家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题研究
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摘要
1997年6月，亚洲金融危机爆发，并由此掀起的第三次全球公司治理浪潮。于是，公司治理理论研究的重心也从第一类代理问题（股东与经理间的代理冲突）转向第二类代理问题（大股东与中小股东间的利益冲突）。La Porta（1999）首次提出终极股东控制（Ultimate Control）问题，即终极股东是上市公司股权控制链条的最终控制者，往往运用直接或间接手段持有公司股份获取其实际的控制权。此后，Claessens（1999）、Faccio（2002）对终极股东控制问题的基本属性及存在根源做了大量开创性的研究，最终归纳为统一的理论架构——股权控制链分析范式。由此，很多学者习惯于股权控制链的视角剖析我国家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题。但在我国，家族企业的经营管理，特别是家族公司治理实践，不仅深受传统文化影响，而且我国法治机制尚未完善，法律意识薄弱，所以其治理实践本身就相当复杂，简单依据股权控制链追溯终极股东并不能克服其控制路径的隐蔽性，不能准确揭示其真实身份，相应地难以精确地度量终极股东对上市公司的实际控制程度。这样，就必须复杂地看待和思考上市家族企业终极股东控制问题。在家族公司治理中，终极股东是否动用非经济性的社会因素影响力实施对上市公司控制？实际上，这种现象时有发生、确实存在，但迄今为止，很多学者在解释终极股东控制问题时总会无意识地割裂非经济性的社会因素与家族企业治理实践间的内在联系，简单认为终极股东只会运用股权控制链手段控制上市家族企业。然而，也有不少学者已经发现在家族公司治理中，“一方面我们应运用股权控制链分析范式解释终极股东控制问题，倡导用股权追溯其身份、监督其行为；另一方面还要重视网络连带、传统文化、惯例势力等社会因素在终极股东获得实际控制权中的重要作用”。所以，终极股东并非只有股权一种手段获取控制权，通常还会凭借其创业家长及家族首脑身份，家族控制权威等取得社会资本来控制上市家族企业，称为社会资本控制链。
基于此，论文以家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题为研究对象，在文献综述和探索研究的基础上结合社会资本理论，构建“社会资本控制链”，以此弥补股权控制链分析范式的不足，最终形成终极股东双重控制链分析范式来分析家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题。与此同时，本研究运用组织惯例演化的认识论与方法论，系统探讨在上市家族企业终极股东双重控制链的构建过程及演化机理，诠释终极股东怎样将股权控制链与社会资本控制链完美结合，运用社会因素与经济因素最终实现其对上市家族企业的控制，从而为家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题研究开辟了一条崭新的道路。主要工作如下：
（1）家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的缘由解读与现状分析。首先，在对国内外有关家族企业研究文献的归纳基础上，总结出家族企业的基本特征是。然后，结合上市家族企业控制权的实践内涵，揭示家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的实质是一种代理关系问题。最后，通过有关我国上市家族企业终极股东控制的研究数据，对其现状特征以及构成原因搭建大致的研究轮廓。
（2）终极股东双重控制链分析。引入社会资本基本概念及理论方法，阐释家族公司治理终极股东控制问题中仅依据股权控制链分析所产生的不足之处，并进一步陈述运用终极股东社会资本控制链分析的必要性。也就是说，在股权控制链分析的基础上，增加社会资本控制链分析，运用比较方法说明两者探讨终极股东控制问题时的优势及不足，形成终极股东双重控制链分析范式。
（3）基于组织惯例基本概念及其演化规律对家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的研究。在查阅国内外组织惯例相关文献的基础上，诠释其与终极股东双重控制链之间的对应关系，构建双重控制链生成机制的理论分析框架。然后，界定终极股东股权控制意愿度和社会资本意愿度两个概念，整合为终极股东控制意愿度迭代模型以此说明其双重控制链的生成与演化过程。
（4）充分描述家族公司治理终极股东双重控制链理论分析框架后，解释社会资本是如何以组织惯例为中介，通过社会资本控制链，最终形成终极股东控制的作用机理及传导路径。
（5）实证分析。在明晰家族公司治理终极股东双重控制链作用机理后，采用问卷调查及跟踪访谈的方式收集并整理样本数据、运用相关分析及嵌套模型分析等多种统计方法，对理论模型及关系路径假设进行验证。除此之外，还通过单案例分析阐明对家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的探讨，不能仅依据股权控制链，还需要增添社会资本控制链的相关分析，应用双重控制链分析范式来保证结论的有效性。
通过对家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的系统研究与深入探讨，得出以下重要结论：（1）终极股东往往会同时采用股权控制链和社会资本控制链保障对上市公司的终极控制；（2）仅用股权控制链分析范式探讨终极股东控制问题存在局限性，需要考虑其社会资本控制链，基于双重控制链视角才能保证结论的合理性及有效性；（3）终极股东双重控制链是组织惯例演化的最终结果，通过组织惯例演化的认识论及方法论能够充分揭示其双重控制链的构建和演化过程；（4）社会资本通过组织惯例对终极股东控制产生间接的、显著的正向作用。并且，社会资本结构、关系维度对终极股东控制不具有直接的、显著的正向作用，但是社会资本认知维度对终极股东控制具有直接的、显著的正向作用。对不同上市状态的上市家族企业来说，社会资本、组织惯例与终极股东控制的关系路径及影响程度也会有所差异。
In June1997, The Asian financial crisis broke out, which sets off the third globalwave of corporate governance revolution. It also contributed to the focus of theoreticalresearch turn to the issues-II agency problem from the issues-I agency problem, fromagency conflicts between shareholders and managers of the company to conflicts ofinterest between the major shareholders with medium and small shareholders. La Porta R.(1999) first proposed the concept of the ultimate shareholder control. It means that theultimate shareholder controls of the equity control chain by directly and indirectly heldstock to have actual control right of company. With the guidance of this concept, ClaessensS.