泛东亚经济一体化经济效应研究
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摘要
经济全球化和一体化趋势不断加剧,以中国和印度为核心的亚洲一体化不同方案对成员国的影响是中国制定国际合作策略的基础。中国—印度自由贸易区(CIFTA)的构建是至关重要的一步。东亚地区FTA的建设呈现相互交织的局面,区域合作的进展仍然存在较大的变数,若中国与印度顺利达成CIFTA(方案S1),在其基础上可能进一步动态扩展出中国-印度-东盟FTA(方案S2)、中国-印度-东盟-新西兰-澳大利亚FTA(方案S3)以及“10+6”的EPA计划(方案S4)。
在中国目前面临如此之多的FTA谈判的时候,将会给中国以及利益相关国家带来什么样的影响?CIFTA谈判及其基础上可能动态扩展出的其他几种区域合作方案,将对东亚乃至整个世界贸易体系产生什么样的后果?这些问题成为我国对外经济合作中需要解决的很重要问题。本文以CIFTA为主线,旨在模拟分析CIFTA及其基础上可能扩展而成的其他几种FTA将对成员国产生的经济影响。首先从CGE模型传统的比较静态的框架下,就GDP、贸易规模、双边贸易、贸易结构及产出水平、国民福利等方面来阐释各政策情景产生的冲击效果;然后通过投资动态机制与价格的内生化,考虑资源限制及生产要素间的替代性,以逐年递归动态求解方式,分国别从宏观经济、进出口贸易角度出发,对于成员国在政策变动后可能产生的远期影响进一步做出评估,以此来反映各种可能的政策变动对成员国经济的短期影响与长期影响之间的关系。
本文围绕中国积极参与东亚经济一体化的动机,运用GTAP模型及其数据库,结合递推动态思想及构建投资动态机制,具体的分析了中国、印度、东盟、澳大利亚、新西兰、日本、韩国关于建立FTA的几种可能的政策所带来的经济后果,并逐一对各国做出分析和判断,主要研究结论有以下:
①四种模拟方案中,在“先行优势”效应下每种方案对中国的经济均产生了积极影响,而效果最大的是S4方案,即贸易自由化范围越广,中国从中获益越多。因此,该结论印证了我国广结FTA网络的正确性与有效性。然而,由于各成员国产业竞争力的差异以及在既有的贸易安排中地位的不同,各自在利益分配上出现不均衡性。
②印度的优胜战略是积极与中国、东盟、新西兰、澳大利亚缔结FTA;毕竟在S1、S2、S3方案下印度都是有利可取的,这些伙伴国同为发展中国家或者是经济规模非常狭小的发达小国,对印度总体看不会造成威胁;而要尽量避免与日本、韩国构建FTA,因为在当前的经济格局下印度还尚无能力应对来自日本和韩国的严峻负面冲击。③东盟在S3和S4方案下能获得显著的经济改进,尽管日本和韩国对东盟会产生一定良性竞争,致使东盟在S4下GDP增长不及S3,但东盟在S4中的总体国民福利所得大于S3,那么,参与FTA正是东盟的占优选择。因此,在泛东亚的大背景下,东盟应积极利用轮轴地位,为实现“10+6”发挥纽带作用,作为跳板促进中日韩的经济合作。
④新西兰和澳大利亚加入东亚FTA进程,尽管对区域内其他成员国所造成的积极效果相对较小,却为自身带来明显的经济利益。相反地,由于这两国的外贸对象和贸易量正向东亚地区偏转,假如东亚达成FTA而他们却孤身在外,所遭受的经济损失是不言而喻的。从这个意义上讲,新西兰和澳大利亚的优胜战略同样是确保自己成为东亚FTA中的一员。
⑤日本和韩国一旦被排斥在FTA外,会受到负面经济影响,且随着该FTA规模扩大,蒙受的负面效应会更大;相比之下,倘若顺利成为FTA成员国,则会获得最多的经济改进和福利所得。因此,对日韩来讲,作为东亚地区的重要国度,对构建以自我为中心的FTA网络是不会丧失积极性的。这也解释了,当前尽管中日韩三国间的合作与谈判缓慢,但日本和韩国也在纷纷如同中国一样搭建自己的FTA网络。
⑥在动态条件下各成员国宏观指标和贸易的变动仍然维持比较静态状态下的趋势,依旧存在因为贸易政策的改变导致区域内获得经济与福利的改进而区域外存在损失的状况,且成员国之间利益分配的不均衡性会进一步扩大,差距更加明显。而比较静态条件下形成的次优状况,在长期并不会得到有效改善,相反还有进一步恶化的趋势。
Today in the context of globalization, the trend of integration intensifies continually. In order to achieve true integration in Asia, it’s essential for cooperation between China and India, which has reached one-third of the world's total population. The“10 +3”and the“South Asian Association for Regional Alliance”is only the first step for Asian integration, and the construction of China-India Free Trade Area (CIFTA) is the second step which is crucial as well. Meanwhile, the building of FTA in East Asia has intertwined, and the progress of regional cooperation in East Asia is quite variable. If China and India achieve CIFTA (S1), there maybe expand three other scenarios dynamically, namely, China-India-ASEAN FTA (S2), China-India- ASEAN-New Zealand-Australia FTA (S3) and the "10 +6" EPA plan (S4).
