美国言论自由的观念转向与制度嬗变
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摘要
个体自由的言论自由观是一种从个体的视角看待言论自由的观念。这种言论自由观源于霍布斯开启的个人主义传统,之后又为美国宪法第一修正案所强化。这种观念在当今世界获得了普遍的影响力,世界上绝大多数国家都将言论自由作为一项基本人权或者权利在宪法中加以规定。长期以来,我国学界也一直把言论自由视为一项个体自由。突出的表现是我们通常把言论自由作为一项基本人权加以讨论,将讨论公共事务的言论与淫秽、商业等非政治性言论混同视之,并试图用同一标准来为各种不同类型言论划定界限。
与商业、淫秽等非政治性言论相比,政治性言论有其特殊性。一方面,我们可以将政治性言论理解为一个人想说什么就说什么的自由。当我们对政治性言论做这种理解时,它本质上与商业、淫秽等非政治性言论并不存在差异。另一方面,我们又可以将政治性言论理解为民主社会中公民参与政治过程、就公共事务发表意见的自由。当我们对政治性言论做这种理解时,它与非政治性言论之间就存在着根本区别。政治性言论不仅仅关涉个体自由,还关涉政治自由。当我们仅仅从个体自由的角度来看待政治性言论时,我们在理论上就无法对政治性言论与非政治性言论做出区分,从而会将二者混为一谈,进而就会把政治自由降低到个人自由的地位,最终用个体自由的标准来为政治自由划定界限。个体自由的一元观不仅阻碍着我们对言论自由理论的把握,也阻碍着言论自由保护的制度构建。我们有关言论自由的理论和制度保护的探讨应当建立在两种言论自由观区分基础之上。
煽动性诽谤是英美历史上一项普通法罪名,在事先审查制度被废止后成为英美政府控制言论的主要手段。尽管英美普通法从未以概念化形式对煽动性诽谤进行准确界定,但从实践来看,‘任何对政府的构成、性质及政策的批评、蔑视或取笑,都会降低人们对政府的尊重,从而有可能被认定为煽动性诽谤。煽动性诽谤的核心和实质是禁止公民对政府及其官员进行批评,它与言论自由的关系构成1964年之前美国言论自由的主题。此前无论是传统的自然法理论还是言论自由市场理论都没有能废止这一罪名。究其原因,该两种理论都是从个体自由的视角来看待言论自由的。只要将言论自由视为一项个体自由,逻辑上就必定无法彻底否定对言论进行事后惩罚的合理性。直到1964年联邦最高法院从政治自由的视角出发阐明了公共讨论对于民主政治的重要意义后,煽动性诽谤才被彻底废除。此后,立基于政治自由的观念,言论自由在联邦最高法院受到近乎绝对的保护。区分言论自由的两种观念对于理解和把握美国言论自由的历史和当下具有极其重要的意义。
本文以美国言论自由的历史为基础区分了个体自由和政治自由两种不同的言论自由观念;阐释了以个体自由观为基础的传统自然法理论、言论自由市场理论和以政治自由观为基础的公民自治理论给予言论自由的意义,揭示了以这三种理论为基础的司法准则——“恶劣倾向准则”、“明显而现存危险准则”、“公共讨论自由应当不受限制准则”——所蕴含的言论自由保护逻辑,“言者有罪”、“言者未必有罪”及“言者无罪”,指出了言论自由在当代美国受到高度保护是言论自由理论和司法实践由个体自由向政治自由转向的结果；探讨了两种言论自由观存在及转向的制度原因,并从两种言论自由观的关系出发分析了当今联邦最高法院有关言论自由案件的判决“统一”与“分裂”并存的现状。基于此,论文正文内容分五章,基本内容如下：
第一章在对美国建国前后有关言论自由的历史进行同情化理解的基础上,阐述了美国宪法中限于个体自由的言论自由观和基于政治自由的言论自由观两种不同的言论自由观。这两种言论自由观在缘起、理论基础、理论基点及性质等方面都存在着诸多差异。限于个体自由的言论自由源于良心和宗教信仰自由,体现在美国宪法第一修正案中,直接关注的是个人权利如何得以满足的问题,是一种想说什么就说什么的自由。这种言论自由是一项人民作为被统治者所享有的权利,它要求为政府权力划定边界,属于消极自由的范畴。基于政治自由的言论自由观源于英国议员在议会中对公共事务进行辩论不受惩罚的特权,体现在美国宪法序言“我们人民”的民主精神之中,所关注的是如何创造并维持民主制度的问题,是一种确保人民能够对公共问题做出明智判断和选择的自由。这种言论自由是一项人民作为主权者和统治者所享有的权力,它要求人民控制政府权力本身,属于积极自由的范畴。
第二章探讨了限于个体自由的言论自由观所蕴含的理论逻辑以及与之相对应的司法准则。以洛克的思想为代表的自然法理论是普通法上煽动性诽谤及其司法上“恶劣倾向准则”的理论基础。根据“恶劣倾向准则”任何被认为具有恶劣倾向的言论都应受到惩罚,它包含着一种“言者有罪”的逻辑。这一准则是1919年之前美国言论自由的司法准则。1919年至1964年美国绝大部分言论自由案件适用的是霍姆斯提出的“明显而现存危险准则”,其理论基础是言论自由市场。根据这一准则,言者是否有罪需要置于言论发表的环境下进行具体个案衡量。它本质是一种衡平准则,包含着“言者未必有罪”的逻辑。这一准则使煽动性诽谤的合法性处于一种不确定的地位。无论是以洛克的思想为代表的自然法理论,还是密尔、霍姆斯的言论自由市场理论始终都无法彻底否定煽动性诽谤,原因在于这两种理论都是从个体自由的角度来看待言论自由的。只要将言论自由视为一项个体自由,逻辑上就必定无法彻底否定对言论进行事后惩罚的合理性。
第三章分析了基于政治自由的言论自由观所蕴含的理论逻辑以及与之相对应的司法准则。米克尔约翰基于政治自由的立场的公民自治理论认为对言论自由的任何限制都是对公民自治的破坏,没有言论自由的保障,政治自由就不复存在。公民自治理论不仅要求不能对言论进行事先审查,也禁止对言论进行事后的惩罚。这使得对言论进行事后惩罚的煽动性诽谤完全丧失了存在的合理性。立基于政治自由,联邦最高法院在1964年纽约时报案中阐明了美国宪法第一修正案中心意义,即“公共讨论的自由应当是不受限制、强健有力和完全开放的”。此后对公共事务讨论的自由在联邦最高法院受到近乎于绝对的保护,从而使美国言论自由进入到一个全新的“言者无罪”的时代。就言论自由的保护来说,公民自治理论比言论自由市场理论相更具革命性的意义。
第四章进一步探讨了美国法院有关言论自由案件的判决基点从个体自由到政治自由转向的制度基础。这种转变不仅仅源于言论自由理论的逻辑自洽,从根本说它是美国社会变迁引起的民主理念由共和向多元转向及其带来的司法审查理念从实体导向到程序导向转变的结果。与建国初期的小农经济为基础、高度同质化的社会相适应,美国实行的是共和民主。共和民主旨在追求一种区别于个体利益的公共利益,此时“由人民代表发出的公众呼声,要比人民自己为此集会和亲自提出意见更能符合公共利益”,因此言论自由存在的制度基础受到削弱。与共和民主追求公共利益的目的相适应,司法审查的目的在于确保多数人统治的政府追求公共而非多数人利益。据此,司法审查虽然在实践中划定了个体自由的范围,但如果法院一旦认定政府的行为符合公共利益,个体自由就要让位于公共利益。这与煽动性诽谤维护社会秩序的旨趣不谋而合。自19世纪末20世纪初开始随着美国社会经济发展、移民数量激增、文化多元化,共和民主逐渐向多元民主转向。在多元民主理念之下,民主意味着一套开放的程序,所有的个人和团体都可以通过这种程序自由地追求自己的利益。这时限制了言论自由,民主结果就会因程序瑕疵而丧失合法性。与多元民主理念相适应,司法审查也不再是审查民主结果是否符合公共利益,而是审查获取民主结果的政治过程是否公平、开放。法院对言论自由保护的强调与法院将自己多元民主程序监督者定位缠绕在一起；保护言论自由与强化代议制司法功能紧密相连。
第五章分析了当今美国联邦最高法院有关言论自由判决“统一”与“分裂”并存的现状。1964年之后美国言论自由存在两个不同题域：界限题域和配置题域。前者需要解决的是国家权力对公民言论自由的侵害问题,这个问题也是1964年之前美国言论自由的主题,煽动性诽谤案件是典型代表；后者需要解决的是谁的言论自由的问题,是1964年之后美国言论自由的主题,政治资金改革案件是最典型的代表。当今美国联邦最高法院虽然在界限领域很容易形成一致意见,但是在配置领域却持续分裂。这是言论自由题域转换而导致的两种言论自由观念由协调到冲突的结果。在配置题域内,那些持个体自由观的联邦保守派大法官们的错误之处在于将言论自由市场实质化。正如自由派大法官们所批评的那样,对美国宪法第一修正案来说,言论的自由市场并不是一个终极目标；是否需要一个自由市场取决于这个自由的市场是否有助于促进公共讨论自由这一更高宪法目标。
本文的核心观点是美国宪法中存在着个体自由和政治自由两种不同的言论自由观念,个体自由的言论自由观并不存在着“言者无罪”的逻辑,它是基于政治自由的言论自由观的产物,政治性言论在当今美国受到高度保护是以政治自由而非个体自由为基础的。
The concept of freedom of speech on individual freedom is one kind of concept that looks at freedom of speech from the individual perspective. This concept of freedom of speech is rooted in the traditional individualism initiated by Hobbes and later strengthened by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The concept has exerted widespread influence on today's world, while most countries in the world have the freedom of speech as one kind of basic human rights or basic right specified in their constitution. For a long time, the freedom of speech is viewed as one kind of individual freedom in the academic circles of China, the significant aspect of which is that we usually take freedom of speech as one kind of fundamental human rights to discuss and mix up speech about public affairs with nonpolitical speech such as obscenity and business, trying to define the limits of different kinds of speech through a single standard.
Compared with nonpolitical speech such as obscenity and business, political speech has its specialty. On one hand, political speech can be perceived as the freedom that one can say what they want to say. In this sense, there is no essential difference between nonpolitical speech such as obscenity and business and political speech. On the other hand, political speech can be construed as the freedom that in democratic society citizens can participate in political process and voice their opinions about public affairs. When perceived in this way, political speech is fundamentally different from nonpolitical speech. Political speech is not only concerned with individual freedom but political freedom. When looking on political speech only from the perspective of individual freedom, theoretically we cannot differentiate political speech and non-political speech, thus mixing them up, then reduce the role of the political freedom to individual freedom, and ultimately delimit political freedom with the standards of individual freedom. Monism on individual freedom not only hinders our grasp of the theory of freedom of speech, but also hinders the system construction on protection of freedom of speech. The theory on freedom of speech and its system protection should be based on the distinction between the two concepts of freedom of speech.
Seditious libel is an accusation in common law in British and American history, and it became the main tool for British and American government to control speech after the censorship system was abolished. Although the Anglo-American common law has never accurately defined seditious Liberal in the form of conceptualization, but from the point of practice, any criticism or contempt the composition, nature and policy of government will reduce people's respect for government, which thus may be deemed to be seditious libel. The core and essence of seditious libel is prohibition of the citizens' criticism of the government and its officials, the relationship of which with the freedom of speech constitutes the topic of American freedom of speech before1964. Before then, both the traditional natural law theory and freedom of speech market theory did not abolish this accusation. The reason is that both of the theories view freedom of speech from the perspective of individual freedom. As long as freedom of speech is perceived as a kind of individual freedom, the rationality of subsequent punishment of speech cannot be completely and logically denied. Seditious libel has not been abolished until in1964the Supreme Court of the United States from the perspective of political freedom illuminated the significance of public discussion on democratic politic. After that, based on the concept of political freedom, freedom of speech in the Supreme Court was under almost absolute protection.
In this paper, based on the history of American freedom of speech, first distinguishes the two different kinds of freedom of speech concepts-individual freedom and political freedom; Illustrates the significance to freedom of speech of the individual-freedom-based traditional natural law theory and freedom of speech market theory and political-freedom-based citizen self-government theory; reveals the logic contained in the judicial principles which are based on the three theories-"bad tendency norms","clear and existing risk criteria","public discussion should not be limited criteria"--"blame the speaker ","the speaker may not be guilty" and " blame not the speaker". And points out that the reason why freedom of speech is highly protected in contemporary America is the result of the change of freedom of speech theory and judicial practice from the individual freedom to political freedom; Discusses the institutional reason for the existence and change of the two kinds of speech freedom and analyzes the coexistence of "unity" and "splitting" situation of the recent Supreme Court rulings on freedom of speech Based on this, the thesis is divided into five chapters.
Chapter One:I discuss the two different concepts of free speech contained in the U.S. Constitution based on the history before and after the founding of the United States. They have many differences in their origins, theories, the core stones which they stand on and the nature what they are. Freedom of expression limited to individual freedom originated in conscience and freedom of religion, embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the immediate concern is how to meet the problems of individual rights is the freedom to say what one would say. This is a people's rights to freedom of expression enjoyed by the rulers as it requires the government authority demarcation of the border, belong to the category of negative liberty. Concept of freedom of expression for political freedom from the British Members of Parliament to debate public affairs impunity privileges embodied in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution," We the People " in the spirit of democracy among the concerns is how to create and sustain democracy the problem is to ensure that people are able to make an informed judgment and freedom of choice on public issues. This speech is one of the people as the sovereign power and the rulers enjoyed it requires the people to control government power itself, belongs to the category of positive freedom.
