管理系统动力机制研究
|
摘要
管理学诞生近百年来一直围绕管理职能进行研究,着重从操作层面阐述原理和规范,制度与机制似乎成了管理的外生变量。但是制度对于员工的积极性具有决定性的影响,中国的改革进程已经充分证明了这一点。本文试图从机制的层面解读组织运行的机理,探索积极性产生的机制性原因,通过机制而不是人治进行管理,以期寻求“无为而治”的效果。
《老子》是一部哲学诗篇,更是最早的管理学巨著,其“道法自然,无为而治”的管理理念是本文立论的哲学基础。“道”就是自然规律,就是事物运行的内在机理,简而言之:“道”即机制。基于这样的认识再来探讨人性的本质――从生物人的角度来看,人是自利的;从经济人的角度来看,人是自利与利他的统一;从社会人的角度来看,人有自利、利他和中性成份。自利是基因派生的属性,从深层次到表层次逐渐减弱,这即是本文的“层次人”假设。基于这样的假设导出了利益导向原则,以此作为机制设计的主线。人是趋利的,放之于坏的机制,产生无尽的冲突与祸患;放之于好的机制,趋利性恰是组织动力的源泉。利用机制进行管理是通往“无为而治”的必由之路。
权力、责任、利益是组织生命的基本元素,三者适当配置构成动力机制的微观结构;导向机制、激励机制、约束机制、控制机制及其置身其中的文化场构成动力机制的宏观结构。导向机制的功能是引导和凝聚人的积极性。根据组织行为学关于需要、动机、行为、目标之间的因果关系,在行为与目标之间,抓住业绩考评这个关键环节,借助于考评体系把个人目标与组织目标捆绑在一起,将人的积极性引导到实现组织目标的轨道上来。激励机制的功能是激发与强化人的积极性。传统的激励机制模型是委托人单方面设计、代理人无奈选择的不平等条约,面对知识经济的新环境,本文设计了剩余共享的激励机制模型。约束机制的功能是整合与集束人的积极性,将人的行为取向整合到组织目标上来。约束机制的构建要遵循利益制衡的原则,利用行为主体之间的利益冲突建立相互制约的耦合,使约束成为系统内在的天然机能。控制机制的功能是纠正偏差,确保组织沿着既定的轨道运行。控制机制的设计要遵从封闭运行的原则,使得各层级的组织单元具有相应的责权利,成为相对独立的“生命体”,采用“复合嵌套控制机制”,抓住关键的控制点,运用政策杠杆驾驭组织运行。
管理系统动力机制研究以“物理、事理、人理”为方法论基础,按照设计科学的研究范式,吸收管理学、经济学和新兴交叉学科的研究成果,拓展了一个管理学研究的新视角,对“无为而治”的管理进行了初步的探索。
The management theories have been developed for almost a whole century. All studies on management mainly focused on the functions of management itself through analyzing the principles and norms of management from operational perspectives. Consequently, the system as well as the mechanism of management seems to be identified as exogenous variables. Nevertheless, the mechanism of organizational management plays practically decisive role in motivating a member of any organization, which has been thoroughly verified through the reform practice in China. This essay tries to uncover the real effective mechanism of management that drives the organization smoothly running, and probe into the essential cause that makes the members of organization work actively. All of which I study will come into together to form the real effective driving mechanism of management, to achieve the ideal governing status, which I see as“governing by mechanism”instead of ruling .
is a collection of writings or thoughts of Philosophy Tao, as well as the earliest magnum opus on management. The managerial principle“When nothing is done, nothing is left undone. The world is won by letting things take their own course”is the philosophical foundation of this essay. In accordance with Taoism, Tao ( Dao ) - a word translated to English as "The Way," means "the natural flow of things" which implies the "course of nature". To put it simply, it is the mechanism of management in a broad sense. On the basis of such philosophy, to view the nature of human――in term of Human-being biological nature, People’s behavior could be thought as a process of purchasing their own interests; as the Economic Man, their behaviors are the combination of self-interests and public interests; as the socio-person, they are always been identified with the integration of self-interests, public interests and neutralism. The self-interest-driven nature is designed by human’s genes. The strength of which will be gradually weakened off from the inner thought to the outside. This is the hypothesis of“Multilevel Human”of this essay. Based upon such a hypothesis, the principle of interest-oriented will be introduced to act as guideline for designing management mechanism. Since human beings are unexceptionally interests-motivated, given a bad mechanism,endless conflicts and disasters will be aroused; on the other hand, given a good mechanism, such interest-oriented motivation of human could be led to be transferred into the source of motivation of an organization. To manage an organization by the automatically systematic mechanism is the only way to achieve the status of“Nothing is done then nothing is left undone”.
Rights and responsibilities and benefits are three fundamental elements of an organization, The micro-structure of the driving mechanism is formed with the well-combined three elements, while the macro-structure of the dynamical mechanism is constructed by the Guiding Mechanism, the Incentive Mechanism, constrained system, controlling system, and the Culture Field. Guidance Mechanism functions as a guidance as well as a collector of human’s enthusiasm. According to the cause-effect relationship among need, motive, behavior and objective in Organization Behavior, from setting an organization objective to putting it into practice, human’s enthusiasm can be guided to fulfill such an objective if personal target and organization objective are in harmony through executing such a key process as assessment. Incentive Mechanism functions as a stimulator and a strengthener of the human’s enthusiasm. The traditional incentive mechanism is an unfair treaty which is designed by principal unilaterally and chose by agents reluctantly. Here propose a profit-sharing incentive mechanism model which is a better solution for knowledge-based economy. Constrained system functions as an integrator and restrictor of the human’s enthusiasm. It serves to regulate human’s behavior towards the organization objectives. Establishment of such mechanism relies on the basis of a benefit balance. Restrictions within an organization can be achieved by balancing the interest conflicts among individuals. The major functions of the controlling system are redressing discrepancies in order to ensure the organization is operated towards the scheduled direction. The establishment of such mechanism relies on the basis of closed operation, guaranteeing the corresponding obligations and rights of relatively independent units along the hierarchy. With such Internal Control Mechanism, when the key checkpoints controlled, the operation of an organization can be achieved.
The study of the dynamical mechanism is founded on the basis of the methodology“WSR”and the paradigm“design science”. This essay tries to explore a new way to manage by Taoism philosophy,“Nothing is done then nothing is left undone”, and to search for a scientific model in organization management by integrating management studies, economics and some New Transverse Subjects.
《老子》是一部哲学诗篇,更是最早的管理学巨著,其“道法自然,无为而治”的管理理念是本文立论的哲学基础。“道”就是自然规律,就是事物运行的内在机理,简而言之:“道”即机制。基于这样的认识再来探讨人性的本质――从生物人的角度来看,人是自利的;从经济人的角度来看,人是自利与利他的统一;从社会人的角度来看,人有自利、利他和中性成份。自利是基因派生的属性,从深层次到表层次逐渐减弱,这即是本文的“层次人”假设。基于这样的假设导出了利益导向原则,以此作为机制设计的主线。人是趋利的,放之于坏的机制,产生无尽的冲突与祸患;放之于好的机制,趋利性恰是组织动力的源泉。利用机制进行管理是通往“无为而治”的必由之路。
权力、责任、利益是组织生命的基本元素,三者适当配置构成动力机制的微观结构;导向机制、激励机制、约束机制、控制机制及其置身其中的文化场构成动力机制的宏观结构。导向机制的功能是引导和凝聚人的积极性。根据组织行为学关于需要、动机、行为、目标之间的因果关系,在行为与目标之间,抓住业绩考评这个关键环节,借助于考评体系把个人目标与组织目标捆绑在一起,将人的积极性引导到实现组织目标的轨道上来。激励机制的功能是激发与强化人的积极性。传统的激励机制模型是委托人单方面设计、代理人无奈选择的不平等条约,面对知识经济的新环境,本文设计了剩余共享的激励机制模型。约束机制的功能是整合与集束人的积极性,将人的行为取向整合到组织目标上来。约束机制的构建要遵循利益制衡的原则,利用行为主体之间的利益冲突建立相互制约的耦合,使约束成为系统内在的天然机能。控制机制的功能是纠正偏差,确保组织沿着既定的轨道运行。控制机制的设计要遵从封闭运行的原则,使得各层级的组织单元具有相应的责权利,成为相对独立的“生命体”,采用“复合嵌套控制机制”,抓住关键的控制点,运用政策杠杆驾驭组织运行。
管理系统动力机制研究以“物理、事理、人理”为方法论基础,按照设计科学的研究范式,吸收管理学、经济学和新兴交叉学科的研究成果,拓展了一个管理学研究的新视角,对“无为而治”的管理进行了初步的探索。
The management theories have been developed for almost a whole century. All studies on management mainly focused on the functions of management itself through analyzing the principles and norms of management from operational perspectives. Consequently, the system as well as the mechanism of management seems to be identified as exogenous variables. Nevertheless, the mechanism of organizational management plays practically decisive role in motivating a member of any organization, which has been thoroughly verified through the reform practice in China. This essay tries to uncover the real effective mechanism of management that drives the organization smoothly running, and probe into the essential cause that makes the members of organization work actively. All of which I study will come into together to form the real effective driving mechanism of management, to achieve the ideal governing status, which I see as“governing by mechanism”instead of ruling .
