning power profitability and growth power with regression models and case study in detail. This thesis follows the key of“motivation-action-effect”and is organized as follows:
Part One (from chapter 1 to chapter 3) introduces the theoretical and realistic foundations. Chapter 1 is introduction, explaining the research background, theoretical and practical significance, framework and possible innovations. Chapter 2 provides literature review, which serves as the theoretical foundation of the research. The literature review abroad focuses on vertical integration and diversification based on contract theory. While that in China focuses on industrialization, diversification and change of stock financing investment projects. With the summary above, it provides the theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter 3 is puts forward the realistic foundation of stock financing investment projects in agricultural listed companies, by briefly summarizing the institutional background such as financial support, preferential tax and subsidy in the development of agricultural listed companies, and by analyzing the investment characters in agricultural listed companies.
Part Two (chapter 4 and chapter 5) provides the theoretical analysis of motivation and action both in agriculture and other industries. Chapter 4 puts forward dynamic games models with transaction cost and special investment to find out the motivation of investment in agricultural chain, meaning vertical integration will increase downstream parties’market share and upstream parties’profit. Chapter 5 is theoretical and empirical study of investment in other industry chains and points out the key motivation of diversification is to make use of resource effectively.
Part Three (chapter 6 and chapter 7) is empirical and case study of investment effect. Chapter 6 provides some hypotheses based on the analysis of chapter 4 and chapter 5, and builds regression models to test the investment results from firm value, earning power profitability and growth power. Chapter 7 analyses investment projects in three listed companies of dairy products industry, and draws conclusions that agricultural listed companies should invest in agriculture chain with financing advantage to lead agricultural industrialization.
Part Four (chapter 7) is the conclusion and prospect, presenting main conclusions from previous chapters and proposing a series of suggestions on how to develop agricultural listed companies. Also, the weakness and the further study is touched upon.
Findings of thesis:
(1) Agricultural listed companies keep ahead in industrialization with financing advantage. (2) The most important motivation of invest in vertical integration is to increase market share in downstream market. And the empirical study shows that most agricultural listed companies have invested both in vertically and horizontally integration. (3) The key motivation of diversification is to make use of resource effectively. (4) Most agricultural listed companies have changed the content of the original investment projects. It is popular to change from agricultural industry to other industries. While vice versa is rare. (5) The change of original investment projects increases earning power and growth power, but reduces firm value, which means the action depresses the investors in trust. (6) Case study shows vertical integration will help listed companies keep competitive edge in different economic circumstances.
Based on the study above, the innovations include:
(1) In research system, it brings forth new ideas of industrial chain to analyze different investment projects. Within the framework the new classification of investment choices, namely vertical integration in agricultural chain and diversification in non-agricultural chain, makes the research system more clear, and brings a comprehensive study of action and effect. (2) Regarding the theoretical study, it applies the characteristics of agricultural chain to analysis, and builds up companies’vertical integration decision models and competition models. The dynamic game models are based on the farmers’small-scale production to find the invest motivation and evolution of industrialization. (3) It chooses a comprehensive indicator system including firm value, earning power profitability and growth power to test investment results. The indicators reflect the investors’attitude and the companies’earning power in the short term and the companies’growth power in the long term.
引文
①中发[2007]1号《中共中央国务院关于积极发展现代农业扎实推进社会主义新农村建设的若干意见》(2007年1月30日)
③中发[2006]1号《中共中央国务院关于推进社会主义新农村建设的若干意见》(2005年12月31日)
①中发[2008]1号《中共中央国务院关于切实加强农业基础建设进一步促进农业发展农民增收的若干意见》(2007年12月31日)
①朱道华,《农业经济学》(第4版),2003,1-2页
②参见:《中华人民共和国农业法》(1993年7月2日第八届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二次会议通过,2002年12月28日第九届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第三十一次会议修订)。
①参见:财发[2005]4号《财政部关于印发<农业综合开发中央财政贴息资金管理办法>的通知》(2005年3月23日),财发[2005]39号《财政部关于印发<国家农业综合开发投资参股经营试点管理办法>的通知》(2005年10月10日),中华人民共和国财政部令第29号《国家农业综合开发资金和项目管理办法》(2005年12月28日),
①参见:中发[1996]13号《中共中央国务院关于切实做好减轻农民负担工作的决定》(1996年12月30日)
②参见:财税[1997]72号《②财政部国家税务总局关于对远洋渔业企业自捕水产品征免农业特产税问题的通知》(1997年7月4日),财税[2001]66号《关于"十五"期间继续对远洋渔业企业自捕水产品和远洋鱿钓渔业自捕鱿鱼免征农业特产税的通知》(2001年4月17日)
③参见:财税[2001]200号《关于对采伐国有林区原木的企业减免农业特产税问题的通知》(2001年12月14日)
④参见:财税[2004]120号《财政部、国家税务总局关于取消除烟叶外的农业特产税有关问题的通知》(2004年6月30日)
⑤参见:全国人民代表大会常务委员会公报《国务院关于振兴东北老工业基地情况的报告》(2005年12月27日)
⑥参见:财税[2004]77号《财政部农业部国家税务总局关于2004年降低农业税税率和在部分粮食主产区进行免征农业税改革试点有关问题的通知》(2004年5月25日)
⑦参见:国务院公报《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于废止<中华人民共和国农业税条例>的决定》(2005年12月29日)
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③中发[2006]1号《中共中央国务院关于推进社会主义新农村建设的若干意见》(2005年12月31日)
①中发[2008]1号《中共中央国务院关于切实加强农业基础建设进一步促进农业发展农民增收的若干意见》(2007年12月31日)
①朱道华,《农业经济学》(第4版),2003,1-2页
②参见:《中华人民共和国农业法》(1993年7月2日第八届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二次会议通过,2002年12月28日第九届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第三十一次会议修订)。
①参见:财发[2005]4号《财政部关于印发<农业综合开发中央财政贴息资金管理办法>的通知》(2005年3月23日),财发[2005]39号《财政部关于印发<国家农业综合开发投资参股经营试点管理办法>的通知》(2005年10月10日),中华人民共和国财政部令第29号《国家农业综合开发资金和项目管理办法》(2005年12月28日),
①参见:中发[1996]13号《中共中央国务院关于切实做好减轻农民负担工作的决定》(1996年12月30日)
②参见:财税[1997]72号《②财政部国家税务总局关于对远洋渔业企业自捕水产品征免农业特产税问题的通知》(1997年7月4日),财税[2001]66号《关于"十五"期间继续对远洋渔业企业自捕水产品和远洋鱿钓渔业自捕鱿鱼免征农业特产税的通知》(2001年4月17日)
③参见:财税[2001]200号《关于对采伐国有林区原木的企业减免农业特产税问题的通知》(2001年12月14日)
④参见:财税[2004]120号《财政部、国家税务总局关于取消除烟叶外的农业特产税有关问题的通知》(2004年6月30日)
⑤参见:全国人民代表大会常务委员会公报《国务院关于振兴东北老工业基地情况的报告》(2005年12月27日)
⑥参见:财税[2004]77号《财政部农业部国家税务总局关于2004年降低农业税税率和在部分粮食主产区进行免征农业税改革试点有关问题的通知》(2004年5月25日)
⑦参见:国务院公报《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于废止<中华人民共和国农业税条例>的决定》(2005年12月29日)
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