中国股权分置制度研究
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摘要
中国经济在过去28年取得了举世瞩目的成就,中国几千年的梦想,人类已有的知识、经验和技术,亿万人民的艰苦努力,成就这惊天动地的奇迹。
自从1990年12月19日上海证券交易所成立以来,中国资本市场不过15岁多一点,却走完了相当于欧美国家资本市场100多年的历史。本文通过对中国股权分置制度的形成、发展、危机和改革全过程的描述和分析,得出中国股权分置制度变迁的规律性。
中国股权分置制度是在中国由计划经济向市场经济转型过程中形成的,不仅是中国资本市场制度的核心和基础,是中国双轨制的一个典型样本,而且具有中国转型社会整体性制度特征。中国股权分置制度是一个时期内,中国资本市场的共同知识和共享信念,是约束市场参与人的内生制度。市场参与人在资本市场里,围绕着这个特定的制度,共生共荣,沉沉浮浮,形成相生相克的制度束,对应着多重复杂的利益关系。由于人们总是从资本市场输出利益,而没有输入利益,资本市场走向枯竭,中国股权分置制度危机不可避免。中国股权分置制度危机是中国资本市场的整体性危机,标志着双轨制的危机。双轨制曾经是转型过程中的适应性制度安排,起到过积极作用,但是在中国社会进一步转型过程中,成为转型的障碍。改革的成本由非流通股股东支付,是中国社会向市场化方向转型的必要条件,而如果由流通股股东承担,则意味着改革的倒退。改革的实践证明:结束中国股权分置制度是大势所趋,人心所向。从此,中国资本市场将翻开新的一页,迎来全流通的时代。
本文主要从制度变迁和比较的角度,采用博弈论的方法,对中国股权分置制度进行深入研究。
本文前言主要介绍本文选题的背景和意义,国内外的研究现状和不足,研究思路和方法,主要观点和创新,结构安排。
第一章提出中国股权分置制度的概念,并作出简要的理论解释。
第二章研究中国股权分置制度的形成,分析参与人的行为。本章通过对中国股权分置制度的起源的考察,结合参与人策略互动,分析中国股权分置制度形成的条件和原因;从中国股权分置制度对中国资本市场参与人影响的角度,分析参与人的预期和行为;通过研究参与人策略互动,用博弈论均衡分析方法,揭示中国股权分置制度能够生存下来的原因。
第三章揭示中国股权分置制度的演化机制和危机。本章主要研究中国股权分置制度的结构特点和演化过程,描述中国股权分置制度的再生产、动力机制和强化机制,从制度关联和历时演化的角度,深刻揭示中国股权分置制度实际上是中国资本市场整体性制度特点的信息浓缩和概要表征;结合国内外经济技术大背景,分析中国股权分置制度内在缺陷和危机,在中国经济改革过程中,中国股权分置制度曾发挥积极作用,而今天则成为中国经济进一步发展的障碍,因而必须进行改革。
第四章对中国股权分置制度改革的各种方案进行比较,分析改革实践。本章首先介绍中国股权分置制度改革的几次尝试,分析其夭折的原因;接着解析关于中国股权分置制度的大讨论,分析几种主要的方案,介绍笔者的方案;通过分析中国股权分置制度的改革实践,用博弈论的方法分析何种方案被选择、均衡解的形成和路径选择的特点。
第五章提出中国股权分置制度改革中存在的问题和对策。本章首先指出中国股权分置制度改革中存在的几个问题,分析当前改革的局限性;接着分析进一步改革的有利条件和制约因素;最后提出解决问题的对策。
本文通过对中国股权分置制度的形成、发展、危机和改革全过程的描述和分析,总结出中国股权分置制度变迁的规律性,并建立一些简要模型,得出经验、教训和启示,对未来作出预测和展望。
Economy in China had obtained great achievement in the past 28 years, attracting the attention of the whole world. Dreams of China for thousand years, knowledge, experience and techniques already ascertained by humankind as well as painstaking efforts by all people had accomplished such an earthshaking miracle.Since the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange on 19th December of 1990, Chinese Capital market has migrated just a little over 15 years. Nevertheless, it has traversed through a historical course equivalent to more than 100 years taken by the capital markets in Europe and America. This article researched the regularity of the changing of the Chinese share right splitting institution through describing and analyzing the formation, development, crisis and reform of the whole process of the Chinese share right splitting institution.
