所有者权益构成对资本构成的影响
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摘要
马克思的资本结构思想是以剩余价值为中心范畴,根据资本的不同部分在剩余价值生产与瓜分过程中的不同作用,划分为一定的资本结构,详尽地从生产到流通与分配,从个别资本到社会总资本分析了剩余价值的产生、积累、实现及分配问题。与西方资本结构理论相比,后者基本属于企业融资结构与融资决策理论,更关注微观层面的问题,属于企业(公司)的资本结构理论。而马克思的资本结构理论既研究生产过程,也研究流通和分配过程,既研究个别资本运动,也研究社会总资本运动,因此,它是一种最广义的,也是最基本的社会资本结构理论。社会的资本结构是企业(公司)的资本结构赖以存在的条件与环境,影响并制约着企业(公司)的资本结构,因此,马克思的资本结构理论无论在方法论上,还是在具体内容上,对我们研究企业(公司)的资本结构仍具有重要的指导作用。
现代资本结构理论的起点是莫迪利亚尼和米勒(Modigliani & Miller)1958年发表在《美国经济评论》上的一篇经典论文《资本成本、公司财务和投资理论》。Modigliani & Miller(MM)定理是一组结论,表明在理想市场的假设前提下,企业价值与公司的财务决策无关。这一理论建立在莫迪利亚尼和米勒1958年开始发表的一系列论文之上,并在佛朗哥·莫迪利亚尼(Franco Modigliani)和默顿·米勒(Merton Miller)分别获诺贝尔经济学奖时被引用。尽管人们普遍承认公司的财务决策非常重要,MM理论依然是现代公司财务理论的核心。MM理论的主要内容如下:
(1)命题Ⅰ。公司的总市场价值与其资本结构无关。
(2)命题Ⅱ。公司的权益资本成本是其债务权益比率的线性递增函数。
(3)股利不变命题。公司的总市场价值与其股利政策无关。
(4)股东冷漠命题。公司的股东对公司的财务决策漠不关心。
这些命题源于以下推论:即若股东能以同样价格采取和公司同样的金融交易,那么只要股东愿意,他们可以彻底抵消公司财务决策的任何作用,并且不需任何成本。
莫迪利亚尼和米勒对前三个命题作了阐释,股东冷漠命题隐含在他们的分析中,而被其他经济学家在不同框架中明确说明。大量文献针对于MM结论中一个或多个不适用的情形,对MM理论或质疑或进行新的诊释。在多数情形中,由于信息不对称、交易成本、税收或卖空限制等,股民不能以同样价格采取和公司同样的金融交易。破产的出现对MM的不变结论并非致命的,而要视情形而定。税收对MM推理的影响是另一大部分工作的基础,并且也是由莫迪利亚尼和米勒(1963年)引起的。当公司的管理人员拥有公司有关的信息而股东不知道时,财务决策就不是无关的。
从20世纪70年代开始,研究者们把很重要的一部分精力放在由代理成本决定的资本结构模型上,即利益冲突带来的成本。詹森和麦克林定义了两类冲突。股东和经营者之间的冲突是因为经营者并不百分之百地控制剩余权益,所以他们不能从盈利行为获得全部的利润,却要为这些行为负担所有的费用。例如,经营者可以在管理企业资源上不那么努力,可以把企业资源转化为他们自己的利益,比如通过享受“特殊待遇”,如公司飞机、豪华办公室及建造“个人王宫”等。经营者为节制这些行为负担了所有的费用,但只得到一小部分好处。于是,经营者在这些与公司价值最大化水平有关的追求上大肆挥霍。经营者所占公司股份越大,这种低效率现象就会越少。保持经营者在公司中的绝对投资不变,增加公司中的债券融资比例,会增加经营者的股份,并且减少由经营者和股东的冲突带来的损失。此外,正如詹森1986年提出的,由于债券需要公司以现金支付,减少了经营者用于上述挥霍的“自由”现金的数量。经营者和股东之间的冲突缓解就是债券融资的好处。
债权人和股东之间冲突的起因是债务契约刺激股东作出次优的投资决策,更特别的是债务契约规定,如果投资获得了远高于债券面值的巨大收益,股东将获得大部分利润。而如果投资失败,因为有限的责任,债权人将承担结果。因此,股东可能从“走向破产”(即,投资在十分冒险的项目上。即使它们正在贬值)中受益。这样的投资带来的结果是债券价值降低。拙劣投资引起的股票价值损失会大于由债权人损失产生的股票价值收益。但是当债券发行时,如果债权人正确地预计到股东将来的行动,股东将替债权人承担这种代价。在这种情况下,股东从债券中获得的利润将会少一些。这种由债券产生的,投资在减值项目上的激励成本将由发行债券的股东承担。这种效应一般称作“资产替代效应”,是债务融资的一种代理成本。
詹森和麦克林指出,最优资本结构是由债务代理成本正好等于以前所说的债务收益来获得的。随之而来有一些结论:第一,人们希望债券契约能够包防止资产替代这一问题,例如利息偿付需要,禁止对新的、无关行业投资等等。第二,如果其他条件相同,发生资产替代的机会越有限的行业将拥有越高的负债水平。例如,该理论预测,受管制的公用事业,银行以及发展机会较小的成熟行业内的公司将有更高的负债水平。第三,缓慢增长甚至负增长最理想的公司以及营运过程会带来大量现金流人的公司应该有更多的债务。大量的现金流人,又没有好的投资前景,由此产生了消费特殊待遇;建造“个人王宫”、超额支付部属等。增加债务减少了“自由现金”的数量,增加了经营者对剩余权益的拥有比例。依据詹森(1989)的论述,具有这些特点的工业目前包括钢铁、化学、酿造、烟草、电视和无线电广播、木材纸品工业等。该理论预测这些工业的特点在于高负债率。从此,以外部股东所有权和内部人所有权的比重及其构成为核心内容的股权结构对资本结构的影响成为学术讨论的热点。
从国内现有的研究来看,众多的学者着重于研究股权结构和公司绩效的关系,而在股权结构对资本结构的影响这一研究领域探讨的不多。我国上市公司的股权结构如何影响资本结构?本文将股权集中度、国家持股比例、法人持股比例、管理者持股比例、社会公众股比例作为自变量纳入分析,试图在这方面有所发现。
本文分为六个部分。第一部分是绪论,第二部分是理论回顾和文献综述,第三部分是我国上市公司股权结构的特点,第四部分是实证检验以及分析,第五部分基于MATLAB的资本结构预测模型,第六部分是研究总结。
第一部分介绍了选题背景,研究目标和研究意义,以及研究方法和本文的研究思路。
第二部分综述了资本结构理论和股权结构理论并作了一些评价,并介绍了资本结构度量指标和常用的股权结构度量指标,为下文的指标设计做好理论铺垫。此外,笔者综述了现有的股权结构对资本结构影响的实证研究成果,总体而言,学术界尚未得出一致的结论,这也是笔者将进行实证检验的动因之一。