In the first chapter, based on the sympathetic understanding of the history on the freedom of speech around the founding of the United States, this paper expounds the two concepts of freedom of speech in the Constitution of the United States-freedom of speech concept which is limited to individual freedom and the freedom of speech concept which is based on political freedom. These two kinds of freedom of speech concepts differ a lot in the origin, theoretical basis, theoretical lens and nature. The freedom of speech which is limited to individual freedom is derived from conscience and the freedom of religious belief and is embodied in the first amendment to American Constitution. It is the freedom of saying what one wants to say, while its focus is how individual rights can be satisfied. This kind of freedom of speech is the right enjoyed by people as the ruled and it requires delimiting government power, which belongs to negative freedom. The freedom of speech concept which is based on political freedom stems from the privilege of British councilors'immunity of punishment for debating over public affairs, which is embodied in the democratic spirit "we the people" in the preface of the United States constitution. It focuses on the issue of how to create and maintain a democratic system and is a kind of freedom to ensure that people can make sensible judgment and choice of public issues. The freedom of speech is a power that the people enjoy as a sovereign ruler, which requires people to control the power of the government itself and belongs to the category of positive freedom.
The second chapter explores the theoretical logic contained in the individual-freedom-confined freedom of speech concept and its corresponding judicial principles. The theory of natural law represented by Locke is the theoretical foundation of seditious libel and its judicial "criterion of bad tendency" in common law system. According to the rule of "bad tendency", any speech which is thought to have a bad tendency should be punished, which contains a "blame the speaker" logic. This criterion is the judicial criteria before1919of American freedom of speech. From1919to1964, the vast majority of cases of freedom of speech in the United States have adopted the "clear and existing risk criterion" put forward by Holmes, theoretical basis of which is the market of freedom of speech. According to this criterion, whether you're guilty is ought to be measured in specific case under the situation where the speech was published. Its essence is a kind of equity principle, which contains the logic of "blame not the speaker". This criterion makes the legitimacy of seditious libel in an uncertain status. Neither natural law theory represented by Locke nor freedom of speech market theory of John Stuart Mill and Holmes can completely negate seditious libel, the reason of which is that both of the theories view freedom of speech from the perspective of individual freedom. As long as freedom of speech is treated as an individual freedom, logically the rationality of subsequent punishment cannot be completely denied.
The third chapter analyzes the theoretical logic contained in freedom of speech concept on the basis of political freedom and its corresponding judicial criteria. The civic autonomy theory of Mikel John based on the position of political freedom believe that any restriction to freedom of speech is the destruction of civic autonomy and if there is no guarantee of freedom of speech, political freedom will cease to exist. Civic autonomy theory not only requires no precensoring speech, but also bans subsequent punishment for speech, which makes the seditious libel which punishes speech afterwards completely lose its rationality of existence. Based on political freedom, the Supreme Court in New York case in1964clarified the central meaning of the first amendment, namely "the freedom of public discussion should be unconstrained, sturdy, and fully open". Since then, freedom of discussion over public affairs is under nearly absolute protection at the federal Supreme Court, which thereby makes American freedom of speech into a new era of "blame not the speaker". As far as the protection of the freedom of speech is concerned, civic autonomy theory has more revolutionary significance more than freedom of speech market theory.
The fourth chapter further discusses the ruling basis of American courts and the institutional basis of its change from individual freedom to political freedom. This change not only derived from coherent logic of freedom of speech theory itself, but also fundamentally speaking rooted in the change of the notion of democracy from republic to pluralism and its judicial review theory from substance-oriented to procedure-oriented, which are brought by American social change. To be compatible with its small-scale peasant economy based and highly homogenized society in its early years, the United States adopted republican democracy. Republican democracy aims to pursue a kind of public interest distinct from the individual interest and at this time "the calls made by the representatives of people are more in accordance with public interests than the assembly and personal suggestions made by the people themselves". So the institutional basis of the existence of the freedom of speech is weakened. To accord with the purpose of public interests pursued by republican democracy, judicial review aims to ensure the government of majority rule pursues public interest rather than the interest of majority. Accordingly, although judicial review outlines the scope of individual freedom in practice, still once if the court rules that the government's behavior conforms to the public interest, individual freedom will give way to the public interest. With the social and economic development, the proliferation of immigration, cultural diversity of American society since the late19th century and early20th century, republican democracy gradually turns to pluralist democracy. Under the concept of pluralist democracy, democracy means a set of open procedure, through which all individuals and groups can be available to pursue their own interests. It then limits the freedom of speech, and democratic result will lose its legitimacy because of procedural flaws. Corresponding with concept of pluralist democracy, judicial review no longer examines whether democratic results conform to the public interest, but investigates whether political process to achieve democratic results is fair and open. The court intertwined its stress on protection of freedom of speech and its position as supervisors of pluralist democracy procedure. Protecting freedom of speech and reinforcing judicial function of representative system are closely linked.
The fifth chapter analyses the current "unity" and "split" status of Supreme Court rulings about freedom of speech. After1964, there are two different domains of freedom of speech in the United States:demarcation domain and allocation domain. The former is to solve the state power's infringement of citizens' freedom of speech, which is the theme of the freedom of speech before1964, with the seditious libel case as its typical representative; the latter is to solve who the freedom of speech belongs to, which is the main topic of American freedom of speech after1964, with the reform of political capital case as its typical representative. Today although the U.S. Supreme Court are easy to reach an agreement in the domain of demarcation, continue to split in the domain of allocation. This is the result of coordination to conflict of two kinds of freedom of speech concepts led by the change of the freedom of speech domains. In the allocation domain, those federal conservative justices who hold the individual freedom concept erred in substantiation of freedom of speech market. As the liberal justices have criticized, for the first amendment to the U.S. constitution, the free market of freedom of speech is not an ultimate goal; Whether a free market is needed depends on whether the free market helps to promote the higher goal of constitution-freedom of public discussion.
The core idea of this thesis is that there are two different concepts of freedom of speech-individual freedom and political freedom in the Constitution of the United States. And the freedom of speech concept on individual freedom does not exist "blame not the speaker" logic; it is the product of speech freedom based on apodictically freedom. The strong protection of political speech in current American is based on political rather than individual freedom.
与商业、淫秽等非政治性言论相比,政治性言论有其特殊性。一方面,我们可以将政治性言论理解为一个人想说什么就说什么的自由。当我们对政治性言论做这种理解时,它本质上与商业、淫秽等非政治性言论并不存在差异。另一方面,我们又可以将政治性言论理解为民主社会中公民参与政治过程、就公共事务发表意见的自由。当我们对政治性言论做这种理解时,它与非政治性言论之间就存在着根本区别。政治性言论不仅仅关涉个体自由,还关涉政治自由。当我们仅仅从个体自由的角度来看待政治性言论时,我们在理论上就无法对政治性言论与非政治性言论做出区分,从而会将二者混为一谈,进而就会把政治自由降低到个人自由的地位,最终用个体自由的标准来为政治自由划定界限。个体自由的一元观不仅阻碍着我们对言论自由理论的把握,也阻碍着言论自由保护的制度构建。我们有关言论自由的理论和制度保护的探讨应当建立在两种言论自由观区分基础之上。
煽动性诽谤是英美历史上一项普通法罪名,在事先审查制度被废止后成为英美政府控制言论的主要手段。尽管英美普通法从未以概念化形式对煽动性诽谤进行准确界定,但从实践来看,‘任何对政府的构成、性质及政策的批评、蔑视或取笑,都会降低人们对政府的尊重,从而有可能被认定为煽动性诽谤。煽动性诽谤的核心和实质是禁止公民对政府及其官员进行批评,它与言论自由的关系构成1964年之前美国言论自由的主题。此前无论是传统的自然法理论还是言论自由市场理论都没有能废止这一罪名。究其原因,该两种理论都是从个体自由的视角来看待言论自由的。只要将言论自由视为一项个体自由,逻辑上就必定无法彻底否定对言论进行事后惩罚的合理性。直到1964年联邦最高法院从政治自由的视角出发阐明了公共讨论对于民主政治的重要意义后,煽动性诽谤才被彻底废除。此后,立基于政治自由的观念,言论自由在联邦最高法院受到近乎绝对的保护。区分言论自由的两种观念对于理解和把握美国言论自由的历史和当下具有极其重要的意义。
本文以美国言论自由的历史为基础区分了个体自由和政治自由两种不同的言论自由观念;阐释了以个体自由观为基础的传统自然法理论、言论自由市场理论和以政治自由观为基础的公民自治理论给予言论自由的意义,揭示了以这三种理论为基础的司法准则——“恶劣倾向准则”、“明显而现存危险准则”、“公共讨论自由应当不受限制准则”——所蕴含的言论自由保护逻辑,“言者有罪”、“言者未必有罪”及“言者无罪”,指出了言论自由在当代美国受到高度保护是言论自由理论和司法实践由个体自由向政治自由转向的结果；探讨了两种言论自由观存在及转向的制度原因,并从两种言论自由观的关系出发分析了当今联邦最高法院有关言论自由案件的判决“统一”与“分裂”并存的现状。基于此,论文正文内容分五章,基本内容如下：
第一章在对美国建国前后有关言论自由的历史进行同情化理解的基础上,阐述了美国宪法中限于个体自由的言论自由观和基于政治自由的言论自由观两种不同的言论自由观。这两种言论自由观在缘起、理论基础、理论基点及性质等方面都存在着诸多差异。限于个体自由的言论自由源于良心和宗教信仰自由,体现在美国宪法第一修正案中,直接关注的是个人权利如何得以满足的问题,是一种想说什么就说什么的自由。这种言论自由是一项人民作为被统治者所享有的权利,它要求为政府权力划定边界,属于消极自由的范畴。基于政治自由的言论自由观源于英国议员在议会中对公共事务进行辩论不受惩罚的特权,体现在美国宪法序言“我们人民”的民主精神之中,所关注的是如何创造并维持民主制度的问题,是一种确保人民能够对公共问题做出明智判断和选择的自由。这种言论自由是一项人民作为主权者和统治者所享有的权力,它要求人民控制政府权力本身,属于积极自由的范畴。
第二章探讨了限于个体自由的言论自由观所蕴含的理论逻辑以及与之相对应的司法准则。以洛克的思想为代表的自然法理论是普通法上煽动性诽谤及其司法上“恶劣倾向准则”的理论基础。根据“恶劣倾向准则”任何被认为具有恶劣倾向的言论都应受到惩罚,它包含着一种“言者有罪”的逻辑。这一准则是1919年之前美国言论自由的司法准则。1919年至1964年美国绝大部分言论自由案件适用的是霍姆斯提出的“明显而现存危险准则”,其理论基础是言论自由市场。根据这一准则,言者是否有罪需要置于言论发表的环境下进行具体个案衡量。它本质是一种衡平准则,包含着“言者未必有罪”的逻辑。这一准则使煽动性诽谤的合法性处于一种不确定的地位。无论是以洛克的思想为代表的自然法理论,还是密尔、霍姆斯的言论自由市场理论始终都无法彻底否定煽动性诽谤,原因在于这两种理论都是从个体自由的角度来看待言论自由的。只要将言论自由视为一项个体自由,逻辑上就必定无法彻底否定对言论进行事后惩罚的合理性。
第三章分析了基于政治自由的言论自由观所蕴含的理论逻辑以及与之相对应的司法准则。米克尔约翰基于政治自由的立场的公民自治理论认为对言论自由的任何限制都是对公民自治的破坏,没有言论自由的保障,政治自由就不复存在。公民自治理论不仅要求不能对言论进行事先审查,也禁止对言论进行事后的惩罚。这使得对言论进行事后惩罚的煽动性诽谤完全丧失了存在的合理性。立基于政治自由,联邦最高法院在1964年纽约时报案中阐明了美国宪法第一修正案中心意义,即“公共讨论的自由应当是不受限制、强健有力和完全开放的”。此后对公共事务讨论的自由在联邦最高法院受到近乎于绝对的保护,从而使美国言论自由进入到一个全新的“言者无罪”的时代。就言论自由的保护来说,公民自治理论比言论自由市场理论相更具革命性的意义。
第四章进一步探讨了美国法院有关言论自由案件的判决基点从个体自由到政治自由转向的制度基础。这种转变不仅仅源于言论自由理论的逻辑自洽,从根本说它是美国社会变迁引起的民主理念由共和向多元转向及其带来的司法审查理念从实体导向到程序导向转变的结果。与建国初期的小农经济为基础、高度同质化的社会相适应,美国实行的是共和民主。共和民主旨在追求一种区别于个体利益的公共利益,此时“由人民代表发出的公众呼声,要比人民自己为此集会和亲自提出意见更能符合公共利益”,因此言论自由存在的制度基础受到削弱。与共和民主追求公共利益的目的相适应,司法审查的目的在于确保多数人统治的政府追求公共而非多数人利益。据此,司法审查虽然在实践中划定了个体自由的范围,但如果法院一旦认定政府的行为符合公共利益,个体自由就要让位于公共利益。这与煽动性诽谤维护社会秩序的旨趣不谋而合。自19世纪末20世纪初开始随着美国社会经济发展、移民数量激增、文化多元化,共和民主逐渐向多元民主转向。在多元民主理念之下,民主意味着一套开放的程序,所有的个人和团体都可以通过这种程序自由地追求自己的利益。这时限制了言论自由,民主结果就会因程序瑕疵而丧失合法性。与多元民主理念相适应,司法审查也不再是审查民主结果是否符合公共利益,而是审查获取民主结果的政治过程是否公平、开放。法院对言论自由保护的强调与法院将自己多元民主程序监督者定位缠绕在一起；保护言论自由与强化代议制司法功能紧密相连。
第五章分析了当今美国联邦最高法院有关言论自由判决“统一”与“分裂”并存的现状。1964年之后美国言论自由存在两个不同题域：界限题域和配置题域。前者需要解决的是国家权力对公民言论自由的侵害问题,这个问题也是1964年之前美国言论自由的主题,煽动性诽谤案件是典型代表；后者需要解决的是谁的言论自由的问题,是1964年之后美国言论自由的主题,政治资金改革案件是最典型的代表。当今美国联邦最高法院虽然在界限领域很容易形成一致意见,但是在配置领域却持续分裂。这是言论自由题域转换而导致的两种言论自由观念由协调到冲突的结果。在配置题域内,那些持个体自由观的联邦保守派大法官们的错误之处在于将言论自由市场实质化。正如自由派大法官们所批评的那样,对美国宪法第一修正案来说,言论的自由市场并不是一个终极目标；是否需要一个自由市场取决于这个自由的市场是否有助于促进公共讨论自由这一更高宪法目标。
本文的核心观点是美国宪法中存在着个体自由和政治自由两种不同的言论自由观念,个体自由的言论自由观并不存在着“言者无罪”的逻辑,它是基于政治自由的言论自由观的产物,政治性言论在当今美国受到高度保护是以政治自由而非个体自由为基础的。
The concept of freedom of speech on individual freedom is one kind of concept that looks at freedom of speech from the individual perspective. This concept of freedom of speech is rooted in the traditional individualism initiated by Hobbes and later strengthened by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The concept has exerted widespread influence on today's world, while most countries in the world have the freedom of speech as one kind of basic human rights or basic right specified in their constitution. For a long time, the freedom of speech is viewed as one kind of individual freedom in the academic circles of China, the significant aspect of which is that we usually take freedom of speech as one kind of fundamental human rights to discuss and mix up speech about public affairs with nonpolitical speech such as obscenity and business, trying to define the limits of different kinds of speech through a single standard.
