论我国董事薪酬法律制度的完善
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摘要
公司治理存在很多难点问题,董事薪酬制度作为其中之一备受关注,在公司经营业绩不佳甚至公司亏损的情况下,董事薪酬持续高涨,严重损害了公司股东和债权人的利益。
由于所有权和经营权分离,董事作为公司的经营主体,出于自身的经济利益考虑,难免会实施一些机会主义行为。为了解决这一问题,国外普遍采取股票期权等长期激励措施,但还是出现董事冒险投资和辞职套现等现象。因此,各国都根据具体情况制定详细的法律法规限制董事薪酬。我国董事薪酬也成为公众关注的焦点问题,但法律上对此问题规定不够完善。
完善我国董事薪酬法律制度,重点包括以下几个方面:完善董事薪酬决定机制,将薪酬决定权在股东大会和董事会之间合理分配,并且应该建立健全薪酬委员会制度;全面披露董事薪酬内容和形式,把董事薪酬置于公众监督之下;完善董事薪酬追回制度,将董事通过不法手段取得的利益归还公司。
Companies take increasingly important role in the market economy along with the market economic advance. The role of directors in the company is also significant. In order to solve conflicting interests due to the principal-agent reasons, Encourage Directors make better job for the company and international practice implements measures such as stock options. However, with this series of measures to implement, issues are becoming apparent. The rapid expansion of the directors’remuneration levels which does not match with the company's performance makes shareholders and the communities focus attention on this issue.
The public paying the directors such a high interest in the most essential reason for the performance of the company in its depressed level of remuneration of the way continues to rise. Both at home and abroad, it has become the company's areas of urgent need to address one of the issues. In the United States and other countries, the remuneration of the directors to restrict enactment of laws and regulations. In China there are a large number of state-owned enterprises, insufficient or irrational incentive remuneration of directors’of China's problem is particularly serious. What’s more, the provisions of remuneration of directors of China's relevant laws and systems are not perfect. Thus, referring to foreign legal experience and improving the remuneration of directors of China's legal system is necessary.
This paper is divided into four parts to analyze the remuneration system. Firstly the thesis introduces the directors’remuneration-related issues, pointing out problems that lie in the pay of the composition and remuneration system including performance-related difference and the resignation of directors for arbitrage and such phenomena. The most essential of these phenomena occurs because the separation of system of ownership and management, leading to the inconsistency of fundamental interests between shareholders and directors. To solve such problems, formulation and regulations should be done to ensure that a reasonable remuneration of directors and shareholders of the company to get and creditors approval. There are reasons to believe that the community would not have been overpaid questioned as long as the remuneration of company directors in line with company performance as well as its level of remuneration is understood by the shareholders. Therefore, we should focus on improving legal system on further clarifying the pay of directors, recovering compensation and the disclosure of pay.
First chapter gives a brief introduction to remuneration system for directors, including the concept of remuneration of directors, the directors remuneration theoretical basis for the legal system, theory based on principal-agent and agent cost and risk and investment harm the interests of the company when company shareholders and directors have conflicting interests. It also describes the legal system of remuneration of directors of purpose, intending to make compensation of directors to play a constraint and normative role in the salary structure. It will set diversification into a open, symmetric and transparent pay through the strengthening of the decisions and the disclosure provisions of the legal system. Based on the principles of these types, forming a set of harmonized legal system provides to enable our company's shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders to supervise the remuneration of directors of the main legal basis for the.
The second chapter focuses on the legal system of remuneration-determining. In China's relevant laws, determinations of the remuneration of directors are not sufficiently clear and there’s even some contradiction. The right for general meeting of shareholders to decide on the provisions is too absolute, resulting in that shareholders have arduous tasks and can not focus on the main issues to resolve. What’s more, its operators are not specific and can not be adjusted according to the situation in due course to the provisions of remuneration of directors of some of the subjective. Reference to foreign-related legislation, the appropriate remedy for this issue is to give the board the right to participate and moderate this right in order to avoid its self-set salaries. Remuneration of directors’which is determined by general meeting of shareholders makes major decisions on the principle of payment, stock options, other long-term incentive plan and the Board total compensation. The board should be conferred a certain degree of decision-making power too, mainly including the implementation of the shareholders as well as the compensation policy and assessment methods. The scope of the statutory shareholders will decide the amount and payment methods of remuneration of individual directors. In addition, the Remuneration Committee should be established and improving the implementation of this specific agency and its system of deciding the remuneration of directors is also very important. Combined with China's actual conditions, details of the Remuneration Committee set up circumstances and needs improvement. For the particularity of independent directors the thesis also conducted a detailed study on their remuneration decision, pointing out that the chairman of state-owned enterprises pay attention to employee directors of the decision and the need for participation.