第三部分结合股改的影响阐述我国上市公司股权结构的现状。
第四部分提出了六个研究假设,即股权集中度与股东权益比率正相关、国有股比例与股东权益比率正相关、境内法人股比例与股东权益比率负相关、外资法人股比例与股东权益比率负相关、社会公众股比例与股东权益比率负相关、管理者持股比例与股东权益比率正相关。针对不同的研究假设,笔者分别设计了六个不同的解释变量,即第一大股东持股比例、国有股比例、境内法人股比例、外资法人股比例、社会公众股比例、管理者持股比例。此外,由于股权结构不是影响资本结构的唯一因素,笔者设计了四个控制变量将这些因素纳入分析,四个变量分别是公司规模、资产担保价值、非债务税盾、盈利性。实证检验中的回归方程将纳入这些控制变量。通过六个回归方程的检验,境内法人股和外资法人股对股东权益比率的影响满足线性相关关系,其余四个变量的线性关系均未通过。
第五部分对在第四部分中没有通过线性关系检验的变量运用MATLAB语言进行非线性相关关系分析,结果证实股权集中度与股东权益比率非线性相关,国有股比例与股东权益比率非线性相关,社会公众股比例与股东权益比率非线性相关,管理者持股比例与股东权益比率非线性相关。
第六部分概述本文得出的主要结论以及本文的创新点与展望。本文最大的创新是在非线性相关上的模型构建。
Marx’s ideology on the capital structure is based on the residual value. According to its various functions manifested by the different parts of the capital during the process of production of surplus value, capital is divided into several structures. Ranging from production, circulation to allocation, from individual capital to social gross capital, Marx’s capital structure analyzes the production, accumulation and distribution of residual value. And the Western theory of capital structure, which belongs to the basic structure of corporate finance and financial decision-making theory, is more concerned about the micro-level, belonging to the enterprise (company) capital structure theory. Marx’s capital structure theory examines not only the production process, but also the flow and distribution process, and studies not only individual capital movement, but also the movement of social gross capital. In this sense, Marx’s capital structure theory is both a general and a fundamental theory concerning capital structure. Social capital structure provides the essential conditions and circumstances for the existence of enterprise (company) capital structure and determines and plays an influence on the company’s capital structure. Marx’s capital structure theory, in terms of methodology, or in terms of the content, is still an important guide for the research on enterprise (company) capital structure.
The landmark of modern capital structure theory is Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and Investment Theory (Modigliani & Miller: 1958) published in American Economic Review. Modigliani & Miller (MM) theorem is a sequence of conclusions: in an ideal market assumption, the enterprise value has nothing to do with the company's financial decision-making. This theory is built on a series of papers by Modigliani and Miller in 1958, which is quoted when Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller Nobel were awarded Nobel Prize in Economics. Although the importance of company’s financial decision-making is widely acknowledged, MM theory is still the modern theory of corporate finance at the core.