Rights and responsibilities and benefits are three fundamental elements of an organization, The micro-structure of the driving mechanism is formed with the well-combined three elements, while the macro-structure of the dynamical mechanism is constructed by the Guiding Mechanism, the Incentive Mechanism, constrained system, controlling system, and the Culture Field. Guidance Mechanism functions as a guidance as well as a collector of human’s enthusiasm. According to the cause-effect relationship among need, motive, behavior and objective in Organization Behavior, from setting an organization objective to putting it into practice, human’s enthusiasm can be guided to fulfill such an objective if personal target and organization objective are in harmony through executing such a key process as assessment. Incentive Mechanism functions as a stimulator and a strengthener of the human’s enthusiasm. The traditional incentive mechanism is an unfair treaty which is designed by principal unilaterally and chose by agents reluctantly. Here propose a profit-sharing incentive mechanism model which is a better solution for knowledge-based economy. Constrained system functions as an integrator and restrictor of the human’s enthusiasm. It serves to regulate human’s behavior towards the organization objectives. Establishment of such mechanism relies on the basis of a benefit balance. Restrictions within an organization can be achieved by balancing the interest conflicts among individuals. The major functions of the controlling system are redressing discrepancies in order to ensure the organization is operated towards the scheduled direction. The establishment of such mechanism relies on the basis of closed operation, guaranteeing the corresponding obligations and rights of relatively independent units along the hierarchy. With such Internal Control Mechanism, when the key checkpoints controlled, the operation of an organization can be achieved.
The study of the dynamical mechanism is founded on the basis of the methodology“WSR”and the paradigm“design science”. This essay tries to explore a new way to manage by Taoism philosophy,“Nothing is done then nothing is left undone”, and to search for a scientific model in organization management by integrating management studies, economics and some New Transverse Subjects.
引文
①参见 2004 年 11 月监察部副部长屈万祥在广东省所作的学习《中国共产党党内监督条例(试行)》和《中国共产党纪律处分条例》的专题辅导报告。未经史学考证。
② 参见刘兵、张士英.激励理论综述与展望[J].中国软科学,1999.5:p21-23.
①理查德·爱波斯坦语。 Richard A Epstein(1997):Iaw and Economics:Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future,64(4)University of Chicago Law Review:pp.1167-1174.转引自黄立君.法经济学发展历史概述[A].黄少安主编.制度经济学研究(第五辑).北京:经济科学出版社,2004.第 23 页.
①冯友兰.贞元六书 (上) ·新世训[M ].上海:华东师范大学出版社, 19961 转引自:牟宗艳. 老子自然主义与人文主义相结合的治国理念[J].文史哲.2003.6.121-125
②牟宗艳. 老子自然主义与人文主义相结合的治国理念[J].文史哲.2003.6.121-125
①杨先举.老子管理学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005
① 参见熊凯,段方乐:老子哲学的文化境域解读[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版)2005.2.68-72
①转引自赵泉民.集体主义文化与中国合作制经济的困境――基于中西方文化精神比较的视野[J]人文杂志,2005.4.52-57
① 转引自曾小华《文化、制度与社会变革》北京:中国经济出版社,2004.第 1-2 页.
② 转引自石伟主编《组织文化》上海:复旦大学出版社,2004.第 12 页
① [美]斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯.组织行为学精要(第六版).北京:电子工业出版社,2004 第 100 页
① 参见何建华.正义是什么:效用、公平、权利、还是美德.学术月刊,2004.10
② E.博登海默在《法理学――法律哲学与法律方法》一书中归纳了正义的各种定义。普洛透斯希腊神话中变幻莫测莫测的海神。
① 在其随后的表述中罗尔斯区分了原初状态与无知之幕的不同,即原初状态=无知之幕+相互冷淡。见罗尔斯《正义论》北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988
①赵泉民.集体主义文化与中国合作制经济的困境――基于中西方文化精神比较的视野[J]人文杂志,2005.4.52-57
②同上
③ 《马克思恩格斯全集》第 12 卷,第 734 页。
①袁永和.对西方个人主义价值观的几点思考[J] 西南民族大学学报(人文社科版)2005.7.300-303
②袁永和.对西方个人主义价值观的几点思考[J] 西南民族大学学报(人文社科版)2005.7.300-303
③ 蔡晓.个人主义与经济秩序[J]读书.1997.4 转引自徐克谦:先秦儒家的个人主义精神[J]齐鲁学刊.2005.5
① 参见 2006 年 3 月 3 日经济观察报:《理性思考中国改革》
① 参见威廉·大内,Z 理论[A]. 载孙耀君.西方管理学名著提要[C].南昌:江西人民出版社,1995.第 301 页.
①马克思恩格斯全集(第 1 卷)[M],北京:人民出版社,1972.第 182 页.
① 参见孙剑平 《薪酬体系与机制设计》上海交通大学出版社,2006.01.
① 西蒙将人的追求归结为财富、权力和荣誉,本文对个人目标函数的设计参照西蒙的观点。见 Herbert A Simon 著,黄涛译.西蒙选集[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002.483 页.
① 参见斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯著,郑晓明译《组织行为学精要》.电子工业出版社,2004.第 168 页。
① 参见 Edward E.Lawler Ⅲ、Lyman Porter.1967.The Effect of Performence on Job Satisfaction..
② 参见 Porter Lyman W.,and Edward E.Lawler,Ⅲ.1968.Managerial Attitudes and Performance.Homewood:Irwin.
① 孙剑平.薪酬体系与机制设计.上海:上海交通大学出版社,2006.pp18.
② 孙磊. TCL 增量奖股催生国际知名企业.南方日报,2005.8.29.
① Brennan ,Geoffrey,1996.Selection and the Currency of Reward[A], Robert E. Goodin. The Theory of Institutional Design[C].New York :Cambridge University Press .
① 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2004.pp242.
① 转引自房宁.面对“非典”说政体――两岸三地的观察与比较[J]科学决策,2003.08.pp41-45
②[美]丹尼尔.W.布罗姆利著,陈郁等译..经济利益与经济制度[M]上海:上海人民出版社,1996.第 55 页.
①转引自鲁克俭. 西方制度创新理论中的制度设计理论[J]马克思主义与现实,2001.1:65-70
②参见 J . N. Gray , Hayek on Liberty , Oxford , 1984.第 134 页
[1] [美]彼德·德鲁克,工商企业能从非营利性组织中学到什么[A],载史蒂文·克尔编著,薪酬与激励[C].北京:机械工业出版社,2005,44-54.
