公司治理与资本结构对上市公司价值创造能力影响的实证研究
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摘要
价值创造能力是公司可持续发展、保有持续竞争优势的关键因素，而加强公司治理与优化资本结构是提高公司价值创造能力和实现股东收益最大化的基石和保证。然而目前，由于我国资本市场自身存在缺陷、公司治理不完善，股票的流动性较低以及保护中小股东的相关法律法规不健全等，导致我国上市公司价值创造能力普遍较低。翁洪波（2006）研究得出“近年来我国约65%的上市公司EVA是负值”；阮素梅、杨善林（2013）实证研究发现：2000年EVA为负的上市公司占比86.89%，2010年EVA为负的上市公司占比64.2%，表明在这11年间，我国上市公司价值创造能力普遍较低，但越来越多的公司价值创造能力正不断增加。公司治理与资本结构治理是企业管理的核心问题，良好的公司治理机制和合理的资本结构是吸引投资者、改善公司运营状况和提高价值创造能力的关键环节。提高公司价值创造能力的手段有很多，影响因素也多种多样，本文重点关注公司治理与资本结构因素对上市公司价值创造能力的独立影响与综合效应，这对进一步完善我国公司治理结构、优化资本结构和提高公司价值创造能力具有较强的理论意义与重要的应用价值。
首先，本文系统阐述了公司治理、资本结构与公司价值之间的相关理论基础；其次，深入分析股权结构、资本结构等与公司价值创造能力之间的作用机理，应用统计判定等分析方法寻找影响上市公司价值创造能力的关键因素以及影响因素之间的关联关系，并在均值回归分析的基础上，采用带有交叉乘积项的多元线性回归模型、二元选择Logit模型、部分线性非平衡面板数据模型等分别讨论股权结构与资本结构等因素对上市公司价值创造能力的独立影响与交叉配合效应。第三，构建结构方程模型，建立上市公司价值创造能力影响因素的综合分析框架，通过进行因子分析和路径分析并根据路径系数从整体上评估董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务等因素对上市公司价值创造能力的直接或间接综合影响效果。最后，对本文的研究进行了总结和展望。
本文的主要研究内容与创新性工作如下：
第一，提出了上市公司价值创造能力异质性概念，对上市公司价值创造能力异质性的表现形式、内在机理、影响方式等进行了系统分析和定量描述。从所有制属性方面的差异、股权制衡度方面的差异、公司规模方面的差异等因素出发，对上市公司价值创造能力的异质性做出了合理地解释；基于分位数回归模型，建立了上市公司价值创造能力异质性分析方法，该方法能够细致地捕获各因子在不同分位点处对上市公司价值创造能力的影响，从而克服均值回归无差异描述的局限，能够更加深入地揭示上市公司价值创造能力的异质行为。实证研究结果表明：这三类因素都显著影响我国上市公司的价值创造能力，但影响方式呈现出异质性，表现为在价值创造能力的上尾部与下尾部都有较大的回归系数，意味着需要特别关注那些价值创造能力层次较高和较低的公司，可以采取“抓两头、促中间”公司治理策略；各因素对公司价值创造能力为正的可能性影响程度表现为“折线型、台阶式”，意味着只有当各因素取值累积到一定程度时，该可能性才会发生变化，而这一变化对公司规模最为敏感，表明要想实现价值创造能力的提升，公司需要进行各因素的积累与准备。这一实证结果具有显著的经济含义，意味着可以采用针对性措施来提升上市公司的价值创造能力。
第二，给出了实现上市公司价值创造能力的最优股权制衡度规模测算方法，解决了最优股权制衡度规模的选择问题。基于部分线性非平衡面板数据模型讨论了股权制衡度对公司价值创造能力的不同影响范式：线性与非线性，并给出优选方案，解决了函数形式选择问题；并在非线性函数的基础上，结合非线性函数求极值方法，进一步给出了最优股权制衡度规模及其变动规律，提高了最优股权制衡度规模的预测精度。实证结果表明：公司价值创造能力随股权制衡度增加反而降低，呈现“倒U型”变化规律，最优股权制衡度规模为3.242。而从实际看，我国上市公司股权制衡度平均值从2000年的1.334到2010年的1.609，相对于最优股权制衡度规模而言，我国上市公司股权制衡度水平偏低。这一创新性结果，为完善中国上市公司治理结构、提高上市公司价值创造能力提供了经验证据，具有重要的现实意义。
第三，建立了上市公司价值创造能力影响因素的综合分析框架，克服了过去只能片面讨论单一模块因素的单独贡献、而不能综合分析各模块因素综合贡献的困境。董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务、公司价值创造等都是不可直接观测的潜在变量，为此构建结构方程模型，通过因子分析对潜在变量进行计量，通过路径分析讨论潜在变量之间的依赖关系，并建立上市公司价值创造能力影响因素的综合分析框架，从整体上评估董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务等因素对上市公司价值创造能力的直接或间接影响效果。这一综合分析框架，能够充分利用多方面的信息，从而给出上市公司价值创造能力整体分析方案，可以为后续此类研究提供理论与方法基础。实证研究表明：董事会治理与股权结构的直接影响都不显著，只是存在间接影响；资本结构对上市公司价值创造能力既存在直接影响，也存在间接影响；公司财务存在直接影响。可以认为董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务等都对上市公司价值创造能力产生直接或间接的影响，按照总体影响程度大小，依次排序为：资本结构、股权结构、公司财务、董事会治理。
第四，使用经济计量方法，细致地区分了影响上市公司价值创造能力各因素间的独立影响与交叉配合效应。通过应用统计判定等分析方法寻找影响上市公司价值创造能力的关键因素以及各影响因素之间的关联关系，进而构造预测和评价上市公司价值创造能力的综合判定模型，从而克服了以往单方面或用单一指标进行相关主题研究的片面性和局限性。并在均值回归分析基础上，采用带有交叉乘积项的多元线性回归模型、二元选择Logit模型、部分线性非平衡面板数据模型等方法分别讨论公司治理、资本结构对上市公司价值创造能力的独立影响和交叉配合效应，能够区分对于处于不同层次价值创造能力的上市公司而言，公司治理和资本结构能够引起差异化的价值创造模式。交叉配合效应的提出，改变了过去将影响因素视为独立性的假定，拓展了研究思路，可以考虑影响因素之间的配合效应，对于正的配合效应，可以为公司治理的组合政策设计提供决策依据，具有重要的应用价值。
