弱专利有效性下的银行质押贷款问题研究
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摘要
在知识经济快速发展的时代，身为我国自主创新的主力军、经济增长和社会发展的重要驱动力的中小企业虽然拥有先进的专利技术，但因缺乏资金、借贷无门而无法对专利技术进行商业化开发，痛失投资机会。专利质押贷款这种以“知识换资本”的新兴融资手段，是解决科技型中小企业有技术无资金的困境的有效途径。虽然专利质押贷款的前景很好，是打通银行与科技型中小企业之间融资渠道的有效方式，并且国家和政府也陆续出台一系列的方针和政策来促进这种新兴的融资模式的快速发展，但是在实践中，银行开展专利质押贷款业务的积极性并不是很高，专利质押贷款融资并没有在我国如火如荼地展开。在理论层面上，这方面的研究成果也非常少，大量的微观研究问题还处在空白。鉴于此目的，本课题研究综合运用实物期权理论和博弈论分析方法，力图建立起一个专利质押贷款融资模型，从弱专利技术价值评估、弱专利质押贷款期权分析、政府风险补偿政策的有效性、银行损失减少措施和违约风险管理、不对称信息下的弱专利质押贷款合同设计以及弱专利质押贷款模式创新等多个维度，深入分析探讨我国的专利质押贷款融资能力不足的深层次原因，并给出相应的建议和可行的解决方案。这些研究对于提高我国中小企业（尤其是科技型中小企业）利用专利质押进行融资的能力，推进专利质押贷款的快速发展，并且对于我国创新金融制度、推进知识产权战略和转变经济发展方式具有非常重要的理论和现实意义。
专利诉讼风险是商业银行在开展专利质押贷款业务中最难把握的不确定因素（即弱专利），弱专利技术价值评估是专利质押贷款开展的基础和前提。为此，本文首先明确区分了商业化专利技术项目的价值与弱专利技术自身的价值，专利在不同实现方式下的价值大小总是与其利润流和专利长度是正相关的，与诉讼风险是负相关的，法律诉讼风险的存在显著降低了专利在不同实现方式下的价值大小。
在弱专利价值评估及影响因素研究的基础上，本文基于实物期权思想和方法建立了多不确定性因素下的弱专利质押贷款期权定价分析模型，在分析借款企业在质押贷款中的各种行为决策以及对质押贷款价值和均衡贷款合同利率产生的影响时，该模型显然比传统的专利质押贷款模型更有优势；研究发现加强知识产权的保护力度，逐步建立成熟和完善的技术交易市场，对银行开展专利质押贷款融资业务是有积极地促进作用的；专利质押贷款合同中嵌套的期权对专利质押贷款价值的影响是比较大的，并且，专利诉讼风险的存在使得银行遭受的损失进一步地恶化；在我国政府现行的专利质押贷款风险补偿措施中，贷款贴息政策对专利质押贷款有两种相反效应的影响，一方面降低违约动机的激励是有效的，另一方面却使得融资成本上升；损失补偿政策对专利质押贷款有积极地促进作用的。通过引入借款企业在丧失质押品赎回权前有恢复处于欠款状态的质押贷款的权力，本文进一步地构建了关于借款企业违约管理过程的更加具体的期权分析模型，这个模型有助于对银行的损失减少措施有效性进行分析：延长欠款期对处于欠款状态的质押贷款有正面的影响；但对提前还款概率的影响非常小；在大多数情况下，免除欠款罚金会增大欠款的发生率，但是不一定会降低丧失质押品赎回权的发生率；企业的资信状况的好坏也会对专利质押贷款产生比较大的影响，银行方面应该强化信用记录的重要性，让企业重视自己的信用评级。
在不对称信息下，以贷款数额和贷款合同利率作为甄别筛选工具下，银行能够对高风险的企业和低风险的企业进行筛选，但是，这种甄别筛选是以减少低风险类型企业的贷款额度为代价的，引起贷款合同的扭曲，同时企业效用水平也有一定程度的损失。因而，本文进一步地探索了专利质押贷款合同的金融创新，以可调整利率（AR）和固定利率（FR）模式的专利质押贷款合同作为甄别筛选工具时，在某些特定参数取值范围内，存在唯一的分离均衡，高风险类型借款企业选择AR合同，而低风险类型的借款企业选择FR合同。
With the fast development of knowledge economy, the science and technology SMEshave been the main carrier of innovation and greatest of economic growth and socialdevelopment in China. While they possess lots of valuable patent technologies,“FinancingDifficulty” has been one of the main factors preventing them from developing andcommercializing their patent technologies to realize the value of such innovation. Patentpledged loans help to solve this problem effectively. At the same time, our governmentdepartments are rapidly developing various policy alternatives, giving incentives for lendersand borrowers to actively engage in patent pledged financing. However, many banks arevery cautious, hesitating to give a shot, this business is carried out slowly. And thetheoretical research on financing with patent as collateral is also sparse. Under thisbackground, based on the theory of real option and equilibrium game, this paper attempts toestablish the influential factor model of effectiveness in bank’s patent pledged loans businessand the corresponding solutions to help with the SMEs’ financing difficulties, hoping to.spurthe development of this new financing business. Therefore, this research has vital academicand practical significances.
