农村信用社股份制改革及公司治理研究
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摘要
农村信用社是我国农村金融最重要的组成部分,农村信用社的改革问题直接关系到农村金融效率的提升,关系到社会主义新农村建设,关系到我国社会、政治和国民经济发展的总体战略。建国以来,农村信用社在经过数轮改革后,其内在机制和外部体制不断变化,至今农村信用社已经成为一种极具中国特色的农村金融机构。
目前理论界和实务界普遍认为农村金融中既需要商业性金融,也需要合作金融和政策性金融,这就要求我们建立不同的金融组织形式以适应农村地区不同层次的需求。中央也提出要“建立和完善以合作金融为基础,商业性金融、政策性金融分工协作的农村金融体系”。在我国建立多层次的农村金融体系中,对于现有农村信用社的改革方向一直存在较大争议,有的学者认为农村信用社应当按照合作制进行规范,以合作金融的方式为农村提供融资服务；有的学者认为农村信用社按照股份合作制或者股份制的方式运作更能符合实际。到底哪种改革方向更加适应我国农村信用社的实际,目前尚未达成共识。
2003年以来的农村信用社改革政策是在各方争议较大的情况下推出的一个折中方案,在市场化和产权清晰的总体目标下,允许各地自主选择合作制、股份合作制和股份制三种产权形式。由此产生了保留合作制的农村信用社、实行股份合作制的县联社和农村合作银行、实行股份制的农村商业银行等性质不同的机构。但是改革最初设定的市场化原则和产权清晰的目标并未真正实现,现有的各类农村合作金融机构(含县联社、农村合作银行、农村商业银行)仍然距离现代金融企业的目标差距甚远。而且由于政府主导的强制性制度变迁形成的路径依赖,形成了行政色彩浓厚的管理体制,产生了农村信用社新的管理者——省联社。在此条件下,性质不同的各类基层农村合作金融机构运行方式基本趋同,并未因其产权性质的差距体现出不同的市场效果,而且产权主体缺位的情况仍然十分严重。
本文阐述了我国农村信用社改革发展历程,并对其制度变迁的特征和效果进行了评价。笔者认为我国农村信用社最初是按照合作制原则建立的金融组织,但历经数轮改革后,在历史和现实因素的多重驱动下,早已严重脱离了合作金融运行轨道,其本质属性已经发生根本变化。现有农村信用社仅仅是名义上的信用合作组织,难以划归合作金融范畴,农村信用社已经形成事实上的商业化经营。而且由于股金来源泛化、规模过大、法人层级较高、行政管理体制约束等现实障碍,现有农村信用社已经不可能重新回到合作金融体制下,带有合作性质的改革难以达到产权清晰、产权功能健全的改革目标,也难以适应目前农村信用社的发展实际。现实的选择是将现有农村信用社在进一步明晰产权的基础上,真正按照股份制方向进行彻底改造,使之成为农村商业性金融。对于农村地区仍然存在的合作金融需求,只能随着我国专业合作社的深入发展,在市场化的基础上重新产生(如农村资金互助社、民间金融组织等),政策性金融需求则主要通过政策性银行予以满足。同时农村信用社股份制改革后,国家仍然可以从政策层面,通过窗口指导、财政补贴、税收优惠等方式,对农村商业银行开展涉及农户和中小农业生产者的金融业务进行引导和激励,使之成为主要面向农村市场的地方性、社区化的商业银行。
农村商业银行是农村信用社股份制改革的产物。截至目前,我国已经相继组建了80多家农村商业银行。有关方面在农村商业银行的管理体制、运行机制等方面做出了许多积极的探索,取得了一定的成效。但是,’如何看待农村商业银行发展的内在要求,如何让农村商业银行真正成为拥有独立法人地位和运行高效、风险可控、适应农村经济发展的现代农村金融企业,在内部运行机制和外部政策环境方面还存在许多缺陷。从内部来看,农村商业银行所有者主体缺位的情况十分突出,产权功能的发挥还缺乏必要的基础和条件,公司治理中委托代理关系的割裂和股东监督成本、代理成本过高的问题相当突出。从外部来看,在过去农村信用社管理混乱,经营粗放、道德风险突出的情况下,过于行政化的农村信用社管理体制在短期虽然能够取得明显效果,但长期却不利于促进基层农村商业银行效率的提升。因此,研究农村信用社的股份制改革问题,既要研究农村信用社股份制后的内部运行机制,也要研究其外部管理体制。
本文试图运用合作金融理论、现代产权理论、公司治理理论和制度经济学等,在博弈分析和实证研究的基础上,对农村信用社改革的路径和方向进行论述,并从农村信用社股份制改革最基础的产权制度、最关键的公司治理和最复杂的外部管理体制入手,提出一些对农村信用社改革实践有参考价值的思路和观点。本文的创新主要体现在：一是从农村信用社现有股金构成、业务规模、资产构成、管理体制等方面进行了规范分析,从现实角度阐述了我国农村信用社难以走合作制道路的原因,提出基层农村信用社已经不具备合作制改造条件,应当按照股份制方向改制为农村商业银行。二是农村信用社股份制改革的基础在于产权制度。但是当前农村信用社合格投资者的匮乏以及没有建立必要的市场约束,严重影响了农村信用社产权功能的发挥,提出要通过稳定产权制度、构建适度集中的股权结构、选择合适的法人层级、调整行业管理、强化市场约束等方面为农村信用社产权改革创造条件,进而对农村信用社法人层级问题(即农村商业银行应当设在县级或者市级、省级)、发展专业的农村信用社股权投资机构、建立农村信用社股权流转机制进行了探讨。尤其指出在当前农村信用社加快改制组建农村商业银行的情况下,迫切需要尽快建立公开、透明的发起人征集平台。三是从农村信用社股份制改革的内在需要和当前的外部管理体制出发,提出了按照“政企分开、职能分离”的原则推进省联社的改革,为农村信用社股份制改革创造有利的外部条件,探讨了按照合作制原则把省联社改造成为真正为基层农村商业银行服务的系统联合体。
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) have become the most important component of rural finance, the reform of RCCs is directly related to financial efficiency in rural areas, related to the construction of new socialist countryside, also related to our social political and overall national economic development Strategy. Since the founding of our country, the RCCs, after several rounds of reform, its internal mechanisms and external systems are constantly changing, RCCs have become a term of economy with Chinese characteristics.
Currently, both the theorists and the practitioners consider as not only need the commercial finance, but also need to co-finance and financial policy in rural areas. It can be fully meet through various forms of financial institutions. Central Government also proposed to "establish and improve the financial basis of cooperation, commercial finance, financial policy division of labor in the rural financial system ". I agree with this view. However, the direction of the reform of RCCs is still controversial, some scholars believe that the RCCs system shall be regulated in a cooperative way for rural financial services to provide financing; some scholars believe that the RCCs should be regulated in a stock cooperative system in accordance with the manner. Which direction of reform is more practical to adapt to RCCs?