(1999), and Faccio M.(2002) did a lot of ground-breaking research on the existence andbasic properties of ultimate shareholder control right, which form a fixed analyticalframework--equity control chain analysis paradigm. It also makes our scholars used tostudy of family corporate governance only from the perspective of equity control chain todiscover and parse ultimate shareholder control problems. But in our country, themanagement of the family business, especially family practice of corporate governance hasbeen influenced by the traditional Chinese culture. And the Chinese company law is not yetperfect leading to weak legal consciousness, so family corporate governance practice inour contry is a very complex issue. Based on equity control chain, we can not completelyfind out the hidden nature of the ultimate shareholder of listed companies. It’s difficult toreveal the real ultimate shareholder deep behind the scenes and to measure its actualcontrol degree of listed companies. It requires reconsidering ultimate shareholder controlproblems in the family listed companies. Whether the ultimate shareholder of familycorporate governance has some non-economic social factors influence to control listedcompanies? Currently, this phenomenon does exist. Researchers often unconsciously treatsocial factors and equity control analysis. So far, there are many scholars having found theintrinsic relationship between social factors and the ultimate shareholder control. Theynoted:"On one hand, we vigorously apply the equity control analysis of the ultimateshareholder deprivation problem, advocated using 'equity control chain' to find andsupervise ultimate shareholder; On the other hand, We have a clear clear insight into theimportant role of social networks, traditional culture, routine forces in ultimate shareholdercontrol problems.
So this paper forcus on ultimate shareholders control problems in the family corporate governance practices as the research object. Baesd on literature review and exploratoryresearch, it combines with the theory of social capital to build “social capital control chain”to make up the shortage of only application of “equity control chain”. Finally, it forms"dual" control chain analysis paradigm to solve such ultimate shareholder problems infamily corporate governance. And this paper uses the epistemology and methodology oforganizational routine evolution to explore how the ultimate shareholders "double" controlchain formed, which opens up a new path for resolving the ultimate shareholder controlproblems in family corporate governance. Its main work is as follows:
(1) This paper gives the definition, causes, current status analysis of the ultimateshareholder control in family corporate governance. First, Based on the research literatureof family business, it sums up the concept and characteristics of family business. And then,combined with control right in corporate governance practice, it reveals that the ultimateshareholder control in family corporate governance is essentially an agency relationship.Finally, with research data of the ultimate shareholder control in Chinese family listedcompanies, the paper summarizes its current characteristics and reasons for the formation.
