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家族企业中的家族缔约问题及其治理机制研究
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摘要
尽管家族企业研究已经解决了价值判断和分析方法上的一些基本问题,但总体上仍然还处在“前范式”阶段(Sharma,2004),研究方法和问题选择等方面都还没有系统的主流观点存在。这种背景下,比常规企业更具特殊性的家族企业如何有效治理成为一个难题。因此,家族企业理论(Family Firm Theory)中关于治理的内容很缺乏(Chrisman et al.,2003)。主要因为,家族企业在一系列方面存在家族与企业的模糊边界,从而使研究主题和分析方法的选择面临较大困难。
     家族企业研究的核心是家族与企业的相互影响(Zahra,2003),但当前研究却把家族因素基本排除在治理机制之外。本文针对这一缺失,提出了一个存在已久但却没有引起重视的问题,即家族群体的内部关系与行为特征对企业治理所造成的影响。本文分析了当前研究中“家族治理”(Family Governance)概念的模糊性,并提出了一个有别于传统的观点:家族群体并不是一个同质化的个体,他们在治理企业的过程中会出现内部的代理关系,并因而出现家族群体内的代理成本。同时,家族成员所具有的较高利他性却并不一定都能带来企业的收益。
     也就是说,家族在治理企业的同时,由于内部存在代理关系而需要对自身的代理成本和利他主义进行调节。同时,由于家族企业普遍存在高度的家族控制,也使得家族影响成为企业治理中无法回避的一个关键因素。因此,本文的分析明确了一个重要现实:家族既是治理企业的主体,同时又应该是被治理的对象。这就是本文研究的基本立足点和分析起点,即家族成员在参与企业事务过程存在缔约行为,这种行为影响到企业的治理目标和代理成本,并继而影响企业绩效。
     本文提出了家族缔约治理的具体要素,并总结出由家族身份引发的特殊代理成本和利他主义产生的正效应,由此形成本文的家族缔约治理机制和路径。然后,再提出结合了家族成就和企业成长的复合型家族企业绩效概念,把家族缔约治理的效果与企业绩效建立起联系。
     在家族缔约治理要素和机制的理论模型基础上,本文展开了相应的实证研究。通过对浙江、广东和湖南三地家族企业的实地和问卷调查,对模型假设进行了检验,并取得了较好的检验结果。
     总体上,本文的创新体现在以下三个方面:
     第一,研究主题的选择上有所创新
     本文把分析重点深入到家族关系内部,分析了以往被看做与“正式的”、“企业的”或“制度的”因素无关的家族因素。明确了家族缔约治理可以针对三类因素展开,即家族群体内部的权力、关系和文化因素。正如Chrisman等(2003)指出的,家族已经成为最重要的研究变量。忽视家族影响来谈家族企业治理必然遇到困境,本文提出针对家族成员的家族缔约治理问题,在主题上有创新价值。
     家族是家族企业最大的代理成本载体,也是家族企业鲜明竞争优势——利他主义的载体。因此,家族缔约治理要素和治理机制的分析将有利于为家族企业设计真正合适的治理模式。从而有助于摆脱以往公司治理理论在解释家族企业时遇到的困境,因为家族企业治理不以所有权和经营权分离为代理关系的前提假设。
     第二,在分析视角上有所创新
     本文摆脱了以往家族企业研究的“好坏之争”(Whiteside et al.,1996),采取了更为客观的研究视角。本文认为,家族缔约治理的目标就是:在肯定家族制存在不利影响的前提下,降低主要由家族身份引发的代理成本;同时,在肯定家族治理也能为家族企业带来独特优势的前提下,促发家族成员的利他效应。这种视角有助于分析一个矛盾现实:家族企业的治理“落后”,却也有竞争优势。以往存在两种倾向:一种是对家族企业简单否定,不加分说就要引入“现代企业制度”;另一种对家族企业持一定积极评价的观点也有所偏颇,就是对家族群体的负面效应有意无意地进行忽略。相比而言,本文的分析视角有所创新,也符合家族企业虽然治理不完善却也能迅猛发展的客观现实。
     第三,在实证研究方面有所推进
     本文通过家族企业特殊性的分析,认为家族企业绩效应该同时包括来自家族和企业的经济性与非经济性要素。通过代理问题和利他效应这两个中间变量,把具有社会性的家族要素与企业绩效联系起来。而以往的相关研究都只针对单纯的企业层面,并以纯经济性指标来定义家族企业绩效。以往研究很少将家族内部关系和权力等因素引入到战略和治理模型中,已有的少量文献也只针对这类问题提出了一些陈述或命题(Proposition),而明确提出假设(Hypothesis)并进行数据验证的实证研究很少。本文则通过理论研究与实证研究结合的方式,明确分析了家族内部如何针对权力、关系和文化因素进行治理,并指出它们如何影响企业成长和家族成就。
     本文关于家族缔约治理的分析对于随着企业发展而逐渐膨胀的控制性家族是有较大现实意义的,因为他们面临的将是越来越难的企业治理任务,和可能出现内部矛盾而越来越迫切的家族治理任务。而且,更大的困难会来自二者的结合。从这方面看,本文在实践和理论意义上都有一定的创新性价值。
Guiding principles of professional investigation in social sciences can help us to clarify understanding of the complicated segments of the social world(Sharma, 2004), but things doesn't seen to be in such circumstances in the field of family business research. It is becoming a common view that family firm theory has received scant attention in the mainstream management literature, particularly with respect to the development of Theory of the Firm(Chrisman et al., 2003).
