优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工与销售环节的质量行为协调机制研究
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摘要
中国是世界上最大的猪肉生产和消费大国，但我国的猪肉质量普遍存在着安全隐患，导致猪肉质量安全事件时有发生，既影响了国内猪肉消费者的身心健康，又制约着中国猪肉产业国际竞争力的培育和提升。这些问题产生的原因在于，猪肉产品质量安全不是一个企业或一个环节的问题，而是涉及到生猪养殖、屠宰加工、存储运输、销售到消费者手中的各个环节。行为主体的质量行为不规范、质量信息不对称，管理不规范，没有形成良好的协调机制，导致猪肉供应链的质量预防水平、惩罚与利益分配水平均不合理，最终导致猪肉质量链的不稳定、失控和断裂。在生猪质量一定的情况下，如何促进屠宰加工和销售环节的质量行为协调，形成利益共享、风险共担的供应链合作伙伴机制，促进行为主体间的质量行为的配合得当，最终确保从生猪养殖到餐桌的整个供应链的猪肉质量安全，已成为我国政府、企业和学者们共同关注的重要问题，迫切需要研究。
本文在综述国内外文献、走访相关专家并进行实地调研的基础上，以提高猪肉质量安全水平和消费者满意度为切入点，以实现优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调目标为目的，综合运用了系统分析和统计分析、结构方程计量模型分析、熵变模型分析、微分博弈分析和系统仿真等方法，从相关文献综述、系统全面认识研究对象、现状统计描述、影响因素识别、协调机制分析、对策建议提出等六大方面，对优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工与销售环节的质量行为协调机制进行了系统深入的研究。
本文首先对优质猪肉、优质猪肉供应链、屠宰加工环节与销售环节质量行为协调的相关问题等内容进行了系统的界定与阐释，从宏观层面上全面认识研究对象及其内容系统，为下一步深入研究奠定理论基础。研究表明，为实现协调状态目标和协调结果目标，优质猪肉供应链屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调是以认知为基础，以系统观为思想，以提高优质猪肉供应链整体竞争优势、追求个体利益最大化为动因的动态演化过程。
本文利用山东省等9省（市）的982份问卷调查数据，从双方的认知协调与行为协调2个层面实证研究了双方在环境维护、投入品来源、检疫检验、设施配置、生产档案、员工培训、质量标准与追溯等7个方面的质量行为协调状况。然后，运用结构方程模型分析了超市质量行为协调的影响因素。结果表明：屠宰加工企业的质量安全认知与行为均优于超市。并且超市的质量行为协调认知状况受经营特征、环境特征的显著正向影响，超市质量行为协调状况受认知特征和经营特征的显著正向影响。
在实证研究的基础上，阐述了优质猪肉供应链屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调的形成与演进机制模型，从动力机制、传导机制、实现机制三大主导机制，以及促进机制和保障机制两大辅助机制方面深入剖析。然后，运用熵变模型深入系统地揭示屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调演进的过程、影响因素及其作用关系，得到结论：熵变模型视角的屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调机制表明，增加负熵流和减少正熵流是促进两环节质量行为协调逐步提高，实现质量行为协调效应的根本途径，并利用两环节的实地调查数据印证了理论分析。
在猪肉供应链质量行为及其协调研究的基础上，借鉴一般供应链质量控制与协调问题的研究成果，运用微分博弈方法，深入系统地研究由单一屠宰加工企业和单一超市组成的二级猪肉供应链质量行为协调机制，考察了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈以及协同合作博弈情形下屠宰加工企业和超市的最优质量行为决策，结果表明协同合作决策模式下，屠宰加工企业和超市的质量行为以及猪肉供应链总体利润均严格优于在非合作决策模式下的相应值。然后通过证明给出了能够使屠宰加工企业和超市的个体利润达到帕累托最优，进而实现双方质量行为协调的供应链总体利润分配系数的取值范围。最后运用算例试算和系统仿真验证微分博弈得到的结论。
基于前文研究结论，提出了促进优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调的对策建议。具体包括政府应加强理念宣传，加大产业扶持政策，完善社会化服务体系，加强立法与监管，维护良好的猪肉市场秩序；行业策略有健全行业组织培训与协调职能，推动信息共享和信用制度的建立；供应链策略包括加强沟通与合作，建立合理的利益分配与风险共担机制，制定协调度评价体系；企业应作出坚定的信任与承诺，强化内部学习与责任意识，完善内部管理制度；消费者应培养健康的消费理念，提高信息反馈与维权意识并积极参与社会监督。
China is the largest producer and consumer of pork in the world, but the pork qualityubiquitous safety risks, and quality and safety incidents occurred, which not only relates toconsumers’ lives and health, but also has an impact on the global competitiveness of porkindustry. Is that the reason of these problems, quality and safety of pork products is not anenterprise or a part of the problem, but involves various aspects of the pig breeding,slaughtering and processing, storage, transportation and sales to consumers. Not standardizedquality behaviorasymmetry quality information and irregularities management, not form agood coordination mechanism, which lead quality pork supply chain prevention level,punishment and profit distribution is not reasonable, eventually lead to pork quality chaininstability, uncontrolled and fracture. How to promote the quality behavior coordinationbetween slaughterhouse and supermarkets, to form benefit sharing and risk sharingmechanism of supply chain partners, to promote the proper quality behavior among thesubjects, finally make sure to provide quality and safety pork of the whole supply chain frompig breeding to table, has become the important issues of common concern of our government,enterprises and scholars. There is an urgent need to study.
