创业融资：基于努力互补效应的视角
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摘要
创业在市场经济中扮演着一个至关重要的角色，市场经济中一个最显著的特征之一就是作为市场基本单元的企业在不断地演化：诞生、成长、成熟、扩张或者消亡，整个经济正是在这种动态过程中得到发展。显然，不断有新的企业创立是市场经济得以持续发展的推动力。就中国而言，随着社会经济的发展，市场经济环境下创业实践越来越活跃，创业也成为中国这个人口大国解决就业问题的重要途径。创业活动对经济增长的作用越来越显著，越来越多的学者关注创业的研究，由于创业的发展需要一种新的资本市场环境，即创业融资市场，这也使得创业融资成为创业研究的焦点。
创业融资属于创业管理和风险投资的交叉板块，创业管理强调创业企业家在创业企业中的关键作用，而风险投资强调创业投资者在创业企业中的重要作用。创业投资者在创业企业中不仅投入资金，而且提供了管理支持，即创业企业求助于创业投资者属于融资融智，并且创业企业家和创业投资者的努力付出具有互补效应。目前研究主要集中在创业企业家身上，涉及其利用创业投资者的资金发展创业企业，很少提及创业投资者在创业企业中的管理贡献。即使部分学者在创业企业的研究中提及了创业投资者的管理贡献，但是其倾向于各自努力，并没有涉及到二者的互补效应。故本文从努力互补角度分析创业企业的融资契约，提出创业企业家与创业投资者的互补效应，并在其基础上展开研究分析。论文的主要研究内容包括四个方面：基于努力互补效应的单阶段和多阶段的契约安排；基于努力互补效应的双边信号监控机制分析；基于努力互补效应的融资工具选择；基于努力互补效应的融资对象选择。通过以上四个方面的研究，得到的基本结论如下：
其一，基于努力互补效应的创业融资契约安排，从完全信息到不完全信息，从单阶段到多阶段进行分析。在单阶段契约安排中，不完全信息促使创业企业双方选择较低努力水平。同时，创业企业家和创业投资者的产出效率会影响分配比例及努力的选择，从而影响收益与效应变化；创业企业互补系数的变化并不会影响分配比例和个体努力，但其对互补努力及总收益、总效应有显著影响。在多阶段契约安排中，不完全信息也会促使创业双方选择更低努力水平。本文以二阶段模型为例进行分析，由于在第二阶段投资者的作用开始得以显现，对于分配比例，第二阶段的分配比例大于第一阶段的分配比例，即投资者获得的收益份额在第二阶段更大。而不同互补系数也会对于两个阶段的努力水平有所影响。当互补系数所形成的努力收益的放大程度足以抵消努力付出的成本时，投资的合作契约双方会在第二阶段加大互补努力的投入，使得指数增长的效用促进企业的最大化收益。将单阶段投资的契约安排和多阶段的融资契约模型进行比较我们也可以发现，由于多阶段模型中引入了声誉模型的一些基本的概念，即本阶段的表现会影响到下一阶段各方的努力投入，这样就形成了一种监督约束的机制。通过比较分析发现，多阶段的融资契约所形成的总体的效用更大，且创业投资者和创业企业家倾向于投入比单阶段更大的努力水平。
其二，信号监控对于创业企业合作双方的合作水平和效率都有提升作用，同时对于产出也有增长效益，因此信号监控不失为有效的合作方式，对于创业企业的合作实践有指导作用。通过研究分析发现：①创业企业家或创业投资者单独监控时，信号监控对于双方的合作水平的提升是有促进作用；同时，信号监控对于创业投资者是一种占优策略，创业企业家出于“融资融智”等综合因素考虑会接受信号监控；②双边信号监控也是一种有效行为，但并不能保证一定优于单边监控；③对于个体效应和互补效应的监控效果，互补效应的监控既有监控影响，又有增长效应。④联合产出效应下，信号监控的效率提升作用依然存在，创业企业参与者需要在效率和产出之间做出选择，并且互补系数对于联合监控的效率有重大影响，应根据互补系数来选择合适的监控对象和相应的监控机制。
其三，作为抑制双边道德风险的有力工具,可转换债券这种金融契约安排一直备受学者们的青睐，但当同时考虑到阶段性利润和创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补效应之后，各种常用金融工具都可以成为最佳选择。通过研究发现：①当创业企业家在契约选择中拥有完全议价能力时，普通股、普通债券、优先股和可转换债券是可执行的唯一最优合同；②创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补性很低时，对于创业企业家而言普通债券是最优合同；③创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补性适中时，当资本成本相对较低时，可转换债券对于创业企业家是最优的。而当资本成本相对较高时，普通债券对于创业企业家是最优的；④创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补性高时，当资本成本相对较低时，普通股是最优的；资本成本相对较高时，优先股是最优的。
其四，创业企业家根据经济性和行为性因素选择银行贷款、天使投资者和风险投资者，从而得到创业企业家在融资对象上的最优选择。通过研究发现：①当努力互补效应过小时，受资本约束影响较小创业企业家选择风险资本融资；②当努力互补效应适中时，受资本约束影响较小创业企业家选择天使资本融资，随着资本回报要求的增加，创业企业家选择风险资本融资；③当努力互补效应过大时，受资本约束影响较小创业企业家选择天使资本融资。而无论努力互补效应的大小，受到资本约束影响较大创业企业家一定会选择银行融资。
Enterprise plays a vital part in the market economy. One of the most notablefeatures in the market economy is the constant evolution of the enterprise, which is thebasic element of market. And the evolution experiences a process of birth, growth,maturity, expansion or death. The economy is developing in such a dynamic process.Apparently, the establishment of new business is the driving force for sustainabledevelopment for market economy. Just take China as an example, with the developmentof social economy; the entrepreneurial practice has become more and more active in theenvironment of market economy, which forms a significant solution to the employmentrate in the country with such a large population. Entrepreneurial activity plays a moreand more important role in the economic growth, which attracts more and morescholars’ attention. And the business development needs a new capital marketenvironment, namely the venture financing market, which makes the venture financingbecome another research focus.