Compared with nonpolitical speech such as obscenity and business, political speech has its specialty. On one hand, political speech can be perceived as the freedom that one can say what they want to say. In this sense, there is no essential difference between nonpolitical speech such as obscenity and business and political speech. On the other hand, political speech can be construed as the freedom that in democratic society citizens can participate in political process and voice their opinions about public affairs. When perceived in this way, political speech is fundamentally different from nonpolitical speech. Political speech is not only concerned with individual freedom but political freedom. When looking on political speech only from the perspective of individual freedom, theoretically we cannot differentiate political speech and non-political speech, thus mixing them up, then reduce the role of the political freedom to individual freedom, and ultimately delimit political freedom with the standards of individual freedom. Monism on individual freedom not only hinders our grasp of the theory of freedom of speech, but also hinders the system construction on protection of freedom of speech. The theory on freedom of speech and its system protection should be based on the distinction between the two concepts of freedom of speech.
Seditious libel is an accusation in common law in British and American history, and it became the main tool for British and American government to control speech after the censorship system was abolished. Although the Anglo-American common law has never accurately defined seditious Liberal in the form of conceptualization, but from the point of practice, any criticism or contempt the composition, nature and policy of government will reduce people's respect for government, which thus may be deemed to be seditious libel. The core and essence of seditious libel is prohibition of the citizens' criticism of the government and its officials, the relationship of which with the freedom of speech constitutes the topic of American freedom of speech before1964. Before then, both the traditional natural law theory and freedom of speech market theory did not abolish this accusation. The reason is that both of the theories view freedom of speech from the perspective of individual freedom. As long as freedom of speech is perceived as a kind of individual freedom, the rationality of subsequent punishment of speech cannot be completely and logically denied. Seditious libel has not been abolished until in1964the Supreme Court of the United States from the perspective of political freedom illuminated the significance of public discussion on democratic politic. After that, based on the concept of political freedom, freedom of speech in the Supreme Court was under almost absolute protection.
In this paper, based on the history of American freedom of speech, first distinguishes the two different kinds of freedom of speech concepts-individual freedom and political freedom; Illustrates the significance to freedom of speech of the individual-freedom-based traditional natural law theory and freedom of speech market theory and political-freedom-based citizen self-government theory; reveals the logic contained in the judicial principles which are based on the three theories-"bad tendency norms","clear and existing risk criteria","public discussion should not be limited criteria"--"blame the speaker ","the speaker may not be guilty" and " blame not the speaker". And points out that the reason why freedom of speech is highly protected in contemporary America is the result of the change of freedom of speech theory and judicial practice from the individual freedom to political freedom; Discusses the institutional reason for the existence and change of the two kinds of speech freedom and analyzes the coexistence of "unity" and "splitting" situation of the recent Supreme Court rulings on freedom of speech Based on this, the thesis is divided into five chapters.
Chapter One:I discuss the two different concepts of free speech contained in the U.S. Constitution based on the history before and after the founding of the United States. They have many differences in their origins, theories, the core stones which they stand on and the nature what they are. Freedom of expression limited to individual freedom originated in conscience and freedom of religion, embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the immediate concern is how to meet the problems of individual rights is the freedom to say what one would say. This is a people's rights to freedom of expression enjoyed by the rulers as it requires the government authority demarcation of the border, belong to the category of negative liberty. Concept of freedom of expression for political freedom from the British Members of Parliament to debate public affairs impunity privileges embodied in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution," We the People " in the spirit of democracy among the concerns is how to create and sustain democracy the problem is to ensure that people are able to make an informed judgment and freedom of choice on public issues. This speech is one of the people as the sovereign power and the rulers enjoyed it requires the people to control government power itself, belongs to the category of positive freedom.
In the first chapter, based on the sympathetic understanding of the history on the freedom of speech around the founding of the United States, this paper expounds the two concepts of freedom of speech in the Constitution of the United States-freedom of speech concept which is limited to individual freedom and the freedom of speech concept which is based on political freedom. These two kinds of freedom of speech concepts differ a lot in the origin, theoretical basis, theoretical lens and nature. The freedom of speech which is limited to individual freedom is derived from conscience and the freedom of religious belief and is embodied in the first amendment to American Constitution. It is the freedom of saying what one wants to say, while its focus is how individual rights can be satisfied. This kind of freedom of speech is the right enjoyed by people as the ruled and it requires delimiting government power, which belongs to negative freedom. The freedom of speech concept which is based on political freedom stems from the privilege of British councilors'immunity of punishment for debating over public affairs, which is embodied in the democratic spirit "we the people" in the preface of the United States constitution. It focuses on the issue of how to create and maintain a democratic system and is a kind of freedom to ensure that people can make sensible judgment and choice of public issues. The freedom of speech is a power that the people enjoy as a sovereign ruler, which requires people to control the power of the government itself and belongs to the category of positive freedom.
The second chapter explores the theoretical logic contained in the individual-freedom-confined freedom of speech concept and its corresponding judicial principles. The theory of natural law represented by Locke is the theoretical foundation of seditious libel and its judicial "criterion of bad tendency" in common law system. According to the rule of "bad tendency", any speech which is thought to have a bad tendency should be punished, which contains a "blame the speaker" logic. This criterion is the judicial criteria before1919of American freedom of speech. From1919to1964, the vast majority of cases of freedom of speech in the United States have adopted the "clear and existing risk criterion" put forward by Holmes, theoretical basis of which is the market of freedom of speech. According to this criterion, whether you're guilty is ought to be measured in specific case under the situation where the speech was published. Its essence is a kind of equity principle, which contains the logic of "blame not the speaker". This criterion makes the legitimacy of seditious libel in an uncertain status. Neither natural law theory represented by Locke nor freedom of speech market theory of John Stuart Mill and Holmes can completely negate seditious libel, the reason of which is that both of the theories view freedom of speech from the perspective of individual freedom. As long as freedom of speech is treated as an individual freedom, logically the rationality of subsequent punishment cannot be completely denied.
The third chapter analyzes the theoretical logic contained in freedom of speech concept on the basis of political freedom and its corresponding judicial criteria. The civic autonomy theory of Mikel John based on the position of political freedom believe that any restriction to freedom of speech is the destruction of civic autonomy and if there is no guarantee of freedom of speech, political freedom will cease to exist. Civic autonomy theory not only requires no precensoring speech, but also bans subsequent punishment for speech, which makes the seditious libel which punishes speech afterwards completely lose its rationality of existence. Based on political freedom, the Supreme Court in New York case in1964clarified the central meaning of the first amendment, namely "the freedom of public discussion should be unconstrained, sturdy, and fully open". Since then, freedom of discussion over public affairs is under nearly absolute protection at the federal Supreme Court, which thereby makes American freedom of speech into a new era of "blame not the speaker". As far as the protection of the freedom of speech is concerned, civic autonomy theory has more revolutionary significance more than freedom of speech market theory.
The fourth chapter further discusses the ruling basis of American courts and the institutional basis of its change from individual freedom to political freedom. This change not only derived from coherent logic of freedom of speech theory itself, but also fundamentally speaking rooted in the change of the notion of democracy from republic to pluralism and its judicial review theory from substance-oriented to procedure-oriented, which are brought by American social change. To be compatible with its small-scale peasant economy based and highly homogenized society in its early years, the United States adopted republican democracy. Republican democracy aims to pursue a kind of public interest distinct from the individual interest and at this time "the calls made by the representatives of people are more in accordance with public interests than the assembly and personal suggestions made by the people themselves". So the institutional basis of the existence of the freedom of speech is weakened. To accord with the purpose of public interests pursued by republican democracy, judicial review aims to ensure the government of majority rule pursues public interest rather than the interest of majority. Accordingly, although judicial review outlines the scope of individual freedom in practice, still once if the court rules that the government's behavior conforms to the public interest, individual freedom will give way to the public interest. With the social and economic development, the proliferation of immigration, cultural diversity of American society since the late19th century and early20th century, republican democracy gradually turns to pluralist democracy. Under the concept of pluralist democracy, democracy means a set of open procedure, through which all individuals and groups can be available to pursue their own interests. It then limits the freedom of speech, and democratic result will lose its legitimacy because of procedural flaws. Corresponding with concept of pluralist democracy, judicial review no longer examines whether democratic results conform to the public interest, but investigates whether political process to achieve democratic results is fair and open. The court intertwined its stress on protection of freedom of speech and its position as supervisors of pluralist democracy procedure. Protecting freedom of speech and reinforcing judicial function of representative system are closely linked.
The fifth chapter analyses the current "unity" and "split" status of Supreme Court rulings about freedom of speech. After1964, there are two different domains of freedom of speech in the United States:demarcation domain and allocation domain. The former is to solve the state power's infringement of citizens' freedom of speech, which is the theme of the freedom of speech before1964, with the seditious libel case as its typical representative; the latter is to solve who the freedom of speech belongs to, which is the main topic of American freedom of speech after1964, with the reform of political capital case as its typical representative. Today although the U.S. Supreme Court are easy to reach an agreement in the domain of demarcation, continue to split in the domain of allocation. This is the result of coordination to conflict of two kinds of freedom of speech concepts led by the change of the freedom of speech domains. In the allocation domain, those federal conservative justices who hold the individual freedom concept erred in substantiation of freedom of speech market. As the liberal justices have criticized, for the first amendment to the U.S. constitution, the free market of freedom of speech is not an ultimate goal; Whether a free market is needed depends on whether the free market helps to promote the higher goal of constitution-freedom of public discussion.
The core idea of this thesis is that there are two different concepts of freedom of speech-individual freedom and political freedom in the Constitution of the United States. And the freedom of speech concept on individual freedom does not exist "blame not the speaker" logic; it is the product of speech freedom based on apodictically freedom. The strong protection of political speech in current American is based on political rather than individual freedom.
引文
① 清华大学周光权教授主张从刑法中剔除这一罪名,而人民大学韩玉胜教授主张保留；于建嵘教授则认为还不到讨论立法修改的层面,何兵教授则寄希望于“司法独立”。参见谢雪琳：《王鹏错案引发“诽谤罪”存废激辩》,载《第一财经日报》2010年12月3日。
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版。
③ [美]欧文·M.费斯：《一种既是个人又是政治的自由》,刘掣、殷莹译,载《言论自由的反讽》,北京：新 星出版社,2005年版,第89-112页。
① [英]以赛亚·柏林：《自由论》(修订版),胡传胜译,南京：译林出版社,2011年版,第167-221页。
② [法]邦雅曼·贡斯当著：《古代人的自由与现代人的自由》,阎克文等译,上海：上海人民出版社,2003年版。
③ [美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版。
④ [美]萨托利·乔万尼著：《民主新论》,冯克利、阎克文译,上海：上海人民出版社,2009年版。
⑤ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版。
⑥ 煽动性诽谤是一个源于英国普通法的罪名,据此任何对政府及其官员的批评都被视为具有某种危险情形而被判有罪。
⑦ 从建国到20世纪40年代,美国历史上所有的言论自由问题都围绕政治性言论而展开,如1798年煽动性法案、废奴运动中南方各州对宣传废奴材料的限制和禁止、1917年间谍法案等等均是涉及到政治性言论问题。See, Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, Oxford University Press, New York/London,1985, pp220-282;Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege ", Duke University Press, Durham and London,2002; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997,pp.248-299.
⑧ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.9-10.
⑨ 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第68页。
⑩ Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (London,1765-69),book 4.
11 [英]洛克著：《政府论》(上、下),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版。
12 [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年版。
13 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969.
① [美]科恩著：《论民主》,聂崇信、朱秀贤译,北京：商务印书馆,2005年版。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205 (1964).
③ See, Madison's Report", Elliot, ed., Debates,4:569-70, or the Virginia Report,220, quoted from Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.316-317.
④ Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, George Allen & Unvin, London and New York,1976;罗伯特·达尔著：《民主及其批评者》(上、下),曹海军、佟德志译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2010年版
⑤ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.396.
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第49页。
③ [法]托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》(上卷),董国良译,北京：商务印书馆,2009年版。
④ 参见张千帆：《司法审查与民主——矛盾中的共同体?》,载《环球法律评论》2009年第1期：冷罗生：《违宪审查的理论基础》,载《学习与探索》2009年第3期；姜峰：《违宪审查——一根救命稻草》：载《政法论坛》2010年第1期。
⑨ [美]亚历山大·比克尔著：《最小危险部门》,姚中秋译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版；[美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》(下),曹海军、佟德志译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2010年版,第196-197页
⑩ [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版。
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.2008.
② 关于这个论断最明显的两个例证一个是民主转型时期后洛克纳时代,特别是罗斯福新政前后,联邦最高法院遭遇的“反多数”质疑和批评；一个是在联邦最高法院在竞选资金改革案判决中的持续分裂及其趋于保守判决所遭受的质疑和批评。
③ See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.1.
④ Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.2.
③ [美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版；Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc.,1995.
① 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第23页.
② Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc., 1995,p.xii.
① [美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著, 《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版,第27页。
② 布鲁图：《共和国应限于狭小的范围》,载《联邦党人与反联邦党人》,姜峰、毕竞悦编译,中国政法大学出版社,2012年版,第9页。
③ [美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著,《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版,第26页。
④ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.61.