Based on field research, the domestic and international literature review, and interviewrelevant experts, in order to improve the quality and safety level of pork and customersatisfaction as the starting point, for the purpose of achieve the quality behavior coordinationtarget of the slaughterhouse and supermarket in high quality pork supply chain,comprehensive use system analysis, statistical analysis, econometric analysis, entropy changemodel analysis, differential game analysis and system simulation method, from the literaturereview, comprehensive understanding of the research object system, status of statisticaldescription, factors influencing the identification, coordination mechanism analysis, andsuggestions in six aspects, slaughterhouse and sales quality behavior coordination mechanismin high quality pork supply chain are studied.
The paper reviewed on the quality and safety of pork supply chain related content first.Through literature review, found that the lack of research on the coordination mechanism,coordination status and profit distribution problem of partner quality behavior under the environment of supply chain. Based on the above analysis, this paper defined and interpretedthe content of the high quality pork, high quality pork supply chain, slaughtering and saleslink quality behavior coordination related issues.From the macro level, a comprehensiveunderstanding of research object and content system, which lays a theoretical foundation forthe further research. Research shows that, in order to realize the coordination state of thetarget and the target coordinate, quality safety behavior coordination between slaughteringand sales links is a formation and dynamic evolutionary process which guarantees porkquality safety and decreases the cost of pork quality, which in the purpose to produce highquality pork. The process is based on recognition, directed by systematic perspective anddriven by the enhancement of overall competitiveness of high quality pork supply chain andpursuit of optimal personal interest.
This paper use in Shandong province and other8provinces(city)982copies of thequestionnaire data, from the cognitive coordination and behavior coordination2levelempirical research the behavior coordination condition in7perspectives such asenvironmental maintenance. Then, analyzed the influencing factors of the supermarket qualitybehavior coordination by using structural equation model. The results show that: the qualityand safety cognition and behavior of slaughterhouse were superior to the supermarket. It alsoshowed positive effects of supermarket quality behavior coordination cognitive by operatingcharacters and environmental characters; positive effects of supermarket quality behaviorcoordination state of cognitive characteristics and operating characteristics.
On the basis of empirical research, describes the quality behavior of high quality porksupply chain of slaughtering and sales coordination evolution mechanism model, from thedynamic mechanism, conduction mechanism, realization mechanism of three leadingmechanism, as well as promoting mechanism and guarantee mechanism of two auxiliarymechanism. Then, using the entropy model systematically reveal the coordination evolutionprocess of quality behavior of slaughtering and sales, impact factors and relationship,obtained the conclusion: from the perspective of Entropy model, the quality behaviorcoordination mechanism of slaughtering and sales indicated that, increase the negativeentropy flow and reduce positive entropy is the fundamental way to promote quality behaviorof two link coordination gradually increased and to realize quality behavior coordinationeffect, then using field survey data of two link confirms the theoretical analysis.
Based on the research of supply chain quality behavior and coordination, drawing on theresults of general supply chain quality control and coordination problem,coordinationmechanism of quality behaviors in two-echelon pork supply chain composed of a slaughterhouse and a supermarket is researched by use of differential game. Theslaughterhouse’s and supermarket’s optimal quality behavioral decisions in the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game with either slaughterhouse orsupermarket in the dominant position, and coordinated cooperative game are investigatedrespectively. The results show that, the slaughterhouse’s and supermarket’s quality behaviors,the pork supply chain’s profit in the coordinated game are superior to those in the non-cooperative game.Then value range of distribution coefficient of pork supply chain’s profit isproposed to achieve Pareto Optimality of individual profits of slaughterhouse andsupermarket and coordination of quality behaviors. Finally, the validity of modes and thecorrectness of conclusions are illustrated by numerical examples and simulation system.
