隐性契约下的研究型合资企业与国际技术交叉许可模式研究
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摘要
当今世界经济的发展已经从资本竞争逐渐转向技术竞争,进入了企业核心技术能力决定国际市场竞争力的技术资本化时代,研发是获取新技术最直接的来源。随着技术生命周期的不断缩短,技术市场和产品市场的竞争越来越激烈,技术研发所需要资源种类越来越多。与此同时,研发本身还存在不确定性,技术溢出和知识创新成果公共产品化等外部性,企业仅仅依赖于自身的力量,已无法满足技术创新的要求。
在此情形下,企业必须超越组织界限以寻求优势资源互补和风险共担,企业间的合作研发变得越来越重要。合作研发有助于企业寻求优势资源的互补,共享信息和科研成果；优化生产要素组合方式,提高资源的利用和研发效率；有利于降低研发投入,缓解研发不确定性风险；而创新技术的产业化成果还有利于提高企业在国际产品市场和技术市场的优势地位,增强收益谈判的话语权。
研究型合资企业和技术交叉许可是最常见的两种合作研发模式,前者采用股权式的合作方式,属于投资方式；而后者则采取非股权合作方式,是贸易方式的一种,但二者的技术研发创新及其产业化目标一致。基于组织结构的差异,两种合作研发模式的技术资本化路径不同。同时,作为显性契约有效补充的隐性契约对合作机制运行中不可核实因素的约束与激励能力不容忽视。因此,文章主要探讨的是隐性契约下的研究型合资企业与技术交叉许可模式。
在这样的背景下,文章以博弈论为基础,探讨不同市场竞争程度下的两种合作研发模式的微观机理；以契约理论为基础,运用规范研究方法通过建立经济理论模型,分别探讨两种模式的运行机制,考察隐性契约下两种模式的企业绩效、稳定性和政府政策的不同路径；运用创新理论、投资理论、契约理论和国际贸易理论,阐述二者对主体收益、客体效率、合同效力和社会福利的影响；通过对主要发达国家实证检验结果的分析,检验隐性契约影响合作研发模式运行机制的效果；以交易成本、产业组织和组织间学习理论为基础,分析两种模式在特定竞争模式下的伙伴选择、创新成果所有权安排、努力行为与专有技术披露以及稳定性方面的差异,从而实现对合作研发模式的优选研究；通过梳理合作研发政策的国际经验,为我国的研究型合资企业与技术交叉许可的开展提供政策建议。
基于以上研究,文章得出结论,研究型合资企业和技术交叉许可都能起到优势资源互补,促进技术进步,增强市场核心竞争力。与此同时,隐性契约可以很好地缓解有限理性、不确定性和不完全信息所引发的逆向选择、机会行为和道德风险等问题,是合作研发运行过程中不可避免的关键因素。企业应当根据战略目标、发展现状、资源需求以及对未来市场预期的不同,合理进行合作研发模式优选；由此政府应适时地针对产业对象不同的市场定位、发展状况和创新能力,为两种研发模式提供适当的经济与法律政策支持,营造良好的技术研发环境。
Development of today's world economy has gradually shift from the capital competition to technological competition. It has come into the technology capital period in which core technical capacity determines the competitiveness in international markets. Research and development is the most direct source of access to new technologies. With the ever shortening technology life cycle, technology and product markets are more competitive. So the quantity, kind and quality of resources needed are more and more complex. Research and development is uncertainties, at the same time, the problem of technology spillovers and innovation public products are severe tests to R&D. Companies rely solely on its own strength, has been unable to meet the requirements of technological innovation.
In this case, the enterprise must go beyond organizational boundaries to seek the advantage of complementary resources and risk-sharing. Cooperative R&D between enterprises is becoming increasingly important. Cooperative R&D will help enterprises to share the innovation information and result. It can optimize the combination of production factors and improve resource utilization and R&D efficiency. It also can reduce R&D investment to ease the R&D uncertainty risk. Cooperative R&D, the most important effect, is beneficial to enhance their dominant position in the international market and technology market, to enhance the right to speak of the negotiations.
Research joint ventures and cross-license agreement are the most common cooperative R&D mode, the former one is equity cooperation, belonging to the investment style; while the latter one is non-equity cooperation, belonging to method of trade. But the goal is the same-technology innovation and industrialization. The process of technology capital of the two cooperative R&D modes is different because of the differences in organizational structure. As an effective complement to explicit contract, implicit contract on unverifiable factors constrained the operation of the co-operation mechanism and incentive can not be ignored. Therefore, the article mainly focuses on research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement model under the implicit contract.