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第430页。
② 参见[美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著, 《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版,第123-124页。
③ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.234.
④ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.254.
⑤ Divid M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,37 Stan. L. Rev.795,813.
⑥ James L. Roark etc., the American Promise:A History of the United States (Forth Edition), Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martin's,2009, p.290.
① See Madison's Speech, in Bernard Schwarts, ed., The Bill of Rights:a Documentary History (volume 2), New York, 1971, pp.1023-1034.
① 列维教授在详细考证了整个宪法起草和批准、国会制定权利法案及各州批准权利法案的过程后,包括当时的一些私人信件和报纸,发现找不到任何有关言论自由含义的资料。See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.234.
② See Melvin L. Urofsky, Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty (Volume I), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,2002, p.75.
③ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.183.
④ See Melvin L. Urofsky, Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty (Volume I), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,2002, pp.75-76.
⑤ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.218-219.
① 有学者在考证英国历史后得出如下结论：“在17世纪后半叶的英国,没有任何方式比普通法法院发展和应用的煽动性诽谤法能够更加有效的控制出版自由了。① Frederick S. Siebert, Freedom of the Press, Urbana,1952,P.365、269.美国历史上著名的言论自由理论家和历史学家,如查费教授、霍姆斯大法官及列维教授、卡尔文教授等都持此种观点。具体论述本文将在后面的第二、三章中展开。
② Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England(London,1765-69),book 4, pp.151-152。
③ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.7.
① 如New York Times v. Sullivan (1964),就是一个典型的例子,虽然是民事诽谤,但是同样具有限制公民批评政府的作用和效果,所以被认为是一个典型的煽动性诽谤的案例。
② Rex v. Tuchin, in Thomas Bayly Howell, comp., A complete collection of state trials to 1783, continued by T.J. Howell to 1820 (London,1816-28,34 vols.),14:1095,1128 (1704), quoted in Stephen, History of the criminal law in England,2:318, quoted in Levy, the emergence of a free press, p.9.
③ See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, pp.21-22.
④ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.xiv.
⑤ Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,2nd session, p.2097,1798.
⑥ Id., at 2112.
① Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,2nd session, p.2148,2151.
② Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times:Free Speech in Wartimes, Norton, New York,2004, pp.40-41.
③ Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,2nd session, p.2151.
④ Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege", Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2002, p.67. Also see, Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.83.
⑤ See Free Expression in American:A Documentary History, Edited by Sheila Suss Kennedy, Greenwood Press, Westport,1999, pp.33-39; Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.306.
② 论文将在第二章中对此展开具体论述。理论上的证据我们可以从19世纪美国两位最伟大的宪法学者的论述中得到证明,斯托里和库利在论述言论自由时都沿袭了布莱克斯通的论证思维。See Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders'Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), pp.182-183. Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008,pp.214-215.；实践中的证据是,各州所普遍接受的司法标准是“有条件的真实性”准则,其实质就是普通法上的“不良倾向准则”。See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985,pp.339-340.
③ Patterson v. Colorado,205 U.S.454 (1907).
① Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1776-1787) (1969),p.164,转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第16-17页。
② 参见[美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版,第254页。
③ 同上注,第236页。
④ 同上注,第70、73页。
① [美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版,第242页。
② 同上注,第243-244,247页。
③ Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1776-1787),1969,p.137,转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第19页。
④ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：上务印书馆,2004年版,第45页
⑥ [美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版,第664页。
① 参见[美]戈登·伍德著：《美国革命激进主义》,傅国英译,北京：北京大学出版社,1997年版,第169、175页。
② 同上注,第169页。
③ Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Revolution (1776-1787) (1969), p136,24-25,转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社2011年,第18页。
④ 亚历山大汉密尔顿：《文集》,亨利卡伯特洛奇主编,12卷本,纽约,1904年版,第二卷,第92页,转引自施特劳斯主编《政治哲学史》,第665页。
⑤ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第51页
⑥ 这种民主通常意味着民众的直接参与,并不需要代表来实现。即使需要通过代表来实现,代表也不过是人民的传声筒。人民代表必须根据其所代表人民的意见来处理公共事务。政府就是一面精确反映人民意志的镜子,它敏锐地折射出人民的愿望和感情,取得一致意见是一个持续的过程,人民就是政府。政府脱离人民的就不能独立的存在。在这种民主概念之下,政府既为民所治,亦为民所享；政府从人民的持续许可中获得权威。参见[美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版,第157-158页。
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第48、49页。
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第264页。
③ Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Revolution (1776-1787) (1969), p590.转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社2011年版,第21-22页。
④ [美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第22页
⑤ 同上注,第21页。
⑥ [美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等泽,北京：法律出版社,2009年版第665页。
⑦ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第45、48贝。
① Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,3rd session, pp.3003.
② Id., at 3003-3014.
③ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985,
① See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.294.
② See Free Expression in American:A Documentary History, Edited by Sheila Suss Kennedy, Greenwood Press, Westport,1999, p.90.
③ Id., at 90.
④ "Madison's Report", Elliot, ed., Debates,4:569, or the Virginia Report,220, quoted from Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.316.
⑤ Madison's Report", Elliot, ed., Debates,4:569-70, or the Virginia Report,220, quoted from Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.316-317.
① See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.317. Also see Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.91.
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.91.
② See Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders' Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), pp182-183. Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.214-215.
③ 参见[台]林子仪著：《言论自由与新闻自由》,台北：元照出版公司,1998年版,第24-34页。Stone etc The First Amendment (third edition), Austin etc, Aspen Publishers,2008, p.10-12.
① Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.92,
② Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.3.
③ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.5.
① Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.3.
② 对于美国民主制度在其芫政体制中的地位和作用宪法学界在很长一段时间内没有重视,脱离民主制度研究美国宪法导致了我们对司法审查等一系列宪政制度产生了误解,对于民主制度对理解美国宪政体制的重要性我们可以这样来概括：不理解美国宪法的民主性特征,就无从理解美国宪政制度的精髓。关于美国联邦宪法民主性特征的讨论和论证,参见[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第16-27页。
③ 这种观点自霍布斯以来古典自由主义者所强调,它曾契合了当时反对专制和任意权力之历史需要。参见[美]萨托利·乔万尼著：《民主新论》,冯克利、阎克文译,上海人民出版社2009年版,第331-333页。
④ 参见李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第55-58页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第20页。
② 激进辉格党人关于人民主权与言论自由关系的论述可参见Divid M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,37 Stan. L. Rev.795,823-824.
① [英]以赛亚·伯林著：《自由论》,胡传胜译,南京：译林出版社,2011年版,第178页。
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第6页。
① [英]霍布豪斯著：《自由主义》,朱曾汶译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第21页。
② [美]萨托利·乔万尼著：《民主新论》,冯克利、阎克文译,上海：上海人民出版社,2009年版,第334页。
③ [法]邦雅曼·贡斯当著：《古代人的自由与现代人的自由》,阎克文等译,上海：上海人民出版社,2003年版,第66,67页。
④ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第630页。
① Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.282.
① Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.337.
② See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.109.
③ 3 Johnson's (N.Y.) Cases 336 (1804).
① 曾格案曾经被认为是北美殖民地时期,最能反映自由主义要求的言论自由判决。在该案中陪审团不顾法官的指示,认为言论自由案件中法律和事实问题都应该由陪审团来决定,而且言论的真实性可以作为对其定罪的有效抗辩理由。See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.110-111; Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.338-339.
① See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.339.
② 4 Yeat's (Penn.) Reports 267 (1805).
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.114.
② See Phillip I. Blumberg, Repressive Jurisprudence in the Early American Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2010, p.208.
③ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp339-340.
④ Commonwealth v. Clapp,4 Mass.164 (1808).
⑤ Commonwealth v. Morris,1 Va. Cases 176 (1811).
⑥ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.342.
⑦ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.114.
① Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders'Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), pp.182-183.
② Id., at 184.
③ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.113.
④ Phillip I. Blumberg, Repressive Jurisprudence in the Early American Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2010, pp.208-209.
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.85.
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.214-215.
② Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.215.
③ 参见[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨著：《美国法律史》,王军等译,北京：法律出版社,2007年版,第119页。
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.217.
② See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, New York, Cambridge University Press,1997, p.24; Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.44.
③ 李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第76页。
④ See Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990,p16.单纯从自由主义理论自身发展来看,洛克也是第一位将自由主义的核心要素提炼为一套一致的知识传统的人,阿那森认为：“如果说现代自由主义政治哲学选择一部经典著作的话,它肯定是洛克的《政府论》(下篇)。”参见李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第53页。
⑤ [美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版,第208-209页；约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版第477-478页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第4页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第12、14、15、23页。
② 洛克并没有直接解释自然在一个人人都遵守自然法的完美的自然状态为何会出现战争状态,但他却在论述中间接给出了答案：“如果不是由于有些堕落的人的腐化和罪恶,人们本来无需再组成政治任何社会,也没有必要从这个庞大的和自然的社会中分离出来,以明文协议去结成较小的和各别的组合。”洛克:《政府论》(下篇),第79页。
③ [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第77-78页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第77页。
② 参见李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第55页。
③ [美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版,第498页。
④ [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第76页。
⑤ [美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版,第211页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第14页。
① [英]霍布豪斯著：《自由主义》,朱曾汶译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第30页。
② [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第79页。
③ 同上注,第80页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第83页,注释1。
② Locker, Letter, p237,241, quoted in Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.28
① Locker, Letter, p237,241, quoted in Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.363-365.
② [英]洛克著： 《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第36页。
③ [美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版,第211页。
④ 洛克眼中的个人自由就是一种私人自由(private freedom). Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.27.
⑤ [英]洛克：《论宗教宽容》,吴云贵译,北京：商务印书馆,1999年版,第5页。
① [英]洛克：《论宗教宽容》,吴云贵译,北京：商务印书馆,1999年版,第44-45页。
② See Loker, Letter, p27,46,50,51, qouted from Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Rogers M. Smith,, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.27.
③ Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.21.
④ 不仅在言论自由问题上,实际上在理论的整体框架上布莱克斯通也沿袭了洛克的论证思路。有关布莱克斯通整体思想的论述请参见Steven J. Heyman, Human Dignity and Free Speech, New Haven and London, Yale University Press,2008, pp.9-11.
⑤ 直到19世纪末,美国宪法学家沃特恩还认为私人利益,包括表达自由,必须服从公共利益。See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.215.
① David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,p.3.
① See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.84.
② Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.104.
③ 1917年6月15日,国会通过《间谍法案》,规定：(1)在美国战争期间,任何人故意散布旨在阻碍美国军事或海军正常运转和胜利或者帮助敌对方取得胜利的虚假报告和陈述,(2)在美国战争期间,任何人在美国军队或海军中故意造成或试图造成不服从、叛变、军事政变或拒绝履行义务,(3)或者故意破坏征兵,损害美国义务兵役制,将会被处以不超过1万美元或者12年监禁的处罚,也可二者并罚。1918年修改后又增加了几个新的条款：(1)发表“背叛、诋毁和辱骂美国政体的言论”,(2)发表“旨在使美国政府蒙受蔑视、嘲弄、羞辱和坏名声”的言论,(3)发表“意图煽动、挑唆或者鼓励人们反对处于交战状态的美国政府的”言论,(4)“通过口头、书面、印刷或者出版的方式,敦促、煽动或者宣传削减……将战争进行到底……所必需的……物品的产量。”
④ 该法案在国会的通过,进一步证明了布莱克斯通普通法上言论自由的观念仍旧为20世纪初美国社会所普遍接受和认可。
⑤ See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,pp.3-4.
① Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.33.
② Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.31.
③ 250 U.S.630(1919).
④ See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,25 UCLA L. Rev.964,974-978 (1978).
① Ineber. The Marketplace of Ideas:A Legitimizing Myth, Duck L. J.,4-5 (1984).
② 查费教授对20世纪20年化联邦最高法院对《间谍法案》中的言论自由仅仅包含个人利益的批评也再次证明了此前美国历史上有关言论自由的讨论中人们把言论自由仅仅看作具有个人利益的观念。
③ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.34.
④ See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.34-35.
① See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.122.
② See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.23.
① Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review, note 64,206-207 (1964). Also see, Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech:the Supreme Court and Judicial Review. Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey,1966, p.48.
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 206 (1964).
③ Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech, New York, Lexington Books,2009,p.1.在美国历史上很长一段时间内,只有对批评政府的政治性言论规制才会引起言论自由的问题,而政府对此类言论规制的法律依据则是普通法上的煽动性诽谤：政府对其它类型言论的规制在20世纪40年代之前甚至根本不被认为会产生法律意义上言论自由问题。而且美国宪法第一修正案对言论自由保护范围得以扩展和力度得以增强,是在煽动性诽谤对言论自由的威胁被解处以后也并非一种历史偶然。
④ [英]弥尔顿著：《论出版自由》,吴之椿译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第53页。
① [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年版,第17,53页。
① [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年,第1、10页。
② [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年,第13页。
③ 同上注,第59页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第45页。
② [英]约翰·密尔著:《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年,第59页。密尔的这个结论可能会造成质疑：密尔这里是在一般意义上使用“个人的自由”一词的,并非单纯指的是言论自由。密尔这句话后紧接着这句话足以证明密尔这里的“个人的自由”就是指的是“言论自由”：“但是如果他戒免了在涉及他人的事情上有碍于他人,而在仅仅涉及自己的事情上依照自己的意向和判断而行动,那么,范式足以说明意见应有自由的理由,也同样足以证明他应当得到允许在其自己的牺牲之下将其意见付诸实践而不遭到妨害。”
③ [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第41页。
④ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.3.
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.150.
② David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,p.132.
③ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.224.
① People v. Most,128 N.Y.108,115(1891); People v. Most,171 N.Y.423,426 (1902).
② People v. Sinclair,86 Misc.426,438,419 (1914).
③ Commonwealth v. Karvonen,219 Mass.30,31-32 (1914).
① People v.Buman,154 Mich.150,155-157(1908).
② 205 U.S.454(1907).
① Patterson v. Colorado,250 U.S.454,462 (1907).
② David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,p.131.
③ 查费教授认为申克案是第一项也是对日后宪法发展影响最大的判决。See, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, pp.80-81.