[2][美]彼德·德鲁克.管理:任务、责任、实践[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1987. {3}[美]彼德·圣吉,第五项修炼――学习型组织的艺术与实务[M].上海:上海三联书店,1998.
[4]曹元坤,占小军.激励理论研究现状及发展[J],当代财经,2003.12:p89-98
[5]成中英.C 理论:中国管理哲学[M],上海:学林出版社,1999.12
[6][美]戴维·韦默主编,费方域,朱宝钦译.制度设计[C],上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.11-12.
[7][美]丹尼尔.W.布罗姆利著,陈郁等译..经济利益与经济制度[M]上海:上海人民出版社,1996.第 55 页.
[8][美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯等. 制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[C].上海:三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994.
[9]范黎波,张卫. 海尔 SBU 经营机制的深层次思考[J]集团经济研究,2006.01.26-28.
[10]房宁.面对“非典”说政体――两岸三地的观察与比较[J]科学决策,2003.08:41-45
[11][美]费里蒙特·E·卡斯特,詹姆斯·E·罗森茨韦克.组织与管理——系统方法与权变方法[M]. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1985.
[12]费孝通.差序格局[A].费孝通.乡土中国[C].北京:三联书社,1985.
[13]冯友兰.贞元六书 (上) ·新世训[M ].上海:华东师范大学出版社, 19961 转引自 : 牟 宗 艳 . 老 子 自 然 主 义 与 人 文 主 义 相 结 合 的 治 国 理 念 [J]. 文 史哲.2003.6.121-125
[14]高 波,张志鹏. 文化与经济发展 :一个文献评述[J]. 江海学刊 2004. 1,80-87
[15]高清海. 中国传统哲学的思维特质及其价值[J]中国社会科学.2002.02:52-55
[16]龚霁茸,费方域.寻求公平的经济人[J].经济学家,2006.2:32-39
[17]国务院.《全民所有制工业企业承包经营责任制暂行条例》1988.2.21.
[18]国务院国资委企业改革局.国有企业改革的进展和下一步措施[J]. 中国经贸导刊,2005.4,24-25
[19]顾基发, 唐锡晋.从古代系统思想到现代东方系统方法论[J].系统工程理论与实践 2000.1:89-92.
[20]顾基发,高 飞.从管理科学角度谈物理―事理―人理系统方法论[J].系统工程理论与实践,1998.8:1-5.136
[21]郝辽钢,刘健西.激励理论研究的新趋势[J].北京工商大学学报,2003.9:12-17.
[22]郝英奇.管理力学初探[J].石家庄经济学院学报,1998.4:384-390
[23]郝英奇.管理力学的基本思想和应用前景[A].第一届国际软科学大会论文集[C]1999.11
[24]郝英奇.科技进步动力机制研究[J].暨南学报(哲学社会科学版),2003.6:61-66
[25]郝英奇、刘金兰.应试教育的动力机制分析[J]教育发展研究,2006.9B:11-14 郝英奇、郑江波。管理研究新范式――基于设计科学的研究范式[J]科技管理研究,2007.2(待发)。
[26][美]赫伯特·西蒙著,黄涛译. 1995,西蒙选集[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002.480 页.435 页.
[27]何建华.正义是什么:效用、公平、权力还是美德[J]学术研究,2004.10.30-37
[28]胡军.跨文化管理[M].广州:暨南大学出版社,1995,第 30 页
[29]黄津孚.组织设计中的职权和职责分析[J].管理评论,2003.8.59-62
[30]黄再胜.西方企业激励理论的最新发展[J],外国经济与管理,2004.1
[31]杰弗里·班克斯.制度设计:代理理论的角度[A].David L.Weimer 主编.制度设计[C]上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.11-12.
[32]金吾伦.整体论哲学在中国的复兴[J].自然辩证法研究,1994.8:3-4
[33]孔茨.再论管理理论的丛林[A]载孙耀君.西方管理学名著提要[C].南昌:江西人民出版社, 1995.
[34][美]科斯,1960.社会成本问题[A].载财产权利与制度变迁――产权学派与新制度学派译文集.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994.3-38
[35][美]科斯,1937.企业的性质[A].载盛洪主编现代制度经济学(上卷)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2003:103-118.
[36]黎红雷. 人性假设与人类社会的管理之道[J]中国社会科学.2001.02:66-73
[37]李春琦、石磊 国外激励理论评述[J].经济学动态,2001.6:61-66.
[38]李国纲,李宝山.管理系统工程[M].北京:中国人民出版社,1993.1.
[39]李怀祖.论管理意境[J].领导理论与实践,1995,4.转引自席酉民 1998.
[40]李怀祖,管理研究方法论(第二版)[M]. 西安:西安交通大学出版社,2004.
[41]李署华.老子的自然哲学与科学[J].中国社会科学,1999.5:118-130
[42]李学栋,何海燕,李习彬.管理机制的概念及设计理论研究[J].工业工程,1999.12:p31-39
[43][英]理查德.道金斯著,卢允中,张岱云译.自私的基因[M].北京:科学出版社1981.
[44]林毅夫,蔡 昉,李 周.充分信息与国有企业改革[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1997.
[45]林毅夫,谭国富.自生能力、政策性负担、责任归属和预算软约束[J].经济社会体制比较,2000.4:54-58
[46]林毅夫.自生能力与改革的深层次问题[J].经济社会体制比较,2002.02:32-37
[47]寥申白.《正义论》对古典自由主义的修正[J].中国社会科学,2003.05:126-208
[48]刘兵、张士英.激励理论综述与展望[J].中国软科学,1999.5:21-23.
[49]刘建一.企业管理系统功能分析和载体设计的理论研究[J]价值工程,1995.6.
[50]刘康德.老子直解[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.1997.
[51]刘善仕. 组织行为学视野中的个人主义与集体主义[J]科技进步与对策,2003.9(下半月)97-99
[52]鹿荷.事在人为:松下幸之助谈经营[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2005
[53]鲁克俭. 西方制度创新理论中的制度设计理论[J]马克思主义与现实,2001.1:65-70
[54][美]罗纳德·H.科斯等著,(法)克劳德·梅纳尔编,刘刚等译.制度、契约与组织--从新制度经济学角度的透视.北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[55][德]马克思恩格斯《马克思恩格斯全集》[C]第 18 卷,北京:人民出版社,1972.
[56][德]马克思恩格斯《马克思恩格斯全集》[C]第 12 卷,北京:人民出版社,1972.第 734 页
[57]钱颖一.激励与约束[J].经济社会体制比较,1999.5:7-12
[58]马克斯·韦伯文选[C]天津:天津大学出版社,1969.转引自黄津孚 2003.
[59] 牟 宗 艳 . 老 子 自 然 主 义 与 人 文 主 义 相 结 合 的 治 国 理 念 [J]. 文 史哲.2003.6:121-125
[60][美]奥利弗·威廉姆森. 资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约[M].北京:商务印书馆,2002.
[61][日]青木昌彦著,周黎安译.比较制度分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001
[62][日]青木昌彦,奥野正宽著,魏加宁等译.经济体制的比较制度分析[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2005.
[63][法]让.梅松纳夫.群体动力学[M].北京:商务印书馆,1997.
[64]任继愈.老子今译[M].北京:古籍出版社.1956.
[65]萨克斯、胡永泰、杨小凯.经济改革和宪政转轨[J].经济学〔季刊〕,2003.7:961-989
[66]盛洪.现代制度经济学(上)[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.
[67]盛洪.现代制度经济学(下)[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.
[68]盛洪.为什么制度重要[M].郑州:郑州大学出版社,2004.
[69]师雯,李路曲. 新加坡治理腐败的政治与文化基础[J]理论探索,2006.01:139-141.
[70][美]史蒂文·克尔,薪酬与激励[M],机械工业出版社,北京,2005.1
[71][美]斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯.管理学(第四版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[72][美]斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯.组织行为学(第六版)[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2002.
[73]单维华.论老子的“无为而治”[J]求是学刊.1995.2:25-26.