In 2003, the reform policy of RCCs is issued in a balance of different views, both the proposed overall goal of clear property rights, but also allows to choose all over the cooperative system, stock cooperative system and the stock of three Property form. The resulting cooperative system of reservation are rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), the country-level RCUs and rural commercial banks (RCBs). However, the initial set of market-oriented reform, the principles and objectives of clear property rights did not realize that the existing types of rural cooperative financial institutions (including RCCs, country-level RCUs and RCBs) is still far away from modern financial. And because of the mandatory system of government-led changes in the formation of path dependence, the RCCS will inevitably produce a new provincial RCUs, formed a strong sense of administrative management system of RCCs. Under these conditions, the nature of different kinds of grass-roots rural cooperative financial institutions, the basic operation mode of convergence, the gap does not reflect the nature of their property rights different effect on the market, and the absence of property rights is still very serious. Therefore, how to understand the nature of existing rural RCCs, which type of reform is still an important issue to be studied.
In this regard, the paper describes the process of reform and development of RCCs, and the characteristics and effects of institutional change were evaluated. I believe that RCCs was originally established in accordance with the principles of cooperative financial organization, but after several rounds of reform, the history and reality driven by multiple factors, already seriously out of the cooperative financial orbit, the nature of property has been a fundamental changed. Existing RCCs in name only credit cooperatives, cooperative financial areas should not be classified as RCCs has become the de facto commercial operations. Source of the money paid for shares and generalization, the scale is too large, higher levels of legal, administrative and other practical obstacles to institutional constraints, the existing rural credit cooperatives have been impossible to return to the cooperative financial system, with the cooperative nature of the reform of property rights is difficult to achieve Clear, well-functioning property rights reform objectives, it is difficult to adapt to the actual development of the current rural credit cooperatives. Realistic option is to further the existing RCCs on the basis of clear property rights, real reinvented according to the direction of stock, making the rural commercial finance. For the rural areas of cooperation remain the financial needs of the cooperative movement only with the depth of expertise in the market based on the re-generation (such as rural credit union funds, etc.), policy financial requirements are mainly to be met by policy banks. Joint-stock reform of rural credit cooperatives at the same time, the state can still be from the policy level, through the window guidance, financial subsidies, tax concessions to the commercial banks to make farmers and small agricultural producers involved in financial operations to guide and inspire. This article focused on the research of existing RCCs.