From the beginning of the 1970s, researchers put a very important part of the focus on the agency-cost-determined capital structure model, which is the cost brought about by a conflict of interest. Jason and McLean and defines two types of conflicts. The conflict between shareholders and the operators originate from the fact that the operators do not fully control the remainder of their rights so that they can not gain 100% profits from the profitable acts and pay for the cost of all these acts. For example, operators can manage resources on less effort, and enterprise resource can be translated into their own interests, such as through the enjoyment of "special treatment", like corporate aircraft, luxury office and the construction of the "personal palace". Operators burden all the costs aiming to restrain these acts, only to share a small slice of the benefits. As a result, operators begin to pursue the luxuries which are in accordance with the maximize value of the company. The greater proportion of shares the operators control, the less the low-efficiency will be. If the proportion of operators absolute investments are kept unchangeable and the company increases the proportion of bond financing, the proportion of shares held by operators will be increased along with the decrease of the losses caused by the conflict between operators and shareholders. In addition, as is proposed by Johnson in 1986, the bonds need to be paid in cash, reducing the amount of the“free”money that the operators would spend in luxurious pursuits. The advantage of Bond financing is to ease the conflicts between operators and shareholders.
The conflicts between the creditors and shareholders are generated by that the contractual obligation guides shareholders into a second-best investment decision-making. Particularly according to the debt contract, if the investment was much higher than bonds with a face value of the huge gains, shareholders will receive most of the profits. And if the investment failed, the creditor will bear the responsibility because of the limited liability. As a result, shareholders may benefit from "going bankrupt" (that is, to invest on very risky projects even if they are in depreciation). Such investment leads to depreciation of bonds. The stock value losses caused by poor investment are larger than the benefits brought about by creditors’losses. When the bonds are issued, not creditors but shareholders will shoulder the losses if the creditors have expected the shareholders’future actions. In this case, the shareholders’benefits from the bonds will be less. This is generated by the bonds, and impairment of investment in the project cost will be an incentive to issue bonds of their shareholders. This effect known as "asset substitution effect" is an agent of debt financing costs.