[74][日]松下幸之助著,潘祖铭译.经营成功之道[M].北京:军事译文出版社,1987.
[75]孙剑平.薪酬体系与机制设计[M].上海:上海交通大学出版社,2006.01.
[76]孙磊. TCL 增量奖股催生国际知名企业[N].南方日报,2005.8.29.
[77]孙绍荣、朱佳生 管理机制设计理论[J].系统工程理论与实践,1995.5:50-55
[78]孙绍荣、齐丽萍,行为控制机制与行为管理制度的数学模型新进展[J],上海理工大学学报,2004.1.
[79]孙耀君主编.西方管理学名著提要[C].南昌:江西人民出版社,1995.
[80]孙中一.企业战略运行机制――机制论[M]. 天津:天津人民出版社, 2001.1:
[81]田国强. 经济机制设计理论与信息经济学[A],载经济学与中国经济改革[C].上海:上海人民出版社,1995.
[82]田会.企业动力系统理论及其应用[M]. 北京:经济管理出版社,2004.
[83][美]托玛斯·A·巴斯著,李尧, 张志峰译,.再创未来——世界著名科学家访谈录[M].上海:三联书店,1997.
[84]王红领 张永山.国有企业产权改革之我见—— 来自中国 800 家国有工业企业的实证分析[J].现代经济探讨,2005.2:3-9.
[85]王静波.个人主义·集体主义——一项中国青年价值观的本土化研究[J]当代青年研究,2002:238-40.
[86]王永丽,时勘,黄旭.个人主义与集体主义结构的验证性研究[J]. 心理科学.2003.6:996-999.
[87][美]威廉大内. Z 理论:美国企业界怎样迎接日本的挑战[M]. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1984.
[88]文建东,李欲晓. 市场经济与利他主义、利己主义的界限[J]中国软科学,2004.02:44-50.
[89]吴敬莲.通向市场经济之路[M].北京:北京工业大学出版社,1992.
[90]吴敬莲.构筑市场经济的基础结构[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1997.
[91]席酉民.管理与管理研究的几点理论思考[J].系统工程理论与实践 1998.7:8-16.
[92]熊凯,段方乐:老子哲学的文化境域解读[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版)2005.2:68-72.
[93]徐克谦. “道”与“真理”[J] 江苏社会科学.2005.05:105-108.
[94]严春忠.天人合一·道法自然·无为而治——读老子《道德经》一得[J]中国道教2001.1:61-62.
[95]颜泽贤.复杂性探索与控制论发展[J].自然辩证法研究,2005.06:11-16.
[96]杨先举.老子管理学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[97]于景元.关于综合集成的研究——方法、理论、技术、工程[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2005.2:3-10
[98]袁永和.对西方个人主义价值观的几点思考[J] 西南民族大学学报(人文社科版)2005.7.300-303
[99][美]约翰·罗尔斯著,何怀宏,何包钢,寥申白译.正义论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988.
[100]曾小华.文化、制度与社会变革[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2004.
[101]章凯.激励理论新解[J].科学管理研究,2003.4:89-98.
[102]张维迎.企业的企业家--契约理论[M].上海:上海三联书社,1995a.
[103]张维迎.企业理论及其对中国国有企业改革的意义[A].载北京大学中国经济研究中心主编.经济学与中国经济改革[C].上海:上海人民出版社,1995b;
[104]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革[C]. 北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[105]张维迎,邓峰.信息、激励与连带责任――对中国古代连坐、保甲制度的法和经济学解释[J].中国社会科学,2003.3:99-112.
[106]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004.
[107]张维迎.产权改革和我国后发优势的转变[J].经济学动态,2005.2:3-5.
[108]张维迎. 理性思考中国改革[N]经济观察报.2006.3:3.
[109]赵泉民.集体主义文化与中国合作制经济的困境――基于中西方文化精神比较的视野[J]人文杂志,2005.4:52-57.
[110]赵 伟,韩文秀,罗永泰.基于激励理论的团队机制设计[J]. 天津大学学报(社会科学版)1999.12:295-298.
[111]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996.6:71-75.
[112]周其仁.不承认企业家人力资本价值会怎样?[J]中国企业家,2005.5:54-56.
[113]周溯源.略论我国古代无为而治的治国思想[J]人文杂志.2005.3:45-47.
[114]朱绍文.《国富论》中的“经济人”的属性及其品德问题[J].经济研究,1987, 4.
[115]Abraham H Maslow, 1954,Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper&Row
[116]Alston JP. 1989. Wa, guanxi, and inhwa: managerial principles in Japan, China, and Korea. Business Horizons March–April: 26–31.
[117]Anthoney.1965.Planning and Control Systems : Framework for Analysis [M].Boston Graduate School of Business Administration,Harvard University.
[118]Ashok Bhundia,Gus Donnell. 2002. UK Policy Coordination: The Importance of Institutional Design. Fiscal Studies.(1).135–164.
[119]Bernard Berelson and Gary A Steiner, 1964, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings.New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, pp.239.
[120]Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. & McCabe, K. Trust, 1995.Reciprocity and Social History. Game Economic Behavior. (10),122–142.
[121]Bolton, G. E. & Ockenfels, A. Erc. 2000. A theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition. American Economic Review. (90),166–193.
[122]Bolton G.E , Zwick Rami.1995.Anonymity versus Punlishment Ultimatum Bargainning.Games and Economic Behavior,(10),95-121.
[123]Cameron, L. A. 1999. Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia.Economic Inquiry.(37), 47–59.
[124]Coleman J. 1990. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology (94),95–120.
[125]David M. Kreps,1997,The Interaction Between Norms and Economic Incentives :Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives.The American Economic Review, (5), 359-364.
[126]Deci, E. 1975,Intrinsic Motivation.New York: Plenum Press.
[127]Deci, E., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. 1999,A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, Psychological Bulletin, Vol.125 (6), 627–668.
[128]Dirk Bergmann and Stephen Morris. 2005, Robust Mechanism Design.Econometrica.(11), 1771–1813.
[129]Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher. 2003,The nature of human altruism,Nature,425(23),785-791.
[130]Flamholtz,E.G..Das,T.K.&Tsui. 1985,Toward an Integrative Framework of Organizational Control.Accounting,Organizations and Society,(10),35-50.
[131]Frederick F Reichheld, 1993,Loyalty-Based Management, Harvard Business Review, (3-4).64-73.
[132]Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. & Riedl, A. 1993, Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Iinvestigation. Q. J. Econ. 108, 437–459.
[133]Fitzroy,Felix R.and Dennis Mueller,1984,Cooperation and Conflict in Contractual Organization,Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,24(4).
[134]G. R. Steele.2004. Understanding Economic Man Psychology, Rationality, and Values. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 63(5):1021-1055.
[135]Gibbons, R.1997, Incentives and Careers in Organizations, in D. Kreps and K. Wallis eds. Advances in EconomicTheory and Econometrics, Vol. II .Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
[136]Gregory M.parkhurst.2003.Ecnomic incentives for Endengered Species Protection.PH.D Paper. University of Wyoming.
[137]Grossman,Sanford J. and Oliver Hart,1983.An Analysis of the Principle Agent Problem,Economitrica.(51):7-45
[138]Gu¨th, W., Schmittberger, R. & Schwarze, B. 1982, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Economic Behavior Organization.(3), 367–388.
[139]Hart,O.and B.Holmstrom,1987,Theory of contrast,in Advances in Economic Theory:Fifth World Cogress, edited by T.Bewley,Cambridge University press.
[140]Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. 2001, Why People Punish Defectors—Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol. (208), 79–89.
[141]Henrich, J. et al. 2001,In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-scale Societies. American Economic Review. (91), 73–78.
[142]Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. & Smith, V. 1994, Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games. Game Economic Behavior. (7), 346–380.
[143]Holmstrom,B.and P.Milgrom,1987. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives. Economitrica(55):303-328.
[144]Jackson M C. 1993.Systems methodology for the management sciences [M]. Plenum Press.