When China is currently facing so many of the FTA negotiations, what kind of impact will be brought for China and other related countries? How CIFTA as well as other three possible regional cooperation programs based on it effect member-nations’economy? These questions lead to the major idea of this article. In this paper, from the traditional comparative static framework of CGE model firstly, we analyze the economic effect on member-nations of these four scenarios from aspects of GDP, trade scale, bilateral trade, national welfare, trade structure and output levels. Subsequently, through the dynamic mechanisms of investment, the endogenesis of price, consideration of the resource constraints and the alternativity between productive factors, this paper completed the historic simulation to update key data, then built the closure criteria for baseline simulation, combined the dynamic recursive methord, finally assessed the long-term impact for member states in terms of policy changes under 4 scenarios. Different to the analysis from perspective of comparative static, the assessment of long-term economic impact was started from the macroeconomic point of view and import and export trade to reflect the relationship between short-term influence and long-term impact under 4 kinds of possible policy changes.
In this paper, we used the GTAP model and its database, combined dynamic recursive methord, and analyzed the specific economic effect in 4 different scenarios for China, India, ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and other non-member nations. Based on the empirical results, we draw up the following conclusions:
1) In this paper, the main line of research is focusing on China's active motive in participating East Asian economic integration. As one of the host countries under four simulation programs, China gains positive impact under each program because of the“first advantage”effect, and China wins the most economic benefit in S4. That is, the broader the scope of trade liberalization is, the more benefit China achieves from it. Therefore, this point confirms the correctness and effectiveness of FTA network. However, because of differences in industrial competitiveness as well as the different status in trade arrangements, there exist the unbalanced distribution of benefits among member states.
2) India’s dominant strategy is to establish FTA positively with China, ASEAN, New Zealand, and Australia. After all, S1, S2 and S3 are beneficial to India, these partners which are developing countries or developed countries with very small scale of economy would not pose a threat to India. At the same time, India should minimize the risk of building FTA with Japan and South Korea, because at the current economic situation India has no ability to respond to severe negative impacts from Japan and Korea.
3) ASEAN has access to significant economic improvement in S3 and S4. Even though Japan and Korea have healthy competition wiht ASEAN, which lead to the result that the GDP growth for ASEAN in S4 is less than in S3, the gains of civil welfare for ASEAN in S4 is more than in S3. Generally, to participate in FTA negotiation is the dominant selection for ASEAN. Therefore, under this background, ASEAN should make active use of the axle position, play the role of springboard to achieve the“10 +6”economic cooperation.
4) Along with New Zealand and Australia’s affiliation to the FTA process in East Asia, the positive effects on other member states is rather limited compared with S2, but significant for their own economic interests. On the contrary, because the two countries’foreign trade volums are deflected towards East Asian gradually, if they are excluded outside of East Asia FTA alone, they would suffer servere economic losses. In this sense, the winning stratege for New Zealand and Australia is to ensure their status in East Asian FTA.
5) If Japan and Korea are excluded from the FTA in East Asia, they would suffer significant negative economic impact, and with the expansion of the FTA, the negative effects will be greater. In contrast, if they successful become the member countries of East Asian FTA, the two will receive most of the economic improvement and well-beings. Therefore, as important countries in East Asia, Japan and South Korea will not lose enthusiasm in building self-centered FTA network.