(2) The ultimate shareholders "double" control chain analysis. With social capitaltheory and methods, it explains the inadequacies of the ultimate shareholder controlproblems based on equity control chain analysis alone, as well as the need for adding theultimate shareholder social capital chain analysis. On the basis of the equity control chainanalysis, the paper increases social capital control chain analysis and analyzes bycomparative method of two control chain's strengths and weaknesses in ultimateshareholder control problems of family listed companies. Eventually, it forms the ultimateshareholders "double "control chain analysis paradigm.
(3) Family corporate governance ultimate shareholder control analysis based onorganizational routine evolutionary theory. With the study of organizational routineevolutionary theory, the paper gives interpretation of corresponding relationship betweenorganizational routine and ultimate shareholders "double" control chain, and theirgeneration mechanism analysis framework. Eventually, it proposes two concepts, whichare equity control willingness and social capital control willingness of ultimate shareholderbased on the epistemology of organizational routine evolution, in order to build socialcapital controls iterative model to illustrate formation and evolution of ultimateshareholder "double" control chain.
(4) Based on the analysis framework of fully revealing ultimate shareholder "double"control chain in family corporate governance with organizational routine evolution theory, it explores how social capital to affect organizational routine, which leads to generateultimate shareholder social capital control chain in the family corporate governance.
(5) Empirical Analysis. With theoretical exploration, this paper uses questionnaires,data processing, statistical analysis and other methods to test and verify of theoreticalmodel and assumptions. Then, it expounds ultimate shareholder control problems in familycorporate governance by case studies, which is not only using equity control chain analysis,but need to add social capital control chain analysis. The application of ultimateshareholder "double" control chain analysis paradigm ensures the validity of results.
Through in-depth system analysis and discussion, several important conclusions areas follows:
(1) In family corporate governance, the ultimate shareholder tends to using equitycontrol chain and social capital control chain to ensure the ultimate control of family listedcompanies.
(2) The ultimate shareholders "double" control chain is performance as organizationalroutine evolution. So it’s reasonable to use epistemology and methodology oforganizational routine theory to explain conformation and evolution of ultimateshareholder "double" control chain.
(3) Through the impact of organizational routine, social capital generates socialcapital control chain of ultimate shareholder.
(4) Using only equity control chain in analysis of ultimate shareholder controlproblems of family corporate governance often causes several deficiencies. In order toensure the validity of results, it is necessary to add social capital control chain by using"double" control chain analysis paradigm.
基于此，论文以家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题为研究对象，在文献综述和探索研究的基础上结合社会资本理论，构建“社会资本控制链”，以此弥补股权控制链分析范式的不足，最终形成终极股东双重控制链分析范式来分析家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题。与此同时，本研究运用组织惯例演化的认识论与方法论，系统探讨在上市家族企业终极股东双重控制链的构建过程及演化机理，诠释终极股东怎样将股权控制链与社会资本控制链完美结合，运用社会因素与经济因素最终实现其对上市家族企业的控制，从而为家族公司治理中的终极股东控制问题研究开辟了一条崭新的道路。主要工作如下：
