防止国有资产境外流失的监管机制研究
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摘要
改革开放近三十年,中国企业已从弱到强发展起来,中国经济正处于历史发展的鼎盛期。中国本土企业也将市场拓展到国外,实现国际化经营,我国的境外直接投资进入高速发展的新阶段。2000年10月中共中央在十五届五中全会上通过了《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十个五年计划的建议》,《建议》首次明确提出“走出去”战略,它号召中国企业将市场拓展到国外,国有企业是这场战役的主力军。
     随着我国国民经济的进一步提高,我国的境外投资也面临着巨大的挑战。由于产权不明、监管不力、法律体系不健全等原因,造成了国有境外资产的大量流失。虽然国家在2003年成立国有资产监督管理委员会,代表政府行使国家财产所有权,也取得了可喜的成就,然而由于国企改革尚未完全到位,面临的问题仍然较多。
     我国的一些处于核心行业的国有大型企业在境外经营中因投资不慎,甚至通过境外经营恶意转移国有资产等原因已造成了令人触目惊心的国有资产流失。作为国有资产的委托代理人——政府;政府的委托代理人——公司,两方面都该予以足够的重视。
     针对国有资产境外流失的状况,国家出台过相关文件,如2001年中国证监会和国家外汇管理局牵头,联合当时的外经贸部(商务部前身)和国家工商总局,颁布《国有企业境外套期保值管理办法》,对国企境外期货交易制订了完整的监管体系,但这些法规还只是针对具体业务,经营范围等方面。如何基于委托代理理论理顺国有资产的层层监管关系,进而从政府层面和企业层面构建境外国有资产监管机制,明确各项审计要素,为监管实务的开展提供理念框架,这是本文的目的所在。
     本文采用规范性研究方法,第一章阐述国内外研究现状。
     第二章首先明确境外国有资产概念,列述对外直接投资规模之大,国有资产仍然是境外投资的主体。进而引出法律对国有资产流失的界定,分析几种典型的境外国资流失实例,如新加坡中航油事件,三九集团境外转移资产事件,中银香港小金库事件。最后总结境外国有资产所处地位,成果与存在的问题。
     第三章从国有资产境外所处环境开始分析国有资产流失成因,总结出境外企业主观经营行为与内部治理状况对境外国有资产流失的影响;体制,环境与历史沿革等客观因素对境外国有资产流失的影响。
     第四章是委托代理理论对国有资产境外监管的意义。从委托代理概念入手,分析境外国有资产多层次委托代理关系,及它相对于一般现代企业委托代理关系之外的独特性。
     第五章首先阐述境外国有资产监管的内涵,明确实施境外国有资产监管的主体,分工协作关系,重点,形式程序。重点是第二、三节。第二节阐述政府对境外国有资产监管的总要求等。第三节从企业层面构建监事会、审计机构、内审部门的三位一体风险监管框架及预警系统。
     本文的逻辑是从国有资产境外流失原因出发,基于相应理论构建制度化的防范机制,让两者更有相关性,保证机制的有效性。难点在于如何形成企业层面的监管机制:监事会、审计机构、内审部门的三位一体风险监管机制,以及以财务信息为主导的资产流失预警信息传导机制。
     以往的文献着重于对境外国有资产流失的热点案例进行分析,或从其业务规范性进行探讨。本文则基于委托代理理论,将国有资产委托受托经管责任层层分解,进而明确各个层次的监管、审计关系,进而从机制层面构建防范国有资产境外流失监管机制,更具理论性。
In 2000,“Go-out”strategy was firstly proposed on the 5th Plenary Session of 15th Central Committee of CPC, which called for the Chinese enterprises going out to extend the domestic market to the entire world and to compete directly with the foreign companies. As the most powerful strength, state-owned enterprise is the pioneer in this campaign.
     But problems are increasing with the growth of FDI of state-owned enterprises. The oversea asset of state-owned enterprises was greatly lost because of the unclear property right, incapable supervision and law systems.
     The frame of the paper is like this: The first chapter introduces the research status home and abroad.
     Chapter II first clears concept of state-owned assets overseas, foreign direct investment of state-owned assets is still the mainstay. Then is the legal definition of loss of the overseas state-owned assets. Through several typical examples, such as China Aviation Oil Singapore issue, Sanjiu Group, BOC Hong Kong’s small exchequer incident. It also concludes the status of state-owned assets, results and the problems that exist.
     Chapter III sums up overseas enterprises’subjective business practices and internal governance; system, the environment and history, and other factor.
     Chapter IV is the principal-agent theory. With the concept of agency, the state-owned assets have a multi-level agency system. The paper also lists the unique characters besides the ordinary modern enterprise agency theory.
     Chapter V introduces the connotation of the state-owned assets supervision, the main body of implementation, and the division cooperative relations. This chapter focuses on the second, three sections. Section II describes the state-owned assets supervision’s total requirements. Section III studies the enterprise level board, the audit agency, OIA Trinity sector regulatory framework and risk warning system.
     In a word, this paper introduces the actuality of our overseas investment, the problem of overseas and the opportunity and challenge of overseas investment.
     Then it analyses the grievous situation of oversea asset loss of state-owned enterprises, including CAOSC,in order to find the problems existed and causes of them. It also summarizes the three reasons on our overseas state-own assets loss including property right management, management of SOE and investment risk management.
     From the introduction and analysis on those problems above, the paper introduce the Basic concepts, basic characters of consign-deputy relationship and connotation of our state-own assets on consign-deputy theoretic; explain the significance on the overseas State-own asset supervision on consign-deputy theoretic.
     At last, the paper brings forward tentatively some measures and suggestions from this theory. In order to keep away the grievous instances on our overseas state-own assets loss. The author puts forward some constructive suggestions to form a systematic and all-direction supervision scheme both from the company and the government aspect.
引文
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