This paper takes the viewpoint that patent value is not equal to the value of thepatent-protected project, but they are always increasing with the expected future cash flowand patent length, the result turns out contrary to that of increasing patent litigation risk.
On this basis, we present an option-based model of weak patent pledged loan pricingunder multi-uncertainties. The results show that strengthening intellectual propertyprotection and enhancing liquidity of technology market are sure to spur the developmentof patent pledged loan business. The embedded options in the loan contract have importantimpact on the value of patent pledged loan to the bank, and the existe nce of litigation riskmakes the bank get worse. As for the present risk compensation policies, loss compensationis efficient, while the effect of interest subsidizing is mixed. With the application of thebasic model, we further build a model that introduces a more detailed specification of thedefault process on weak patent pledged loans by incorporating the borrower’s ability toreinstate the loan out of default prior to foreclosure. Loan forbearance provides an incentivefor the borrower’s reinstatement. Overall, waiving the penalty associated with delinquencydoes lead to higher delinquency rates, but is not effective in reducing defualt. Finally, thevalue of credit reputation does have a significant impact on default. So the bank shouldreinforce the impression that default is costly with respect to future credit opportunities.
In the presence of asymmetric information, we explore the contract designed by bank toscreen borrowers with different levels of risk. The banks can offer a menu of contracts withdifferent loan amount and loan interest rate that allow to distinguish a low-risk borrowerfrom a high-risk borrower. The high-risk borrowers are unaffected by asymmetricinformation, but the low-risk borrowers receives instead a low loan amount. Thus, wefurther explore the feasibility and efficiency of financial innovation in patent pledged loancontracts. There exists a separating equilibrium in which high-risk borrowers preferadjustable rate loan contract while low-risk borrowers choose fixed rate contract, enablingbanks to distinguish low-risk borrowers from high-risk borrowers.
专利诉讼风险是商业银行在开展专利质押贷款业务中最难把握的不确定因素（即弱专利），弱专利技术价值评估是专利质押贷款开展的基础和前提。为此，本文首先明确区分了商业化专利技术项目的价值与弱专利技术自身的价值，专利在不同实现方式下的价值大小总是与其利润流和专利长度是正相关的，与诉讼风险是负相关的，法律诉讼风险的存在显著降低了专利在不同实现方式下的价值大小。
在弱专利价值评估及影响因素研究的基础上，本文基于实物期权思想和方法建立了多不确定性因素下的弱专利质押贷款期权定价分析模型，在分析借款企业在质押贷款中的各种行为决策以及对质押贷款价值和均衡贷款合同利率产生的影响时，该模型显然比传统的专利质押贷款模型更有优势；研究发现加强知识产权的保护力度，逐步建立成熟和完善的技术交易市场，对银行开展专利质押贷款融资业务是有积极地促进作用的；专利质押贷款合同中嵌套的期权对专利质押贷款价值的影响是比较大的，并且，专利诉讼风险的存在使得银行遭受的损失进一步地恶化；在我国政府现行的专利质押贷款风险补偿措施中，贷款贴息政策对专利质押贷款有两种相反效应的影响，一方面降低违约动机的激励是有效的，另一方面却使得融资成本上升；损失补偿政策对专利质押贷款有积极地促进作用的。通过引入借款企业在丧失质押品赎回权前有恢复处于欠款状态的质押贷款的权力，本文进一步地构建了关于借款企业违约管理过程的更加具体的期权分析模型，这个模型有助于对银行的损失减少措施有效性进行分析：延长欠款期对处于欠款状态的质押贷款有正面的影响；但对提前还款概率的影响非常小；在大多数情况下，免除欠款罚金会增大欠款的发生率，但是不一定会降低丧失质押品赎回权的发生率；企业的资信状况的好坏也会对专利质押贷款产生比较大的影响，银行方面应该强化信用记录的重要性，让企业重视自己的信用评级。
在不对称信息下，以贷款数额和贷款合同利率作为甄别筛选工具下，银行能够对高风险的企业和低风险的企业进行筛选，但是，这种甄别筛选是以减少低风险类型企业的贷款额度为代价的，引起贷款合同的扭曲，同时企业效用水平也有一定程度的损失。因而，本文进一步地探索了专利质押贷款合同的金融创新，以可调整利率（AR）和固定利率（FR）模式的专利质押贷款合同作为甄别筛选工具时，在某些特定参数取值范围内，存在唯一的分离均衡，高风险类型借款企业选择AR合同，而低风险类型的借款企业选择FR合同。