The venture financing is the cross plate of entrepreneurial management andinvestment risk. The entrepreneurial management emphasizes the key role ofentrepreneur in enterprise, while risk investment believes in the important role ofventure investors. Investors provide not only fund but also management support for theventure, namely the enterprise turn to investors for money and wisdom, and the effortsof entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have complementary effect.
But according to the literature review of enterprise contracts, research focus on theentrepreneurs who promote the venture with the use of funds from investors, and rarelymentions the contribution of investors. The current studies mainly focus on theentrepreneurs who make use of the funds from venture investors to promote theirventure enterprise, and rarely mentioned the contribution to management in theentrepreneur enterprise. Even if some scholars referred to in the venture capitalmanagement contribution in their research, they have preference for the individualeffort, neglecting complementary effect. So this article analyze the enterprise financingcontract concerning the efforts of complementary, putting forward the complementaryeffect between business entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The main contents of thispaper include the following four aspects: The single stage and multistage contractarrangement based on the efforts of the complementary; bilateral signal monitoring mechanism analysis based on the complementary effect; the choices of financinginstruments; the financing object selection based on the complementary effect. Throughthe above four aspects of research, we got the following conclusions:
Firstly, the arrangement of venture investment contracts based on thecomplementary effect, from incomplete information to incomplete information, andfrom single phase to multi phase. In the single stage investment contract, the moral riskbringing by the incomplete information made the entrepreneurs and investors to choosea less effort level. At the same time, the output efficiency of entrepreneurs and venturecapitalists will affect the distribution proportion and choice for effort, thus affecting theincome and the change of effect; the variation of enterprise complementary coefficientdoes not affect the distribution ratio and individual efforts, but has a great influence onthe complementary efforts, total revenue and total effect. Similarly, in the contractarrangement of multiple stages, incomplete information brings the moral risk,prompting entrepreneurs and investors to choose a lower effort level. And we just takethe two stage investment model as an example. As the role of investors began to emergein the second stage, and the distribution ratio of the second stage is larger than the oneof first phase, which means investors can have a larger share of proceeds in secondstages. But the different complementary coefficient can still influence the effort level ofthe two phases. When the profits caused by complementary can offset the cost of theadditional effort, investment cooperation contract would like to increase complementaryinputs in second stages, and the exponential growth of the utility can promote theenterprises to maximize the benefits. By the comparison of the single stage investmentcontract and the multi-stage investment contract we can find that, due to some basicconcepts of reputation model was introduced by the multiple stage models, theperformance of this stage can affect the efforts of the next phase, forming a supervisionand restriction mechanism. Through a comparative analysis, we found that the overallutility of the multi-stage investment contract is larger, and the venture investors andentrepreneurs tend to put more effort than in the single stage.