Conclusion based on the foregoing research, put forward countermeasures to promotethe quality behavior coordination in high quality pork supply chain between slaughterhouseand supermarkets. Including that the government should strengthen the concept propagandaand industrial support policies,improve the social service system, strengthen legislation andsupervision, and maintain the good order of pork market; industry strategy include improvingthe industry training and coordination functions, promote the sharing of information andcredit system; supply chain strategies include to strengthen communication andcooperation, the establishment of the reasonable benefits distributionand risk sharingmechanism, develop and coordinate system evaluation; the enterprise should make the trustand commitment firmly, strengthen the internal learning and responsibility consciousness,improve the internal management system; consumers should develop a healthy consumptionconcept,improve information feedback consciousness and actively participate in socialsupervision.
本文在综述国内外文献、走访相关专家并进行实地调研的基础上，以提高猪肉质量安全水平和消费者满意度为切入点，以实现优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调目标为目的，综合运用了系统分析和统计分析、结构方程计量模型分析、熵变模型分析、微分博弈分析和系统仿真等方法，从相关文献综述、系统全面认识研究对象、现状统计描述、影响因素识别、协调机制分析、对策建议提出等六大方面，对优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工与销售环节的质量行为协调机制进行了系统深入的研究。
本文首先对优质猪肉、优质猪肉供应链、屠宰加工环节与销售环节质量行为协调的相关问题等内容进行了系统的界定与阐释，从宏观层面上全面认识研究对象及其内容系统，为下一步深入研究奠定理论基础。研究表明，为实现协调状态目标和协调结果目标，优质猪肉供应链屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调是以认知为基础，以系统观为思想，以提高优质猪肉供应链整体竞争优势、追求个体利益最大化为动因的动态演化过程。
本文利用山东省等9省（市）的982份问卷调查数据，从双方的认知协调与行为协调2个层面实证研究了双方在环境维护、投入品来源、检疫检验、设施配置、生产档案、员工培训、质量标准与追溯等7个方面的质量行为协调状况。然后，运用结构方程模型分析了超市质量行为协调的影响因素。结果表明：屠宰加工企业的质量安全认知与行为均优于超市。并且超市的质量行为协调认知状况受经营特征、环境特征的显著正向影响，超市质量行为协调状况受认知特征和经营特征的显著正向影响。
在实证研究的基础上，阐述了优质猪肉供应链屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调的形成与演进机制模型，从动力机制、传导机制、实现机制三大主导机制，以及促进机制和保障机制两大辅助机制方面深入剖析。然后，运用熵变模型深入系统地揭示屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调演进的过程、影响因素及其作用关系，得到结论：熵变模型视角的屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调机制表明，增加负熵流和减少正熵流是促进两环节质量行为协调逐步提高，实现质量行为协调效应的根本途径，并利用两环节的实地调查数据印证了理论分析。
在猪肉供应链质量行为及其协调研究的基础上，借鉴一般供应链质量控制与协调问题的研究成果，运用微分博弈方法，深入系统地研究由单一屠宰加工企业和单一超市组成的二级猪肉供应链质量行为协调机制，考察了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈以及协同合作博弈情形下屠宰加工企业和超市的最优质量行为决策，结果表明协同合作决策模式下，屠宰加工企业和超市的质量行为以及猪肉供应链总体利润均严格优于在非合作决策模式下的相应值。然后通过证明给出了能够使屠宰加工企业和超市的个体利润达到帕累托最优，进而实现双方质量行为协调的供应链总体利润分配系数的取值范围。最后运用算例试算和系统仿真验证微分博弈得到的结论。
基于前文研究结论，提出了促进优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工与销售环节质量行为协调的对策建议。具体包括政府应加强理念宣传，加大产业扶持政策，完善社会化服务体系，加强立法与监管，维护良好的猪肉市场秩序；行业策略有健全行业组织培训与协调职能，推动信息共享和信用制度的建立；供应链策略包括加强沟通与合作，建立合理的利益分配与风险共担机制，制定协调度评价体系；企业应作出坚定的信任与承诺，强化内部学习与责任意识，完善内部管理制度；消费者应培养健康的消费理念，提高信息反馈与维权意识并积极参与社会监督。
China is the largest producer and consumer of pork in the world, but the pork qualityubiquitous safety risks, and quality and safety incidents occurred, which not only relates toconsumers’ lives and health, but also has an impact on the global competitiveness of porkindustry. Is that the reason of these problems, quality and safety of pork products is not anenterprise or a part of the problem, but involves various aspects of the pig breeding,slaughtering and processing, storage, transportation and sales to consumers. Not standardizedquality behaviorasymmetry quality information and irregularities management, not form agood coordination mechanism, which lead quality pork supply chain prevention level,punishment and profit distribution is not reasonable, eventually lead to pork quality chaininstability, uncontrolled and fracture. How to promote the quality behavior coordinationbetween slaughterhouse and supermarkets, to form benefit sharing and risk sharingmechanism of supply chain partners, to promote the proper quality behavior among thesubjects, finally make sure to provide quality and safety pork of the whole supply chain frompig breeding to table, has become the important issues of common concern of our government,enterprises and scholars. There is an urgent need to study.