Meckling and Jensen pointed out that the optimal capital structure by the agency cost of debt is equal to the previously mentioned debt to income received. This idea is followed by a number of conclusions: First, it is hoped that the bond contract package could prevent the issue of alternative assets, such as the need to pay interest and to prohibit the new, unrelated to the investment industry, and so on. Second, other things being equal, the industries with the more limited opportunities for the occurrence of alternative assets will have a higher level of public debt. For example, the theory predicts regulated public utilities, banks, as well as opportunities for the development of less mature industry will have higher levels of debt. Third, slow growth or even negative growth in the company, as well as the best course of the operation will bring a large number of Cash Inflow companies that should have more debt. Large Cash Inflow and dim prospects for investment result in consumer special treatment, the construction of the "personal palace", over-payment of their subordinates. Debt increase reduces the amount of "free cash", while increasing the remaining ownership interest in proportion. According to Johnson’s discussion (1989), the characteristics mentioned above are clearly manifested in the steel industry, chemical, brewing, tobacco, television and radio broadcasting, timber industry and other paper products. These theories predict that the industry is characterized by a high debt ratio. Since then, share ownership structure based on external and internal ownership of shareholders constitutes the core content of the influence of shareholding structure on the capital structure has become a hot topic in the academic circle. As far as the domestic current research is concerned, many scholars center on the ownership structure and the relationship between share ownership and corporate performances and hardly discuss the shareholding structure’s impacts on the capital structure. How do Equity structures of Chinese listed companies affect the capital structure? This article will focus on equity, national ownership, corporate ownership, management ownership, the proportion of shares to the public as independent variables into the analysis and try to explore something new in this area.
This paper contains six sections.SectionⅠis preface. Section II is literature review on the theories and current researches. Section III is to discuss the characteristics of capital structure and ownership structure of Chinese 1isted companies. SectionⅣis an empirical case study with thoroughly analysis. SectionⅤgives the capital structure model based on MATLAB. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are presented in the sectionⅥ.
Section I is to briefly introduce the research backgrounds, research targets, its significance, methodology and the origination of the whole article.
SectionⅡis the literature review on capital structure theories and relevant remarks. And the brief introduction on the variables concerning capital structure and shareholding structure will be concluded in this section. Besides, this section will contain a literature review on the achievements of the current research on the shareholding structure’s impacts on the capital structure. In general, there is no a acknowledged consensus in academic circle, which is the motive of my thesis.
SectionⅢis to describe the characteristics of ownership structure of current Chinese 1isted company.
SectionⅣis aimed at discussing the research design and the regression results.In this section,the author brings forward six hypotheses will be put forward and the definition of dependent variables will be given. The six hypotheses are listed as follows:(1)Concentration ratio is positively associated with owners’equity levels.(2)STATE ratio is positively correlated with owners’equity 1evels. (3)Stock-held-by-institution in domestic ratio is negatively associated with owners’equity 1evels.(4) Stock-held-by-foreign institution ratio is negatively associated with owners’equity 1evels.(5)Stock—held-by-out ratio is negatively correlated with owners’equity levels.(6)Stock-held-by-manager ratio is positively correlated with owners’equity 1evels.The dependent variable is capital structure.Ownership structure is independent variable.As ownership structure is not the unique determinant of capital structure,this paper introduces four control-variables in all regression equations.This section shows the regression results and presents theoretical analyses.
SectionⅤshows the nonlinear regression results.
SectionⅥconcludes this paper and remarks me future research.