Secondly, signal monitoring can promote the cooperation level and the efficiencyof venture enterprises, while increasing the output. Therefore the signal monitoring is aneffective way for the cooperation, and has the guiding role in the business cooperationpractice. Through the analysis, we found that:①when entrepreneurs or investorsmonitored separately, it can stimulate the cooperation level between the two sides; atthe same time, signal monitoring for investors is a dominant strategy, the entrepreneurs will accept signal monitoring considering the" financing wisdom" and othercomprehensive factors;②bilateral signal monitoring is an effective behavior, but notalways better than unilateral supervisory;③as for the monitoring consequences forindividual effect and complementary effect, complementary effect monitoring can hasboth monitoring effect and increasing effect.④Under the effect of the combined output,signal monitoring can still promote the efficiency, and enterprise participants need tomake a choice between efficiency and output, and while the complementary coefficienthave a significant influence on the joint monitoring efficiency, we should select theappropriate monitoring objects and the corresponding control mechanism based on thecomplementary coefficient.
Thirdly, as a powerful tool to inhibit bilateral moral hazard, to have a financialcontract arrangement like convertible bond has attracted a lot of scholars’ interests, butwhen considering the profits for different phases and the complementary effect ofentrepreneurs and investors, a variety of commonly used financial tools can become thebest choice. Through the study, we found that:①when the entrepreneur has completelybargaining power in the contract, common stocks, bonds, preferred stock andconvertible bond can be executed to be the only optimal contract;②when thecomplementary effect of entrepreneurs and investors is very low, and for entrepreneur,the ordinary bonds is the optimal contract;③when the complementary effect ofentrepreneurs and investors is moderate, as the cost of investor's capital is relatively low,the convertible bond is optimal for entrepreneurs. But as the cost of capital is relativelyhigh, the ordinary bonds is optimal for entrepreneurs;④when the complementary effectof entrepreneurs and investors is high, as the investor's cost of capital is relatively low,the ordinary shares is the best choice; as the investor's cost of capital is relatively high,the preferred stock is the optimal one.
Fourthly, entrepreneur chooses a bank loan, angel or venture capital investorsaccording to economic and behavioral factors, to obtain the optimal selection offinancing object. Through the study, we found that:①when the complementary effectis low, entrepreneurs with lower capital restraint would choose venture capital;②whenthe complementary effect is moderate, entrepreneurs with lower capital restraint wouldhave a choice of angel capital, but along with the requirement of capital return increase,entrepreneur turned to select the venture capital financing;③when the complementaryeffect is too high, entrepreneurs with lower capital restraint would choose the angel capital financing. And whatever the extent of complementary effect is, entrepreneursunder a comparable big capital constraint will choose the bank financing.