In this context, the article based on the game theory, investigate the microscopic mechanism of these two cooperative R&D model; based on the contract theory and the use of normative study, establish a theoretical model to explore the two modes through the different paths of the business performance, structure stability and polices etc. aspects under the influence of the implicit contract; using the innovation theory, investment theory, contract theory, and international trade theory, explain the effects of these two modes on subject profit, object efficiency, contract validity and the social welfare; analyzing the empirical results in developed countries, test the effect of cooperative R&D mode operating mechanism under the impact of implicit contract; based on transaction cost theory, industrial organization and organizational learning through, compare the partner selection in a particular mode of competition, arrangements for the ownership of the innovation, efforts behavior and know-how disclosed and stability, in order to achieve the preferred cooperative R&D mode; Combing the international experience of cooperative R&D policy, provide advice to develop our research joint ventures and cross-license agreement.
Based on the above research, the article concluded, research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement can play the advantage of complementary resources, promoting technological progress and enhancing the core competitiveness of the market. At the same time, the implicit contract which is the key factor during the operation of cooperative R&D can mitigate the risk of adverse selection, opportunistic behavior and moral hazard problems aroused by bounded rationality, uncertainty and incomplete information. The enterprise should be based on strategic objectives, development status, resource requirements and future market expectations to choose the optimized mode. Thus the government should be timely for the industry objects different market positioning, development and innovation capacity, to appropriate economic and legal policy and to support a favorable environment for research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement..
在此情形下,企业必须超越组织界限以寻求优势资源互补和风险共担,企业间的合作研发变得越来越重要。合作研发有助于企业寻求优势资源的互补,共享信息和科研成果；优化生产要素组合方式,提高资源的利用和研发效率；有利于降低研发投入,缓解研发不确定性风险；而创新技术的产业化成果还有利于提高企业在国际产品市场和技术市场的优势地位,增强收益谈判的话语权。
研究型合资企业和技术交叉许可是最常见的两种合作研发模式,前者采用股权式的合作方式,属于投资方式；而后者则采取非股权合作方式,是贸易方式的一种,但二者的技术研发创新及其产业化目标一致。基于组织结构的差异,两种合作研发模式的技术资本化路径不同。同时,作为显性契约有效补充的隐性契约对合作机制运行中不可核实因素的约束与激励能力不容忽视。因此,文章主要探讨的是隐性契约下的研究型合资企业与技术交叉许可模式。
在这样的背景下,文章以博弈论为基础,探讨不同市场竞争程度下的两种合作研发模式的微观机理；以契约理论为基础,运用规范研究方法通过建立经济理论模型,分别探讨两种模式的运行机制,考察隐性契约下两种模式的企业绩效、稳定性和政府政策的不同路径；运用创新理论、投资理论、契约理论和国际贸易理论,阐述二者对主体收益、客体效率、合同效力和社会福利的影响；通过对主要发达国家实证检验结果的分析,检验隐性契约影响合作研发模式运行机制的效果；以交易成本、产业组织和组织间学习理论为基础,分析两种模式在特定竞争模式下的伙伴选择、创新成果所有权安排、努力行为与专有技术披露以及稳定性方面的差异,从而实现对合作研发模式的优选研究；通过梳理合作研发政策的国际经验,为我国的研究型合资企业与技术交叉许可的开展提供政策建议。
基于以上研究,文章得出结论,研究型合资企业和技术交叉许可都能起到优势资源互补,促进技术进步,增强市场核心竞争力。与此同时,隐性契约可以很好地缓解有限理性、不确定性和不完全信息所引发的逆向选择、机会行为和道德风险等问题,是合作研发运行过程中不可避免的关键因素。企业应当根据战略目标、发展现状、资源需求以及对未来市场预期的不同,合理进行合作研发模式优选；由此政府应适时地针对产业对象不同的市场定位、发展状况和创新能力,为两种研发模式提供适当的经济与法律政策支持,营造良好的技术研发环境。
Development of today's world economy has gradually shift from the capital competition to technological competition. It has come into the technology capital period in which core technical capacity determines the competitiveness in international markets. Research and development is the most direct source of access to new technologies. With the ever shortening technology life cycle, technology and product markets are more competitive. So the quantity, kind and quality of resources needed are more and more complex. Research and development is uncertainties, at the same time, the problem of technology spillovers and innovation public products are severe tests to R&D. Companies rely solely on its own strength, has been unable to meet the requirements of technological innovation.
In this case, the enterprise must go beyond organizational boundaries to seek the advantage of complementary resources and risk-sharing. Cooperative R&D between enterprises is becoming increasingly important. Cooperative R&D will help enterprises to share the innovation information and result. It can optimize the combination of production factors and improve resource utilization and R&D efficiency. It also can reduce R&D investment to ease the R&D uncertainty risk. Cooperative R&D, the most important effect, is beneficial to enhance their dominant position in the international market and technology market, to enhance the right to speak of the negotiations.
Research joint ventures and cross-license agreement are the most common cooperative R&D mode, the former one is equity cooperation, belonging to the investment style; while the latter one is non-equity cooperation, belonging to method of trade. But the goal is the same-technology innovation and industrialization. The process of technology capital of the two cooperative R&D modes is different because of the differences in organizational structure. As an effective complement to explicit contract, implicit contract on unverifiable factors constrained the operation of the co-operation mechanism and incentive can not be ignored. Therefore, the article mainly focuses on research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement model under the implicit contract.