The third chapter describes the disclosure of directors’remuneration of the legal system, noting that China's existing laws relating to disclosure requirements of directors’remuneration the office is general. The disclosure of content is not comprehensive and the dispersion mode should take some measures against these. The combination of the advanced experience of foreign countries could be used as source in China to response to the disclosure of the remuneration, the Remuneration Committee and the directors of various types. The disclosure of remuneration policies, includes salary structure, salary levels, the manner in which the directors to pay salaries and related pay for performance standards to how to assess and so on. The Remuneration Committee membership and composition and duties should be disclosed and the right of independent directors must be disclosed specific and detailed. The disclosure of the remuneration should be centralized in corporate governance to open up a special chapter in the annual report or additional accessories, or to develop specific remuneration of directors is more conducive to the annual report of the supervision of the general public and shareholders. Besides, ensuring the authenticity of the disclosure of remuneration to increase shareholder right the sensitivity of pay disclosure is significant.
The forth chapter recovers compensation for directors and makes a brief analysis of the legal system, comparing the situation at home and abroad. The thesis points out that our problem lies in the law's provision which is too principled to recover salaries. The legislation is not specific enough, resulting in non-operability in practice strong. Remuneration of directors should be made clear income and the return of clear interests of the principal should be limited in the amount recovered and the time constraints to ensure the timely subjects of rights. The improvement in the recovery of the system makes emphasis on the judge's discretion and the combination of foreign experience reinforces the supervisory role of other subjects such as the staff representatives. And in that way, the supervision on commission on the remuneration of the directors could recover improper behavior.
The thesis draws a summary. From the related legal systems perspective of the directors’salaries, further research on remuneration of directors needs to be related with the economic field. The thesis is looking forward to the ministries of legal provisions on the remuneration of directors that would complement each other, playing a close convergence of role. Look forward to in the corporate governance guidelines, some of the specific provisions of the directors’remuneration can be used specifically on how to do this. Due to many factors, director compensation reform of the legal system is still a long way nowadays. If there is a possibility, a special chapter could be added in the Company Law in China which requires the directors’ remuneration system, improving the company's governance structure in the future.
由于所有权和经营权分离,董事作为公司的经营主体,出于自身的经济利益考虑,难免会实施一些机会主义行为。为了解决这一问题,国外普遍采取股票期权等长期激励措施,但还是出现董事冒险投资和辞职套现等现象。因此,各国都根据具体情况制定详细的法律法规限制董事薪酬。我国董事薪酬也成为公众关注的焦点问题,但法律上对此问题规定不够完善。
完善我国董事薪酬法律制度,重点包括以下几个方面:完善董事薪酬决定机制,将薪酬决定权在股东大会和董事会之间合理分配,并且应该建立健全薪酬委员会制度;全面披露董事薪酬内容和形式,把董事薪酬置于公众监督之下;完善董事薪酬追回制度,将董事通过不法手段取得的利益归还公司。
Companies take increasingly important role in the market economy along with the market economic advance. The role of directors in the company is also significant. In order to solve conflicting interests due to the principal-agent reasons, Encourage Directors make better job for the company and international practice implements measures such as stock options. However, with this series of measures to implement, issues are becoming apparent. The rapid expansion of the directors’remuneration levels which does not match with the company's performance makes shareholders and the communities focus attention on this issue.
The public paying the directors such a high interest in the most essential reason for the performance of the company in its depressed level of remuneration of the way continues to rise. Both at home and abroad, it has become the company's areas of urgent need to address one of the issues. In the United States and other countries, the remuneration of the directors to restrict enactment of laws and regulations. In China there are a large number of state-owned enterprises, insufficient or irrational incentive remuneration of directors’of China's problem is particularly serious. What’s more, the provisions of remuneration of directors of China's relevant laws and systems are not perfect. Thus, referring to foreign legal experience and improving the remuneration of directors of China's legal system is necessary.