现代资本结构理论的起点是莫迪利亚尼和米勒(Modigliani & Miller)1958年发表在《美国经济评论》上的一篇经典论文《资本成本、公司财务和投资理论》。Modigliani & Miller(MM)定理是一组结论,表明在理想市场的假设前提下,企业价值与公司的财务决策无关。这一理论建立在莫迪利亚尼和米勒1958年开始发表的一系列论文之上,并在佛朗哥·莫迪利亚尼(Franco Modigliani)和默顿·米勒(Merton Miller)分别获诺贝尔经济学奖时被引用。尽管人们普遍承认公司的财务决策非常重要,MM理论依然是现代公司财务理论的核心。MM理论的主要内容如下:
(1)命题Ⅰ。公司的总市场价值与其资本结构无关。
(2)命题Ⅱ。公司的权益资本成本是其债务权益比率的线性递增函数。
(3)股利不变命题。公司的总市场价值与其股利政策无关。
(4)股东冷漠命题。公司的股东对公司的财务决策漠不关心。
这些命题源于以下推论:即若股东能以同样价格采取和公司同样的金融交易,那么只要股东愿意,他们可以彻底抵消公司财务决策的任何作用,并且不需任何成本。
莫迪利亚尼和米勒对前三个命题作了阐释,股东冷漠命题隐含在他们的分析中,而被其他经济学家在不同框架中明确说明。大量文献针对于MM结论中一个或多个不适用的情形,对MM理论或质疑或进行新的诊释。在多数情形中,由于信息不对称、交易成本、税收或卖空限制等,股民不能以同样价格采取和公司同样的金融交易。破产的出现对MM的不变结论并非致命的,而要视情形而定。税收对MM推理的影响是另一大部分工作的基础,并且也是由莫迪利亚尼和米勒(1963年)引起的。当公司的管理人员拥有公司有关的信息而股东不知道时,财务决策就不是无关的。
从20世纪70年代开始,研究者们把很重要的一部分精力放在由代理成本决定的资本结构模型上,即利益冲突带来的成本。詹森和麦克林定义了两类冲突。股东和经营者之间的冲突是因为经营者并不百分之百地控制剩余权益,所以他们不能从盈利行为获得全部的利润,却要为这些行为负担所有的费用。例如,经营者可以在管理企业资源上不那么努力,可以把企业资源转化为他们自己的利益,比如通过享受“特殊待遇”,如公司飞机、豪华办公室及建造“个人王宫”等。经营者为节制这些行为负担了所有的费用,但只得到一小部分好处。于是,经营者在这些与公司价值最大化水平有关的追求上大肆挥霍。经营者所占公司股份越大,这种低效率现象就会越少。保持经营者在公司中的绝对投资不变,增加公司中的债券融资比例,会增加经营者的股份,并且减少由经营者和股东的冲突带来的损失。此外,正如詹森1986年提出的,由于债券需要公司以现金支付,减少了经营者用于上述挥霍的“自由”现金的数量。经营者和股东之间的冲突缓解就是债券融资的好处。
债权人和股东之间冲突的起因是债务契约刺激股东作出次优的投资决策,更特别的是债务契约规定,如果投资获得了远高于债券面值的巨大收益,股东将获得大部分利润。而如果投资失败,因为有限的责任,债权人将承担结果。因此,股东可能从“走向破产”(即,投资在十分冒险的项目上。即使它们正在贬值)中受益。这样的投资带来的结果是债券价值降低。拙劣投资引起的股票价值损失会大于由债权人损失产生的股票价值收益。但是当债券发行时,如果债权人正确地预计到股东将来的行动,股东将替债权人承担这种代价。在这种情况下,股东从债券中获得的利润将会少一些。这种由债券产生的,投资在减值项目上的激励成本将由发行债券的股东承担。这种效应一般称作“资产替代效应”,是债务融资的一种代理成本。
詹森和麦克林指出,最优资本结构是由债务代理成本正好等于以前所说的债务收益来获得的。随之而来有一些结论:第一,人们希望债券契约能够包防止资产替代这一问题,例如利息偿付需要,禁止对新的、无关行业投资等等。第二,如果其他条件相同,发生资产替代的机会越有限的行业将拥有越高的负债水平。例如,该理论预测,受管制的公用事业,银行以及发展机会较小的成熟行业内的公司将有更高的负债水平。第三,缓慢增长甚至负增长最理想的公司以及营运过程会带来大量现金流人的公司应该有更多的债务。大量的现金流人,又没有好的投资前景,由此产生了消费特殊待遇;建造“个人王宫”、超额支付部属等。增加债务减少了“自由现金”的数量,增加了经营者对剩余权益的拥有比例。依据詹森(1989)的论述,具有这些特点的工业目前包括钢铁、化学、酿造、烟草、电视和无线电广播、木材纸品工业等。该理论预测这些工业的特点在于高负债率。从此,以外部股东所有权和内部人所有权的比重及其构成为核心内容的股权结构对资本结构的影响成为学术讨论的热点。
从国内现有的研究来看,众多的学者着重于研究股权结构和公司绩效的关系,而在股权结构对资本结构的影响这一研究领域探讨的不多。我国上市公司的股权结构如何影响资本结构?本文将股权集中度、国家持股比例、法人持股比例、管理者持股比例、社会公众股比例作为自变量纳入分析,试图在这方面有所发现。
本文分为六个部分。第一部分是绪论,第二部分是理论回顾和文献综述,第三部分是我国上市公司股权结构的特点,第四部分是实证检验以及分析,第五部分基于MATLAB的资本结构预测模型,第六部分是研究总结。
第一部分介绍了选题背景,研究目标和研究意义,以及研究方法和本文的研究思路。
第二部分综述了资本结构理论和股权结构理论并作了一些评价,并介绍了资本结构度量指标和常用的股权结构度量指标,为下文的指标设计做好理论铺垫。此外,笔者综述了现有的股权结构对资本结构影响的实证研究成果,总体而言,学术界尚未得出一致的结论,这也是笔者将进行实证检验的动因之一。
第三部分结合股改的影响阐述我国上市公司股权结构的现状。
