股权分置改革与资本市场动机盈余管理研究
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摘要
盈余管理一直是目前国内外经济学和会计学领域深入研究的课题。大量的研究结果表明,上市公司存在很强的盈余管理动机,使得我国证券市场中盈余管理现象较为普遍。我国资本市场存在股权分置现象,在“二元股权”结构下,大股东一般都是非流通股股东,大股东的利益与公司二级市场股价并没有直接联系,因此,大股东不会通过盈余管理影响股价,不存在资本市场动机的盈余管理行为。股权分置改革导致上市公司大股东的利益与市场挂钩,大股东的行为也随着利益约束的改变而发生变化,从而影响上市公司的盈余管理模式。
国外关于盈余管理动机的研究主要有三种:资本市场动机、契约动机和政治成本动机。本文以股权分置改革为背景,研究资本市场动机推动的盈余管理。资本市场动机盈余管理是指投资者和财务分析师在股票定价过程中广泛地使用会计信息,从而导致管理者有动机操纵会计盈余影响短期股票价格。文章以股权分置改革后“大小非”减持中的盈余管理行为为研究对象,运用实证分析与规范分析相结合的研究方法,考察我国资本市场是否存在资本市场动机推动的盈余管理行为。
本文首先对盈余管理的涵义进行了界定,剖析了资本市场动机盈余管理行为在我国存在的制度基础及其产生的经济后果,随后,运用案例分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法,通过修正的琼斯模型对中国A股市场2003年以前上市的共1112家非金融行业类上市公司进行实证分析,研究了股权分置改革后“大小非”减持过程中上市公司盈余管理的特征,研究表明,2005年股权分置改革之后,上市公司正向盈余管理行为显著增加,上市公司在“大小非”减持之前的四个财政年度与没有进行大小非减持的上市公司相比,都存在差异显著的正向盈余管理,表明股权分置改革之后,上市公司存在资本市场动机推动的盈余管理行为,针对“大小非”减持过程中的盈余管理行为,本文提出了相应的监管对策,以保护中小股东的合法权益。
Earnings management has been in-depth study in the field of economics and accounting at home and abroad . A lot of research results show that there is a strong motivation on earnings management in most listed companies . Earnings management is very prevalent in China's capital market. In the "dual option" structure, the major shareholders are generally non-tradable shareholders. There is no direct link between major shareholders and the company's secondary market price. So, major shareholders will not affect the stock price through earnings management and there is no capital market earnings management motivation .The reform on the split share structure led to the link between the interests of major shareholders and the stock prices. Shareholder’s behavior patterns will change with the change of the interests. Capital market motivation maybe driven on earnings management .
There are three main motivation on earnings management in the overseas research: capital market motivation、contract motivation and political cost motivation. In this paper , we main research capital market motivation on earnings management in the background of the split-share reform. Capital market motivation on earnings management is that capital investors and financial analysts use accounting information during the decision of stock price , so, managers have an incentive on manipulation of accounting earnings to influence short-term stock price. In this paper, we study the“size not”reduction in earnings management after the split-share reform. We use empirical analysis and normative analysis as our research methods. Investigate whether there is capital market motivation on earnings management in our capital market
In this paper, we first of all define the meaning of the earnings management and analyze the system foundation and economics consequences on the capital market earnings management motivation in our country. The ,we use case research and empirical research as our methods .We analysis a total of 1112 non-financial sector listing by 2003 in china A-share market through Jones model Our target is to study the“size not”reduction listed company’s character of earnings management. The result shows that ,after the split-share reform, positive earnings management of listed companies increased significantly. Compared with no reduction companies ,“size not”reduction companies showed positive earnings management in before four financial years. All results show that, after the split-share reform, there is capital market motivation on earnings management in our capital market. Based on the studies, we propose appropriate regulatory measures to protect the legitimate interests of minority shareholders
国外关于盈余管理动机的研究主要有三种:资本市场动机、契约动机和政治成本动机。本文以股权分置改革为背景,研究资本市场动机推动的盈余管理。资本市场动机盈余管理是指投资者和财务分析师在股票定价过程中广泛地使用会计信息,从而导致管理者有动机操纵会计盈余影响短期股票价格。文章以股权分置改革后“大小非”减持中的盈余管理行为为研究对象,运用实证分析与规范分析相结合的研究方法,考察我国资本市场是否存在资本市场动机推动的盈余管理行为。
本文首先对盈余管理的涵义进行了界定,剖析了资本市场动机盈余管理行为在我国存在的制度基础及其产生的经济后果,随后,运用案例分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法,通过修正的琼斯模型对中国A股市场2003年以前上市的共1112家非金融行业类上市公司进行实证分析,研究了股权分置改革后“大小非”减持过程中上市公司盈余管理的特征,研究表明,2005年股权分置改革之后,上市公司正向盈余管理行为显著增加,上市公司在“大小非”减持之前的四个财政年度与没有进行大小非减持的上市公司相比,都存在差异显著的正向盈余管理,表明股权分置改革之后,上市公司存在资本市场动机推动的盈余管理行为,针对“大小非”减持过程中的盈余管理行为,本文提出了相应的监管对策,以保护中小股东的合法权益。
Earnings management has been in-depth study in the field of economics and accounting at home and abroad . A lot of research results show that there is a strong motivation on earnings management in most listed companies . Earnings management is very prevalent in China's capital market. In the "dual option" structure, the major shareholders are generally non-tradable shareholders. There is no direct link between major shareholders and the company's secondary market price. So, major shareholders will not affect the stock price through earnings management and there is no capital market earnings management motivation .The reform on the split share structure led to the link between the interests of major shareholders and the stock prices. Shareholder’s behavior patterns will change with the change of the interests. Capital market motivation maybe driven on earnings management .