6) Under dynamic conditions, changes in macro-economy and trade for member countries remained the trend in relatively static state. There still exist the situation that mebmer nations gain economic and welfare improvements while non-member nations suffer economic losses and welfare depravation, and the disequilibrium in distribution of benefits between member countries will be further expanded and even more evident. The sub-optimal condition shaped under comparative static state will not be improved in the long term.
在中国目前面临如此之多的FTA谈判的时候,将会给中国以及利益相关国家带来什么样的影响?CIFTA谈判及其基础上可能动态扩展出的其他几种区域合作方案,将对东亚乃至整个世界贸易体系产生什么样的后果?这些问题成为我国对外经济合作中需要解决的很重要问题。本文以CIFTA为主线,旨在模拟分析CIFTA及其基础上可能扩展而成的其他几种FTA将对成员国产生的经济影响。首先从CGE模型传统的比较静态的框架下,就GDP、贸易规模、双边贸易、贸易结构及产出水平、国民福利等方面来阐释各政策情景产生的冲击效果;然后通过投资动态机制与价格的内生化,考虑资源限制及生产要素间的替代性,以逐年递归动态求解方式,分国别从宏观经济、进出口贸易角度出发,对于成员国在政策变动后可能产生的远期影响进一步做出评估,以此来反映各种可能的政策变动对成员国经济的短期影响与长期影响之间的关系。
本文围绕中国积极参与东亚经济一体化的动机,运用GTAP模型及其数据库,结合递推动态思想及构建投资动态机制,具体的分析了中国、印度、东盟、澳大利亚、新西兰、日本、韩国关于建立FTA的几种可能的政策所带来的经济后果,并逐一对各国做出分析和判断,主要研究结论有以下:
①四种模拟方案中,在“先行优势”效应下每种方案对中国的经济均产生了积极影响,而效果最大的是S4方案,即贸易自由化范围越广,中国从中获益越多。因此,该结论印证了我国广结FTA网络的正确性与有效性。然而,由于各成员国产业竞争力的差异以及在既有的贸易安排中地位的不同,各自在利益分配上出现不均衡性。
②印度的优胜战略是积极与中国、东盟、新西兰、澳大利亚缔结FTA;毕竟在S1、S2、S3方案下印度都是有利可取的,这些伙伴国同为发展中国家或者是经济规模非常狭小的发达小国,对印度总体看不会造成威胁;而要尽量避免与日本、韩国构建FTA,因为在当前的经济格局下印度还尚无能力应对来自日本和韩国的严峻负面冲击。③东盟在S3和S4方案下能获得显著的经济改进,尽管日本和韩国对东盟会产生一定良性竞争,致使东盟在S4下GDP增长不及S3,但东盟在S4中的总体国民福利所得大于S3,那么,参与FTA正是东盟的占优选择。因此,在泛东亚的大背景下,东盟应积极利用轮轴地位,为实现“10+6”发挥纽带作用,作为跳板促进中日韩的经济合作。
④新西兰和澳大利亚加入东亚FTA进程,尽管对区域内其他成员国所造成的积极效果相对较小,却为自身带来明显的经济利益。相反地,由于这两国的外贸对象和贸易量正向东亚地区偏转,假如东亚达成FTA而他们却孤身在外,所遭受的经济损失是不言而喻的。从这个意义上讲,新西兰和澳大利亚的优胜战略同样是确保自己成为东亚FTA中的一员。
⑤日本和韩国一旦被排斥在FTA外,会受到负面经济影响,且随着该FTA规模扩大,蒙受的负面效应会更大;相比之下,倘若顺利成为FTA成员国,则会获得最多的经济改进和福利所得。因此,对日韩来讲,作为东亚地区的重要国度,对构建以自我为中心的FTA网络是不会丧失积极性的。这也解释了,当前尽管中日韩三国间的合作与谈判缓慢,但日本和韩国也在纷纷如同中国一样搭建自己的FTA网络。
⑥在动态条件下各成员国宏观指标和贸易的变动仍然维持比较静态状态下的趋势,依旧存在因为贸易政策的改变导致区域内获得经济与福利的改进而区域外存在损失的状况,且成员国之间利益分配的不均衡性会进一步扩大,差距更加明显。而比较静态条件下形成的次优状况,在长期并不会得到有效改善,相反还有进一步恶化的趋势。
Today in the context of globalization, the trend of integration intensifies continually. In order to achieve true integration in Asia, it’s essential for cooperation between China and India, which has reached one-third of the world's total population. The“10 +3”and the“South Asian Association for Regional Alliance”is only the first step for Asian integration, and the construction of China-India Free Trade Area (CIFTA) is the second step which is crucial as well. Meanwhile, the building of FTA in East Asia has intertwined, and the progress of regional cooperation in East Asia is quite variable. If China and India achieve CIFTA (S1), there maybe expand three other scenarios dynamically, namely, China-India-ASEAN FTA (S2), China-India- ASEAN-New Zealand-Australia FTA (S3) and the "10 +6" EPA plan (S4).