④ 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第141页。
① 549 U.S.51-52(1919).
② 同上注。
③ See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, pp.81-82.
④ 549 U.S.51-52(1919).
⑤ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1261(1983).
① See, David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1260-1261, 1345 (1983).
② [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第145页。
③ 250 U.S.616-624(1919).
④ 克拉克在多数意见中认为人们的行为一定是为了某种目的,因此他们应当为其行为可能产生的效果负责,清楚地表明了其适用的是“恶劣倾向准则”.250 U.S.621(1919).
⑤ Geoffery R. Stone, Perilous Times:Free Speech in Wartime, New York, W. W. Norton & Company,2004, p.210.
⑥ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1305 (1983).
⑦ 250 U.S.627(1919).
⑧ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1306 (1983).
① 250 U.S.627-628(1919).
② 250 U.S.630-631(1919).
① Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.81.
② David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1303 (1983).
③ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.136.
④ [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第159页。
⑤ 301 U.S.242(1937).
① Terminiello v. City of Chicago,337 U.S.1,4 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U.S.296,309-311(1940).
② Craig v. Harney,331 U.S.367,378 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,328 U.S.331,336,347 (1946); Bridges v. California, U.S.252,273 (1941).
③ Thornhill v. Alabama,310 U.S.88,104-105 (1940).
④ West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,319 U.S.624,633,639 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi,319 U.S. 583,589-590(1943).
⑤ 麦克洛斯基认为1937年之后霍姆斯的明显而现实危险准则被作为一项万能标准提出来,应用于所有类型的言论自由难题。参见《美国最高法院》,罗伯特·麦克洛斯基著,任东来等译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2005年版,第153页。
⑥ 354 U.S.476(1957).
⑦ Beauharnais v. Illinois,343 U.S.250 (1952).
⑥ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第23,25页。
⑨ 249 U.S.52 (1919).
① 341 U.S.494 (1951).
② [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第105页。
③ 同上注,第104页。
④ 395 U.S.444(1969).
④ 邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第64页。
⑤ [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第40页。关于平衡准则的缺陷：Shaprio教授有着系统地论述,See Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech:The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey,1966, pp.102-104.
⑦ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1348 (1983).
⑥ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第27-28页。
⑦ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版第44页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第41页。
② See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.165.
③ 250 U.S.628(1919).
④ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.31.
② [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第105-106页。
① 宪法保护的言论和出版自由不允许各州禁止使用武力或违法的宣传,除非这种宣传直接煽动或者产生违法行为以及可能煽动或引起这类行为。See 341 U.S.494 (1951).
② [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第249页。
③ 376 U.S.254 (1964).
③ [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第249页。
① 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第20,63页。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205 (1964).
③ 376 U.S.270(1964).
② 为了防止政府侵害公共事务讨论的自由,联邦最高法院甚至不惜禁止政府规制涉及国家安全(New York Times v United States,403 U.S.713(1971))、伤害公众情感的言论(Snyder v Phelps, No.09-751. (2011))
② 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第1、2页。
① 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著： 《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第10-11页。
② 同上注,第2,4-6,12页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第16-19页,第16-19页。
② 同上注,第20页。
③ 凯斯.R·桑斯坦认为米克尔约翰在著作中极力主张复兴的其实是麦迪逊曾经阐释过的第一修正案主要是关于政治审议的观念。参见[美]桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华林、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第232页。
④ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第19,63,65页。
① 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版第17-18,28,44-45页。米克尔约翰以公共利益和私人利益来划分言论保护的做法,显然是有问题的,公共利益不仅存在于公共问题的讨论中,在言论自由市场理论支持下个人自由的言论自由也同样具有推动社会进步、发现真理的公共利益。
② 同上注,第2页。
③ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.90-92,106.
① Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders'Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), p.184.
② See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.214-215.
③ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版第44-45,63页。
① Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review:Alexander Meikeljohn's Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-government,62 Harvard Law Rev.891,899-900 (1949),
② Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism? Hofs Law Rev.1979, Vol.7, p595.转引自邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第166页;Also see Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression:A Critical Analysis, Charlottesville, The Michie Company Law Publishers,1984,pp.205-206.
③ Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,1985, pp.385-389.转引自邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第166-167页。
④ 关于这方面的批评请参见第二章第四节的论述。如果米可尔约翰将公共自由和个人自由作为划分言论自由的标准,其理论就会更加完美,对查费和霍姆斯的批评也就会更具说服力。
⑤ 查费认为从宪法第一修正案的立法史来看,麦迪逊等强调以第一修正案给予言论以完整保护,无意以第五修正案进行补充。邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第166页。而且如前面第一章论述表明的那样,当时权利法案的之所以被写入宪法,是为了防止政府侵害个体自由和权利,与旨在维护政治自治的公共讨论自由的观念风马牛不相及。
⑥ See Alexander Meikeljohn, the First Amendment Is An Absolute, Supreme Court Rev.254 (1961).
① 参见侯健：《米克尔约翰的言论自由理论及其影响》,载[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第87-88页。
② Meiklejohn, Political Freedom:the Constitutional Powers of the People 26-28(1948), quoted from Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 211 (1964).
① 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第72页。
② 纽约时报案对美国言论自由的影响是革命性、全方位和基础性的,具体我们将在后面本章第三节和第五章中看到这种影响。一些学者有关纽约时报案的评价可参见[美]罗纳德·德沃金著：《自由的法》,刘丽君译,上海：上海人民出版社,2001年版,第276页：Also see Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, Simon & Schuster Inc.,1993, p.38; Thomas I. Emerson, the System of Freedom of Expression, New York, Random House,1970, p.524.
③ 376 U.S.257(1964).
① 376 U.S.257-258(1964).
② 376 U.S.259(1964).
③ 376 U.S.260(1964).
① [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第60-61页。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 196 (1964).
③ See Youssoupof v. Metro-Gold wyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd.,50 T.L.R.581 (C.A.1934); Peck v. Tribune Co.,214 U.S. 185 (1909); Marr v. Putnam,196 Ore.1 (1952).
④ 参见[美]安东尼·刘易斯著：《批评官员的尺度》,何帆译,北京：北京大学出版社,2011年版,第8,14-15页。
⑤ 315 U.S.568(1942).
⑥ 283 U.S.697(1931)
⑦ 328 U.S.331 (1946).
⑧ 343 U.S.250(1952).
⑨ 354 U.S.476(1957).
① 376 U.S.269(1964).
② 314 U.S.252(1941).
③ 376 U.S.269.273(1964).
④ 376 U.S.276(1964).
⑤ 376 U.S.278(1964).
① 376 U.S.276,280(1964).
② 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第74页。
③ [美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华林、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第243页
④ Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 204-205 (1964).
⑤ Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:" The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court
① Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205-206 (1964).
② Id., at 206.
③ Id., at 206.
④ 列维教授在做出这样一个结论时,也犯了与卡尔文教授同样的错误。Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.13.
① 这里的合宪性与否是从言论自由本身做出的判断,而非如美国建国初期的管辖权的角度。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205 (1964).
① 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第129页。这里参照原文略有修正,“法律不得取缔煽动性诽谤原则与言论自由止于煽动人们犯罪的常识之间,存在重大紧张关系”的翻译中“法律不得取缔煽动性诽谤”的判断显然与卡尔文第五章诽谤的论述明显相背离。
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第23
① [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第130页。
② 同上注,第250页。
③ 396 U.S.444(1969).
① 396 U.S.4447-448(1969).
② 396 U.S.449 (1969).
③ 396 U.S.449 (1969), Black, concurring opinion.
④ Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,472 U.S.749(1985).
⑤ Garrison v. Louisiana,379 U.S.64,74-75 (1964).
⑥ Connick v.Myers,461 U.S.138,145 (1983).
⑦ United Unions v. Federal Election Commission,130 S. Ct.876 (2010).
⑧ 403 U.S.15 (1971).
① 403 U.S.713(1971).
② 491 U.S.397(1989).
③ 538 U.S.343(2003).
④ 562 U.S.——(2011),No.09-751.
① [美]安东尼·刘易斯著： 《批评官员的尺度》,何帆译,北京：北京大学出版社,2011年版,第5页。
② 当我们从资料或案例中得出美国是一个言论自由的国度结论的时候,我们所指的实际上是公共讨论的自由,而非是作为人权的言论自由。当我们用这种现象来为作为人权的美国言论自由辩护的时候,我们实际是偷换了两种言论自由的概念。作为人权的言论自由在美国言论自由历史中和联邦最高法院宪法第一修正案的体系中是没有任何位置的,当美国政府利用言论自由来指责中国没有人权的时候,它同样也是偷换了两种言论自由的概念。而由于我国政府也没有清楚地意识到二者区别,对美国指责的回应就显得不是那么有力。
③ Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech, New York, Lexington Books,2009, p.1.
① 315 U.S.697 (1942).
② 315 U.S.571-572 (1942).
③ 343 U.S.250 (1952).
④ 354 U.S.476 (1957)
⑤ See Cass R. Sunstien, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, the Free Press,1995, p.122.
① [美]小哈里·卡尔文著:《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京:三联出版社,2009年版,第69页。
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第18页。
③ 376 U.S.269(1964).
④ 505 U.S.377(1992).
⑤ Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 217-218 (1964).
① 413 U. S.15 (1973).
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 218 (1964).
① [法]托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》(上卷),董国良译,北京：商务印书馆,2009年版,第60页。
① James L. Roark, ect., The American Promise:A History of the United States(fourth edition), Boston, Bedford/ST. Martin's,2009, p.255.
② Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.19.
① 参见[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年,第18-19页。
② 参见同上注,第19页。
③ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.19.
① 美国邦联的实践说明,政府没有权威与不受约束的政府权威一样都是自由的最大威胁,联邦宪法的主要任务就是在确保民主制的前提下,赋予全国性政府更大权威。
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第50页。
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第46-47页。
② 参见同上注,第290页。
③ 同上注,第290页。
④ 同上注,第263页。
① 参见[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第263-265页。’
② Stephen M.Feldman,Free Expression and Democracy in America,Chicago and London,University of Chicago Press, 2008,p.19.
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人问集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第48页
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2008, p.23.
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第392页。
③ James Kent,2 Commentaries on American Law 276 (1827; Legal Classics Library Reprint,), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.28.
① 3 U. S.386,388,394 (3 Dall.).
② 198 U.S.45(1905).
① 198 U.S.47 (1905).
② David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, New York, Cambridge University Press,1997, p.131.
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第49页。
② The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (1965), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.169
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.169.
② Id., at 173.
③ 于志森主编：《美国通史》(第四卷),北京：人民出版社,第221页。
④ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.168.
⑤ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.304.
② Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.311.
③ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2008,p.312.
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.317
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.320.
① Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups,51 Harvard Law Rev.201-203 (1937).
② John E. Mulder, Democracy Must Introspect,1 Bill Rights Rev.259,260 (1941).
③ Carl J. Friedrich, The New Belief in the Common Man,41 (1945), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.331.
① Joseph A.Schumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism,and Democracy,George Allen & Unvin,London and New York,1976, p.250-251,269,283,286.
② [美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主理论的前言》,顾昕译,北京：东方出版社,2009年版,第2页。
① 参见[美]罗伯特·达尔： 《民主及其批评者》(上),曹海军、佟德志译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2010年版,第101、136-142页。
② [美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主理论的前言》,顾昕译,北京：东方出版社,2009年版,第131页。
③ [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第179页。
④ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.396.
① 295 U.S.330,368,374(1935).
① Robert L. Hale, Force and State,35 Columbia Law Rev.149,168,198-201 (1935).
② See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.358.
③ 317U.S. 111,118,120,129(1942).
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.370.
② [美]亚历山大·比克尔著：《最小危险部门》,姚中秋译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版,第17页。
③ 参见[美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第69-70页。
④ Jackson Calls Court Curb on Democracy, N.Y. Times, Oct.13,1937, at 6, quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.360-361.
① See Learned Hand, the Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1942), reprinted in The Sprite of Liberty 118-25 (Irving Dilliard ed.,1959ed), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.361.
② Schneider v. State,308 U.S.147,161 (1939)这样一种司法理念也在一定程度上解释了霍姆斯“明显而即刻危险原则”这一本质上的平衡准则一度被美国社会和联邦最高法院所广泛接受的问题。
③ 204 U.S.144(1938).
④ 319 U.S.105,111 (1943).
② See Learned Hand, the Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1942), reprinted in The Sprite of
① Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,348 U.S.488 (1955).
② [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第99页。
③ 同上注,第105页。
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.397.
① [美]欧文·M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第2页。
① Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.12.
② Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech, Lanham, Lexington Books, p.l.
① See Stephen M.Feldman,Free Expression and Democracy in America,Chicago and London,University of Chicago Press,2008,pp.212-213.
② Knowles v.United States,170 F.409,411-412(8th Cir.1909).
③ 315 U.S.697(1942).
④ 343 U.S.250(1952).
⑤ 354 U.S.476(1957)
⑥ 315 U.S.571-572(1942).
① Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.12.
① [美]罗伯特·迈克罗斯基著：《美国最高法院》,任东来等译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第183页。
② [美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第235页
① [美]欧文M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第4页。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 191,217-218(1964).
③ Melvin L. Urofsky, Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty (Volume I), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.47.
④ See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Wesrview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.2; Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.168不仅是费斯,事实上几乎所有的学者都把这三个领域内言论自由问题视为言论自由的焦点问题,如有学者指出的那样：“到了1970年代,‘言论自由’诉讼的焦点已经不再是早期经典案件中的主角——那些不受欢迎的异议者了。现在的焦点有三个：政治竞选的财政支持：对非纸质媒体的规范：以及利用公共房产作为传达个人观点的场所。”[美]罗伯特·迈克罗斯基著：《美国最高法院》,任东
① See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.1.
① Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment,74 Chicago Law Rev.1857,1864 (2007).
② [美]欧文M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第4页。
③ See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.2.
④ See Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent,93 Yale Law J.,581 (1984).
① 424 U.S.1(1976).
① 435 U.S.765(1978).
① 492 U.S.652(1990).
① 540 U.S.93(2003).
② 127 S.Ct.2652(2007).
③ 558 U.S.50(2010).