This paper is divided into four parts to analyze the remuneration system. Firstly the thesis introduces the directors’remuneration-related issues, pointing out problems that lie in the pay of the composition and remuneration system including performance-related difference and the resignation of directors for arbitrage and such phenomena. The most essential of these phenomena occurs because the separation of system of ownership and management, leading to the inconsistency of fundamental interests between shareholders and directors. To solve such problems, formulation and regulations should be done to ensure that a reasonable remuneration of directors and shareholders of the company to get and creditors approval. There are reasons to believe that the community would not have been overpaid questioned as long as the remuneration of company directors in line with company performance as well as its level of remuneration is understood by the shareholders. Therefore, we should focus on improving legal system on further clarifying the pay of directors, recovering compensation and the disclosure of pay.
First chapter gives a brief introduction to remuneration system for directors, including the concept of remuneration of directors, the directors remuneration theoretical basis for the legal system, theory based on principal-agent and agent cost and risk and investment harm the interests of the company when company shareholders and directors have conflicting interests. It also describes the legal system of remuneration of directors of purpose, intending to make compensation of directors to play a constraint and normative role in the salary structure. It will set diversification into a open, symmetric and transparent pay through the strengthening of the decisions and the disclosure provisions of the legal system. Based on the principles of these types, forming a set of harmonized legal system provides to enable our company's shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders to supervise the remuneration of directors of the main legal basis for the.
The second chapter focuses on the legal system of remuneration-determining. In China's relevant laws, determinations of the remuneration of directors are not sufficiently clear and there’s even some contradiction. The right for general meeting of shareholders to decide on the provisions is too absolute, resulting in that shareholders have arduous tasks and can not focus on the main issues to resolve. What’s more, its operators are not specific and can not be adjusted according to the situation in due course to the provisions of remuneration of directors of some of the subjective. Reference to foreign-related legislation, the appropriate remedy for this issue is to give the board the right to participate and moderate this right in order to avoid its self-set salaries. Remuneration of directors’which is determined by general meeting of shareholders makes major decisions on the principle of payment, stock options, other long-term incentive plan and the Board total compensation. The board should be conferred a certain degree of decision-making power too, mainly including the implementation of the shareholders as well as the compensation policy and assessment methods. The scope of the statutory shareholders will decide the amount and payment methods of remuneration of individual directors. In addition, the Remuneration Committee should be established and improving the implementation of this specific agency and its system of deciding the remuneration of directors is also very important. Combined with China's actual conditions, details of the Remuneration Committee set up circumstances and needs improvement. For the particularity of independent directors the thesis also conducted a detailed study on their remuneration decision, pointing out that the chairman of state-owned enterprises pay attention to employee directors of the decision and the need for participation.
The third chapter describes the disclosure of directors’remuneration of the legal system, noting that China's existing laws relating to disclosure requirements of directors’remuneration the office is general. The disclosure of content is not comprehensive and the dispersion mode should take some measures against these. The combination of the advanced experience of foreign countries could be used as source in China to response to the disclosure of the remuneration, the Remuneration Committee and the directors of various types. The disclosure of remuneration policies, includes salary structure, salary levels, the manner in which the directors to pay salaries and related pay for performance standards to how to assess and so on. The Remuneration Committee membership and composition and duties should be disclosed and the right of independent directors must be disclosed specific and detailed. The disclosure of the remuneration should be centralized in corporate governance to open up a special chapter in the annual report or additional accessories, or to develop specific remuneration of directors is more conducive to the annual report of the supervision of the general public and shareholders. Besides, ensuring the authenticity of the disclosure of remuneration to increase shareholder right the sensitivity of pay disclosure is significant.
The forth chapter recovers compensation for directors and makes a brief analysis of the legal system, comparing the situation at home and abroad. The thesis points out that our problem lies in the law's provision which is too principled to recover salaries. The legislation is not specific enough, resulting in non-operability in practice strong. Remuneration of directors should be made clear income and the return of clear interests of the principal should be limited in the amount recovered and the time constraints to ensure the timely subjects of rights. The improvement in the recovery of the system makes emphasis on the judge's discretion and the combination of foreign experience reinforces the supervisory role of other subjects such as the staff representatives. And in that way, the supervision on commission on the remuneration of the directors could recover improper behavior.
The thesis draws a summary. From the related legal systems perspective of the directors’salaries, further research on remuneration of directors needs to be related with the economic field. The thesis is looking forward to the ministries of legal provisions on the remuneration of directors that would complement each other, playing a close convergence of role. Look forward to in the corporate governance guidelines, some of the specific provisions of the directors’remuneration can be used specifically on how to do this. Due to many factors, director compensation reform of the legal system is still a long way nowadays. If there is a possibility, a special chapter could be added in the Company Law in China which requires the directors’ remuneration system, improving the company's governance structure in the future.