With the fast development of knowledge economy, the science and technology SMEshave been the main carrier of innovation and greatest of economic growth and socialdevelopment in China. While they possess lots of valuable patent technologies,“FinancingDifficulty” has been one of the main factors preventing them from developing andcommercializing their patent technologies to realize the value of such innovation. Patentpledged loans help to solve this problem effectively. At the same time, our governmentdepartments are rapidly developing various policy alternatives, giving incentives for lendersand borrowers to actively engage in patent pledged financing. However, many banks arevery cautious, hesitating to give a shot, this business is carried out slowly. And thetheoretical research on financing with patent as collateral is also sparse. Under thisbackground, based on the theory of real option and equilibrium game, this paper attempts toestablish the influential factor model of effectiveness in bank’s patent pledged loans businessand the corresponding solutions to help with the SMEs’ financing difficulties, hoping to.spurthe development of this new financing business. Therefore, this research has vital academicand practical significances.
This paper takes the viewpoint that patent value is not equal to the value of thepatent-protected project, but they are always increasing with the expected future cash flowand patent length, the result turns out contrary to that of increasing patent litigation risk.
On this basis, we present an option-based model of weak patent pledged loan pricingunder multi-uncertainties. The results show that strengthening intellectual propertyprotection and enhancing liquidity of technology market are sure to spur the developmentof patent pledged loan business. The embedded options in the loan contract have importantimpact on the value of patent pledged loan to the bank, and the existe nce of litigation riskmakes the bank get worse. As for the present risk compensation policies, loss compensationis efficient, while the effect of interest subsidizing is mixed. With the application of thebasic model, we further build a model that introduces a more detailed specification of thedefault process on weak patent pledged loans by incorporating the borrower’s ability toreinstate the loan out of default prior to foreclosure. Loan forbearance provides an incentivefor the borrower’s reinstatement. Overall, waiving the penalty associated with delinquencydoes lead to higher delinquency rates, but is not effective in reducing defualt. Finally, thevalue of credit reputation does have a significant impact on default. So the bank shouldreinforce the impression that default is costly with respect to future credit opportunities.
In the presence of asymmetric information, we explore the contract designed by bank toscreen borrowers with different levels of risk. The banks can offer a menu of contracts withdifferent loan amount and loan interest rate that allow to distinguish a low-risk borrowerfrom a high-risk borrower. The high-risk borrowers are unaffected by asymmetricinformation, but the low-risk borrowers receives instead a low loan amount. Thus, wefurther explore the feasibility and efficiency of financial innovation in patent pledged loancontracts. There exists a separating equilibrium in which high-risk borrowers preferadjustable rate loan contract while low-risk borrowers choose fixed rate contract, enablingbanks to distinguish low-risk borrowers from high-risk borrowers.
引文
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