技术标准下的专利联盟形成机理研究
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摘要
专利联盟作为不同专利持有人之间联合彼此专利并统一对外许可的正式或者非正式组织,合理地利用可以清除障碍专利,减少诉讼成本和边缘溢出效应,分散专利联盟成员间的风险,促进技术标准的推广和产业化的快速发展,被视为避免“反公共地悲剧”的一种有效的解决途径。此外,技术标准的网络效应而引发的安装基础效应、消费者预期效应、正反馈效应和锁定效应以及企业之间向竞合模式发展的趋势,也极大地推动了现代专利联盟的形成和发展。
本文选择技术标准下的专利联盟作为研究对象,按照“技术标准下的专利联盟为何形成——技术标准下的专利联盟形成特点——技术标准下专利联盟的形成模式——技术标准下的专利联盟形成中的必要专利评估问题——我国技术标准下的专利联盟形成和发展现状——借鉴意义”的基本逻辑思路进行论文的构建,综合运用政策科学、法学、管理学和经济学的相关理论对技术标准下的专利联盟形成机理做了较为全面的分析。
第一章绪论指出本文的选题意义和研究背景,并对专利联盟的学术研究进行归纳和总结。
第二章从技术背景、经济背景、政策背景以及法律背景四个角度来解析专利联盟的形成。技术标准的专利化趋势引发了技术标准下的专利丛林,而专利丛林则导致了标准专利的反公共地悲剧。专利联盟作为“反公共地悲剧”的一种有效的解决途径,不仅可以破除“专利丛林”,促进专利技术的推广应用,同时也可以降低专利许可中的交易成本和诉讼风险。受网络效应的影响,技术标准的发展呈现安装基础效应、消费者预期效应、正反馈效应和锁定效应的特点,专利联盟不仅能够增强技术标准的上述效应,作为标准推广工具的重要手段,专利联盟还可以弥补标准组织专利政策的潜在缺陷,因而得到了标准专利持有企业和标准制定组织的大力推广和使用。而专利联盟反垄断规制政策的重大转变则直接促进了现代专利联盟的再度兴起和世界范围内的新发展。
第三章基于对1993年-2009年间的31个技术标准下的专利联盟的统计和调研,重点分析技术标准下的专利联盟的三个形成特点：集中在信息技术产业、部分优势企业之间的利益联合以及标准制定组织和第三方管理机构积极推动专利联盟的形成。在分析第二个特点时,运用数据分析和模型推导的方法,构建两阶段动态博弈模型分析许可费分配规则的分配形式。分析结果表明：纵向结构专利联盟的形成,需要分配给高成本的企业相对较高的许可费分配比例。在此基础上反向推导加入专利联盟的纵向一体化企业的特点,即纵向结构的专利联盟通常是优势企业之间的利益联合,企业之间生产成本的差异会妨碍专利联盟的形成。
第四章从技术标准形成路径的角度,将目前技术标准下专利联盟的形成模式分为DVD模式和MPEG模式进行考察。通过两种专利联盟形成模式的对比研究,提出我国企业合理利用专利联盟积极推进专利标准化建设的相关建议。
第五章从31个技术标准下的专利联盟的形成基础——十四个标准制定组织的必要专利披露政策和审查机制的实证分析,来探讨入盟专利必要性评估的必要性,并指出现行的独立专家专利评估机制所存在的缺陷,运用相关的案例分析提出相关的改进对策。
第六章分析了我国AVS专利联盟和IGRS专利联盟的形成过程,并结合第三章国际专利联盟的构建,指出我国企业缺乏加盟国际专利联盟的主动性和实力、专利联盟组建环境的欠缺以及专利联盟组建基础的薄弱制约着我国专利联盟的构建和发展。
第七章归纳总结本文的主要观点,提出完善促进我国专利联盟发展的对策和建议,并指出今后亟待加强的研究方向。
本文的创新之处：(1)利用技术标准的网络效应分析技术标准下的专利联盟构建的战略优势,突破了以往仅仅以“交易成本论”和“资源基础论”对专利联盟形成分析的苑囿。(2)通过数据统计和理论模型分析技术标准下的专利联盟的形成特点：集中在信息技术产业、部分优势企业之间的利益联合以及标准制定组织和第三方管理机构积极推动专利联盟的形成。(3)对技术标准下的专利联盟形成模式进行归纳比较,提出我国企业合理利用专利联盟积极推进专利标准化建设的相关建议。(4)通过实证分析指出技术标准下的专利联盟必要专利评估机制的必要性,提出我国构建专利联盟进行必要专利评估的相关改进对策。
Patent pool is formal or informal organization for acquire patent rights from multiple patent holders in a single transaction, it can resolve uncertainty and conflict in the use of intellectual property and provide a convenient alternative to assist users with implementation of their technology choices, balancing patent users'interest in reasonable access to intellectual property with patent owners' interest in reasonable return,so it is used as an alternative to address other patent thickets. In addition, network effects, consumer expectations effects, lock-in-in effect and the positive feedback mechanism generated by the development of technology standardization and the trend of competing models between enterprises greatly promote the formation and development of modern patent pools.