引文
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4.周芬棉:《高管纷纷辞职套现法律不能眼看股市沦为圈钱机》,《法制日报》2008年2月22日。
5.庞瑞锋:《陈久霖缔造“七年奇迹”中航油何以巨亏45亿》,《南方周末》2004年12月10日。
6.尹卫国:《一千倍收入差距损害和谐劳动关系》,《经营与管理》2007年第6期。
7.人大国企改革课题组:《国有企业的战略性调整与治理结构创新》,《工业企业管理》2000年第1期。
8.马连福:《公司治理评价中的董事会治理评价指标体系设置研究》,《南开管理评论》2003年第3期。
9.王国海:《独立董事有效性:一个制度经济学视角的分析》,《财经理论与实践》2003年第1期。
10.吴友军:《对独立董事制度推行中存在的问题及对策的思考》,《科技与管理》2003年第5期。
11.周云帆、朱羿锟:《经营者薪酬的信息披露制度微探》,《劳动经济与劳动关系》2005年第4期。
12.杨柯:《浅议现代公司中的代理成本》,《会计之友》2003年第11期。
13.孙祖芳:《现代西方收入分配制度的变迁——理论、实践与思考》,《社会科学》2002年第11期。
14.刘星等:《从独立董事的薪酬制度设计透悉其独立性》,《财经理论与实践》2002年第2期。
15.郭建鸾:《董事会与监事会的职能与关系》,《时代经贸》2008年第3期。
16.高岚:《新《企业破产法》对债权保护的影响》,《发展研究》2007年第3期。
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5.庞瑞锋:《陈久霖缔造“七年奇迹”中航油何以巨亏45亿》,《南方周末》2004年12月10日第5版。
6.张潇:《中国平安董事长称自身贡献对得起6000万年薪》,《京华时报》2008年7月18日第8版。
7.蔡经:《职工的收入还要“爬行”多久?》,《工人日报》2008年3月13日第10版。
8. [英]亚当·斯密:《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》(下卷),郭大力、王亚南译,商务印书馆1974年中译本第1版,第303页。
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25.石涛、任永平:《关于我国独立董事薪酬的几个问题》,《财会通讯》2003年第9期,第22页。
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4.孙剑平:《薪酬体系与机制设计》,上海交通大学出版社2006年第1版。
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20.周友苏:《上市公司法律规制论》,商务印书馆2006年第1版。
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22.官欣荣:《独立董事制度与公司治理》,中国检察出版社2004年第1版。
23.刘桂清:《公司治理视角中的股东诉讼研究》,中国方正出版社2005年第1版。
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1.沈世勇、张莎:《CEO薪酬上涨的多纬度分析》,《科教文汇》2006年第1期。
2.朱弈馄、周云帆:《经营者薪酬的程序控制论》,《当代财经》2005年第2期。
3.丁明豪:《职业经理人造富运动》,《中国企业》2007年第11期。
4.周芬棉:《高管纷纷辞职套现法律不能眼看股市沦为圈钱机》,《法制日报》2008年2月22日。
5.庞瑞锋:《陈久霖缔造“七年奇迹”中航油何以巨亏45亿》,《南方周末》2004年12月10日。
6.尹卫国:《一千倍收入差距损害和谐劳动关系》,《经营与管理》2007年第6期。
7.人大国企改革课题组:《国有企业的战略性调整与治理结构创新》,《工业企业管理》2000年第1期。
8.马连福:《公司治理评价中的董事会治理评价指标体系设置研究》,《南开管理评论》2003年第3期。
9.王国海:《独立董事有效性:一个制度经济学视角的分析》,《财经理论与实践》2003年第1期。
10.吴友军:《对独立董事制度推行中存在的问题及对策的思考》,《科技与管理》2003年第5期。
11.周云帆、朱羿锟:《经营者薪酬的信息披露制度微探》,《劳动经济与劳动关系》2005年第4期。
12.杨柯:《浅议现代公司中的代理成本》,《会计之友》2003年第11期。
13.孙祖芳:《现代西方收入分配制度的变迁——理论、实践与思考》,《社会科学》2002年第11期。
14.刘星等:《从独立董事的薪酬制度设计透悉其独立性》,《财经理论与实践》2002年第2期。
15.郭建鸾:《董事会与监事会的职能与关系》,《时代经贸》2008年第3期。
16.高岚:《新《企业破产法》对债权保护的影响》,《发展研究》2007年第3期。