（1）家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的缘由解读与现状分析。首先，在对国内外有关家族企业研究文献的归纳基础上，总结出家族企业的基本特征是。然后，结合上市家族企业控制权的实践内涵，揭示家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的实质是一种代理关系问题。最后，通过有关我国上市家族企业终极股东控制的研究数据，对其现状特征以及构成原因搭建大致的研究轮廓。
（2）终极股东双重控制链分析。引入社会资本基本概念及理论方法，阐释家族公司治理终极股东控制问题中仅依据股权控制链分析所产生的不足之处，并进一步陈述运用终极股东社会资本控制链分析的必要性。也就是说，在股权控制链分析的基础上，增加社会资本控制链分析，运用比较方法说明两者探讨终极股东控制问题时的优势及不足，形成终极股东双重控制链分析范式。
（3）基于组织惯例基本概念及其演化规律对家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的研究。在查阅国内外组织惯例相关文献的基础上，诠释其与终极股东双重控制链之间的对应关系，构建双重控制链生成机制的理论分析框架。然后，界定终极股东股权控制意愿度和社会资本意愿度两个概念，整合为终极股东控制意愿度迭代模型以此说明其双重控制链的生成与演化过程。
（4）充分描述家族公司治理终极股东双重控制链理论分析框架后，解释社会资本是如何以组织惯例为中介，通过社会资本控制链，最终形成终极股东控制的作用机理及传导路径。
（5）实证分析。在明晰家族公司治理终极股东双重控制链作用机理后，采用问卷调查及跟踪访谈的方式收集并整理样本数据、运用相关分析及嵌套模型分析等多种统计方法，对理论模型及关系路径假设进行验证。除此之外，还通过单案例分析阐明对家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的探讨，不能仅依据股权控制链，还需要增添社会资本控制链的相关分析，应用双重控制链分析范式来保证结论的有效性。
通过对家族公司治理终极股东控制问题的系统研究与深入探讨，得出以下重要结论：（1）终极股东往往会同时采用股权控制链和社会资本控制链保障对上市公司的终极控制；（2）仅用股权控制链分析范式探讨终极股东控制问题存在局限性，需要考虑其社会资本控制链，基于双重控制链视角才能保证结论的合理性及有效性；（3）终极股东双重控制链是组织惯例演化的最终结果，通过组织惯例演化的认识论及方法论能够充分揭示其双重控制链的构建和演化过程；（4）社会资本通过组织惯例对终极股东控制产生间接的、显著的正向作用。并且，社会资本结构、关系维度对终极股东控制不具有直接的、显著的正向作用，但是社会资本认知维度对终极股东控制具有直接的、显著的正向作用。对不同上市状态的上市家族企业来说，社会资本、组织惯例与终极股东控制的关系路径及影响程度也会有所差异。
In June1997, The Asian financial crisis broke out, which sets off the third globalwave of corporate governance revolution. It also contributed to the focus of theoreticalresearch turn to the issues-II agency problem from the issues-I agency problem, fromagency conflicts between shareholders and managers of the company to conflicts ofinterest between the major shareholders with medium and small shareholders. La Porta R.(1999) first proposed the concept of the ultimate shareholder control. It means that theultimate shareholder controls of the equity control chain by directly and indirectly heldstock to have actual control right of company. With the guidance of this concept, ClaessensS.(1999), and Faccio M.(2002) did a lot of ground-breaking research on the existence andbasic properties of ultimate shareholder control right, which form a fixed analyticalframework--equity control chain analysis paradigm. It also makes our scholars used tostudy of family corporate governance only from the perspective of equity control chain todiscover and parse ultimate shareholder control problems. But in our country, themanagement of the family business, especially family practice of corporate governance hasbeen influenced by the traditional Chinese culture. And the Chinese company law is not yetperfect leading to weak legal consciousness, so family corporate governance practice inour contry is a very complex issue. Based on equity control chain, we can not completelyfind out the hidden nature of the ultimate shareholder of listed companies. It’s difficult toreveal the real ultimate shareholder deep behind the scenes and to measure its actualcontrol degree of listed companies. It requires reconsidering ultimate shareholder controlproblems in the family listed companies. Whether the ultimate shareholder of familycorporate governance has some non-economic social factors influence to control listedcompanies? Currently, this phenomenon does exist. Researchers often unconsciously treatsocial factors and equity control analysis. So far, there are many scholars having found theintrinsic relationship between social factors and the ultimate shareholder control. Theynoted:"On one hand, we vigorously apply the equity control analysis of the ultimateshareholder deprivation problem, advocated using 'equity control chain' to find andsupervise ultimate shareholder; On the other hand, We have a clear clear insight into theimportant role of social networks, traditional culture, routine forces in ultimate shareholdercontrol problems.