第四部分提出了六个研究假设,即股权集中度与股东权益比率正相关、国有股比例与股东权益比率正相关、境内法人股比例与股东权益比率负相关、外资法人股比例与股东权益比率负相关、社会公众股比例与股东权益比率负相关、管理者持股比例与股东权益比率正相关。针对不同的研究假设,笔者分别设计了六个不同的解释变量,即第一大股东持股比例、国有股比例、境内法人股比例、外资法人股比例、社会公众股比例、管理者持股比例。此外,由于股权结构不是影响资本结构的唯一因素,笔者设计了四个控制变量将这些因素纳入分析,四个变量分别是公司规模、资产担保价值、非债务税盾、盈利性。实证检验中的回归方程将纳入这些控制变量。通过六个回归方程的检验,境内法人股和外资法人股对股东权益比率的影响满足线性相关关系,其余四个变量的线性关系均未通过。
第五部分对在第四部分中没有通过线性关系检验的变量运用MATLAB语言进行非线性相关关系分析,结果证实股权集中度与股东权益比率非线性相关,国有股比例与股东权益比率非线性相关,社会公众股比例与股东权益比率非线性相关,管理者持股比例与股东权益比率非线性相关。
第六部分概述本文得出的主要结论以及本文的创新点与展望。本文最大的创新是在非线性相关上的模型构建。
Marx’s ideology on the capital structure is based on the residual value. According to its various functions manifested by the different parts of the capital during the process of production of surplus value, capital is divided into several structures. Ranging from production, circulation to allocation, from individual capital to social gross capital, Marx’s capital structure analyzes the production, accumulation and distribution of residual value. And the Western theory of capital structure, which belongs to the basic structure of corporate finance and financial decision-making theory, is more concerned about the micro-level, belonging to the enterprise (company) capital structure theory. Marx’s capital structure theory examines not only the production process, but also the flow and distribution process, and studies not only individual capital movement, but also the movement of social gross capital. In this sense, Marx’s capital structure theory is both a general and a fundamental theory concerning capital structure. Social capital structure provides the essential conditions and circumstances for the existence of enterprise (company) capital structure and determines and plays an influence on the company’s capital structure. Marx’s capital structure theory, in terms of methodology, or in terms of the content, is still an important guide for the research on enterprise (company) capital structure.
The landmark of modern capital structure theory is Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and Investment Theory (Modigliani & Miller: 1958) published in American Economic Review. Modigliani & Miller (MM) theorem is a sequence of conclusions: in an ideal market assumption, the enterprise value has nothing to do with the company's financial decision-making. This theory is built on a series of papers by Modigliani and Miller in 1958, which is quoted when Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller Nobel were awarded Nobel Prize in Economics. Although the importance of company’s financial decision-making is widely acknowledged, MM theory is still the modern theory of corporate finance at the core.