When China is currently facing so many of the FTA negotiations, what kind of impact will be brought for China and other related countries? How CIFTA as well as other three possible regional cooperation programs based on it effect member-nations’economy? These questions lead to the major idea of this article. In this paper, from the traditional comparative static framework of CGE model firstly, we analyze the economic effect on member-nations of these four scenarios from aspects of GDP, trade scale, bilateral trade, national welfare, trade structure and output levels. Subsequently, through the dynamic mechanisms of investment, the endogenesis of price, consideration of the resource constraints and the alternativity between productive factors, this paper completed the historic simulation to update key data, then built the closure criteria for baseline simulation, combined the dynamic recursive methord, finally assessed the long-term impact for member states in terms of policy changes under 4 scenarios. Different to the analysis from perspective of comparative static, the assessment of long-term economic impact was started from the macroeconomic point of view and import and export trade to reflect the relationship between short-term influence and long-term impact under 4 kinds of possible policy changes.
In this paper, we used the GTAP model and its database, combined dynamic recursive methord, and analyzed the specific economic effect in 4 different scenarios for China, India, ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and other non-member nations. Based on the empirical results, we draw up the following conclusions:
1) In this paper, the main line of research is focusing on China's active motive in participating East Asian economic integration. As one of the host countries under four simulation programs, China gains positive impact under each program because of the“first advantage”effect, and China wins the most economic benefit in S4. That is, the broader the scope of trade liberalization is, the more benefit China achieves from it. Therefore, this point confirms the correctness and effectiveness of FTA network. However, because of differences in industrial competitiveness as well as the different status in trade arrangements, there exist the unbalanced distribution of benefits among member states.
2) India’s dominant strategy is to establish FTA positively with China, ASEAN, New Zealand, and Australia. After all, S1, S2 and S3 are beneficial to India, these partners which are developing countries or developed countries with very small scale of economy would not pose a threat to India. At the same time, India should minimize the risk of building FTA with Japan and South Korea, because at the current economic situation India has no ability to respond to severe negative impacts from Japan and Korea.
3) ASEAN has access to significant economic improvement in S3 and S4. Even though Japan and Korea have healthy competition wiht ASEAN, which lead to the result that the GDP growth for ASEAN in S4 is less than in S3, the gains of civil welfare for ASEAN in S4 is more than in S3. Generally, to participate in FTA negotiation is the dominant selection for ASEAN. Therefore, under this background, ASEAN should make active use of the axle position, play the role of springboard to achieve the“10 +6”economic cooperation.
4) Along with New Zealand and Australia’s affiliation to the FTA process in East Asia, the positive effects on other member states is rather limited compared with S2, but significant for their own economic interests. On the contrary, because the two countries’foreign trade volums are deflected towards East Asian gradually, if they are excluded outside of East Asia FTA alone, they would suffer servere economic losses. In this sense, the winning stratege for New Zealand and Australia is to ensure their status in East Asian FTA.
5) If Japan and Korea are excluded from the FTA in East Asia, they would suffer significant negative economic impact, and with the expansion of the FTA, the negative effects will be greater. In contrast, if they successful become the member countries of East Asian FTA, the two will receive most of the economic improvement and well-beings. Therefore, as important countries in East Asia, Japan and South Korea will not lose enthusiasm in building self-centered FTA network.
6) Under dynamic conditions, changes in macro-economy and trade for member countries remained the trend in relatively static state. There still exist the situation that mebmer nations gain economic and welfare improvements while non-member nations suffer economic losses and welfare depravation, and the disequilibrium in distribution of benefits between member countries will be further expanded and even more evident. The sub-optimal condition shaped under comparative static state will not be improved in the long term.
引文
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