So this paper forcus on ultimate shareholders control problems in the family corporate governance practices as the research object. Baesd on literature review and exploratoryresearch, it combines with the theory of social capital to build “social capital control chain”to make up the shortage of only application of “equity control chain”. Finally, it forms"dual" control chain analysis paradigm to solve such ultimate shareholder problems infamily corporate governance. And this paper uses the epistemology and methodology oforganizational routine evolution to explore how the ultimate shareholders "double" controlchain formed, which opens up a new path for resolving the ultimate shareholder controlproblems in family corporate governance. Its main work is as follows:
(1) This paper gives the definition, causes, current status analysis of the ultimateshareholder control in family corporate governance. First, Based on the research literatureof family business, it sums up the concept and characteristics of family business. And then,combined with control right in corporate governance practice, it reveals that the ultimateshareholder control in family corporate governance is essentially an agency relationship.Finally, with research data of the ultimate shareholder control in Chinese family listedcompanies, the paper summarizes its current characteristics and reasons for the formation.
(2) The ultimate shareholders "double" control chain analysis. With social capitaltheory and methods, it explains the inadequacies of the ultimate shareholder controlproblems based on equity control chain analysis alone, as well as the need for adding theultimate shareholder social capital chain analysis. On the basis of the equity control chainanalysis, the paper increases social capital control chain analysis and analyzes bycomparative method of two control chain's strengths and weaknesses in ultimateshareholder control problems of family listed companies. Eventually, it forms the ultimateshareholders "double "control chain analysis paradigm.
(3) Family corporate governance ultimate shareholder control analysis based onorganizational routine evolutionary theory. With the study of organizational routineevolutionary theory, the paper gives interpretation of corresponding relationship betweenorganizational routine and ultimate shareholders "double" control chain, and theirgeneration mechanism analysis framework. Eventually, it proposes two concepts, whichare equity control willingness and social capital control willingness of ultimate shareholderbased on the epistemology of organizational routine evolution, in order to build socialcapital controls iterative model to illustrate formation and evolution of ultimateshareholder "double" control chain.
(4) Based on the analysis framework of fully revealing ultimate shareholder "double"control chain in family corporate governance with organizational routine evolution theory, it explores how social capital to affect organizational routine, which leads to generateultimate shareholder social capital control chain in the family corporate governance.
(5) Empirical Analysis. With theoretical exploration, this paper uses questionnaires,data processing, statistical analysis and other methods to test and verify of theoreticalmodel and assumptions. Then, it expounds ultimate shareholder control problems in familycorporate governance by case studies, which is not only using equity control chain analysis,but need to add social capital control chain analysis. The application of ultimateshareholder "double" control chain analysis paradigm ensures the validity of results.
Through in-depth system analysis and discussion, several important conclusions areas follows:
(1) In family corporate governance, the ultimate shareholder tends to using equitycontrol chain and social capital control chain to ensure the ultimate control of family listedcompanies.
(2) The ultimate shareholders "double" control chain is performance as organizationalroutine evolution. So it’s reasonable to use epistemology and methodology oforganizational routine theory to explain conformation and evolution of ultimateshareholder "double" control chain.
(3) Through the impact of organizational routine, social capital generates socialcapital control chain of ultimate shareholder.
(4) Using only equity control chain in analysis of ultimate shareholder controlproblems of family corporate governance often causes several deficiencies. In order toensure the validity of results, it is necessary to add social capital control chain by using"double" control chain analysis paradigm.
引文
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143幕后股权受托者促成董事们订立了一系列的建筑合同（在建筑公司以及一条竞争性铁路线中均有利益，可从运输中分配中获取），该合同是在由几个人组成的委员会（终极股东）为了可观的个人利益而指令股权受托者如何投票的情况下达成的。
144我国《公司法》规定“公司是企业法人，有独立的法人财产，享有法人财产权”。企业都具有法律上的独立“人格”，法律无权干涉其财产权（日常经营活动），除非企业存在违法行为。股东也是如此。
145引自《论语·子路》。
146中国古代帝王既是人君又为人师，君权的合法性、权威性源于“上天”并以其道德魅力为保障。
147正如王凤彬在分析“制度不变性与响应性的悖论”时所陈述的那样：“大一统”的制度规定以及执行中的“柔性”，成为我国工商企业组织治理实践的主要特征。在这样的法律或制度框架下，“既有原则性，又有灵活性”的领导者深谙“该何时援引制度，何时不援引制度”的艺术，往往会在事关组织整体利益的制度执行上采取灵活变通的举措。
148侯健.法治的刚性、柔性与东西方法治模式的比较[J].华东政法学院学报,2004(4).