This dissertation chooses patent pools under the technology standardization as the research object, research. Applying the theory of economics, management and antitrust law and policy science, the dissertation focuses on the formation of patent pool, and tries to explain the reason that corporation choose to form patent pool under technology standard, and the formation characteristics. Then the dissertation analyzes the formation pattern of patent pools under the trend of patent standardization and essential patents assessment mechanism. Finally the dissertation does some research on AVS and IGRS patent pool, compares them with other patent pools discussed in chapter 3. Pool summarizes the whole research and gives some suggestions on how to accelerate the formation of patent pools.
Chapter 1 points out the significance of the dissertation and research background, summarizes present academic research patent on patent pools.
Chapter 2 analyzes the formation background of patent pools under technical standards from technology, economic, policy and law perspectives. The trend of patent standardization causes patent thicket, then leads to the anti-commons tragedy. Patent pools can not only get rid of patent thickets to and promote the popularization and application of technology standards, but also reduce transaction costs in patent licensing and litigation risks as an effective solution of this anti-commons tragedy. Affected by the network effect, the development of technical standards show features of the installed base effect, consumers expected effects, the positive feedback effect and the lock-ining effect, patent pools can not only enhance these effects of technology standards, as an important means to promote standards, patent pools can also make up potential defects in patent policy of standard setting organization, so they are vigorously promoted and used by the standard patent holding companies and standards setting organizations. The major shift of patent antitrust regulation policy directly contributes to the re-emergence of the modern patent pools and new developments in the world.
Chapter 3 analyzes three major formation characteristics of patent pools under technical standards:focus on information technology industry, joined by some advantage enterprises with mutual interests and the standard-setting organizations and third-party management agencies actively promote the formation of patent pools based on data and information of 31 patent pools under technical standards among the year of 1993-2009. The dissertation constructs a two-stage dynamic game model to analyze royalty distribution rules using the method of data statistics and model derivation on the second feature. The results show that the formation of the vertical structure patent pools needs to allocate more license fee to the relatively high cost companies. It can also get another conclusion that patent pools are usually joined by some advantage enterprises with mutual interests, the production cost difference of enterprises would hinder the formation of patent pools.
Chapter 4 discusses the formation pattern of patent pools under technology standards in two modes:DVD mode and MPEG mode from the formation path of technology standards, and puts forward that enterprises should actively promote the standardization of patents, build the fence of patent pools, improve the core competitiveness of enterprises, and circumvent barriers of foreign technical and intellectual property rights in China.
Chapter 5 analyzes essential patent disclosure policies of 14 standard-setting organizations and point out it is necessary for patent pools to assess the essentiality of patents, then studies the existing essential patents assessment mechanism of patent pools, combining with the review letters of the U.S. Department of Justice on the MPEG-2, DVD 3C as well as DVD 6C patent pools and practical case studies, and find out some potential defects on them, finally proposes several improvements and hope that's useful for building the essential patents assessment mechanism based on China's technical standards.
Chapter 6 researches the patent pool formation of AVS and IGRS patent pools, combining with the result of Chapter 3, points out that lack of the initiative to join the international patent pools and strength, good environment of patent pool formation and the weak formation foundation of the patent pools restrict the formation and development of patent pools in China.
Chapter 7 summarizes the main points of this dissertation and proposes countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the development of patent pools in China and points out that future research should be strengthened.
The innovation of this dissertation:(1) Research the strategic advantages of patent pools with network effects of technical standards, without using the traditional "transaction cost theory", and "resource-based theory". (2) Analyze three major formation characteristics of patent pools under technical standards:focus on information technology industry, joined by some advantage enterprises with mutual interests and the standard-setting organizations and third-party management agencies actively promote the formation of patent pools based on statistical analysis and theoretical model.(3) Summarize and compare the formation patterns of patent pools under the technical standards, propose suggestions to actively promote the rational use of patent pools and patent standardization for Chinese enterprises. (4) Point out it is necessary for patent pools to assess the essentiality of patents with statistical analysis, proposes several improvements and hope that's useful for building the essential patents assessment mechanism based on China's technical standards.