There are three main motivation on earnings management in the overseas research: capital market motivation、contract motivation and political cost motivation. In this paper , we main research capital market motivation on earnings management in the background of the split-share reform. Capital market motivation on earnings management is that capital investors and financial analysts use accounting information during the decision of stock price , so, managers have an incentive on manipulation of accounting earnings to influence short-term stock price. In this paper, we study the“size not”reduction in earnings management after the split-share reform. We use empirical analysis and normative analysis as our research methods. Investigate whether there is capital market motivation on earnings management in our capital market
In this paper, we first of all define the meaning of the earnings management and analyze the system foundation and economics consequences on the capital market earnings management motivation in our country. The ,we use case research and empirical research as our methods .We analysis a total of 1112 non-financial sector listing by 2003 in china A-share market through Jones model Our target is to study the“size not”reduction listed company’s character of earnings management. The result shows that ,after the split-share reform, positive earnings management of listed companies increased significantly. Compared with no reduction companies ,“size not”reduction companies showed positive earnings management in before four financial years. All results show that, after the split-share reform, there is capital market motivation on earnings management in our capital market. Based on the studies, we propose appropriate regulatory measures to protect the legitimate interests of minority shareholders
引文
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①Bergstresset and Phmppon. Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds. Journal of Business.2006
①Holthausen R W, D F Larcker, R G Sloan.Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economic,1995,19.2: 29‐74
②Healy Paul and Krishna G Palepu. Effectiveness of Accounting_ Based Dividend covenants. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1990.12:92‐124
③Healy PM. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decision. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985.7
④Defond M L and J Jiambalvo. Debt Covenant Effects and the Manipulation of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994.17(1):145‐176
⑤Moyer S'. Capital Adequacy Ratio Regulations and Accounting Choices in Commercial Banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1990.12:123‐154
⑥Petroni K R .Optimistic Reporting in the Property Casualty Insurance Industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1992.15:485‐508
⑦Cahan S .The Effect of Antitrust Investigations on Discretionary Accruals: A Refined Test of the Political Cost Hypothesis. Accounting Review, 1992.67: 77‐95
①蒋义宏等主编.证券市场会计问题实证研究.上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998
②陆建桥,中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究.会计研究,1999.9:25‐35.
①林舒,魏明海.中国A股发行公司首次公开募股过程中的盈利管理.中国会计与财务研究,2000, 12 (2):87‐107
②于海燕、李增泉,会计选择与盈余管理.公司金融,2001.1:37‐42
①陈建梁、叶护,.股权分置对上市公司股利分配影响的差异性研究.南方金融,2004.9:38‐41.
②陈建梁、卢万青,股权分置下不同类型股东分配与收益的差别分析——以上证180指数成份股为例,对外经济贸易大学学报,2005.3
③吴晓,股权分置改革的若干理论问题.财贸经济,2006.2:24‐31
④陈蛇、陈朝龙,股权分置改革的表决机制为何引发市场的异常波动.财经科学,2005.4:15‐21
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①吴晓,资本市场和现代金融体系一兼谈股权分置改革问题.中南财经政法大学学报,2006.2:20‐23
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③Willian Scott .财务会计理论.陈汉文译.第1版.北京:机械工业出版社,2000,235
①Paul M.Healy and James M. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and lts impliciations for standard setting. Accounting Horizons,1999.12:365‐383.
②王学军、肖华译,盈余管理研究回顾及其对会计准则建设的启示.会计研究,2000.11:52‐60
③陆建桥,中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J],会计研究,1999(9):25‐35
④孙铮,王跃堂,资源配置与盈余操纵之实证研究[J],财经研究,1999(4):3‐9
⑤李吉栋,上市公司盈余管理的实证检验——来自于亏损上市公司的实证证据,现代管理科学,2006.5:24‐28
①Healy ,P. M , and J. M . Wahlen . A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting . Accounting Horizons .1999(13) : 365-383
①秦天、刘亚琳,盈余管理动机分析与评价,财务管理,2009.2:61‐62
①杨怡,股权分置改革对上市公司盈利能力影响分析.现代商贸工业,2009.14:128-129
①田利辉,国有产权、预算软约束和上市公司杠杆治理.管理世界,2005.7:31‐35
①陈晓、陈小悦、刘钊,A股盈余报告的有用性研究—来白上海、深圳股市的实证证据.经济研究,1999.6:21-28.
②赵宇龙,王志台.我国证券市场“功能锁定”现象的实证研究[J].经济研究,1999.9:56-63
①蔡宁、魏明海,“大小非”减持中的盈余管理.审计研究,2009.2.40-4
①李琪琦,对股权分置改革市场效应的探讨.经济专论,2006.l:35-40
②蔡奕,股份全流通后大股东行为变化及监管研究,深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告,2007.深证综研字第0157号
①高雷、宋顺林,关联交易、线下项目于盈余管理—来自中国上市公司的经验证据.中国会计评论,2008.3:61‐77
①夏立军,盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究,中国会计与财务研究,2003,第5卷2期:94-154.
①夏立军,盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究,中国会计与财务研究,2003,第5卷2期:94-154.
②夏立军,盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究,中国会计与财务研究,2003,第5卷2期:94-154.
③张雁翎、陈涛,盈余管理计量模型效力的实证研究.数理统计与管理,2007.5.
④Bartov,Et al, Is Cretionary Accruals Models and Auditor Qualification .Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001.30:421—452.
①任春艳,上市公司盈余管理与会计准则制定.中国财政经济出版社,2004.10:25‐26
①黄世忠、林启云,后安然时代,如何监管会计职业.中国注册会计师,2002.3
①范翠梅,我国独立董事制度存在的问题及完善对策.财会月刊.2005.7:21‐23
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