     The biggest reason comes from the inner-field of family business research because it is still in a "pre-paradigm" condition and there is no consent about the range of key factors and theoretical framework(Xinchun Li, 2004). Some theoretical confusion occured in the family firm study as family governance, and the effects of family influences on firm performance, consequently the whole basis of the research field of family business is NOT in a steady situation under these reasons.
     Governance is a long-term difficulty in Family Business research, Melin(2000) considered that the definition and mechanism of governance of the mainstream theory can not apply well in family firm governance study, and Lubatkin et al. (2005) claimed that the governance problems of family firm are hard to solve in the existing theory.
     The role of family in the firm and its influence to the firm is becoming a common interest in recent research (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2003; Habberson et al, 2003; Mustakallio et al. 2002), and it can create unique resources and capabilities in the firm. Such inclines may clue to the importance of the family contracting in family firms:
     (1)nature of the firm: Family be much more stressed other than the firm
     (2)contract character: Family contracting be stressed other than the firm contract
     (3)agency costs: Family team's behavior be emphasized other than the managers'
     (4)family influence: Negative perspective be recognized other than the positive
     The purpose of this article is to find a new line of analyzing family governance, and the analysis base is the nature of family business. When the figure of the family contracting is drew in detail, a theoretical model is made to link the effectiveness of family governance with family firm performance by the mesne variables of Agency Problems and Altruistic Effect. The theoretical model simplified a mixed perspectives of different theories as agency and stewardship, and different evaluations of efficiency of family contracting.
     It's considered in this dissertation that the process of family contracting has a two-faced capacity: The condition of family governance will reduce agency costs meanwhile raise them, the governance of altruism can help to amplify the advantage of family firm, but it can also engender self-control problems which are difficult to solve in family firms. The better the family contracting is governed, the more efficient the family business will be.
     The main results and implications of the research in whole can be concluded in the following three aspects:
     (1)By getting the analysis deeper into the family, the mythos of this dissertation plays a new role in family business researching field, which is also valuable because of the extreme importance of family influence to the family firm governance.
     As considered by Chrisman et al.(2003), the viewpoint that family is to be most important analyzing variable in the study of family-controlled firms will be undertaken by more researchers. By revelation of the concluding of contracting governance factors and mechanisms of how the factors work on agency costs and altruistic effect and finally on the firm performance, this dissertation may give much help in the study of the characteristic of family business and it' governance.
     (2)The angle of view in this research may be more impersonal. NOT like some former angles of view, "good or bad"(Whiteside et al., 1996) is not to be a ingredient in this dissertation. This can be much more helpful for the study of governance of family business, because family influence will not only bring some governance obstacles but also can form some kind of special advantage.
     The describing of the purpose of family contracting governance can incarnates that angle of view, which means to reduce the agency costs and enhance the altruistic effect. This angle and researching style can be newly valuable academicly, and it also shows a veracious affiliation to the real world of family business governance.
     (3)The research put forward a model and demonstration process to test the theoretical hypothesises, which is a scarcity of the former research. Questionnaire and interviews are finished in family businesses from three area: Zhe Jiang, Guang Dong and Hu Nan. The demonstration process and results may promote contribution to the study of family business governance because it can show the linkage between family factors and firm performance, which is not considered to be notable and relevant statisticly in the former research.
引文
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