The Chinese share right splitting institution was formed in the process of transferring the Chinese planed economy towards the market economy; it is not only the core and foundation of the China’s capital market institution and a typical sample of the China’s double-track institution, but also it possesses the characters of the Chinese integrated institutions as a transitional society. The Chinese share right splitting institution is a common cognition and a sharing faith; it is an endogenous institution developed to restrict participants of the market in a period of time. The market participants, around this special institution, will survive together and enjoy a common honor, they may rise and sink in the capital market, forming thus a series of mutually-promoting and restraining institutions to deal with various complicated relations of interests.
On account of the fact that people always get benefits from the capital market but without benefits given, capital market will proceed to exhaustion, therefore the Chinese share right splitting institution will have no chance to avoid the crisis. The crisis of the Chinese share right splitting institution is not only the integrated crisis of China’s capital market,is also the crisis of the double-track institutions. As a matter of fact, the double-track institutions had been arranged as an adaptive institution in the process of transition, it had played an active role; yet, in the process of transition in the Chinese society, it has become an obstacle. The cost of reform should be paid by the shareholders of the non-negotiable shares, this is necessary for the transition of the Chinese society towards market economy. If the cost is paid by the shareholders of the negotiable shares, it would mean a retrogression of the reform in China.
It has been proved by the practice of reform that to put the Chinese share right splitting institution to an end represents the general trend and accords with the will of people. From then on, a new page will be opened in the history of the Chinese capital market to greet arrival of the era of complete circulation.
This article mainly adopts the method of game theory from the angle of institution changing and comparison to proceed a deep investigation to the Chinese share right splitting institution.
Preface of this article introduces mainly the background and meaning of selection of this subject, current state and inadequacy of study both within and out of China, train of thought and method of study, essential point of view and innovation as well as structural arrangement.
In the first chapter, concept of the Chinese share right splitting institution is raised up and a brief theoretical explanation is given.
In the second chapter, formation of the Chinese share right splitting institution is presented with analysis of the behaviors of the participants. This chapter, through investigating the origin of the Chinese share right splitting institution, together with the strategic interaction of the participants, analyzes the conditions and causes of the formation of the Chinese share right splitting institution. This chapter then analyzes the participants’expectations and behaviors, which have been influenced by the Chinese share right splitting institution.By using the game theory and the method of equilibrium analysis, this chapter reveals why the Chinese share right splitting institution has been able to exist.
In the third chapter, mechanism and crisis of the evolution in the Chinese share right splitting institution are revealed. The main study in this chapter mainly investigates the special features in structure and the evolutional process of the Chinese share right splitting institution.It describes reproduction of the Chinese share right splitting institution, mechanism of motive power and mechanism of enhancement. From the angle of institution relevance and long evolution, this chapter reveals deeply the fact that the Chinese share right splitting institution represents concentration of information and generalized characteristics of the integral Chinese capital market. This chapter also analyzes the internal defects and crisis of the Chinese share right splitting institution associated with economic technical background both at home and abroad. In the process of the Chinese economic reform, the Chinese share right splitting institution had played an active role, but today it has become an obstacle to further development of the Chinese economy, therefore it should be reformed.
In the fourth chapter, a comparison is made among various schemes of the Chinese share right splitting institution with an analysis of the practice of the reform. In this chapter, first of all, several trials in reforming the Chinese share right splitting institution are introduced so as to analyze the causes of their premature ending; then it is followed by explaining and analyzing the discussions of the Chinese share right splitting institution with several main schemes analyzed meanwhile with the author’s scheme introduced. Through analysis of the Chinese share right splitting institution reformation and realization and by applying the game theory , an analysis is made to decide which scheme should be chosen for the formation of the equilibrium solution and characteristics of the route selection.
In the fifth chapter, problems existing in the course of reforming the Chinese share right splitting institution and suggestions for overcoming them are presented. In this chapter, first is to point out some of the problems appearing in the course of reform of the Chinese share right splitting institution with analysis of the limitations of the current reform; following which favorable conditions and restricting factors in further reformation process are analyzed, and then countermeasures are finally raised to solve the problems.
Through a description and analysis of the total process of formation, development, crisis and reform of the Chinese share right splitting institution, this article summarizes the regularity of the Chinese share right splitting institution changing, and build up a series of brief models to obtain experience, lessons and inspirations as well as to make a forecast and outlook for it.