[145]Joan Ernst van Aken.2005.Management Research as a DesignScience: Articulating theResearch Products of Mode 2 Knowledge Production in Management. British Journal of Management, Vol. 16, 19–3619-36
[146]J . N. Gray , 1984. Hayek on Liberty[M] , Oxford , p134.
[147]J Daniel Sherman,Howard L Smith,1984,The inflence of Organization Structure on Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation.Academy of Management Journal.(4).pp877-885.
[148]Jacqueline A-M. Coyle-Shapiro, Paula C. Morrow, RayRichardson, and Stephen R. Dunn.2002. Using Profit Sharing to Enhence Employee Attitudes: A Longitudinal Examination of The Effects onTrust and Comitment,Human Resource Management, 41(4):423–439.
[149]Kit Fai Pun and Anthony Sydney White.2005,A performance measurement paradigm for integrating strategy formulation: A review of systems and frameworks. International Journal of Management Reviews,7(1):49–71.
[150]Kohn, A. 1993, Punished by Rewards.New York: Plenum Press.
[151]Kornai, J.1980. Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[152]Kruglanski, A., Friedman, I. and Zeevi, G.,1971, The Effect of Extrinsic Incentives on Some Qualitative Aspects of Task Performance, Journal of Personality, Vol.39, 608–617.
[153]L.J.Mullins.Management and Organizational Behavior (Fourth Edition) [m].Pitman Publishing,1996.
[154]Lawler,Edward E.,Ⅲ,and Lyman W.Porter,1967,The Effect of Performance on Job satisfaction,Industrial Relations.Vol.7. 20-28.
[155]Lazear, E. 2000,Performance, Pay and Productivity, American Economic Review,Vol.90 (5), 1346–1361.
[156]Merchant,K.A. 1985,Control in Business Organizations.Ballinger,Cambridge,Mass.
[157]Michael R. Sosin. 2005.The Administrative Control System of Substance Abuse Managed Care. HSR: Health Services Research.2.157-176
[158]Mick Marchington and Steven Vincent. 2004. Analysing the Influence of Institutional,Organizational and Interpersonal Forces in Shaping Inter-Organizational Relations. Journal of Management Studies41(6):1029-1056
[159]Milgrom, P R, North. D and Weingast B.R. 1990.The Role of institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private judges, and the Champagne Fairs.Economics and Politics,(2).pp1-21.
[160]Myers , 1996, Knowledge Management and Organization Design, Butter worth-Heinemann.
[161]Oliver C. 1990. Determinants of inter organizational relationships: integration and future directions. Academy of Management Review 15(2): 241–265.
[162]Rabin, M. 1993,Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics[J]. American Economic Review. (83), 1281–1302.
[163]Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole,2003.Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review of Economic Studies .Vol.70, 489–520.
[164]Miner, J. B. 1984,The validity and usefulness of theories in an emerging organizational science. Academy of Management Review, (9),p296–306.
[165]Oliver, C. 1997.Sustainable competitive advantage: combining institutional and resource based views. Strategic Management Journal, 18(9), 697–713.
[166]Porter Lyman W.,and Edward E.Lawler,Ⅲ . ,1968,Managerial Attitudes and Performance.Homewood:Irwin.
[167]Rees,Ray,1985,The Theory of Principal and Agent:Part 1,Bulletin of Economic Research. Vol. 37 (1)3-24.
[168]Redding SG, Ng M. 1982. The role of face in the organizational perceptions of Chinese managers.Organizational Studies (3),204–209.
[169]Roland Be ′n abou,Jean Tirole. 2003.Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,Review of Economic Studies 70:489–520
[170]Ruth Maria Stock,Wayne D.Hoyer. 2002 Leadership Style as Driver ofSalespeoples’ Customer Orientation. Journal of Market-Focused Management, 5, 355–376.
[171]S. H. Park and Yadong Luo.2001, Guanxi and organizational dynamics:organizational networking in Chinese firm. Strategic Management Journal(22),455–477
[172]Takanorit Adachi.2002.Severe Versus Lenient internal Promotion:an Analysis of the Optimal Promotion Mechanism in Organizations.The Japanese Economic Review.53(2):226-241.
[173]Triandis,H.C.1995. Individualism and collectivism. Boulder , CO:Westview Press
[174]Trevor Buck, Alistair Bruce, Brian G. M. Main and Henry Udueni. 2003. Long Term Incentive Plans, Executive Pay and UKCompany Performance. Journal of Management Studies 40(7):1710-1727
[175]Van Aken J E.2004,.Management research based on the paradigm of the design sciences: The quest for field-tested and grounded technological rules, Journal of Management Studies, (41), 219–245.
[176]Van Aken J E.2005,Management research as a design science: Articulating the research products of mode 2 knowledge production in management,British Journal of Management,(16),19–36.
[177]Victor H Vroom, 1964,Work and Motivation. New York: Wiley.
[178] Wank DL. 1996. The institutional process of market clientelism: guanxi and private business in a south China city. The China Quarterly 3: 820–838.
[179]Wilson, T., Hull, J. and Johnson,J. 1981,Awareness and Self-Perception: Verbal Reports on Internal States,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, (40), 53–71.
[180]Yang MM.1994,Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China. Cornell University Press: New York.
[181]Yeung IY, Tung RL. 1996. Achieving business success in Confucian societies: the importance of guanxi. Organizational Dynamics.(3), 54–65.
[182]Yixin Dai,David Popp,Stuart Bretschneide.2005.Institutions and Intellectual Property: The Influence of Institutional Forces on University Patenting. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.(3),579–598
[183]Yujing Shen. 2003.Selection Incentives in a Performance-Based Contracting System. HSR: Health Services Research.(4),535-552
② 参见刘兵、张士英.激励理论综述与展望[J].中国软科学,1999.5:p21-23.
①理查德·爱波斯坦语。 Richard A Epstein(1997):Iaw and Economics:Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future,64(4)University of Chicago Law Review:pp.1167-1174.转引自黄立君.法经济学发展历史概述[A].黄少安主编.制度经济学研究(第五辑).北京:经济科学出版社,2004.第 23 页.
①冯友兰.贞元六书 (上) ·新世训[M ].上海:华东师范大学出版社, 19961 转引自:牟宗艳. 老子自然主义与人文主义相结合的治国理念[J].文史哲.2003.6.121-125
②牟宗艳. 老子自然主义与人文主义相结合的治国理念[J].文史哲.2003.6.121-125
①杨先举.老子管理学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005
① 参见熊凯,段方乐:老子哲学的文化境域解读[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版)2005.2.68-72
①转引自赵泉民.集体主义文化与中国合作制经济的困境――基于中西方文化精神比较的视野[J]人文杂志,2005.4.52-57
① 转引自曾小华《文化、制度与社会变革》北京:中国经济出版社,2004.第 1-2 页.
② 转引自石伟主编《组织文化》上海:复旦大学出版社,2004.第 12 页
① [美]斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯.组织行为学精要(第六版).北京:电子工业出版社,2004 第 100 页
① 参见何建华.正义是什么:效用、公平、权利、还是美德.学术月刊,2004.10
② E.博登海默在《法理学――法律哲学与法律方法》一书中归纳了正义的各种定义。普洛透斯希腊神话中变幻莫测莫测的海神。
① 在其随后的表述中罗尔斯区分了原初状态与无知之幕的不同,即原初状态=无知之幕+相互冷淡。见罗尔斯《正义论》北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988
①赵泉民.集体主义文化与中国合作制经济的困境――基于中西方文化精神比较的视野[J]人文杂志,2005.4.52-57
②同上
③ 《马克思恩格斯全集》第 12 卷,第 734 页。
①袁永和.对西方个人主义价值观的几点思考[J] 西南民族大学学报(人文社科版)2005.7.300-303
②袁永和.对西方个人主义价值观的几点思考[J] 西南民族大学学报(人文社科版)2005.7.300-303
③ 蔡晓.个人主义与经济秩序[J]读书.1997.4 转引自徐克谦:先秦儒家的个人主义精神[J]齐鲁学刊.2005.5
① 参见 2006 年 3 月 3 日经济观察报:《理性思考中国改革》
① 参见威廉·大内,Z 理论[A]. 载孙耀君.西方管理学名著提要[C].南昌:江西人民出版社,1995.第 301 页.