① See Saran Kellogg, In the Wake of Citizens United, Washington Lawyers, Nov.2010, p.19.
① 424 U.S.47-48(1976).
② 435 U.S.777(1978).
③ 494 U.S.659(1990).
④ 424 U.S.49(1976).
① FEC v. National Right to Work Comm.,459 U.S.197,209,210 (1982).
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.362.
① Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.1.
② See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.12.“双轨理论”——一种基于内容限制和内容中立限制区分的理论——是内容中立原则的具体体现。诸多美国宪法学教科书都是以双轨理论为基础编写的,See Geoffrey R. Stone etc., The First Amendment (third edition), Austin, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business,2008.当今美国联邦最高法院在审查言论自由案件时首先要判断案件涉及的问题是对基于内容的限制还是内容中立的限制,对前者适用的审查标准要比后者严格的多。
③ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.31.
① [美]欧文-M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第19页。
② 475 U.S.14-15(1986).
② American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut,771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.1985), aff'd mem,475 U.S.1001 (1986).
③ 558 U.S.50 (2010).
① 参见：[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著： 《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第307页；[美]凯瑟琳-A.麦金农著：《言辞而已》,王笑红译,桂林：广西师范大学出版社,2004年版,第56页。
② [美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年,第35页。
① 参见[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第240-241页。
② [美]欧文-M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第19页。
③ 参见同上注,第19页。
① 最著名的代表人物是费斯和桑斯坦教授,其整体论证围绕公共辩诊问题展开,并到此为止。参见[美]凯斯.R桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版；[美]欧文·M,费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版;Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc.,1995; Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996.
② 参见[美]欧文·M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第13-14,19-20页。
③ See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,25 UCLA L. Rev.964 (1978).
① 参见[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第241-251页。
1.[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年年版。
2.[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版。
3.[美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著,《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版。
4.[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,1980年版。
5.[美]安东尼·刘易斯著：《言论的边界》,徐爽译,北京：法律出版社,2007年版。
6.李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版。
7.[美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版。
8.[英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版。
9.[英]霍布豪斯著：《自由主义》,朱曾汶译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版。
10.[英]密尔顿著：《论出版自由》,吴之椿译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版。
11.[台]林子仪著：《言论自由与新闻自由》,台北：元照出版公司,1998年版。
12.[英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年版。
13.[美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版。
14.邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版。
15.[美]桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华林、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版。
16.[美]罗纳德·德沃金著：《自由的法》,刘丽君译,上海：上海人民出版社,2001年版。
17.[美]安东尼·刘易斯著：《批评官员的尺度》,何帆译,北京：北京大学出版社,2011年版。
18.[法]托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》(上卷),董国良译,北京：商务印书馆,2009年版。
19.[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北 京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版。
20.[美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主理论的前言》,顾听译,北京：东方出版社,2009年版.
21.[美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》(上、下),曹海军、佟德志译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2010年版。
22.[美]亚历山大·比克尔著：《最小危险部门》,姚中秋译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版。
23.[美]欧文M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版。
24.[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨著：《美国法律史》,王军等译,北京：法律出版社,2007年版。
25.[英]以赛亚·柏林：《自由论》(修订版),胡传胜译,南京：译林出版社,2011年版。
26.刘军宁等主编：《自由与社群》,北京：生活、读书、新知三联书店,1998年版。
27.[澳]菲利普·佩蒂特著：《共和主义：一种关于自由与政府的理论》,刘训练译,江苏人民出版社2012年版。
28.王焱主编：《社会理论的两种传统》,北京：生活、读书、新知三联书店,2012年版。
29.[法]邦雅曼·贡斯当著：《古代人的自由与现代人的自由》,阎克文等译,上海：上海人民出版社,2003年。
30.[美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版。
31.[美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版。
32.[美]戈登·伍德著：《美国革命激进主义》,傅国英译,北京：北京大学出版社,1997年版。
33.[美]科恩著：《论民主》,聂崇信、朱秀贤译,北京：商务印书馆,2005年版。
1. Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985.
2. Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times:Free Speech in Wartimes, Norton, New York, 2004.
3. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum, 1969.
4. David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, New York, Cambridge University Press,1997.
5. Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege", Duke University Press, Durham and London,2002.
6. Thomas I. Emerson, the System of Freedom of Expression, New York, Random House,1970.
7.Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, Simon & Schuster Inc.,1993.
8. Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1996.
9.Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991.
10.Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008.
11. Phillip I. Blumberg, Repressive Jurisprudence in the Early American Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2010.
12. Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech:The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey,1966.
13. Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990.
14. Melvin L. Urofsky, Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty (Volume I), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,2002.
15.Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech, New York, Lexington Books, 2009.
16. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, George Allen & Unvin, London and New York,1976.
17. Bernard Schwarts, ed., The Bill of Rights:a Documentary History (volume 2), New York,1971.
18. Steven J. Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity, New Haven and London, Yale University Press,2008.
19.Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 206 (1964).
20.Divid M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,37 Stan. L. Rev.795 (1978).
21.Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,25 UCLA L. Rev.964 (1984).
22.Ingber, the Marketplace of Ideas:A Legitimizing Myth, Duck L. J.,4-5 (1984).
23.David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1305 (1983).
24.Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review:Alexander Meikeljohn's Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-government,62 Harvard Law Rev.891(1949).
25. Alexander Meikeljohn, the First Amendment Is An Absolute, Supreme Court Rev.254 (1961).
26.Robert L. Hale, Force and State,35 Columbia Law Rev.149 (1935).
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版。
③ [美]欧文·M.费斯：《一种既是个人又是政治的自由》,刘掣、殷莹译,载《言论自由的反讽》,北京：新 星出版社,2005年版,第89-112页。
① [英]以赛亚·柏林：《自由论》(修订版),胡传胜译,南京：译林出版社,2011年版,第167-221页。
② [法]邦雅曼·贡斯当著：《古代人的自由与现代人的自由》,阎克文等译,上海：上海人民出版社,2003年版。
③ [美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版。
④ [美]萨托利·乔万尼著：《民主新论》,冯克利、阎克文译,上海：上海人民出版社,2009年版。
⑤ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版。
⑥ 煽动性诽谤是一个源于英国普通法的罪名,据此任何对政府及其官员的批评都被视为具有某种危险情形而被判有罪。
⑦ 从建国到20世纪40年代,美国历史上所有的言论自由问题都围绕政治性言论而展开,如1798年煽动性法案、废奴运动中南方各州对宣传废奴材料的限制和禁止、1917年间谍法案等等均是涉及到政治性言论问题。See, Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, Oxford University Press, New York/London,1985, pp220-282;Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege ", Duke University Press, Durham and London,2002; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997,pp.248-299.
⑧ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.9-10.
⑨ 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第68页。
⑩ Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (London,1765-69),book 4.
11 [英]洛克著：《政府论》(上、下),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版。
12 [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年版。
13 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969.
① [美]科恩著：《论民主》,聂崇信、朱秀贤译,北京：商务印书馆,2005年版。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205 (1964).
③ See, Madison's Report", Elliot, ed., Debates,4:569-70, or the Virginia Report,220, quoted from Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.316-317.
④ Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, George Allen & Unvin, London and New York,1976;罗伯特·达尔著：《民主及其批评者》(上、下),曹海军、佟德志译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2010年版
⑤ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.396.
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第49页。
③ [法]托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》(上卷),董国良译,北京：商务印书馆,2009年版。
④ 参见张千帆：《司法审查与民主——矛盾中的共同体?》,载《环球法律评论》2009年第1期：冷罗生：《违宪审查的理论基础》,载《学习与探索》2009年第3期；姜峰：《违宪审查——一根救命稻草》：载《政法论坛》2010年第1期。
⑨ [美]亚历山大·比克尔著：《最小危险部门》,姚中秋译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版；[美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》(下),曹海军、佟德志译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2010年版,第196-197页
⑩ [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版。
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.2008.
② 关于这个论断最明显的两个例证一个是民主转型时期后洛克纳时代,特别是罗斯福新政前后,联邦最高法院遭遇的“反多数”质疑和批评；一个是在联邦最高法院在竞选资金改革案判决中的持续分裂及其趋于保守判决所遭受的质疑和批评。
③ See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.1.
④ Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.2.
③ [美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版；Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc.,1995.
① 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第23页.
② Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc., 1995,p.xii.
① [美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著, 《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版,第27页。
② 布鲁图：《共和国应限于狭小的范围》,载《联邦党人与反联邦党人》,姜峰、毕竞悦编译,中国政法大学出版社,2012年版,第9页。
③ [美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著,《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版,第26页。
④ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.61.
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第430页。
② 参见[美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著, 《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版,第123-124页。
③ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.234.
④ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.254.
⑤ Divid M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,37 Stan. L. Rev.795,813.
⑥ James L. Roark etc., the American Promise:A History of the United States (Forth Edition), Boston and New York, Bedford/St. Martin's,2009, p.290.
① See Madison's Speech, in Bernard Schwarts, ed., The Bill of Rights:a Documentary History (volume 2), New York, 1971, pp.1023-1034.
① 列维教授在详细考证了整个宪法起草和批准、国会制定权利法案及各州批准权利法案的过程后,包括当时的一些私人信件和报纸,发现找不到任何有关言论自由含义的资料。See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.234.
② See Melvin L. Urofsky, Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty (Volume I), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,2002, p.75.
③ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.183.
④ See Melvin L. Urofsky, Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty (Volume I), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,2002, pp.75-76.
⑤ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.218-219.
① 有学者在考证英国历史后得出如下结论：“在17世纪后半叶的英国,没有任何方式比普通法法院发展和应用的煽动性诽谤法能够更加有效的控制出版自由了。① Frederick S. Siebert, Freedom of the Press, Urbana,1952,P.365、269.美国历史上著名的言论自由理论家和历史学家,如查费教授、霍姆斯大法官及列维教授、卡尔文教授等都持此种观点。具体论述本文将在后面的第二、三章中展开。
② Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England(London,1765-69),book 4, pp.151-152。
③ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.7.
① 如New York Times v. Sullivan (1964),就是一个典型的例子,虽然是民事诽谤,但是同样具有限制公民批评政府的作用和效果,所以被认为是一个典型的煽动性诽谤的案例。
② Rex v. Tuchin, in Thomas Bayly Howell, comp., A complete collection of state trials to 1783, continued by T.J. Howell to 1820 (London,1816-28,34 vols.),14:1095,1128 (1704), quoted in Stephen, History of the criminal law in England,2:318, quoted in Levy, the emergence of a free press, p.9.
③ See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, pp.21-22.
④ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.xiv.
⑤ Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,2nd session, p.2097,1798.
⑥ Id., at 2112.
① Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,2nd session, p.2148,2151.
② Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times:Free Speech in Wartimes, Norton, New York,2004, pp.40-41.
③ Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,2nd session, p.2151.
④ Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege", Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2002, p.67. Also see, Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.83.
⑤ See Free Expression in American:A Documentary History, Edited by Sheila Suss Kennedy, Greenwood Press, Westport,1999, pp.33-39; Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.306.
② 论文将在第二章中对此展开具体论述。理论上的证据我们可以从19世纪美国两位最伟大的宪法学者的论述中得到证明,斯托里和库利在论述言论自由时都沿袭了布莱克斯通的论证思维。See Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders'Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), pp.182-183. Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008,pp.214-215.；实践中的证据是,各州所普遍接受的司法标准是“有条件的真实性”准则,其实质就是普通法上的“不良倾向准则”。See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985,pp.339-340.
③ Patterson v. Colorado,205 U.S.454 (1907).
① Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1776-1787) (1969),p.164,转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第16-17页。
② 参见[美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版,第254页。
③ 同上注,第236页。
④ 同上注,第70、73页。
① [美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版,第242页。
② 同上注,第243-244,247页。
③ Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1776-1787),1969,p.137,转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第19页。
④ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：上务印书馆,2004年版,第45页
⑥ [美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版,第664页。
① 参见[美]戈登·伍德著：《美国革命激进主义》,傅国英译,北京：北京大学出版社,1997年版,第169、175页。
② 同上注,第169页。
③ Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Revolution (1776-1787) (1969), p136,24-25,转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社2011年,第18页。
④ 亚历山大汉密尔顿：《文集》,亨利卡伯特洛奇主编,12卷本,纽约,1904年版,第二卷,第92页,转引自施特劳斯主编《政治哲学史》,第665页。
⑤ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第51页
⑥ 这种民主通常意味着民众的直接参与,并不需要代表来实现。即使需要通过代表来实现,代表也不过是人民的传声筒。人民代表必须根据其所代表人民的意见来处理公共事务。政府就是一面精确反映人民意志的镜子,它敏锐地折射出人民的愿望和感情,取得一致意见是一个持续的过程,人民就是政府。政府脱离人民的就不能独立的存在。在这种民主概念之下,政府既为民所治,亦为民所享；政府从人民的持续许可中获得权威。参见[美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版,第157-158页。
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第48、49页。
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第264页。
③ Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Revolution (1776-1787) (1969), p590.转引自《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社2011年版,第21-22页。
④ [美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第22页
⑤ 同上注,第21页。
⑥ [美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等泽,北京：法律出版社,2009年版第665页。
⑦ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第45、48贝。
① Annals of Congress,5th Cong.,3rd session, pp.3003.
② Id., at 3003-3014.
③ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985,
① See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.294.
② See Free Expression in American:A Documentary History, Edited by Sheila Suss Kennedy, Greenwood Press, Westport,1999, p.90.
③ Id., at 90.
④ "Madison's Report", Elliot, ed., Debates,4:569, or the Virginia Report,220, quoted from Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.316.
⑤ Madison's Report", Elliot, ed., Debates,4:569-70, or the Virginia Report,220, quoted from Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.316-317.
① See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.317. Also see Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.91.
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.91.
② See Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders' Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), pp182-183. Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.214-215.
③ 参见[台]林子仪著：《言论自由与新闻自由》,台北：元照出版公司,1998年版,第24-34页。Stone etc The First Amendment (third edition), Austin etc, Aspen Publishers,2008, p.10-12.
① Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.92,
② Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.3.
③ See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.5.
① Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.3.