From the beginning of the 1970s, researchers put a very important part of the focus on the agency-cost-determined capital structure model, which is the cost brought about by a conflict of interest. Jason and McLean and defines two types of conflicts. The conflict between shareholders and the operators originate from the fact that the operators do not fully control the remainder of their rights so that they can not gain 100% profits from the profitable acts and pay for the cost of all these acts. For example, operators can manage resources on less effort, and enterprise resource can be translated into their own interests, such as through the enjoyment of "special treatment", like corporate aircraft, luxury office and the construction of the "personal palace". Operators burden all the costs aiming to restrain these acts, only to share a small slice of the benefits. As a result, operators begin to pursue the luxuries which are in accordance with the maximize value of the company. The greater proportion of shares the operators control, the less the low-efficiency will be. If the proportion of operators absolute investments are kept unchangeable and the company increases the proportion of bond financing, the proportion of shares held by operators will be increased along with the decrease of the losses caused by the conflict between operators and shareholders. In addition, as is proposed by Johnson in 1986, the bonds need to be paid in cash, reducing the amount of the“free”money that the operators would spend in luxurious pursuits. The advantage of Bond financing is to ease the conflicts between operators and shareholders.
The conflicts between the creditors and shareholders are generated by that the contractual obligation guides shareholders into a second-best investment decision-making. Particularly according to the debt contract, if the investment was much higher than bonds with a face value of the huge gains, shareholders will receive most of the profits. And if the investment failed, the creditor will bear the responsibility because of the limited liability. As a result, shareholders may benefit from "going bankrupt" (that is, to invest on very risky projects even if they are in depreciation). Such investment leads to depreciation of bonds. The stock value losses caused by poor investment are larger than the benefits brought about by creditors’losses. When the bonds are issued, not creditors but shareholders will shoulder the losses if the creditors have expected the shareholders’future actions. In this case, the shareholders’benefits from the bonds will be less. This is generated by the bonds, and impairment of investment in the project cost will be an incentive to issue bonds of their shareholders. This effect known as "asset substitution effect" is an agent of debt financing costs.
Meckling and Jensen pointed out that the optimal capital structure by the agency cost of debt is equal to the previously mentioned debt to income received. This idea is followed by a number of conclusions: First, it is hoped that the bond contract package could prevent the issue of alternative assets, such as the need to pay interest and to prohibit the new, unrelated to the investment industry, and so on. Second, other things being equal, the industries with the more limited opportunities for the occurrence of alternative assets will have a higher level of public debt. For example, the theory predicts regulated public utilities, banks, as well as opportunities for the development of less mature industry will have higher levels of debt. Third, slow growth or even negative growth in the company, as well as the best course of the operation will bring a large number of Cash Inflow companies that should have more debt. Large Cash Inflow and dim prospects for investment result in consumer special treatment, the construction of the "personal palace", over-payment of their subordinates. Debt increase reduces the amount of "free cash", while increasing the remaining ownership interest in proportion. According to Johnson’s discussion (1989), the characteristics mentioned above are clearly manifested in the steel industry, chemical, brewing, tobacco, television and radio broadcasting, timber industry and other paper products. These theories predict that the industry is characterized by a high debt ratio. Since then, share ownership structure based on external and internal ownership of shareholders constitutes the core content of the influence of shareholding structure on the capital structure has become a hot topic in the academic circle. As far as the domestic current research is concerned, many scholars center on the ownership structure and the relationship between share ownership and corporate performances and hardly discuss the shareholding structure’s impacts on the capital structure. How do Equity structures of Chinese listed companies affect the capital structure? This article will focus on equity, national ownership, corporate ownership, management ownership, the proportion of shares to the public as independent variables into the analysis and try to explore something new in this area.
This paper contains six sections.SectionⅠis preface. Section II is literature review on the theories and current researches. Section III is to discuss the characteristics of capital structure and ownership structure of Chinese 1isted companies. SectionⅣis an empirical case study with thoroughly analysis. SectionⅤgives the capital structure model based on MATLAB. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are presented in the sectionⅥ.