①马克思恩格斯全集(第 1 卷)[M],北京:人民出版社,1972.第 182 页.
① 参见孙剑平 《薪酬体系与机制设计》上海交通大学出版社,2006.01.
① 西蒙将人的追求归结为财富、权力和荣誉,本文对个人目标函数的设计参照西蒙的观点。见 Herbert A Simon 著,黄涛译.西蒙选集[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002.483 页.
① 参见斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯著,郑晓明译《组织行为学精要》.电子工业出版社,2004.第 168 页。
① 参见 Edward E.Lawler Ⅲ、Lyman Porter.1967.The Effect of Performence on Job Satisfaction..
② 参见 Porter Lyman W.,and Edward E.Lawler,Ⅲ.1968.Managerial Attitudes and Performance.Homewood:Irwin.
① 孙剑平.薪酬体系与机制设计.上海:上海交通大学出版社,2006.pp18.
② 孙磊. TCL 增量奖股催生国际知名企业.南方日报,2005.8.29.
① Brennan ,Geoffrey,1996.Selection and the Currency of Reward[A], Robert E. Goodin. The Theory of Institutional Design[C].New York :Cambridge University Press .
① 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2004.pp242.
① 转引自房宁.面对“非典”说政体――两岸三地的观察与比较[J]科学决策,2003.08.pp41-45
②[美]丹尼尔.W.布罗姆利著,陈郁等译..经济利益与经济制度[M]上海:上海人民出版社,1996.第 55 页.
①转引自鲁克俭. 西方制度创新理论中的制度设计理论[J]马克思主义与现实,2001.1:65-70
②参见 J . N. Gray , Hayek on Liberty , Oxford , 1984.第 134 页
[1] [美]彼德·德鲁克,工商企业能从非营利性组织中学到什么[A],载史蒂文·克尔编著,薪酬与激励[C].北京:机械工业出版社,2005,44-54.
[2][美]彼德·德鲁克.管理:任务、责任、实践[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1987. {3}[美]彼德·圣吉,第五项修炼――学习型组织的艺术与实务[M].上海:上海三联书店,1998.
[4]曹元坤,占小军.激励理论研究现状及发展[J],当代财经,2003.12:p89-98
[5]成中英.C 理论:中国管理哲学[M],上海:学林出版社,1999.12
[6][美]戴维·韦默主编,费方域,朱宝钦译.制度设计[C],上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.11-12.
[7][美]丹尼尔.W.布罗姆利著,陈郁等译..经济利益与经济制度[M]上海:上海人民出版社,1996.第 55 页.
[8][美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯等. 制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[C].上海:三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994.
[9]范黎波,张卫. 海尔 SBU 经营机制的深层次思考[J]集团经济研究,2006.01.26-28.
[10]房宁.面对“非典”说政体――两岸三地的观察与比较[J]科学决策,2003.08:41-45
[11][美]费里蒙特·E·卡斯特,詹姆斯·E·罗森茨韦克.组织与管理——系统方法与权变方法[M]. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1985.
[12]费孝通.差序格局[A].费孝通.乡土中国[C].北京:三联书社,1985.
[13]冯友兰.贞元六书 (上) ·新世训[M ].上海:华东师范大学出版社, 19961 转引自 : 牟 宗 艳 . 老 子 自 然 主 义 与 人 文 主 义 相 结 合 的 治 国 理 念 [J]. 文 史哲.2003.6.121-125
[14]高 波,张志鹏. 文化与经济发展 :一个文献评述[J]. 江海学刊 2004. 1,80-87
[15]高清海. 中国传统哲学的思维特质及其价值[J]中国社会科学.2002.02:52-55
[16]龚霁茸,费方域.寻求公平的经济人[J].经济学家,2006.2:32-39
[17]国务院.《全民所有制工业企业承包经营责任制暂行条例》1988.2.21.
[18]国务院国资委企业改革局.国有企业改革的进展和下一步措施[J]. 中国经贸导刊,2005.4,24-25
[19]顾基发, 唐锡晋.从古代系统思想到现代东方系统方法论[J].系统工程理论与实践 2000.1:89-92.
[20]顾基发,高 飞.从管理科学角度谈物理―事理―人理系统方法论[J].系统工程理论与实践,1998.8:1-5.136
[21]郝辽钢,刘健西.激励理论研究的新趋势[J].北京工商大学学报,2003.9:12-17.
[22]郝英奇.管理力学初探[J].石家庄经济学院学报,1998.4:384-390
[23]郝英奇.管理力学的基本思想和应用前景[A].第一届国际软科学大会论文集[C]1999.11
[24]郝英奇.科技进步动力机制研究[J].暨南学报(哲学社会科学版),2003.6:61-66
[25]郝英奇、刘金兰.应试教育的动力机制分析[J]教育发展研究,2006.9B:11-14 郝英奇、郑江波。管理研究新范式――基于设计科学的研究范式[J]科技管理研究,2007.2(待发)。
[26][美]赫伯特·西蒙著,黄涛译. 1995,西蒙选集[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002.480 页.435 页.
[27]何建华.正义是什么:效用、公平、权力还是美德[J]学术研究,2004.10.30-37
[28]胡军.跨文化管理[M].广州:暨南大学出版社,1995,第 30 页
[29]黄津孚.组织设计中的职权和职责分析[J].管理评论,2003.8.59-62
[30]黄再胜.西方企业激励理论的最新发展[J],外国经济与管理,2004.1
[31]杰弗里·班克斯.制度设计:代理理论的角度[A].David L.Weimer 主编.制度设计[C]上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.11-12.
[32]金吾伦.整体论哲学在中国的复兴[J].自然辩证法研究,1994.8:3-4
[33]孔茨.再论管理理论的丛林[A]载孙耀君.西方管理学名著提要[C].南昌:江西人民出版社, 1995.
[34][美]科斯,1960.社会成本问题[A].载财产权利与制度变迁――产权学派与新制度学派译文集.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994.3-38
[35][美]科斯,1937.企业的性质[A].载盛洪主编现代制度经济学(上卷)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2003:103-118.
[36]黎红雷. 人性假设与人类社会的管理之道[J]中国社会科学.2001.02:66-73
[37]李春琦、石磊 国外激励理论评述[J].经济学动态,2001.6:61-66.
[38]李国纲,李宝山.管理系统工程[M].北京:中国人民出版社,1993.1.
[39]李怀祖.论管理意境[J].领导理论与实践,1995,4.转引自席酉民 1998.
[40]李怀祖,管理研究方法论(第二版)[M]. 西安:西安交通大学出版社,2004.
[41]李署华.老子的自然哲学与科学[J].中国社会科学,1999.5:118-130
[42]李学栋,何海燕,李习彬.管理机制的概念及设计理论研究[J].工业工程,1999.12:p31-39
[43][英]理查德.道金斯著,卢允中,张岱云译.自私的基因[M].北京:科学出版社1981.
[44]林毅夫,蔡 昉,李 周.充分信息与国有企业改革[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1997.
[45]林毅夫,谭国富.自生能力、政策性负担、责任归属和预算软约束[J].经济社会体制比较,2000.4:54-58
[46]林毅夫.自生能力与改革的深层次问题[J].经济社会体制比较,2002.02:32-37
[47]寥申白.《正义论》对古典自由主义的修正[J].中国社会科学,2003.05:126-208
[48]刘兵、张士英.激励理论综述与展望[J].中国软科学,1999.5:21-23.
[49]刘建一.企业管理系统功能分析和载体设计的理论研究[J]价值工程,1995.6.
[50]刘康德.老子直解[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.1997.