② 对于美国民主制度在其芫政体制中的地位和作用宪法学界在很长一段时间内没有重视,脱离民主制度研究美国宪法导致了我们对司法审查等一系列宪政制度产生了误解,对于民主制度对理解美国宪政体制的重要性我们可以这样来概括：不理解美国宪法的民主性特征,就无从理解美国宪政制度的精髓。关于美国联邦宪法民主性特征的讨论和论证,参见[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版,第16-27页。
③ 这种观点自霍布斯以来古典自由主义者所强调,它曾契合了当时反对专制和任意权力之历史需要。参见[美]萨托利·乔万尼著：《民主新论》,冯克利、阎克文译,上海人民出版社2009年版,第331-333页。
④ 参见李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第55-58页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第20页。
② 激进辉格党人关于人民主权与言论自由关系的论述可参见Divid M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,37 Stan. L. Rev.795,823-824.
① [英]以赛亚·伯林著：《自由论》,胡传胜译,南京：译林出版社,2011年版,第178页。
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第6页。
① [英]霍布豪斯著：《自由主义》,朱曾汶译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第21页。
② [美]萨托利·乔万尼著：《民主新论》,冯克利、阎克文译,上海：上海人民出版社,2009年版,第334页。
③ [法]邦雅曼·贡斯当著：《古代人的自由与现代人的自由》,阎克文等译,上海：上海人民出版社,2003年版,第66,67页。
④ [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第630页。
① Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.282.
① Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.337.
② See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.109.
③ 3 Johnson's (N.Y.) Cases 336 (1804).
① 曾格案曾经被认为是北美殖民地时期,最能反映自由主义要求的言论自由判决。在该案中陪审团不顾法官的指示,认为言论自由案件中法律和事实问题都应该由陪审团来决定,而且言论的真实性可以作为对其定罪的有效抗辩理由。See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.110-111; Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp.338-339.
① See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.339.
② 4 Yeat's (Penn.) Reports 267 (1805).
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.114.
② See Phillip I. Blumberg, Repressive Jurisprudence in the Early American Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2010, p.208.
③ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, pp339-340.
④ Commonwealth v. Clapp,4 Mass.164 (1808).
⑤ Commonwealth v. Morris,1 Va. Cases 176 (1811).
⑥ Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.342.
⑦ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.114.
① Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders'Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), pp.182-183.
② Id., at 184.
③ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.113.
④ Phillip I. Blumberg, Repressive Jurisprudence in the Early American Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2010, pp.208-209.
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.85.
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.214-215.
② Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.215.
③ 参见[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨著：《美国法律史》,王军等译,北京：法律出版社,2007年版,第119页。
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.217.
② See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, New York, Cambridge University Press,1997, p.24; Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.44.
③ 李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第76页。
④ See Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990,p16.单纯从自由主义理论自身发展来看,洛克也是第一位将自由主义的核心要素提炼为一套一致的知识传统的人,阿那森认为：“如果说现代自由主义政治哲学选择一部经典著作的话,它肯定是洛克的《政府论》(下篇)。”参见李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第53页。
⑤ [美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版,第208-209页；约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版第477-478页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第4页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第12、14、15、23页。
② 洛克并没有直接解释自然在一个人人都遵守自然法的完美的自然状态为何会出现战争状态,但他却在论述中间接给出了答案：“如果不是由于有些堕落的人的腐化和罪恶,人们本来无需再组成政治任何社会,也没有必要从这个庞大的和自然的社会中分离出来,以明文协议去结成较小的和各别的组合。”洛克:《政府论》(下篇),第79页。
③ [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第77-78页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第77页。
② 参见李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版,第55页。
③ [美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版,第498页。
④ [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第76页。
⑤ [美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版,第211页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第14页。
① [英]霍布豪斯著：《自由主义》,朱曾汶译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第30页。
② [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第79页。
③ 同上注,第80页。
① [英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第83页,注释1。
② Locker, Letter, p237,241, quoted in Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.28
① Locker, Letter, p237,241, quoted in Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.363-365.
② [英]洛克著： 《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第36页。
③ [美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版,第211页。
④ 洛克眼中的个人自由就是一种私人自由(private freedom). Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.27.
⑤ [英]洛克：《论宗教宽容》,吴云贵译,北京：商务印书馆,1999年版,第5页。
① [英]洛克：《论宗教宽容》,吴云贵译,北京：商务印书馆,1999年版,第44-45页。
② See Loker, Letter, p27,46,50,51, qouted from Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Rogers M. Smith,, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.27.
③ Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,1990, p.21.
④ 不仅在言论自由问题上,实际上在理论的整体框架上布莱克斯通也沿袭了洛克的论证思路。有关布莱克斯通整体思想的论述请参见Steven J. Heyman, Human Dignity and Free Speech, New Haven and London, Yale University Press,2008, pp.9-11.
⑤ 直到19世纪末,美国宪法学家沃特恩还认为私人利益,包括表达自由,必须服从公共利益。See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.215.
① David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,p.3.
① See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.84.
② Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.104.
③ 1917年6月15日,国会通过《间谍法案》,规定：(1)在美国战争期间,任何人故意散布旨在阻碍美国军事或海军正常运转和胜利或者帮助敌对方取得胜利的虚假报告和陈述,(2)在美国战争期间,任何人在美国军队或海军中故意造成或试图造成不服从、叛变、军事政变或拒绝履行义务,(3)或者故意破坏征兵,损害美国义务兵役制,将会被处以不超过1万美元或者12年监禁的处罚,也可二者并罚。1918年修改后又增加了几个新的条款：(1)发表“背叛、诋毁和辱骂美国政体的言论”,(2)发表“旨在使美国政府蒙受蔑视、嘲弄、羞辱和坏名声”的言论,(3)发表“意图煽动、挑唆或者鼓励人们反对处于交战状态的美国政府的”言论,(4)“通过口头、书面、印刷或者出版的方式,敦促、煽动或者宣传削减……将战争进行到底……所必需的……物品的产量。”
④ 该法案在国会的通过,进一步证明了布莱克斯通普通法上言论自由的观念仍旧为20世纪初美国社会所普遍接受和认可。
⑤ See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,pp.3-4.
① Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.33.
② Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.31.
③ 250 U.S.630(1919).
④ See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,25 UCLA L. Rev.964,974-978 (1978).
① Ineber. The Marketplace of Ideas:A Legitimizing Myth, Duck L. J.,4-5 (1984).
② 查费教授对20世纪20年化联邦最高法院对《间谍法案》中的言论自由仅仅包含个人利益的批评也再次证明了此前美国历史上有关言论自由的讨论中人们把言论自由仅仅看作具有个人利益的观念。
③ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.34.
④ See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.34-35.
① See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.122.
② See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.23.
① Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review, note 64,206-207 (1964). Also see, Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech:the Supreme Court and Judicial Review. Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey,1966, p.48.
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 206 (1964).
③ Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech, New York, Lexington Books,2009,p.1.在美国历史上很长一段时间内,只有对批评政府的政治性言论规制才会引起言论自由的问题,而政府对此类言论规制的法律依据则是普通法上的煽动性诽谤：政府对其它类型言论的规制在20世纪40年代之前甚至根本不被认为会产生法律意义上言论自由问题。而且美国宪法第一修正案对言论自由保护范围得以扩展和力度得以增强,是在煽动性诽谤对言论自由的威胁被解处以后也并非一种历史偶然。
④ [英]弥尔顿著：《论出版自由》,吴之椿译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第53页。
① [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年版,第17,53页。
① [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年,第1、10页。
② [英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年,第13页。
③ 同上注,第59页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第45页。
② [英]约翰·密尔著:《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年,第59页。密尔的这个结论可能会造成质疑：密尔这里是在一般意义上使用“个人的自由”一词的,并非单纯指的是言论自由。密尔这句话后紧接着这句话足以证明密尔这里的“个人的自由”就是指的是“言论自由”：“但是如果他戒免了在涉及他人的事情上有碍于他人,而在仅仅涉及自己的事情上依照自己的意向和判断而行动,那么,范式足以说明意见应有自由的理由,也同样足以证明他应当得到允许在其自己的牺牲之下将其意见付诸实践而不遭到妨害。”
③ [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第41页。
④ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.3.
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.150.
② David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,p.132.
③ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.224.
① People v. Most,128 N.Y.108,115(1891); People v. Most,171 N.Y.423,426 (1902).
② People v. Sinclair,86 Misc.426,438,419 (1914).
③ Commonwealth v. Karvonen,219 Mass.30,31-32 (1914).
① People v.Buman,154 Mich.150,155-157(1908).
② 205 U.S.454(1907).
① Patterson v. Colorado,250 U.S.454,462 (1907).
② David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, Cambridge University Press, New York,1997,p.131.
③ 查费教授认为申克案是第一项也是对日后宪法发展影响最大的判决。See, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, pp.80-81.
④ 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第141页。
① 549 U.S.51-52(1919).
② 同上注。
③ See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, pp.81-82.
④ 549 U.S.51-52(1919).
⑤ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1261(1983).
① See, David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1260-1261, 1345 (1983).
② [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第145页。
③ 250 U.S.616-624(1919).
④ 克拉克在多数意见中认为人们的行为一定是为了某种目的,因此他们应当为其行为可能产生的效果负责,清楚地表明了其适用的是“恶劣倾向准则”.250 U.S.621(1919).
⑤ Geoffery R. Stone, Perilous Times:Free Speech in Wartime, New York, W. W. Norton & Company,2004, p.210.
⑥ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1305 (1983).
⑦ 250 U.S.627(1919).
⑧ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1306 (1983).
① 250 U.S.627-628(1919).
② 250 U.S.630-631(1919).
① Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.81.
② David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1303 (1983).
③ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.136.
④ [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第159页。
⑤ 301 U.S.242(1937).
① Terminiello v. City of Chicago,337 U.S.1,4 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U.S.296,309-311(1940).
② Craig v. Harney,331 U.S.367,378 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,328 U.S.331,336,347 (1946); Bridges v. California, U.S.252,273 (1941).
③ Thornhill v. Alabama,310 U.S.88,104-105 (1940).
④ West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,319 U.S.624,633,639 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi,319 U.S. 583,589-590(1943).
⑤ 麦克洛斯基认为1937年之后霍姆斯的明显而现实危险准则被作为一项万能标准提出来,应用于所有类型的言论自由难题。参见《美国最高法院》,罗伯特·麦克洛斯基著,任东来等译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2005年版,第153页。
⑥ 354 U.S.476(1957).
⑦ Beauharnais v. Illinois,343 U.S.250 (1952).
⑥ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第23,25页。
⑨ 249 U.S.52 (1919).
① 341 U.S.494 (1951).
② [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第105页。
③ 同上注,第104页。
④ 395 U.S.444(1969).
④ 邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第64页。
⑤ [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第40页。关于平衡准则的缺陷：Shaprio教授有着系统地论述,See Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech:The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey,1966, pp.102-104.
⑦ David M. Rabbin, Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, the University of Chicago Law Rev.1348 (1983).
⑥ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第27-28页。
⑦ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版第44页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第41页。
② See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.165.
③ 250 U.S.628(1919).
④ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.31.
② [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第105-106页。
① 宪法保护的言论和出版自由不允许各州禁止使用武力或违法的宣传,除非这种宣传直接煽动或者产生违法行为以及可能煽动或引起这类行为。See 341 U.S.494 (1951).
② [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第249页。
③ 376 U.S.254 (1964).
③ [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第249页。
① 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第20,63页。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205 (1964).
③ 376 U.S.270(1964).
② 为了防止政府侵害公共事务讨论的自由,联邦最高法院甚至不惜禁止政府规制涉及国家安全(New York Times v United States,403 U.S.713(1971))、伤害公众情感的言论(Snyder v Phelps, No.09-751. (2011))
② 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第1、2页。
① 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著： 《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第10-11页。
② 同上注,第2,4-6,12页。
① [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第16-19页,第16-19页。
② 同上注,第20页。
③ 凯斯.R·桑斯坦认为米克尔约翰在著作中极力主张复兴的其实是麦迪逊曾经阐释过的第一修正案主要是关于政治审议的观念。参见[美]桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华林、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第232页。
④ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第19,63,65页。
① 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版第17-18,28,44-45页。米克尔约翰以公共利益和私人利益来划分言论保护的做法,显然是有问题的,公共利益不仅存在于公共问题的讨论中,在言论自由市场理论支持下个人自由的言论自由也同样具有推动社会进步、发现真理的公共利益。
② 同上注,第2页。
③ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.90-92,106.
① Joseph Story,3 Commentaries on the Constitution,1874-86 (1833), reprinted in the Founders'Constitution (Philip B. Kuiland & Ralph Lerner eds.,1987), p.184.
② See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, pp.214-215.
③ 参见[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版第44-45,63页。
① Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review:Alexander Meikeljohn's Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-government,62 Harvard Law Rev.891,899-900 (1949),
② Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism? Hofs Law Rev.1979, Vol.7, p595.转引自邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第166页;Also see Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression:A Critical Analysis, Charlottesville, The Michie Company Law Publishers,1984,pp.205-206.
③ Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,1985, pp.385-389.转引自邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第166-167页。
④ 关于这方面的批评请参见第二章第四节的论述。如果米可尔约翰将公共自由和个人自由作为划分言论自由的标准,其理论就会更加完美,对查费和霍姆斯的批评也就会更具说服力。
⑤ 查费认为从宪法第一修正案的立法史来看,麦迪逊等强调以第一修正案给予言论以完整保护,无意以第五修正案进行补充。邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第166页。而且如前面第一章论述表明的那样,当时权利法案的之所以被写入宪法,是为了防止政府侵害个体自由和权利,与旨在维护政治自治的公共讨论自由的观念风马牛不相及。
⑥ See Alexander Meikeljohn, the First Amendment Is An Absolute, Supreme Court Rev.254 (1961).
① 参见侯健：《米克尔约翰的言论自由理论及其影响》,载[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第87-88页。
② Meiklejohn, Political Freedom:the Constitutional Powers of the People 26-28(1948), quoted from Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 211 (1964).
① 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第72页。
② 纽约时报案对美国言论自由的影响是革命性、全方位和基础性的,具体我们将在后面本章第三节和第五章中看到这种影响。一些学者有关纽约时报案的评价可参见[美]罗纳德·德沃金著：《自由的法》,刘丽君译,上海：上海人民出版社,2001年版,第276页：Also see Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, Simon & Schuster Inc.,1993, p.38; Thomas I. Emerson, the System of Freedom of Expression, New York, Random House,1970, p.524.