Based on field research, the domestic and international literature review, and interviewrelevant experts, in order to improve the quality and safety level of pork and customersatisfaction as the starting point, for the purpose of achieve the quality behavior coordinationtarget of the slaughterhouse and supermarket in high quality pork supply chain,comprehensive use system analysis, statistical analysis, econometric analysis, entropy changemodel analysis, differential game analysis and system simulation method, from the literaturereview, comprehensive understanding of the research object system, status of statisticaldescription, factors influencing the identification, coordination mechanism analysis, andsuggestions in six aspects, slaughterhouse and sales quality behavior coordination mechanismin high quality pork supply chain are studied.
The paper reviewed on the quality and safety of pork supply chain related content first.Through literature review, found that the lack of research on the coordination mechanism,coordination status and profit distribution problem of partner quality behavior under the environment of supply chain. Based on the above analysis, this paper defined and interpretedthe content of the high quality pork, high quality pork supply chain, slaughtering and saleslink quality behavior coordination related issues.From the macro level, a comprehensiveunderstanding of research object and content system, which lays a theoretical foundation forthe further research. Research shows that, in order to realize the coordination state of thetarget and the target coordinate, quality safety behavior coordination between slaughteringand sales links is a formation and dynamic evolutionary process which guarantees porkquality safety and decreases the cost of pork quality, which in the purpose to produce highquality pork. The process is based on recognition, directed by systematic perspective anddriven by the enhancement of overall competitiveness of high quality pork supply chain andpursuit of optimal personal interest.
This paper use in Shandong province and other8provinces(city)982copies of thequestionnaire data, from the cognitive coordination and behavior coordination2levelempirical research the behavior coordination condition in7perspectives such asenvironmental maintenance. Then, analyzed the influencing factors of the supermarket qualitybehavior coordination by using structural equation model. The results show that: the qualityand safety cognition and behavior of slaughterhouse were superior to the supermarket. It alsoshowed positive effects of supermarket quality behavior coordination cognitive by operatingcharacters and environmental characters; positive effects of supermarket quality behaviorcoordination state of cognitive characteristics and operating characteristics.
On the basis of empirical research, describes the quality behavior of high quality porksupply chain of slaughtering and sales coordination evolution mechanism model, from thedynamic mechanism, conduction mechanism, realization mechanism of three leadingmechanism, as well as promoting mechanism and guarantee mechanism of two auxiliarymechanism. Then, using the entropy model systematically reveal the coordination evolutionprocess of quality behavior of slaughtering and sales, impact factors and relationship,obtained the conclusion: from the perspective of Entropy model, the quality behaviorcoordination mechanism of slaughtering and sales indicated that, increase the negativeentropy flow and reduce positive entropy is the fundamental way to promote quality behaviorof two link coordination gradually increased and to realize quality behavior coordinationeffect, then using field survey data of two link confirms the theoretical analysis.
Based on the research of supply chain quality behavior and coordination, drawing on theresults of general supply chain quality control and coordination problem,coordinationmechanism of quality behaviors in two-echelon pork supply chain composed of a slaughterhouse and a supermarket is researched by use of differential game. Theslaughterhouse’s and supermarket’s optimal quality behavioral decisions in the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game with either slaughterhouse orsupermarket in the dominant position, and coordinated cooperative game are investigatedrespectively. The results show that, the slaughterhouse’s and supermarket’s quality behaviors,the pork supply chain’s profit in the coordinated game are superior to those in the non-cooperative game.Then value range of distribution coefficient of pork supply chain’s profit isproposed to achieve Pareto Optimality of individual profits of slaughterhouse andsupermarket and coordination of quality behaviors. Finally, the validity of modes and thecorrectness of conclusions are illustrated by numerical examples and simulation system.
Conclusion based on the foregoing research, put forward countermeasures to promotethe quality behavior coordination in high quality pork supply chain between slaughterhouseand supermarkets. Including that the government should strengthen the concept propagandaand industrial support policies,improve the social service system, strengthen legislation andsupervision, and maintain the good order of pork market; industry strategy include improvingthe industry training and coordination functions, promote the sharing of information andcredit system; supply chain strategies include to strengthen communication andcooperation, the establishment of the reasonable benefits distributionand risk sharingmechanism, develop and coordinate system evaluation; the enterprise should make the trustand commitment firmly, strengthen the internal learning and responsibility consciousness,improve the internal management system; consumers should develop a healthy consumptionconcept,improve information feedback consciousness and actively participate in socialsupervision.
引文
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