[51]刘善仕. 组织行为学视野中的个人主义与集体主义[J]科技进步与对策,2003.9(下半月)97-99
[52]鹿荷.事在人为:松下幸之助谈经营[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2005
[53]鲁克俭. 西方制度创新理论中的制度设计理论[J]马克思主义与现实,2001.1:65-70
[54][美]罗纳德·H.科斯等著,(法)克劳德·梅纳尔编,刘刚等译.制度、契约与组织--从新制度经济学角度的透视.北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[55][德]马克思恩格斯《马克思恩格斯全集》[C]第 18 卷,北京:人民出版社,1972.
[56][德]马克思恩格斯《马克思恩格斯全集》[C]第 12 卷,北京:人民出版社,1972.第 734 页
[57]钱颖一.激励与约束[J].经济社会体制比较,1999.5:7-12
[58]马克斯·韦伯文选[C]天津:天津大学出版社,1969.转引自黄津孚 2003.
[59] 牟 宗 艳 . 老 子 自 然 主 义 与 人 文 主 义 相 结 合 的 治 国 理 念 [J]. 文 史哲.2003.6:121-125
[60][美]奥利弗·威廉姆森. 资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约[M].北京:商务印书馆,2002.
[61][日]青木昌彦著,周黎安译.比较制度分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001
[62][日]青木昌彦,奥野正宽著,魏加宁等译.经济体制的比较制度分析[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2005.
[63][法]让.梅松纳夫.群体动力学[M].北京:商务印书馆,1997.
[64]任继愈.老子今译[M].北京:古籍出版社.1956.
[65]萨克斯、胡永泰、杨小凯.经济改革和宪政转轨[J].经济学〔季刊〕,2003.7:961-989
[66]盛洪.现代制度经济学(上)[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.
[67]盛洪.现代制度经济学(下)[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.
[68]盛洪.为什么制度重要[M].郑州:郑州大学出版社,2004.
[69]师雯,李路曲. 新加坡治理腐败的政治与文化基础[J]理论探索,2006.01:139-141.
[70][美]史蒂文·克尔,薪酬与激励[M],机械工业出版社,北京,2005.1
[71][美]斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯.管理学(第四版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[72][美]斯蒂芬·P·罗宾斯.组织行为学(第六版)[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2002.
[73]单维华.论老子的“无为而治”[J]求是学刊.1995.2:25-26.
[74][日]松下幸之助著,潘祖铭译.经营成功之道[M].北京:军事译文出版社,1987.
[75]孙剑平.薪酬体系与机制设计[M].上海:上海交通大学出版社,2006.01.
[76]孙磊. TCL 增量奖股催生国际知名企业[N].南方日报,2005.8.29.
[77]孙绍荣、朱佳生 管理机制设计理论[J].系统工程理论与实践,1995.5:50-55
[78]孙绍荣、齐丽萍,行为控制机制与行为管理制度的数学模型新进展[J],上海理工大学学报,2004.1.
[79]孙耀君主编.西方管理学名著提要[C].南昌:江西人民出版社,1995.
[80]孙中一.企业战略运行机制――机制论[M]. 天津:天津人民出版社, 2001.1:
[81]田国强. 经济机制设计理论与信息经济学[A],载经济学与中国经济改革[C].上海:上海人民出版社,1995.
[82]田会.企业动力系统理论及其应用[M]. 北京:经济管理出版社,2004.
[83][美]托玛斯·A·巴斯著,李尧, 张志峰译,.再创未来——世界著名科学家访谈录[M].上海:三联书店,1997.
[84]王红领 张永山.国有企业产权改革之我见—— 来自中国 800 家国有工业企业的实证分析[J].现代经济探讨,2005.2:3-9.
[85]王静波.个人主义·集体主义——一项中国青年价值观的本土化研究[J]当代青年研究,2002:238-40.
[86]王永丽,时勘,黄旭.个人主义与集体主义结构的验证性研究[J]. 心理科学.2003.6:996-999.
[87][美]威廉大内. Z 理论:美国企业界怎样迎接日本的挑战[M]. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1984.
[88]文建东,李欲晓. 市场经济与利他主义、利己主义的界限[J]中国软科学,2004.02:44-50.
[89]吴敬莲.通向市场经济之路[M].北京:北京工业大学出版社,1992.
[90]吴敬莲.构筑市场经济的基础结构[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1997.
[91]席酉民.管理与管理研究的几点理论思考[J].系统工程理论与实践 1998.7:8-16.
[92]熊凯,段方乐:老子哲学的文化境域解读[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版)2005.2:68-72.
[93]徐克谦. “道”与“真理”[J] 江苏社会科学.2005.05:105-108.
[94]严春忠.天人合一·道法自然·无为而治——读老子《道德经》一得[J]中国道教2001.1:61-62.
[95]颜泽贤.复杂性探索与控制论发展[J].自然辩证法研究,2005.06:11-16.
[96]杨先举.老子管理学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[97]于景元.关于综合集成的研究——方法、理论、技术、工程[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2005.2:3-10
[98]袁永和.对西方个人主义价值观的几点思考[J] 西南民族大学学报(人文社科版)2005.7.300-303
[99][美]约翰·罗尔斯著,何怀宏,何包钢,寥申白译.正义论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988.
[100]曾小华.文化、制度与社会变革[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2004.
[101]章凯.激励理论新解[J].科学管理研究,2003.4:89-98.
[102]张维迎.企业的企业家--契约理论[M].上海:上海三联书社,1995a.
[103]张维迎.企业理论及其对中国国有企业改革的意义[A].载北京大学中国经济研究中心主编.经济学与中国经济改革[C].上海:上海人民出版社,1995b;
[104]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革[C]. 北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[105]张维迎,邓峰.信息、激励与连带责任――对中国古代连坐、保甲制度的法和经济学解释[J].中国社会科学,2003.3:99-112.
[106]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004.
[107]张维迎.产权改革和我国后发优势的转变[J].经济学动态,2005.2:3-5.
[108]张维迎. 理性思考中国改革[N]经济观察报.2006.3:3.
[109]赵泉民.集体主义文化与中国合作制经济的困境――基于中西方文化精神比较的视野[J]人文杂志,2005.4:52-57.
[110]赵 伟,韩文秀,罗永泰.基于激励理论的团队机制设计[J]. 天津大学学报(社会科学版)1999.12:295-298.
[111]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996.6:71-75.
[112]周其仁.不承认企业家人力资本价值会怎样?[J]中国企业家,2005.5:54-56.
[113]周溯源.略论我国古代无为而治的治国思想[J]人文杂志.2005.3:45-47.
[114]朱绍文.《国富论》中的“经济人”的属性及其品德问题[J].经济研究,1987, 4.
[115]Abraham H Maslow, 1954,Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper&Row
[116]Alston JP. 1989. Wa, guanxi, and inhwa: managerial principles in Japan, China, and Korea. Business Horizons March–April: 26–31.
[117]Anthoney.1965.Planning and Control Systems : Framework for Analysis [M].Boston Graduate School of Business Administration,Harvard University.
[118]Ashok Bhundia,Gus Donnell. 2002. UK Policy Coordination: The Importance of Institutional Design. Fiscal Studies.(1).135–164.
[119]Bernard Berelson and Gary A Steiner, 1964, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings.New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, pp.239.
[120]Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. & McCabe, K. Trust, 1995.Reciprocity and Social History. Game Economic Behavior. (10),122–142.
[121]Bolton, G. E. & Ockenfels, A. Erc. 2000. A theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition. American Economic Review. (90),166–193.
[122]Bolton G.E , Zwick Rami.1995.Anonymity versus Punlishment Ultimatum Bargainning.Games and Economic Behavior,(10),95-121.
[123]Cameron, L. A. 1999. Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia.Economic Inquiry.(37), 47–59.
[124]Coleman J. 1990. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology (94),95–120.
[125]David M. Kreps,1997,The Interaction Between Norms and Economic Incentives :Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives.The American Economic Review, (5), 359-364.