自从1990年12月19日上海证券交易所成立以来,中国资本市场不过15岁多一点,却走完了相当于欧美国家资本市场100多年的历史。本文通过对中国股权分置制度的形成、发展、危机和改革全过程的描述和分析,得出中国股权分置制度变迁的规律性。
中国股权分置制度是在中国由计划经济向市场经济转型过程中形成的,不仅是中国资本市场制度的核心和基础,是中国双轨制的一个典型样本,而且具有中国转型社会整体性制度特征。中国股权分置制度是一个时期内,中国资本市场的共同知识和共享信念,是约束市场参与人的内生制度。市场参与人在资本市场里,围绕着这个特定的制度,共生共荣,沉沉浮浮,形成相生相克的制度束,对应着多重复杂的利益关系。由于人们总是从资本市场输出利益,而没有输入利益,资本市场走向枯竭,中国股权分置制度危机不可避免。中国股权分置制度危机是中国资本市场的整体性危机,标志着双轨制的危机。双轨制曾经是转型过程中的适应性制度安排,起到过积极作用,但是在中国社会进一步转型过程中,成为转型的障碍。改革的成本由非流通股股东支付,是中国社会向市场化方向转型的必要条件,而如果由流通股股东承担,则意味着改革的倒退。改革的实践证明:结束中国股权分置制度是大势所趋,人心所向。从此,中国资本市场将翻开新的一页,迎来全流通的时代。
本文主要从制度变迁和比较的角度,采用博弈论的方法,对中国股权分置制度进行深入研究。
本文前言主要介绍本文选题的背景和意义,国内外的研究现状和不足,研究思路和方法,主要观点和创新,结构安排。
第一章提出中国股权分置制度的概念,并作出简要的理论解释。
第二章研究中国股权分置制度的形成,分析参与人的行为。本章通过对中国股权分置制度的起源的考察,结合参与人策略互动,分析中国股权分置制度形成的条件和原因;从中国股权分置制度对中国资本市场参与人影响的角度,分析参与人的预期和行为;通过研究参与人策略互动,用博弈论均衡分析方法,揭示中国股权分置制度能够生存下来的原因。
第三章揭示中国股权分置制度的演化机制和危机。本章主要研究中国股权分置制度的结构特点和演化过程,描述中国股权分置制度的再生产、动力机制和强化机制,从制度关联和历时演化的角度,深刻揭示中国股权分置制度实际上是中国资本市场整体性制度特点的信息浓缩和概要表征;结合国内外经济技术大背景,分析中国股权分置制度内在缺陷和危机,在中国经济改革过程中,中国股权分置制度曾发挥积极作用,而今天则成为中国经济进一步发展的障碍,因而必须进行改革。
第四章对中国股权分置制度改革的各种方案进行比较,分析改革实践。本章首先介绍中国股权分置制度改革的几次尝试,分析其夭折的原因;接着解析关于中国股权分置制度的大讨论,分析几种主要的方案,介绍笔者的方案;通过分析中国股权分置制度的改革实践,用博弈论的方法分析何种方案被选择、均衡解的形成和路径选择的特点。
第五章提出中国股权分置制度改革中存在的问题和对策。本章首先指出中国股权分置制度改革中存在的几个问题,分析当前改革的局限性;接着分析进一步改革的有利条件和制约因素;最后提出解决问题的对策。
本文通过对中国股权分置制度的形成、发展、危机和改革全过程的描述和分析,总结出中国股权分置制度变迁的规律性,并建立一些简要模型,得出经验、教训和启示,对未来作出预测和展望。
Economy in China had obtained great achievement in the past 28 years, attracting the attention of the whole world. Dreams of China for thousand years, knowledge, experience and techniques already ascertained by humankind as well as painstaking efforts by all people had accomplished such an earthshaking miracle.Since the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange on 19th December of 1990, Chinese Capital market has migrated just a little over 15 years. Nevertheless, it has traversed through a historical course equivalent to more than 100 years taken by the capital markets in Europe and America. This article researched the regularity of the changing of the Chinese share right splitting institution through describing and analyzing the formation, development, crisis and reform of the whole process of the Chinese share right splitting institution.