本文选择技术标准下的专利联盟作为研究对象,按照“技术标准下的专利联盟为何形成——技术标准下的专利联盟形成特点——技术标准下专利联盟的形成模式——技术标准下的专利联盟形成中的必要专利评估问题——我国技术标准下的专利联盟形成和发展现状——借鉴意义”的基本逻辑思路进行论文的构建,综合运用政策科学、法学、管理学和经济学的相关理论对技术标准下的专利联盟形成机理做了较为全面的分析。
第一章绪论指出本文的选题意义和研究背景,并对专利联盟的学术研究进行归纳和总结。
第二章从技术背景、经济背景、政策背景以及法律背景四个角度来解析专利联盟的形成。技术标准的专利化趋势引发了技术标准下的专利丛林,而专利丛林则导致了标准专利的反公共地悲剧。专利联盟作为“反公共地悲剧”的一种有效的解决途径,不仅可以破除“专利丛林”,促进专利技术的推广应用,同时也可以降低专利许可中的交易成本和诉讼风险。受网络效应的影响,技术标准的发展呈现安装基础效应、消费者预期效应、正反馈效应和锁定效应的特点,专利联盟不仅能够增强技术标准的上述效应,作为标准推广工具的重要手段,专利联盟还可以弥补标准组织专利政策的潜在缺陷,因而得到了标准专利持有企业和标准制定组织的大力推广和使用。而专利联盟反垄断规制政策的重大转变则直接促进了现代专利联盟的再度兴起和世界范围内的新发展。
第三章基于对1993年-2009年间的31个技术标准下的专利联盟的统计和调研,重点分析技术标准下的专利联盟的三个形成特点：集中在信息技术产业、部分优势企业之间的利益联合以及标准制定组织和第三方管理机构积极推动专利联盟的形成。在分析第二个特点时,运用数据分析和模型推导的方法,构建两阶段动态博弈模型分析许可费分配规则的分配形式。分析结果表明：纵向结构专利联盟的形成,需要分配给高成本的企业相对较高的许可费分配比例。在此基础上反向推导加入专利联盟的纵向一体化企业的特点,即纵向结构的专利联盟通常是优势企业之间的利益联合,企业之间生产成本的差异会妨碍专利联盟的形成。
第四章从技术标准形成路径的角度,将目前技术标准下专利联盟的形成模式分为DVD模式和MPEG模式进行考察。通过两种专利联盟形成模式的对比研究,提出我国企业合理利用专利联盟积极推进专利标准化建设的相关建议。
第五章从31个技术标准下的专利联盟的形成基础——十四个标准制定组织的必要专利披露政策和审查机制的实证分析,来探讨入盟专利必要性评估的必要性,并指出现行的独立专家专利评估机制所存在的缺陷,运用相关的案例分析提出相关的改进对策。
第六章分析了我国AVS专利联盟和IGRS专利联盟的形成过程,并结合第三章国际专利联盟的构建,指出我国企业缺乏加盟国际专利联盟的主动性和实力、专利联盟组建环境的欠缺以及专利联盟组建基础的薄弱制约着我国专利联盟的构建和发展。
第七章归纳总结本文的主要观点,提出完善促进我国专利联盟发展的对策和建议,并指出今后亟待加强的研究方向。
本文的创新之处：(1)利用技术标准的网络效应分析技术标准下的专利联盟构建的战略优势,突破了以往仅仅以“交易成本论”和“资源基础论”对专利联盟形成分析的苑囿。(2)通过数据统计和理论模型分析技术标准下的专利联盟的形成特点：集中在信息技术产业、部分优势企业之间的利益联合以及标准制定组织和第三方管理机构积极推动专利联盟的形成。(3)对技术标准下的专利联盟形成模式进行归纳比较,提出我国企业合理利用专利联盟积极推进专利标准化建设的相关建议。(4)通过实证分析指出技术标准下的专利联盟必要专利评估机制的必要性,提出我国构建专利联盟进行必要专利评估的相关改进对策。
Patent pool is formal or informal organization for acquire patent rights from multiple patent holders in a single transaction, it can resolve uncertainty and conflict in the use of intellectual property and provide a convenient alternative to assist users with implementation of their technology choices, balancing patent users'interest in reasonable access to intellectual property with patent owners' interest in reasonable return,so it is used as an alternative to address other patent thickets. In addition, network effects, consumer expectations effects, lock-in-in effect and the positive feedback mechanism generated by the development of technology standardization and the trend of competing models between enterprises greatly promote the formation and development of modern patent pools.