Value creation ability is the key factor of company's sustainable development andkeeping sustainable competitive advantage. To strengthen corporate governance andoptimize the capital structure are the foundation and guarantee to improve companyvalue creation ability and maximize shareholder value. However, because our countrycapital market itself is flawed, corporate governance is imperfect, stock liquidity is low,and the relevant laws and regulations to protect the minority shareholders is not sound,etc, value creation ability of our country listed company is generally low. HongBoWeng (2006) found that EVA in about65%of the listed companies in China in recentyears is negative. SuMei Ruan&Shanlin Yang(2013) found that negative EVA oflisted companies in2000accounted for86.89%, Negative EVA of listed companies in2010accounted for64.2%, which show that our country listed company value creationability is generally low in these11years, but a growing number of companies valuecreation ability is increasing. Corporate governance and capital structure governance isthe core of enterprise management, good corporate governance mechanism and thereasonable capital structure is the key processes to attract investors, improve thecompany's operating status and improve the ability of value creation. There are a lot ofinfluence factors and means in improving company value creation ability. This articlefocuses on the independent and comprehensive effect of corporate governance andcapital structure factors’ impact on the listed company value creation ability, which hasa strong theoretical significance and important application value to further improve thecorporate governance structure in our country, optimize capital structure and increasethe company value creation ability
First, this paper describes related theory of corporate governance, capital structureand corporate value. Secondly, the paper analyzes the mechanism of action betweenownership structure, capital structure and corporate value creation. This paper looks forthe key factors affecting the value creation ability of listed companies and therelationship between these factors by using the statistical analysis methods, anddiscusses the equity structure and capital structure factors’ independent impact andcross matching effect on the value creation ability of listed company by using multiplelinear regression models with cross-product terms, binary choice Logit models, andpartially linear unbalanced panel data models. Third, by building structural equation model, this paper establish a comprehensive analytical framework to analyses the valuecreation ability of listed companies, which includes the factors of board governance,ownership structure, capital structure and corporate finance. Finally, this papersummarizes the research and outlook.