The Chinese share right splitting institution was formed in the process of transferring the Chinese planed economy towards the market economy; it is not only the core and foundation of the China’s capital market institution and a typical sample of the China’s double-track institution, but also it possesses the characters of the Chinese integrated institutions as a transitional society. The Chinese share right splitting institution is a common cognition and a sharing faith; it is an endogenous institution developed to restrict participants of the market in a period of time. The market participants, around this special institution, will survive together and enjoy a common honor, they may rise and sink in the capital market, forming thus a series of mutually-promoting and restraining institutions to deal with various complicated relations of interests.
On account of the fact that people always get benefits from the capital market but without benefits given, capital market will proceed to exhaustion, therefore the Chinese share right splitting institution will have no chance to avoid the crisis. The crisis of the Chinese share right splitting institution is not only the integrated crisis of China’s capital market,is also the crisis of the double-track institutions. As a matter of fact, the double-track institutions had been arranged as an adaptive institution in the process of transition, it had played an active role; yet, in the process of transition in the Chinese society, it has become an obstacle. The cost of reform should be paid by the shareholders of the non-negotiable shares, this is necessary for the transition of the Chinese society towards market economy. If the cost is paid by the shareholders of the negotiable shares, it would mean a retrogression of the reform in China.
It has been proved by the practice of reform that to put the Chinese share right splitting institution to an end represents the general trend and accords with the will of people. From then on, a new page will be opened in the history of the Chinese capital market to greet arrival of the era of complete circulation.
This article mainly adopts the method of game theory from the angle of institution changing and comparison to proceed a deep investigation to the Chinese share right splitting institution.
Preface of this article introduces mainly the background and meaning of selection of this subject, current state and inadequacy of study both within and out of China, train of thought and method of study, essential point of view and innovation as well as structural arrangement.
In the first chapter, concept of the Chinese share right splitting institution is raised up and a brief theoretical explanation is given.
In the second chapter, formation of the Chinese share right splitting institution is presented with analysis of the behaviors of the participants. This chapter, through investigating the origin of the Chinese share right splitting institution, together with the strategic interaction of the participants, analyzes the conditions and causes of the formation of the Chinese share right splitting institution. This chapter then analyzes the participants’expectations and behaviors, which have been influenced by the Chinese share right splitting institution.By using the game theory and the method of equilibrium analysis, this chapter reveals why the Chinese share right splitting institution has been able to exist.
In the third chapter, mechanism and crisis of the evolution in the Chinese share right splitting institution are revealed. The main study in this chapter mainly investigates the special features in structure and the evolutional process of the Chinese share right splitting institution.It describes reproduction of the Chinese share right splitting institution, mechanism of motive power and mechanism of enhancement. From the angle of institution relevance and long evolution, this chapter reveals deeply the fact that the Chinese share right splitting institution represents concentration of information and generalized characteristics of the integral Chinese capital market. This chapter also analyzes the internal defects and crisis of the Chinese share right splitting institution associated with economic technical background both at home and abroad. In the process of the Chinese economic reform, the Chinese share right splitting institution had played an active role, but today it has become an obstacle to further development of the Chinese economy, therefore it should be reformed.
In the fourth chapter, a comparison is made among various schemes of the Chinese share right splitting institution with an analysis of the practice of the reform. In this chapter, first of all, several trials in reforming the Chinese share right splitting institution are introduced so as to analyze the causes of their premature ending; then it is followed by explaining and analyzing the discussions of the Chinese share right splitting institution with several main schemes analyzed meanwhile with the author’s scheme introduced. Through analysis of the Chinese share right splitting institution reformation and realization and by applying the game theory , an analysis is made to decide which scheme should be chosen for the formation of the equilibrium solution and characteristics of the route selection.
In the fifth chapter, problems existing in the course of reforming the Chinese share right splitting institution and suggestions for overcoming them are presented. In this chapter, first is to point out some of the problems appearing in the course of reform of the Chinese share right splitting institution with analysis of the limitations of the current reform; following which favorable conditions and restricting factors in further reformation process are analyzed, and then countermeasures are finally raised to solve the problems.
Through a description and analysis of the total process of formation, development, crisis and reform of the Chinese share right splitting institution, this article summarizes the regularity of the Chinese share right splitting institution changing, and build up a series of brief models to obtain experience, lessons and inspirations as well as to make a forecast and outlook for it.
引文
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