Section I is to briefly introduce the research backgrounds, research targets, its significance, methodology and the origination of the whole article.
SectionⅡis the literature review on capital structure theories and relevant remarks. And the brief introduction on the variables concerning capital structure and shareholding structure will be concluded in this section. Besides, this section will contain a literature review on the achievements of the current research on the shareholding structure’s impacts on the capital structure. In general, there is no a acknowledged consensus in academic circle, which is the motive of my thesis.
SectionⅢis to describe the characteristics of ownership structure of current Chinese 1isted company.
SectionⅣis aimed at discussing the research design and the regression results.In this section,the author brings forward six hypotheses will be put forward and the definition of dependent variables will be given. The six hypotheses are listed as follows:(1)Concentration ratio is positively associated with owners’equity levels.(2)STATE ratio is positively correlated with owners’equity 1evels. (3)Stock-held-by-institution in domestic ratio is negatively associated with owners’equity 1evels.(4) Stock-held-by-foreign institution ratio is negatively associated with owners’equity 1evels.(5)Stock—held-by-out ratio is negatively correlated with owners’equity levels.(6)Stock-held-by-manager ratio is positively correlated with owners’equity 1evels.The dependent variable is capital structure.Ownership structure is independent variable.As ownership structure is not the unique determinant of capital structure,this paper introduces four control-variables in all regression equations.This section shows the regression results and presents theoretical analyses.
SectionⅤshows the nonlinear regression results.
SectionⅥconcludes this paper and remarks me future research.
引文
1马克思著姜晶花,张梅编译资本论[M]北京:北京出版社,2007
2陆丹.中国上市公司资本结构研究甘肃:兰州商学院硕士论文2007
3夏晓辉.资本结构理论、模型与中国上市公司实证上海:复旦大学博士论文2004
4张兆国资本结构控制权理论评析中南财经政法大学学报,2006年06期
5徐皓.我国上市公司资本结构与融资决策研究成都:西南财经大学硕士论文2007
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2陆丹.中国上市公司资本结构研究甘肃:兰州商学院硕士论文2007
3夏晓辉.资本结构理论、模型与中国上市公司实证上海:复旦大学博士论文2004
4张兆国资本结构控制权理论评析中南财经政法大学学报,2006年06期
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[1]Berle A,Means G..The Modern Corporation and Private Property.New York: Macmillan,1967,Revised edition,
[2]Anup Agrawal,Nandu J.Nagarajan.Corporate Capital Structure,Agency Cost,and Ownership Control:THE Case Of All-Equity Firms.the Journal Of Finance,Sep.1 990,Vol.45,(4),1325-1331
[3]Deangelo,H.,Masulis,R.W. Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation,Journal of Financial Economics.1980,Vol.8,3-29
[4]Demsetz, H..The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm.Journal of Law and Economics.1983,Vol.26,30-32
[5] Fama,Eugene,“Financial Intermediation and Price Level Control.”Journal of Monetary Economics 12.1(January 1983):7-28
[6]Merton,Robert C.,“On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:The Risk of Interest Rates.”Journal of Finance 29.3(May 1974):449-70
[7]Richard A.Brealey,Stewart C.Myers,Alab J.Marcus.Fundamentals of Corporate Finance(Fifth Edition).2007:44-45
[8]James C.Van Home,John M.Wachowicz,JR.Fundamentals of Financial Management(Twelfth Edition).Prentice Hall,2005:445-446
[9] ChamberlainG.,CharlesA.Wilson,2000,Optimal Intertemporal Consumption under Uncertainty,Review of Eeonomic Dynamies 3,365-395
[10]Miller,Merton H.Debt and Taxes.Journal ofFinance,1977,Vol.32,35-38
[11]韩良智.EXCEL在财务管理中的应用[M].北京:人民邮电出版社,2006
[12]苏均和.概率论与数理统计[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2005
[13]庞皓编著.计量经济学[M].北京:科学出版社,2006:73-123
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