[126]Deci, E. 1975,Intrinsic Motivation.New York: Plenum Press.
[127]Deci, E., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. 1999,A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, Psychological Bulletin, Vol.125 (6), 627–668.
[128]Dirk Bergmann and Stephen Morris. 2005, Robust Mechanism Design.Econometrica.(11), 1771–1813.
[129]Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher. 2003,The nature of human altruism,Nature,425(23),785-791.
[130]Flamholtz,E.G..Das,T.K.&Tsui. 1985,Toward an Integrative Framework of Organizational Control.Accounting,Organizations and Society,(10),35-50.
[131]Frederick F Reichheld, 1993,Loyalty-Based Management, Harvard Business Review, (3-4).64-73.
[132]Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. & Riedl, A. 1993, Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Iinvestigation. Q. J. Econ. 108, 437–459.
[133]Fitzroy,Felix R.and Dennis Mueller,1984,Cooperation and Conflict in Contractual Organization,Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,24(4).
[134]G. R. Steele.2004. Understanding Economic Man Psychology, Rationality, and Values. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 63(5):1021-1055.
[135]Gibbons, R.1997, Incentives and Careers in Organizations, in D. Kreps and K. Wallis eds. Advances in EconomicTheory and Econometrics, Vol. II .Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
[136]Gregory M.parkhurst.2003.Ecnomic incentives for Endengered Species Protection.PH.D Paper. University of Wyoming.
[137]Grossman,Sanford J. and Oliver Hart,1983.An Analysis of the Principle Agent Problem,Economitrica.(51):7-45
[138]Gu¨th, W., Schmittberger, R. & Schwarze, B. 1982, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Economic Behavior Organization.(3), 367–388.
[139]Hart,O.and B.Holmstrom,1987,Theory of contrast,in Advances in Economic Theory:Fifth World Cogress, edited by T.Bewley,Cambridge University press.
[140]Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. 2001, Why People Punish Defectors—Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol. (208), 79–89.
[141]Henrich, J. et al. 2001,In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-scale Societies. American Economic Review. (91), 73–78.
[142]Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. & Smith, V. 1994, Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games. Game Economic Behavior. (7), 346–380.
[143]Holmstrom,B.and P.Milgrom,1987. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives. Economitrica(55):303-328.
[144]Jackson M C. 1993.Systems methodology for the management sciences [M]. Plenum Press.
[145]Joan Ernst van Aken.2005.Management Research as a DesignScience: Articulating theResearch Products of Mode 2 Knowledge Production in Management. British Journal of Management, Vol. 16, 19–3619-36
[146]J . N. Gray , 1984. Hayek on Liberty[M] , Oxford , p134.
[147]J Daniel Sherman,Howard L Smith,1984,The inflence of Organization Structure on Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation.Academy of Management Journal.(4).pp877-885.
[148]Jacqueline A-M. Coyle-Shapiro, Paula C. Morrow, RayRichardson, and Stephen R. Dunn.2002. Using Profit Sharing to Enhence Employee Attitudes: A Longitudinal Examination of The Effects onTrust and Comitment,Human Resource Management, 41(4):423–439.
[149]Kit Fai Pun and Anthony Sydney White.2005,A performance measurement paradigm for integrating strategy formulation: A review of systems and frameworks. International Journal of Management Reviews,7(1):49–71.
[150]Kohn, A. 1993, Punished by Rewards.New York: Plenum Press.
[151]Kornai, J.1980. Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[152]Kruglanski, A., Friedman, I. and Zeevi, G.,1971, The Effect of Extrinsic Incentives on Some Qualitative Aspects of Task Performance, Journal of Personality, Vol.39, 608–617.
[153]L.J.Mullins.Management and Organizational Behavior (Fourth Edition) [m].Pitman Publishing,1996.
[154]Lawler,Edward E.,Ⅲ,and Lyman W.Porter,1967,The Effect of Performance on Job satisfaction,Industrial Relations.Vol.7. 20-28.
[155]Lazear, E. 2000,Performance, Pay and Productivity, American Economic Review,Vol.90 (5), 1346–1361.
[156]Merchant,K.A. 1985,Control in Business Organizations.Ballinger,Cambridge,Mass.
[157]Michael R. Sosin. 2005.The Administrative Control System of Substance Abuse Managed Care. HSR: Health Services Research.2.157-176
[158]Mick Marchington and Steven Vincent. 2004. Analysing the Influence of Institutional,Organizational and Interpersonal Forces in Shaping Inter-Organizational Relations. Journal of Management Studies41(6):1029-1056
[159]Milgrom, P R, North. D and Weingast B.R. 1990.The Role of institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private judges, and the Champagne Fairs.Economics and Politics,(2).pp1-21.
[160]Myers , 1996, Knowledge Management and Organization Design, Butter worth-Heinemann.
[161]Oliver C. 1990. Determinants of inter organizational relationships: integration and future directions. Academy of Management Review 15(2): 241–265.
[162]Rabin, M. 1993,Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics[J]. American Economic Review. (83), 1281–1302.
[163]Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole,2003.Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review of Economic Studies .Vol.70, 489–520.
[164]Miner, J. B. 1984,The validity and usefulness of theories in an emerging organizational science. Academy of Management Review, (9),p296–306.
[165]Oliver, C. 1997.Sustainable competitive advantage: combining institutional and resource based views. Strategic Management Journal, 18(9), 697–713.
[166]Porter Lyman W.,and Edward E.Lawler,Ⅲ . ,1968,Managerial Attitudes and Performance.Homewood:Irwin.
[167]Rees,Ray,1985,The Theory of Principal and Agent:Part 1,Bulletin of Economic Research. Vol. 37 (1)3-24.
[168]Redding SG, Ng M. 1982. The role of face in the organizational perceptions of Chinese managers.Organizational Studies (3),204–209.
[169]Roland Be ′n abou,Jean Tirole. 2003.Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,Review of Economic Studies 70:489–520
[170]Ruth Maria Stock,Wayne D.Hoyer. 2002 Leadership Style as Driver ofSalespeoples’ Customer Orientation. Journal of Market-Focused Management, 5, 355–376.
[171]S. H. Park and Yadong Luo.2001, Guanxi and organizational dynamics:organizational networking in Chinese firm. Strategic Management Journal(22),455–477
[172]Takanorit Adachi.2002.Severe Versus Lenient internal Promotion:an Analysis of the Optimal Promotion Mechanism in Organizations.The Japanese Economic Review.53(2):226-241.
[173]Triandis,H.C.1995. Individualism and collectivism. Boulder , CO:Westview Press
[174]Trevor Buck, Alistair Bruce, Brian G. M. Main and Henry Udueni. 2003. Long Term Incentive Plans, Executive Pay and UKCompany Performance. Journal of Management Studies 40(7):1710-1727
[175]Van Aken J E.2004,.Management research based on the paradigm of the design sciences: The quest for field-tested and grounded technological rules, Journal of Management Studies, (41), 219–245.
[176]Van Aken J E.2005,Management research as a design science: Articulating the research products of mode 2 knowledge production in management,British Journal of Management,(16),19–36.
[177]Victor H Vroom, 1964,Work and Motivation. New York: Wiley.
[178] Wank DL. 1996. The institutional process of market clientelism: guanxi and private business in a south China city. The China Quarterly 3: 820–838.
[179]Wilson, T., Hull, J. and Johnson,J. 1981,Awareness and Self-Perception: Verbal Reports on Internal States,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, (40), 53–71.
[180]Yang MM.1994,Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China. Cornell University Press: New York.
[181]Yeung IY, Tung RL. 1996. Achieving business success in Confucian societies: the importance of guanxi. Organizational Dynamics.(3), 54–65.
[182]Yixin Dai,David Popp,Stuart Bretschneide.2005.Institutions and Intellectual Property: The Influence of Institutional Forces on University Patenting. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.(3),579–598
[183]Yujing Shen. 2003.Selection Incentives in a Performance-Based Contracting System. HSR: Health Services Research.(4),535-552