The main research contents and innovative work of this paper are as follows:
First, this paper put forward the heterogeneity of the value creation ability oflisted companies at the first time; do the systematic analysis and quantitativedescription to the forms, internal mechanism, and influence of the heterogeneity of thevalue creation ability. This paper makes a reasonable explanation to the heterogeneityof the value creation ability of listed companies from the aspects of ownership propertydifferences, equity balance degree differences and company size differences etc. Thispaper establishes the heterogeneity analysis method of listed company value creationability based on Quantile regression model. This method is able to capture the detailedfactors at different quantiles which have influence on value creation ability of listedcompanies, thus it could overcome the limitations of no difference by description meanreversion, and it also could reveal the heterogeneous behavior of listed companies’value creation ability more deeply. The empirical results show that these three factorshave significant impact on the value creation ability of listed companies, but it showheterogeneity. The value creation ability of listed companies on the tail and under thetail has a larger regression coefficient, so we need to pay special attention to the higherand lower level companies of value creation ability. We can take "catch two head,promote middle" corporate governance strategy; The possibility of various factors’influence on the positive value creation ability of listed companies express "bent,terraced", which means that only when the value of various factors accumulated to acertain degree, the possibility may change. And the change is most sensitive to thecompany scale. So to achieve the ability to enhance value creation, the company needsto be accumulated and preparation of various factors. This empirical result hasremarkable economic meaning and is beneficial to use targeted measures to improvethe value creation ability of listed companies.
Second, this paper creates the optimal equity balance degree measurement torealize the value creation ability of listed companies, which solve the optimal size ofthe equity restriction choice, and discusses different influence model of equity balancedegree’s impact on the value creation ability by using the unbalanced panel data basedon the partial linear model: linear and nonlinear, and finally gives a preferred embodiment. On the basis of a nonlinear relationship, this paper further gives theoptimal balance of the scale of changes in equity. The empirical results show that thevalue creation ability of listed companies decreased with equity restriction increased,showing the "inverted U" variation. The optimal equity restriction scale is3.242. Andfrom a practical perspective, China's listed companies equity restriction averages from1.334in year2000to1.609in year2010. Contrast to the optimal equity balance degreescale, equity balance degree in China is low. This innovative result provides empiricalevidence to perfect the governance structure and improve corporate value creationability of Chinese listed companies, which has important practical significance.
Third, this paper establish a comprehensive analytical framework of theinfluential factors of the value creation ability of listed companies, which overcome thepast framework that only have one-sided discussion of an individual contribution to thesector factors, and not a comprehensive analysis of all factors contribute to the plightof the plate. Board governance, ownership structure, capital structure, corporatefinance, and corporate value are not directly observed, so we build structural equationmodel, measure the potential variables by Factor Analysis, discuss the potentialdependencies between variables by Path Analysis, and establish a comprehensiveanalytical framework of the value creation ability of listed companies. So we canassess the directly or indirectly affect of the board governance, ownership structure,capital structure, corporate finance and other factors on the value creation as a whole.This comprehensive analytical framework can make full use of various informationand give the listed company value creation ability overall analysis, which can providethe theory and method for the follow-up studies. The empirical research shows that: thedirect influence of board of director’s governance and ownership structure is notsignificant; the both only have indirect effects; the capital structure of listed companyboth exist directly influence and indirect effects; the company’s financial existencedirectly affected. We can see that board of directors governance, ownership structure,capital structure and corporate finance have directly or indirectly influence to the listedcompany value creation ability, according to the overall effect size, prioritize asfollows: the capital structure, ownership structure, corporate financial governance, theboard of directors.