③ 376 U.S.257(1964).
① 376 U.S.257-258(1964).
② 376 U.S.259(1964).
③ 376 U.S.260(1964).
① [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第60-61页。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 196 (1964).
③ See Youssoupof v. Metro-Gold wyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd.,50 T.L.R.581 (C.A.1934); Peck v. Tribune Co.,214 U.S. 185 (1909); Marr v. Putnam,196 Ore.1 (1952).
④ 参见[美]安东尼·刘易斯著：《批评官员的尺度》,何帆译,北京：北京大学出版社,2011年版,第8,14-15页。
⑤ 315 U.S.568(1942).
⑥ 283 U.S.697(1931)
⑦ 328 U.S.331 (1946).
⑧ 343 U.S.250(1952).
⑨ 354 U.S.476(1957).
① 376 U.S.269(1964).
② 314 U.S.252(1941).
③ 376 U.S.269.273(1964).
④ 376 U.S.276(1964).
⑤ 376 U.S.278(1964).
① 376 U.S.276,280(1964).
② 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年版,第74页。
③ [美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华林、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第243页
④ Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 204-205 (1964).
⑤ Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:" The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court
① Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205-206 (1964).
② Id., at 206.
③ Id., at 206.
④ 列维教授在做出这样一个结论时,也犯了与卡尔文教授同样的错误。Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,1985, p.13.
① 这里的合宪性与否是从言论自由本身做出的判断,而非如美国建国初期的管辖权的角度。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 205 (1964).
① 参见[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第129页。这里参照原文略有修正,“法律不得取缔煽动性诽谤原则与言论自由止于煽动人们犯罪的常识之间,存在重大紧张关系”的翻译中“法律不得取缔煽动性诽谤”的判断显然与卡尔文第五章诽谤的论述明显相背离。
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年,第23
① [美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年,第130页。
② 同上注,第250页。
③ 396 U.S.444(1969).
① 396 U.S.4447-448(1969).
② 396 U.S.449 (1969).
③ 396 U.S.449 (1969), Black, concurring opinion.
④ Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,472 U.S.749(1985).
⑤ Garrison v. Louisiana,379 U.S.64,74-75 (1964).
⑥ Connick v.Myers,461 U.S.138,145 (1983).
⑦ United Unions v. Federal Election Commission,130 S. Ct.876 (2010).
⑧ 403 U.S.15 (1971).
① 403 U.S.713(1971).
② 491 U.S.397(1989).
③ 538 U.S.343(2003).
④ 562 U.S.——(2011),No.09-751.
① [美]安东尼·刘易斯著： 《批评官员的尺度》,何帆译,北京：北京大学出版社,2011年版,第5页。
② 当我们从资料或案例中得出美国是一个言论自由的国度结论的时候,我们所指的实际上是公共讨论的自由,而非是作为人权的言论自由。当我们用这种现象来为作为人权的美国言论自由辩护的时候,我们实际是偷换了两种言论自由的概念。作为人权的言论自由在美国言论自由历史中和联邦最高法院宪法第一修正案的体系中是没有任何位置的,当美国政府利用言论自由来指责中国没有人权的时候,它同样也是偷换了两种言论自由的概念。而由于我国政府也没有清楚地意识到二者区别,对美国指责的回应就显得不是那么有力。
③ Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech, New York, Lexington Books,2009, p.1.
① 315 U.S.697 (1942).
② 315 U.S.571-572 (1942).
③ 343 U.S.250 (1952).
④ 354 U.S.476 (1957)
⑤ See Cass R. Sunstien, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, the Free Press,1995, p.122.
① [美]小哈里·卡尔文著:《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京:三联出版社,2009年版,第69页。
② [美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版,第18页。
③ 376 U.S.269(1964).
④ 505 U.S.377(1992).
⑤ Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 217-218 (1964).
① 413 U. S.15 (1973).
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 218 (1964).
① [法]托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》(上卷),董国良译,北京：商务印书馆,2009年版,第60页。
① James L. Roark, ect., The American Promise:A History of the United States(fourth edition), Boston, Bedford/ST. Martin's,2009, p.255.
② Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.19.
① 参见[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年,第18-19页。
② 参见同上注,第19页。
③ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.19.
① 美国邦联的实践说明,政府没有权威与不受约束的政府权威一样都是自由的最大威胁,联邦宪法的主要任务就是在确保民主制的前提下,赋予全国性政府更大权威。
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第50页。
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第46-47页。
② 参见同上注,第290页。
③ 同上注,第290页。
④ 同上注,第263页。
① 参见[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第263-265页。’
② Stephen M.Feldman,Free Expression and Democracy in America,Chicago and London,University of Chicago Press, 2008,p.19.
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人问集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第48页
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2008, p.23.
② [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第392页。
③ James Kent,2 Commentaries on American Law 276 (1827; Legal Classics Library Reprint,), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.28.
① 3 U. S.386,388,394 (3 Dall.).
② 198 U.S.45(1905).
① 198 U.S.47 (1905).
② David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, New York, Cambridge University Press,1997, p.131.
① [美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,第49页。
② The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (1965), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.169
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.169.
② Id., at 173.
③ 于志森主编：《美国通史》(第四卷),北京：人民出版社,第221页。
④ See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.168.
⑤ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.304.
② Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.311.
③ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2008,p.312.
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.317
① See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.320.
① Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups,51 Harvard Law Rev.201-203 (1937).
② John E. Mulder, Democracy Must Introspect,1 Bill Rights Rev.259,260 (1941).
③ Carl J. Friedrich, The New Belief in the Common Man,41 (1945), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.331.
① Joseph A.Schumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism,and Democracy,George Allen & Unvin,London and New York,1976, p.250-251,269,283,286.
② [美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主理论的前言》,顾昕译,北京：东方出版社,2009年版,第2页。
① 参见[美]罗伯特·达尔： 《民主及其批评者》(上),曹海军、佟德志译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2010年版,第101、136-142页。
② [美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主理论的前言》,顾昕译,北京：东方出版社,2009年版,第131页。
③ [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第179页。
④ Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.396.
① 295 U.S.330,368,374(1935).
① Robert L. Hale, Force and State,35 Columbia Law Rev.149,168,198-201 (1935).
② See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.358.
③ 317U.S. 111,118,120,129(1942).
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.370.
② [美]亚历山大·比克尔著：《最小危险部门》,姚中秋译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版,第17页。
③ 参见[美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第69-70页。
④ Jackson Calls Court Curb on Democracy, N.Y. Times, Oct.13,1937, at 6, quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.360-361.
① See Learned Hand, the Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1942), reprinted in The Sprite of Liberty 118-25 (Irving Dilliard ed.,1959ed), quoted from Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.361.
② Schneider v. State,308 U.S.147,161 (1939)这样一种司法理念也在一定程度上解释了霍姆斯“明显而即刻危险原则”这一本质上的平衡准则一度被美国社会和联邦最高法院所广泛接受的问题。
③ 204 U.S.144(1938).
④ 319 U.S.105,111 (1943).
② See Learned Hand, the Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1942), reprinted in The Sprite of
① Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,348 U.S.488 (1955).
② [美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任：一个司法审查的理论》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版,第99页。
③ 同上注,第105页。
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.397.
① [美]欧文·M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第2页。
① Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.12.
② Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech, Lanham, Lexington Books, p.l.
① See Stephen M.Feldman,Free Expression and Democracy in America,Chicago and London,University of Chicago Press,2008,pp.212-213.
② Knowles v.United States,170 F.409,411-412(8th Cir.1909).
③ 315 U.S.697(1942).
④ 343 U.S.250(1952).
⑤ 354 U.S.476(1957)
⑥ 315 U.S.571-572(1942).
① Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.12.
① [美]罗伯特·迈克罗斯基著：《美国最高法院》,任东来等译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第183页。
② [美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第235页
① [美]欧文M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第4页。
② Harry Kalven, Jr., the New York Times Case:"The Central meaning of the First Amendment", The Supreme Court Review 191,217-218(1964).
③ Melvin L. Urofsky, Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty (Volume I), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.47.
④ See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Wesrview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.2; Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, Berkeley, University of California Press,1991, p.168不仅是费斯,事实上几乎所有的学者都把这三个领域内言论自由问题视为言论自由的焦点问题,如有学者指出的那样：“到了1970年代,‘言论自由’诉讼的焦点已经不再是早期经典案件中的主角——那些不受欢迎的异议者了。现在的焦点有三个：政治竞选的财政支持：对非纸质媒体的规范：以及利用公共房产作为传达个人观点的场所。”[美]罗伯特·迈克罗斯基著：《美国最高法院》,任东
① See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.1.
① Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment,74 Chicago Law Rev.1857,1864 (2007).
② [美]欧文M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第4页。
③ See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.2.
④ See Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent,93 Yale Law J.,581 (1984).
① 424 U.S.1(1976).
① 435 U.S.765(1978).
① 492 U.S.652(1990).
① 540 U.S.93(2003).
② 127 S.Ct.2652(2007).
③ 558 U.S.50(2010).
① See Saran Kellogg, In the Wake of Citizens United, Washington Lawyers, Nov.2010, p.19.
① 424 U.S.47-48(1976).
② 435 U.S.777(1978).
③ 494 U.S.659(1990).
④ 424 U.S.49(1976).
① FEC v. National Right to Work Comm.,459 U.S.197,209,210 (1982).
① Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,2008, p.362.
① Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.1.
② See Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996, p.12.“双轨理论”——一种基于内容限制和内容中立限制区分的理论——是内容中立原则的具体体现。诸多美国宪法学教科书都是以双轨理论为基础编写的,See Geoffrey R. Stone etc., The First Amendment (third edition), Austin, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business,2008.当今美国联邦最高法院在审查言论自由案件时首先要判断案件涉及的问题是对基于内容的限制还是内容中立的限制,对前者适用的审查标准要比后者严格的多。
③ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, New York, Atheneum,1969, p.31.
① [美]欧文-M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第19页。
② 475 U.S.14-15(1986).
② American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut,771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.1985), aff'd mem,475 U.S.1001 (1986).
③ 558 U.S.50 (2010).
① 参见：[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著： 《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第307页；[美]凯瑟琳-A.麦金农著：《言辞而已》,王笑红译,桂林：广西师范大学出版社,2004年版,第56页。
② [美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年,第35页。
① 参见[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第240-241页。
② [美]欧文-M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第19页。
③ 参见同上注,第19页。
① 最著名的代表人物是费斯和桑斯坦教授,其整体论证围绕公共辩诊问题展开,并到此为止。参见[美]凯斯.R桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版；[美]欧文·M,费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版;Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, New York, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc.,1995; Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power, Boulder, Westview Press., A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,1996.
② 参见[美]欧文·M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版,第13-14,19-20页。
③ See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,25 UCLA L. Rev.964 (1978).
① 参见[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第241-251页。
1.[美]小哈里·卡尔文著：《美国言论自由》,李忠等译,北京：三联出版社,2009年年版。
2.[美]亚历山大·米克尔约翰著：《表达自由的法律限度》,侯建译,贵阳：贵州人民出版社,2003年版。
3.[美]赫伯特·J·斯托林著,《反联邦党人赞成什么》,汪庆华译,北京大学出版社,2006年版。
4.[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,北京：商务印书馆,1980年版。
5.[美]安东尼·刘易斯著：《言论的边界》,徐爽译,北京：法律出版社,2007年版。
6.李强著：《自由主义》,长春：吉林出版集团有限公司,2007年版。
7.[美]乔治·萨拜因著：《政治学说史》(下卷),邓正来译,上海：上海人民出版社,2010年版。
8.[英]洛克著：《政府论》(下篇),叶启芳、翟菊农译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版。
9.[英]霍布豪斯著：《自由主义》,朱曾汶译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版。
10.[英]密尔顿著：《论出版自由》,吴之椿译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版。
11.[台]林子仪著：《言论自由与新闻自由》,台北：元照出版公司,1998年版。
12.[英]约翰·密尔著：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务出版社,1996年版。
13.[美]约翰·哈特·伊利著：《民主与不信任》,张卓明译,北京：法律出版社,2011年版。
14.邱小平著：《表达自由：美国宪法第一修正案研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版。
15.[美]桑斯坦著：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华林、毕竞悦译,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版。
16.[美]罗纳德·德沃金著：《自由的法》,刘丽君译,上海：上海人民出版社,2001年版。
17.[美]安东尼·刘易斯著：《批评官员的尺度》,何帆译,北京：北京大学出版社,2011年版。
18.[法]托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》(上卷),董国良译,北京：商务印书馆,2009年版。
19.[美]斯蒂芬·布雷耶著：《积极自由：美国宪法的民主解释论》,田雷译,北 京：中国政法大学出版社,2011年版。
20.[美]罗伯特·达尔：《民主理论的前言》,顾听译,北京：东方出版社,2009年版.
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22.[美]亚历山大·比克尔著：《最小危险部门》,姚中秋译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版。
23.[美]欧文M.费斯著：《言论自由的反讽》,刘擎、殷莹译,北京：新星出版社,2005年版。
24.[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨著：《美国法律史》,王军等译,北京：法律出版社,2007年版。
25.[英]以赛亚·柏林：《自由论》(修订版),胡传胜译,南京：译林出版社,2011年版。
26.刘军宁等主编：《自由与社群》,北京：生活、读书、新知三联书店,1998年版。
27.[澳]菲利普·佩蒂特著：《共和主义：一种关于自由与政府的理论》,刘训练译,江苏人民出版社2012年版。
28.王焱主编：《社会理论的两种传统》,北京：生活、读书、新知三联书店,2012年版。
29.[法]邦雅曼·贡斯当著：《古代人的自由与现代人的自由》,阎克文等译,上海：上海人民出版社,2003年。
30.[美]约翰·施特劳斯、约瑟夫·克罗波西：《西方政治学说史》,李洪润等译,北京：法律出版社,2009年版。
31.[美]伯纳德·贝林著：《美国革命的思想意识渊源》,涂永前译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2007版。
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33.[美]科恩著：《论民主》,聂崇信、朱秀贤译,北京：商务印书馆,2005年版。
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