1492001年《中华人民共和国信托法》定义：信托是指委托人基于对受托人的信任，将其财产权委托给受托人，由受托人按委托人的意愿以自己的名义，为受益人的利益或者特定目的进行管理或者处分的行为。在这里意指终极股东与经理层建立起的互信关系，使得经理层听命于终极股东，或是自觉为其服务的被控制关系。这与法律上独立、自由、平等的人权相比是带有“暴力”行为（即使是出于当事人的自愿心理）。可以认为经理层的意志或行为由终极股东代为托管，而成为“傀儡”的控制。
150即终极股东控制与经理层利益之间的矛盾不可调和的时刻。
151《皇矣》：“比于文王，其德靡悔；既受帝祉，施于子孙”。
152据《诗经》，所谓孝：（1）追思、祭祀已故的父母及先祖；（2）遵行其遗教、遗嘱；（3）守孝就可以长寿富贵，子孙永续不绝。显示孝的对象为已逝父母、祖、宗室中的长老兄弟姻亲。
153“是故，人道亲亲也。亲亲故尊祖，尊祖故敬宗，敬宗故收族，收族故宗庙严，宗庙严故重社稷，重社稷故爱百姓。爱百姓故刑罚中，刑罚中故庶民安，庶民安故财用足，财用足故百志成，百志成故礼俗刑，礼俗刑然后乐。”——《礼记大传》
154“恭顺”是指权威承受者对权威拥有者，以及他们彼此间的和睦顺从。
155Fama F. E., Jensen C.M. Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):327-349.
156Hayek A.F. The Use of Knowledge in Society[J]. American Economic Review,1945,25(4):519-530.
157Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness [J]. American Journal ofSociology,1985(91):481-510
158越来越多的家族获得对公司实质上的控制权，尤其是通过金字塔股权结构获得实质控制时，家族作为终极大股东在控制公司资源配置中追求个人财富最大化与按照股权份额获取相应收益之间的代理冲突格外强烈。
159在公司治理中，终极股东的主流控制形式为股权控制。其次，股权控制也是按照公司法严格规定执行的，存在强有力的第三方（法院）保障，具有“普适性”。社会资本控制是作为信托关系的载体依存于社会网络之中，虽然其具有存在的客观必然性，但也无法避免其本身属性中的主观随意性，不是一种稳定持久的控制形式。“颤抖性”的控制平衡不代表终极股东不能驾驭并利用，以实现利益最大化的目的，所以社会资本控制只能作为法律保障的股权控制的分支维度，并发挥辅助控制的功效。
160一般把嵌入在社会关系网络中，并以道德、习俗和信念为基础来规制经济主体行为的控制方式称为“社会资本控制”。因此，在后文中，凡是控制者利用与社会网络关系构成要素（道德、习俗规范、信念、信任及信仰等）有关的各种类型控制都统一称之为“社会资本控制”。
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168法律仅仅对公司治理中的职位进行了权责规制，但对于担任此职位的主体——人来说，公司法律不干涉其所具有的其他社会角色，因此在公司中担任同一职位的人不同，即使都在遵守法律规定该职位的权利和义务的条件下，其行为途径也是不同的。
169高闯,郭斌.嵌入“礼”文化思想的中国组织社会资本分析[J].经济与管理研究,2011(7).