Fourth, this paper carefully distinguishes independent effect and cross effect ofdifferent factors affecting the listed company value creation ability by usingeconometric methods. This paper looks for the key factors affecting the company's ability creating and the relationship between these factors by using the statisticalanalysis methods. Further this paper creates the comprehensive judgment model thatcan predict and evaluate the listed company value creation ability, which overcome theone-sidedness and limitations of related study unilateral or with a single index. Thispaper discusses the equity structure and capital structure factors’ independent impactand cross matching effect on the value creation ability of listed company by usingmultiple linear regression models with cross-product terms, binary choice Logitmodels, and partially linear unbalanced panel data models. So we can distinguishdifferential model of value creation caused by corporate governance and capitalstructure in in different levels of listed companies. The cross matching effect changedthe notion that take the influence factors as the assumption of independence, andexpand the research train of thought. So we can consider the cooperate effect betweeninfluence factors. For the positive effect, we can provide decision-making basis for thecombination of the corporate governance policy design and has important applicationvalue.
首先，本文系统阐述了公司治理、资本结构与公司价值之间的相关理论基础；其次，深入分析股权结构、资本结构等与公司价值创造能力之间的作用机理，应用统计判定等分析方法寻找影响上市公司价值创造能力的关键因素以及影响因素之间的关联关系，并在均值回归分析的基础上，采用带有交叉乘积项的多元线性回归模型、二元选择Logit模型、部分线性非平衡面板数据模型等分别讨论股权结构与资本结构等因素对上市公司价值创造能力的独立影响与交叉配合效应。第三，构建结构方程模型，建立上市公司价值创造能力影响因素的综合分析框架，通过进行因子分析和路径分析并根据路径系数从整体上评估董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务等因素对上市公司价值创造能力的直接或间接综合影响效果。最后，对本文的研究进行了总结和展望。
本文的主要研究内容与创新性工作如下：
第一，提出了上市公司价值创造能力异质性概念，对上市公司价值创造能力异质性的表现形式、内在机理、影响方式等进行了系统分析和定量描述。从所有制属性方面的差异、股权制衡度方面的差异、公司规模方面的差异等因素出发，对上市公司价值创造能力的异质性做出了合理地解释；基于分位数回归模型，建立了上市公司价值创造能力异质性分析方法，该方法能够细致地捕获各因子在不同分位点处对上市公司价值创造能力的影响，从而克服均值回归无差异描述的局限，能够更加深入地揭示上市公司价值创造能力的异质行为。实证研究结果表明：这三类因素都显著影响我国上市公司的价值创造能力，但影响方式呈现出异质性，表现为在价值创造能力的上尾部与下尾部都有较大的回归系数，意味着需要特别关注那些价值创造能力层次较高和较低的公司，可以采取“抓两头、促中间”公司治理策略；各因素对公司价值创造能力为正的可能性影响程度表现为“折线型、台阶式”，意味着只有当各因素取值累积到一定程度时，该可能性才会发生变化，而这一变化对公司规模最为敏感，表明要想实现价值创造能力的提升，公司需要进行各因素的积累与准备。这一实证结果具有显著的经济含义，意味着可以采用针对性措施来提升上市公司的价值创造能力。
第二，给出了实现上市公司价值创造能力的最优股权制衡度规模测算方法，解决了最优股权制衡度规模的选择问题。基于部分线性非平衡面板数据模型讨论了股权制衡度对公司价值创造能力的不同影响范式：线性与非线性，并给出优选方案，解决了函数形式选择问题；并在非线性函数的基础上，结合非线性函数求极值方法，进一步给出了最优股权制衡度规模及其变动规律，提高了最优股权制衡度规模的预测精度。实证结果表明：公司价值创造能力随股权制衡度增加反而降低，呈现“倒U型”变化规律，最优股权制衡度规模为3.242。而从实际看，我国上市公司股权制衡度平均值从2000年的1.334到2010年的1.609，相对于最优股权制衡度规模而言，我国上市公司股权制衡度水平偏低。这一创新性结果，为完善中国上市公司治理结构、提高上市公司价值创造能力提供了经验证据，具有重要的现实意义。
第三，建立了上市公司价值创造能力影响因素的综合分析框架，克服了过去只能片面讨论单一模块因素的单独贡献、而不能综合分析各模块因素综合贡献的困境。董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务、公司价值创造等都是不可直接观测的潜在变量，为此构建结构方程模型，通过因子分析对潜在变量进行计量，通过路径分析讨论潜在变量之间的依赖关系，并建立上市公司价值创造能力影响因素的综合分析框架，从整体上评估董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务等因素对上市公司价值创造能力的直接或间接影响效果。这一综合分析框架，能够充分利用多方面的信息，从而给出上市公司价值创造能力整体分析方案，可以为后续此类研究提供理论与方法基础。实证研究表明：董事会治理与股权结构的直接影响都不显著，只是存在间接影响；资本结构对上市公司价值创造能力既存在直接影响，也存在间接影响；公司财务存在直接影响。可以认为董事会治理、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务等都对上市公司价值创造能力产生直接或间接的影响，按照总体影响程度大小，依次排序为：资本结构、股权结构、公司财务、董事会治理。