This dissertation chooses patent pools under the technology standardization as the research object, research. Applying the theory of economics, management and antitrust law and policy science, the dissertation focuses on the formation of patent pool, and tries to explain the reason that corporation choose to form patent pool under technology standard, and the formation characteristics. Then the dissertation analyzes the formation pattern of patent pools under the trend of patent standardization and essential patents assessment mechanism. Finally the dissertation does some research on AVS and IGRS patent pool, compares them with other patent pools discussed in chapter 3. Pool summarizes the whole research and gives some suggestions on how to accelerate the formation of patent pools.
Chapter 1 points out the significance of the dissertation and research background, summarizes present academic research patent on patent pools.
Chapter 2 analyzes the formation background of patent pools under technical standards from technology, economic, policy and law perspectives. The trend of patent standardization causes patent thicket, then leads to the anti-commons tragedy. Patent pools can not only get rid of patent thickets to and promote the popularization and application of technology standards, but also reduce transaction costs in patent licensing and litigation risks as an effective solution of this anti-commons tragedy. Affected by the network effect, the development of technical standards show features of the installed base effect, consumers expected effects, the positive feedback effect and the lock-ining effect, patent pools can not only enhance these effects of technology standards, as an important means to promote standards, patent pools can also make up potential defects in patent policy of standard setting organization, so they are vigorously promoted and used by the standard patent holding companies and standards setting organizations. The major shift of patent antitrust regulation policy directly contributes to the re-emergence of the modern patent pools and new developments in the world.
Chapter 3 analyzes three major formation characteristics of patent pools under technical standards:focus on information technology industry, joined by some advantage enterprises with mutual interests and the standard-setting organizations and third-party management agencies actively promote the formation of patent pools based on data and information of 31 patent pools under technical standards among the year of 1993-2009. The dissertation constructs a two-stage dynamic game model to analyze royalty distribution rules using the method of data statistics and model derivation on the second feature. The results show that the formation of the vertical structure patent pools needs to allocate more license fee to the relatively high cost companies. It can also get another conclusion that patent pools are usually joined by some advantage enterprises with mutual interests, the production cost difference of enterprises would hinder the formation of patent pools.
Chapter 4 discusses the formation pattern of patent pools under technology standards in two modes:DVD mode and MPEG mode from the formation path of technology standards, and puts forward that enterprises should actively promote the standardization of patents, build the fence of patent pools, improve the core competitiveness of enterprises, and circumvent barriers of foreign technical and intellectual property rights in China.
Chapter 5 analyzes essential patent disclosure policies of 14 standard-setting organizations and point out it is necessary for patent pools to assess the essentiality of patents, then studies the existing essential patents assessment mechanism of patent pools, combining with the review letters of the U.S. Department of Justice on the MPEG-2, DVD 3C as well as DVD 6C patent pools and practical case studies, and find out some potential defects on them, finally proposes several improvements and hope that's useful for building the essential patents assessment mechanism based on China's technical standards.
Chapter 6 researches the patent pool formation of AVS and IGRS patent pools, combining with the result of Chapter 3, points out that lack of the initiative to join the international patent pools and strength, good environment of patent pool formation and the weak formation foundation of the patent pools restrict the formation and development of patent pools in China.
Chapter 7 summarizes the main points of this dissertation and proposes countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the development of patent pools in China and points out that future research should be strengthened.
The innovation of this dissertation:(1) Research the strategic advantages of patent pools with network effects of technical standards, without using the traditional "transaction cost theory", and "resource-based theory". (2) Analyze three major formation characteristics of patent pools under technical standards:focus on information technology industry, joined by some advantage enterprises with mutual interests and the standard-setting organizations and third-party management agencies actively promote the formation of patent pools based on statistical analysis and theoretical model.(3) Summarize and compare the formation patterns of patent pools under the technical standards, propose suggestions to actively promote the rational use of patent pools and patent standardization for Chinese enterprises. (4) Point out it is necessary for patent pools to assess the essentiality of patents with statistical analysis, proposes several improvements and hope that's useful for building the essential patents assessment mechanism based on China's technical standards.
引文
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