1702009年，谢思全在“个体社会资本与社会偏好”一文中表述过：“信任这一概念对于理性经济人假设而言，在逻辑上可能并不成立，因为理性经济人行为的唯一动机是经济动因，他与其他个体的联系仅仅是为实现自身经济利益的一种工具性关系，谈不上信任与否”。这与Hollis（1998）的观点相类似，“理性经济人较之真实世界的人类个体拥有更强的稳定性偏好和理性计算能力，但缺少信仰、情感和群体观念等精神元素”。
171制裁要实现对个体行为的约束，需要对行为主体构成可置信的威胁。
172Fehr，Kirchsteiger，Riedl（1993）在“礼物交换”博弈的实验中，发现个体一般会对对其“友善”的对手采取“友善”的策略，而对其“敌对”的对手采取“敌对”的策略，甚至不惜牺牲自身的经济利益来达到这一目的。
1732009年，谢思全提出“信任本质上是个体对他人在实际行动中考虑互动对方利益的社会偏好强度的主观预期”。
174Matthew Rabin在1993年发表的“Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economic”一文中提出社会网络中个体行为存在的“互惠动机”，即个体对待关心自己利益的其他个体同样报以关心的态度与行为，而对待损害自己利益的个体予以报复，简而言之，就是“以德报德，以怨报怨”。
175私人制裁的实施主体与制裁对象处于同一社会网络中，在发现违规行为后做出裁决，并愿意实施主动惩罚的个人。
1761958年，波兰尼在《对人的研究（Study of Man）》中表示“在社会网络中，某一个体对其他人行为的主观评价能力源于：在长期网络互动中对行为主体相关损益的评价，及情景共享条件下对优劣状态的感受。这并不遵循严格的推理逻辑，而是一种默会的感觉判断”。
177中国有句俗话，“好事不出门，坏事传千里”。
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143幕后股权受托者促成董事们订立了一系列的建筑合同（在建筑公司以及一条竞争性铁路线中均有利益，可从运输中分配中获取），该合同是在由几个人组成的委员会（终极股东）为了可观的个人利益而指令股权受托者如何投票的情况下达成的。
144我国《公司法》规定“公司是企业法人，有独立的法人财产，享有法人财产权”。企业都具有法律上的独立“人格”，法律无权干涉其财产权（日常经营活动），除非企业存在违法行为。股东也是如此。
145引自《论语·子路》。
146中国古代帝王既是人君又为人师，君权的合法性、权威性源于“上天”并以其道德魅力为保障。
147正如王凤彬在分析“制度不变性与响应性的悖论”时所陈述的那样：“大一统”的制度规定以及执行中的“柔性”，成为我国工商企业组织治理实践的主要特征。在这样的法律或制度框架下，“既有原则性，又有灵活性”的领导者深谙“该何时援引制度，何时不援引制度”的艺术，往往会在事关组织整体利益的制度执行上采取灵活变通的举措。
148侯健.法治的刚性、柔性与东西方法治模式的比较[J].华东政法学院学报,2004(4).
1492001年《中华人民共和国信托法》定义：信托是指委托人基于对受托人的信任，将其财产权委托给受托人，由受托人按委托人的意愿以自己的名义，为受益人的利益或者特定目的进行管理或者处分的行为。在这里意指终极股东与经理层建立起的互信关系，使得经理层听命于终极股东，或是自觉为其服务的被控制关系。这与法律上独立、自由、平等的人权相比是带有“暴力”行为（即使是出于当事人的自愿心理）。可以认为经理层的意志或行为由终极股东代为托管，而成为“傀儡”的控制。
150即终极股东控制与经理层利益之间的矛盾不可调和的时刻。
151《皇矣》：“比于文王，其德靡悔；既受帝祉，施于子孙”。
152据《诗经》，所谓孝：（1）追思、祭祀已故的父母及先祖；（2）遵行其遗教、遗嘱；（3）守孝就可以长寿富贵，子孙永续不绝。显示孝的对象为已逝父母、祖、宗室中的长老兄弟姻亲。
153“是故，人道亲亲也。亲亲故尊祖，尊祖故敬宗，敬宗故收族，收族故宗庙严，宗庙严故重社稷，重社稷故爱百姓。爱百姓故刑罚中，刑罚中故庶民安，庶民安故财用足，财用足故百志成，百志成故礼俗刑，礼俗刑然后乐。”——《礼记大传》
154“恭顺”是指权威承受者对权威拥有者，以及他们彼此间的和睦顺从。
155Fama F. E., Jensen C.M. Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):327-349.