创业融资属于创业管理和风险投资的交叉板块，创业管理强调创业企业家在创业企业中的关键作用，而风险投资强调创业投资者在创业企业中的重要作用。创业投资者在创业企业中不仅投入资金，而且提供了管理支持，即创业企业求助于创业投资者属于融资融智，并且创业企业家和创业投资者的努力付出具有互补效应。目前研究主要集中在创业企业家身上，涉及其利用创业投资者的资金发展创业企业，很少提及创业投资者在创业企业中的管理贡献。即使部分学者在创业企业的研究中提及了创业投资者的管理贡献，但是其倾向于各自努力，并没有涉及到二者的互补效应。故本文从努力互补角度分析创业企业的融资契约，提出创业企业家与创业投资者的互补效应，并在其基础上展开研究分析。论文的主要研究内容包括四个方面：基于努力互补效应的单阶段和多阶段的契约安排；基于努力互补效应的双边信号监控机制分析；基于努力互补效应的融资工具选择；基于努力互补效应的融资对象选择。通过以上四个方面的研究，得到的基本结论如下：
其一，基于努力互补效应的创业融资契约安排，从完全信息到不完全信息，从单阶段到多阶段进行分析。在单阶段契约安排中，不完全信息促使创业企业双方选择较低努力水平。同时，创业企业家和创业投资者的产出效率会影响分配比例及努力的选择，从而影响收益与效应变化；创业企业互补系数的变化并不会影响分配比例和个体努力，但其对互补努力及总收益、总效应有显著影响。在多阶段契约安排中，不完全信息也会促使创业双方选择更低努力水平。本文以二阶段模型为例进行分析，由于在第二阶段投资者的作用开始得以显现，对于分配比例，第二阶段的分配比例大于第一阶段的分配比例，即投资者获得的收益份额在第二阶段更大。而不同互补系数也会对于两个阶段的努力水平有所影响。当互补系数所形成的努力收益的放大程度足以抵消努力付出的成本时，投资的合作契约双方会在第二阶段加大互补努力的投入，使得指数增长的效用促进企业的最大化收益。将单阶段投资的契约安排和多阶段的融资契约模型进行比较我们也可以发现，由于多阶段模型中引入了声誉模型的一些基本的概念，即本阶段的表现会影响到下一阶段各方的努力投入，这样就形成了一种监督约束的机制。通过比较分析发现，多阶段的融资契约所形成的总体的效用更大，且创业投资者和创业企业家倾向于投入比单阶段更大的努力水平。
其二，信号监控对于创业企业合作双方的合作水平和效率都有提升作用，同时对于产出也有增长效益，因此信号监控不失为有效的合作方式，对于创业企业的合作实践有指导作用。通过研究分析发现：①创业企业家或创业投资者单独监控时，信号监控对于双方的合作水平的提升是有促进作用；同时，信号监控对于创业投资者是一种占优策略，创业企业家出于“融资融智”等综合因素考虑会接受信号监控；②双边信号监控也是一种有效行为，但并不能保证一定优于单边监控；③对于个体效应和互补效应的监控效果，互补效应的监控既有监控影响，又有增长效应。④联合产出效应下，信号监控的效率提升作用依然存在，创业企业参与者需要在效率和产出之间做出选择，并且互补系数对于联合监控的效率有重大影响，应根据互补系数来选择合适的监控对象和相应的监控机制。
其三，作为抑制双边道德风险的有力工具,可转换债券这种金融契约安排一直备受学者们的青睐，但当同时考虑到阶段性利润和创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补效应之后，各种常用金融工具都可以成为最佳选择。通过研究发现：①当创业企业家在契约选择中拥有完全议价能力时，普通股、普通债券、优先股和可转换债券是可执行的唯一最优合同；②创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补性很低时，对于创业企业家而言普通债券是最优合同；③创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补性适中时，当资本成本相对较低时，可转换债券对于创业企业家是最优的。而当资本成本相对较高时，普通债券对于创业企业家是最优的；④创业企业家与创业投资者努力互补性高时，当资本成本相对较低时，普通股是最优的；资本成本相对较高时，优先股是最优的。
其四，创业企业家根据经济性和行为性因素选择银行贷款、天使投资者和风险投资者，从而得到创业企业家在融资对象上的最优选择。通过研究发现：①当努力互补效应过小时，受资本约束影响较小创业企业家选择风险资本融资；②当努力互补效应适中时，受资本约束影响较小创业企业家选择天使资本融资，随着资本回报要求的增加，创业企业家选择风险资本融资；③当努力互补效应过大时，受资本约束影响较小创业企业家选择天使资本融资。而无论努力互补效应的大小，受到资本约束影响较大创业企业家一定会选择银行融资。
Enterprise plays a vital part in the market economy. One of the most notablefeatures in the market economy is the constant evolution of the enterprise, which is thebasic element of market. And the evolution experiences a process of birth, growth,maturity, expansion or death. The economy is developing in such a dynamic process.Apparently, the establishment of new business is the driving force for sustainabledevelopment for market economy. Just take China as an example, with the developmentof social economy; the entrepreneurial practice has become more and more active in theenvironment of market economy, which forms a significant solution to the employmentrate in the country with such a large population. Entrepreneurial activity plays a moreand more important role in the economic growth, which attracts more and morescholars’ attention. And the business development needs a new capital marketenvironment, namely the venture financing market, which makes the venture financingbecome another research focus.
The venture financing is the cross plate of entrepreneurial management andinvestment risk. The entrepreneurial management emphasizes the key role ofentrepreneur in enterprise, while risk investment believes in the important role ofventure investors. Investors provide not only fund but also management support for theventure, namely the enterprise turn to investors for money and wisdom, and the effortsof entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have complementary effect.