In this context, the article based on the game theory, investigate the microscopic mechanism of these two cooperative R&D model; based on the contract theory and the use of normative study, establish a theoretical model to explore the two modes through the different paths of the business performance, structure stability and polices etc. aspects under the influence of the implicit contract; using the innovation theory, investment theory, contract theory, and international trade theory, explain the effects of these two modes on subject profit, object efficiency, contract validity and the social welfare; analyzing the empirical results in developed countries, test the effect of cooperative R&D mode operating mechanism under the impact of implicit contract; based on transaction cost theory, industrial organization and organizational learning through, compare the partner selection in a particular mode of competition, arrangements for the ownership of the innovation, efforts behavior and know-how disclosed and stability, in order to achieve the preferred cooperative R&D mode; Combing the international experience of cooperative R&D policy, provide advice to develop our research joint ventures and cross-license agreement.
Based on the above research, the article concluded, research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement can play the advantage of complementary resources, promoting technological progress and enhancing the core competitiveness of the market. At the same time, the implicit contract which is the key factor during the operation of cooperative R&D can mitigate the risk of adverse selection, opportunistic behavior and moral hazard problems aroused by bounded rationality, uncertainty and incomplete information. The enterprise should be based on strategic objectives, development status, resource requirements and future market expectations to choose the optimized mode. Thus the government should be timely for the industry objects different market positioning, development and innovation capacity, to appropriate economic and legal policy and to support a favorable environment for research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement..
引文
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① The duration of RJVS:theory and evidence from the Eureka program, Kaz Miyagiwa, Aminata Sissokom, ISER Seminar Series,7/21/11
① The Impact of Research Joint Ventures on Firm Performance:An Empirical Assessment, Ralph Siebert, August 1996, discussion papers, ISSN Nr.0722-6748
① Research joint ventures and firm level performance, Luigi Benfratello, Alessandro Sembenelli, Research Policy 31 (2002) 493-507
① Research joint ventures and international competitiveness:evidence from the national cooperative research act, Julie Decourcy,ISSN 1043-8599 print:ISSN 1476-8364 online(?)2007 Taylor & Francis
① 陈立虎.现代国际贸易法[M].北京：中国商业出版社,2001：299
① 本文模型与郑文军(2001)、陈菊红(2002)、王安宇(2007)等文章的模型原理相似。
① 岳贤平.李廉水.顾海英.专利交叉许可的微观机理研究.理论与探索,2007年第3期：306-310
② Yang-Ming Chang, Hung-Yi Chen. Cross-Licensing, R&D Spillovers, and Welfare. Information and Management Sciences, May 2005:37-56
① 模型引自：Brander, J. and Spencer, B., Strategic commitment with R&D:the symmetric case [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1983,14 (5):225-235
① 模型引自：Cuihong Fan, El mar Wolfstetter, Research Joint Ventures, Licensing, and Industrial Policy. Govermance and the efficiency of economic systems,2005(10)
①Alberto Galasso. Cross-license agreements in the semiconductor industry:waiting to persuade? April 24, 2006
① Kimberly C. Gleason, Ike Mathur, Manohar Singh. Operational characteristics and performance gains associated with international licensing agreements:the US evidence. International Business Review 9 (2000): 431-452
① 龙勇,龚顺杰.竞争性研发联盟合作效应影响因素分析.科技进步与对策第26卷第9期2009年j月：1~4.
① Harris, R. C. etal. The virtual R&D laboratory. Research and Technology Management,1996, March-April: 69-75.
① Morasch, K.,1995. Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 28,63-78.
① Macho-Stadler, I., Perez-Castrillo, D.,1993. Moral hazard with several agents:the gains from cooperation. International Journal of Industrial Organization,11 (1),73-100.
② Perez-Castrillo, D., Sandonis, J.,1996. Disclosure of know-how in Research Joint Ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organization,15,51-75.
① Hladik, K.F.,1988. R&D and international joint ventures. In:Contractor, J., Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington Books, pp.187-204.
① Veugelers, R., Kesteloot, K.,1996. Bargained shares in Joint Ventures among asymmetric partners:Is the Matthew effect catalizing? Journal of Economics 64 (1),23-51
① Maite Pastor, Joel Sandonis (2002). RJVS vs. cross licensing agreements:an agency approach. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20 (2002):215-249
① Stefano Comino. Working paper. On the Government form of R&D Alliances:Joint Ventures & Contractual Agreement.2005
① Jon Vilasuso and Mark R. Frascatore. Public Policy and R&D When Research Joint Ventures Are Costly. The Canadian Journal of Economics. Vol.33, No.3, (Aug.,2000):818-839
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