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158越来越多的家族获得对公司实质上的控制权，尤其是通过金字塔股权结构获得实质控制时，家族作为终极大股东在控制公司资源配置中追求个人财富最大化与按照股权份额获取相应收益之间的代理冲突格外强烈。
159在公司治理中，终极股东的主流控制形式为股权控制。其次，股权控制也是按照公司法严格规定执行的，存在强有力的第三方（法院）保障，具有“普适性”。社会资本控制是作为信托关系的载体依存于社会网络之中，虽然其具有存在的客观必然性，但也无法避免其本身属性中的主观随意性，不是一种稳定持久的控制形式。“颤抖性”的控制平衡不代表终极股东不能驾驭并利用，以实现利益最大化的目的，所以社会资本控制只能作为法律保障的股权控制的分支维度，并发挥辅助控制的功效。
160一般把嵌入在社会关系网络中，并以道德、习俗和信念为基础来规制经济主体行为的控制方式称为“社会资本控制”。因此，在后文中，凡是控制者利用与社会网络关系构成要素（道德、习俗规范、信念、信任及信仰等）有关的各种类型控制都统一称之为“社会资本控制”。
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168法律仅仅对公司治理中的职位进行了权责规制，但对于担任此职位的主体——人来说，公司法律不干涉其所具有的其他社会角色，因此在公司中担任同一职位的人不同，即使都在遵守法律规定该职位的权利和义务的条件下，其行为途径也是不同的。
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1702009年，谢思全在“个体社会资本与社会偏好”一文中表述过：“信任这一概念对于理性经济人假设而言，在逻辑上可能并不成立，因为理性经济人行为的唯一动机是经济动因，他与其他个体的联系仅仅是为实现自身经济利益的一种工具性关系，谈不上信任与否”。这与Hollis（1998）的观点相类似，“理性经济人较之真实世界的人类个体拥有更强的稳定性偏好和理性计算能力，但缺少信仰、情感和群体观念等精神元素”。
171制裁要实现对个体行为的约束，需要对行为主体构成可置信的威胁。
172Fehr，Kirchsteiger，Riedl（1993）在“礼物交换”博弈的实验中，发现个体一般会对对其“友善”的对手采取“友善”的策略，而对其“敌对”的对手采取“敌对”的策略，甚至不惜牺牲自身的经济利益来达到这一目的。
1732009年，谢思全提出“信任本质上是个体对他人在实际行动中考虑互动对方利益的社会偏好强度的主观预期”。
174Matthew Rabin在1993年发表的“Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economic”一文中提出社会网络中个体行为存在的“互惠动机”，即个体对待关心自己利益的其他个体同样报以关心的态度与行为，而对待损害自己利益的个体予以报复，简而言之，就是“以德报德，以怨报怨”。
175私人制裁的实施主体与制裁对象处于同一社会网络中，在发现违规行为后做出裁决，并愿意实施主动惩罚的个人。
1761958年，波兰尼在《对人的研究（Study of Man）》中表示“在社会网络中，某一个体对其他人行为的主观评价能力源于：在长期网络互动中对行为主体相关损益的评价，及情景共享条件下对优劣状态的感受。这并不遵循严格的推理逻辑，而是一种默会的感觉判断”。
177中国有句俗话，“好事不出门，坏事传千里”。
178Emst Fehr，Simon Gachter（2000）在发表的“Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments”中表示“在社会网络中，拥有强社会偏好的个体甚至会不顾及自身的经济收益，而对违反共有规范的个体实施惩罚”。
179美国法学家奥尔森在《诉讼爆炸》一书中指出，“美国普通法传统像其他每个伟大民族的法律传统一样，
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186法制的设立可以在一夜之间发生，但社会资本的构成要素却是逐渐演进的，单一方向的法制变革，如果没有其生长的“温床”——社会网络关系的支持和补充，尤其是当法制缺乏相应的体制配合时，就可能提高其运行、监督的成本，甚至背离其设计初衷，导致整个社会、经济秩序的混乱。
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