第四，使用经济计量方法，细致地区分了影响上市公司价值创造能力各因素间的独立影响与交叉配合效应。通过应用统计判定等分析方法寻找影响上市公司价值创造能力的关键因素以及各影响因素之间的关联关系，进而构造预测和评价上市公司价值创造能力的综合判定模型，从而克服了以往单方面或用单一指标进行相关主题研究的片面性和局限性。并在均值回归分析基础上，采用带有交叉乘积项的多元线性回归模型、二元选择Logit模型、部分线性非平衡面板数据模型等方法分别讨论公司治理、资本结构对上市公司价值创造能力的独立影响和交叉配合效应，能够区分对于处于不同层次价值创造能力的上市公司而言，公司治理和资本结构能够引起差异化的价值创造模式。交叉配合效应的提出，改变了过去将影响因素视为独立性的假定，拓展了研究思路，可以考虑影响因素之间的配合效应，对于正的配合效应，可以为公司治理的组合政策设计提供决策依据，具有重要的应用价值。
Value creation ability is the key factor of company's sustainable development andkeeping sustainable competitive advantage. To strengthen corporate governance andoptimize the capital structure are the foundation and guarantee to improve companyvalue creation ability and maximize shareholder value. However, because our countrycapital market itself is flawed, corporate governance is imperfect, stock liquidity is low,and the relevant laws and regulations to protect the minority shareholders is not sound,etc, value creation ability of our country listed company is generally low. HongBoWeng (2006) found that EVA in about65%of the listed companies in China in recentyears is negative. SuMei Ruan&Shanlin Yang(2013) found that negative EVA oflisted companies in2000accounted for86.89%, Negative EVA of listed companies in2010accounted for64.2%, which show that our country listed company value creationability is generally low in these11years, but a growing number of companies valuecreation ability is increasing. Corporate governance and capital structure governance isthe core of enterprise management, good corporate governance mechanism and thereasonable capital structure is the key processes to attract investors, improve thecompany's operating status and improve the ability of value creation. There are a lot ofinfluence factors and means in improving company value creation ability. This articlefocuses on the independent and comprehensive effect of corporate governance andcapital structure factors’ impact on the listed company value creation ability, which hasa strong theoretical significance and important application value to further improve thecorporate governance structure in our country, optimize capital structure and increasethe company value creation ability
First, this paper describes related theory of corporate governance, capital structureand corporate value. Secondly, the paper analyzes the mechanism of action betweenownership structure, capital structure and corporate value creation. This paper looks forthe key factors affecting the value creation ability of listed companies and therelationship between these factors by using the statistical analysis methods, anddiscusses the equity structure and capital structure factors’ independent impact andcross matching effect on the value creation ability of listed company by using multiplelinear regression models with cross-product terms, binary choice Logit models, andpartially linear unbalanced panel data models. Third, by building structural equation model, this paper establish a comprehensive analytical framework to analyses the valuecreation ability of listed companies, which includes the factors of board governance,ownership structure, capital structure and corporate finance. Finally, this papersummarizes the research and outlook.