But according to the literature review of enterprise contracts, research focus on theentrepreneurs who promote the venture with the use of funds from investors, and rarelymentions the contribution of investors. The current studies mainly focus on theentrepreneurs who make use of the funds from venture investors to promote theirventure enterprise, and rarely mentioned the contribution to management in theentrepreneur enterprise. Even if some scholars referred to in the venture capitalmanagement contribution in their research, they have preference for the individualeffort, neglecting complementary effect. So this article analyze the enterprise financingcontract concerning the efforts of complementary, putting forward the complementaryeffect between business entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The main contents of thispaper include the following four aspects: The single stage and multistage contractarrangement based on the efforts of the complementary; bilateral signal monitoring mechanism analysis based on the complementary effect; the choices of financinginstruments; the financing object selection based on the complementary effect. Throughthe above four aspects of research, we got the following conclusions:
Firstly, the arrangement of venture investment contracts based on thecomplementary effect, from incomplete information to incomplete information, andfrom single phase to multi phase. In the single stage investment contract, the moral riskbringing by the incomplete information made the entrepreneurs and investors to choosea less effort level. At the same time, the output efficiency of entrepreneurs and venturecapitalists will affect the distribution proportion and choice for effort, thus affecting theincome and the change of effect; the variation of enterprise complementary coefficientdoes not affect the distribution ratio and individual efforts, but has a great influence onthe complementary efforts, total revenue and total effect. Similarly, in the contractarrangement of multiple stages, incomplete information brings the moral risk,prompting entrepreneurs and investors to choose a lower effort level. And we just takethe two stage investment model as an example. As the role of investors began to emergein the second stage, and the distribution ratio of the second stage is larger than the oneof first phase, which means investors can have a larger share of proceeds in secondstages. But the different complementary coefficient can still influence the effort level ofthe two phases. When the profits caused by complementary can offset the cost of theadditional effort, investment cooperation contract would like to increase complementaryinputs in second stages, and the exponential growth of the utility can promote theenterprises to maximize the benefits. By the comparison of the single stage investmentcontract and the multi-stage investment contract we can find that, due to some basicconcepts of reputation model was introduced by the multiple stage models, theperformance of this stage can affect the efforts of the next phase, forming a supervisionand restriction mechanism. Through a comparative analysis, we found that the overallutility of the multi-stage investment contract is larger, and the venture investors andentrepreneurs tend to put more effort than in the single stage.
Secondly, signal monitoring can promote the cooperation level and the efficiencyof venture enterprises, while increasing the output. Therefore the signal monitoring is aneffective way for the cooperation, and has the guiding role in the business cooperationpractice. Through the analysis, we found that:①when entrepreneurs or investorsmonitored separately, it can stimulate the cooperation level between the two sides; atthe same time, signal monitoring for investors is a dominant strategy, the entrepreneurs will accept signal monitoring considering the" financing wisdom" and othercomprehensive factors;②bilateral signal monitoring is an effective behavior, but notalways better than unilateral supervisory;③as for the monitoring consequences forindividual effect and complementary effect, complementary effect monitoring can hasboth monitoring effect and increasing effect.④Under the effect of the combined output,signal monitoring can still promote the efficiency, and enterprise participants need tomake a choice between efficiency and output, and while the complementary coefficienthave a significant influence on the joint monitoring efficiency, we should select theappropriate monitoring objects and the corresponding control mechanism based on thecomplementary coefficient.
Thirdly, as a powerful tool to inhibit bilateral moral hazard, to have a financialcontract arrangement like convertible bond has attracted a lot of scholars’ interests, butwhen considering the profits for different phases and the complementary effect ofentrepreneurs and investors, a variety of commonly used financial tools can become thebest choice. Through the study, we found that:①when the entrepreneur has completelybargaining power in the contract, common stocks, bonds, preferred stock andconvertible bond can be executed to be the only optimal contract;②when thecomplementary effect of entrepreneurs and investors is very low, and for entrepreneur,the ordinary bonds is the optimal contract;③when the complementary effect ofentrepreneurs and investors is moderate, as the cost of investor's capital is relatively low,the convertible bond is optimal for entrepreneurs. But as the cost of capital is relativelyhigh, the ordinary bonds is optimal for entrepreneurs;④when the complementary effectof entrepreneurs and investors is high, as the investor's cost of capital is relatively low,the ordinary shares is the best choice; as the investor's cost of capital is relatively high,the preferred stock is the optimal one.
Fourthly, entrepreneur chooses a bank loan, angel or venture capital investorsaccording to economic and behavioral factors, to obtain the optimal selection offinancing object. Through the study, we found that:①when the complementary effectis low, entrepreneurs with lower capital restraint would choose venture capital;②whenthe complementary effect is moderate, entrepreneurs with lower capital restraint wouldhave a choice of angel capital, but along with the requirement of capital return increase,entrepreneur turned to select the venture capital financing;③when the complementaryeffect is too high, entrepreneurs with lower capital restraint would choose the angel capital financing. And whatever the extent of complementary effect is, entrepreneursunder a comparable big capital constraint will choose the bank financing.
引文
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