The main research contents and innovative work of this paper are as follows:
First, this paper put forward the heterogeneity of the value creation ability oflisted companies at the first time; do the systematic analysis and quantitativedescription to the forms, internal mechanism, and influence of the heterogeneity of thevalue creation ability. This paper makes a reasonable explanation to the heterogeneityof the value creation ability of listed companies from the aspects of ownership propertydifferences, equity balance degree differences and company size differences etc. Thispaper establishes the heterogeneity analysis method of listed company value creationability based on Quantile regression model. This method is able to capture the detailedfactors at different quantiles which have influence on value creation ability of listedcompanies, thus it could overcome the limitations of no difference by description meanreversion, and it also could reveal the heterogeneous behavior of listed companies’value creation ability more deeply. The empirical results show that these three factorshave significant impact on the value creation ability of listed companies, but it showheterogeneity. The value creation ability of listed companies on the tail and under thetail has a larger regression coefficient, so we need to pay special attention to the higherand lower level companies of value creation ability. We can take "catch two head,promote middle" corporate governance strategy; The possibility of various factors’influence on the positive value creation ability of listed companies express "bent,terraced", which means that only when the value of various factors accumulated to acertain degree, the possibility may change. And the change is most sensitive to thecompany scale. So to achieve the ability to enhance value creation, the company needsto be accumulated and preparation of various factors. This empirical result hasremarkable economic meaning and is beneficial to use targeted measures to improvethe value creation ability of listed companies.
Second, this paper creates the optimal equity balance degree measurement torealize the value creation ability of listed companies, which solve the optimal size ofthe equity restriction choice, and discusses different influence model of equity balancedegree’s impact on the value creation ability by using the unbalanced panel data basedon the partial linear model: linear and nonlinear, and finally gives a preferred embodiment. On the basis of a nonlinear relationship, this paper further gives theoptimal balance of the scale of changes in equity. The empirical results show that thevalue creation ability of listed companies decreased with equity restriction increased,showing the "inverted U" variation. The optimal equity restriction scale is3.242. Andfrom a practical perspective, China's listed companies equity restriction averages from1.334in year2000to1.609in year2010. Contrast to the optimal equity balance degreescale, equity balance degree in China is low. This innovative result provides empiricalevidence to perfect the governance structure and improve corporate value creationability of Chinese listed companies, which has important practical significance.
Third, this paper establish a comprehensive analytical framework of theinfluential factors of the value creation ability of listed companies, which overcome thepast framework that only have one-sided discussion of an individual contribution to thesector factors, and not a comprehensive analysis of all factors contribute to the plightof the plate. Board governance, ownership structure, capital structure, corporatefinance, and corporate value are not directly observed, so we build structural equationmodel, measure the potential variables by Factor Analysis, discuss the potentialdependencies between variables by Path Analysis, and establish a comprehensiveanalytical framework of the value creation ability of listed companies. So we canassess the directly or indirectly affect of the board governance, ownership structure,capital structure, corporate finance and other factors on the value creation as a whole.This comprehensive analytical framework can make full use of various informationand give the listed company value creation ability overall analysis, which can providethe theory and method for the follow-up studies. The empirical research shows that: thedirect influence of board of director’s governance and ownership structure is notsignificant; the both only have indirect effects; the capital structure of listed companyboth exist directly influence and indirect effects; the company’s financial existencedirectly affected. We can see that board of directors governance, ownership structure,capital structure and corporate finance have directly or indirectly influence to the listedcompany value creation ability, according to the overall effect size, prioritize asfollows: the capital structure, ownership structure, corporate financial governance, theboard of directors.
Fourth, this paper carefully distinguishes independent effect and cross effect ofdifferent factors affecting the listed company value creation ability by usingeconometric methods. This paper looks for the key factors affecting the company's ability creating and the relationship between these factors by using the statisticalanalysis methods. Further this paper creates the comprehensive judgment model thatcan predict and evaluate the listed company value creation ability, which overcome theone-sidedness and limitations of related study unilateral or with a single index. Thispaper discusses the equity structure and capital structure factors’ independent impactand cross matching effect on the value creation ability of listed company by usingmultiple linear regression models with cross-product terms, binary choice Logitmodels, and partially linear unbalanced panel data models. So we can distinguishdifferential model of value creation caused by corporate governance and capitalstructure in in different levels of listed companies. The cross matching effect changedthe notion that take the influence factors as the assumption of independence, andexpand the research train of thought. So we can consider the cooperate effect betweeninfluence factors. For the positive effect, we can provide decision-making basis for thecombination of the corporate governance policy design and has important applicationvalue.
引文
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