RCBs as the results of RCCs joint-stock reform in China. Up to now, China has successively set up more than 80 RCBs. The RCBs have made a number of active exploration on management system, operation mechanism, etc. However, how to look at the development of RCBs, the inherent requirements, how to make RCBs to truly become an independent legal person status and operation of efficient, risk control, to adapt to rural economic development of the modern rural financial enterprises in the internal operation mechanism and the external policy environment There are many defects. Internally, the principal owner of the RCBs, the situation is very conspicuous absence, lack of property rights play an essential function of the foundation and conditions for shareholder oversight of corporate governance in the high cost of high costs and agency problems are quite prominent. From an external point of view, chaotic management of RCCs in the past, management is extensive, prominent cases of moral hazard, over-administration and the management system of RCCs can be achieved remarkable results in the short term, but long term is not conducive to promoting grass-roots RCBs Improved efficiency. Therefore, the study of joint-stock reform of RCCs, needs to study both the internal operation mechanism, and the external management system.
This article attempts to use co-finance theory, modern property rights theory, corporate governance theory and institutional economics, etc. at the use of game analysis and empirical research, based on the reform of RCCs to discuss the path and direction, and most joint-stock reform of RCCs Based system of property rights, the most critical and most complex corporate governance external management system to start, some of the reform of RCCs have reference value ideas and perspectives. This innovation is mainly reflected in:First, the RCCs from the existing capital stock structure, business size, asset composition, management structure and other aspects of the empirical analysis, from a realistic perspective of the RCCs system is difficult to walk the road of reason Proposed grassroots RCCs system has been modified do not have the condition, only in accordance with the direction of the restructuring of joint-stock rural commercial bank. Second, the reform of RCCs is the key to stock ownership structure and corporate governance. In particular, pointed out that the current restructuring of rural.credit cooperatives, set up rural commercial banks to speed up the case of an urgent need to quickly establish an open, transparent platform for collecting sponsors. Third, in the use of game theory to analysis the model for RCCs, and point that the key is to reduce the costs of monitoring and control of agency costs. Fourth, joint-stock reforms of RCCs come from the internal needs and external management system.
目前理论界和实务界普遍认为农村金融中既需要商业性金融,也需要合作金融和政策性金融,这就要求我们建立不同的金融组织形式以适应农村地区不同层次的需求。中央也提出要“建立和完善以合作金融为基础,商业性金融、政策性金融分工协作的农村金融体系”。在我国建立多层次的农村金融体系中,对于现有农村信用社的改革方向一直存在较大争议,有的学者认为农村信用社应当按照合作制进行规范,以合作金融的方式为农村提供融资服务；有的学者认为农村信用社按照股份合作制或者股份制的方式运作更能符合实际。到底哪种改革方向更加适应我国农村信用社的实际,目前尚未达成共识。
2003年以来的农村信用社改革政策是在各方争议较大的情况下推出的一个折中方案,在市场化和产权清晰的总体目标下,允许各地自主选择合作制、股份合作制和股份制三种产权形式。由此产生了保留合作制的农村信用社、实行股份合作制的县联社和农村合作银行、实行股份制的农村商业银行等性质不同的机构。但是改革最初设定的市场化原则和产权清晰的目标并未真正实现,现有的各类农村合作金融机构(含县联社、农村合作银行、农村商业银行)仍然距离现代金融企业的目标差距甚远。而且由于政府主导的强制性制度变迁形成的路径依赖,形成了行政色彩浓厚的管理体制,产生了农村信用社新的管理者——省联社。在此条件下,性质不同的各类基层农村合作金融机构运行方式基本趋同,并未因其产权性质的差距体现出不同的市场效果,而且产权主体缺位的情况仍然十分严重。
本文阐述了我国农村信用社改革发展历程,并对其制度变迁的特征和效果进行了评价。笔者认为我国农村信用社最初是按照合作制原则建立的金融组织,但历经数轮改革后,在历史和现实因素的多重驱动下,早已严重脱离了合作金融运行轨道,其本质属性已经发生根本变化。现有农村信用社仅仅是名义上的信用合作组织,难以划归合作金融范畴,农村信用社已经形成事实上的商业化经营。而且由于股金来源泛化、规模过大、法人层级较高、行政管理体制约束等现实障碍,现有农村信用社已经不可能重新回到合作金融体制下,带有合作性质的改革难以达到产权清晰、产权功能健全的改革目标,也难以适应目前农村信用社的发展实际。现实的选择是将现有农村信用社在进一步明晰产权的基础上,真正按照股份制方向进行彻底改造,使之成为农村商业性金融。对于农村地区仍然存在的合作金融需求,只能随着我国专业合作社的深入发展,在市场化的基础上重新产生(如农村资金互助社、民间金融组织等),政策性金融需求则主要通过政策性银行予以满足。同时农村信用社股份制改革后,国家仍然可以从政策层面,通过窗口指导、财政补贴、税收优惠等方式,对农村商业银行开展涉及农户和中小农业生产者的金融业务进行引导和激励,使之成为主要面向农村市场的地方性、社区化的商业银行。
农村商业银行是农村信用社股份制改革的产物。截至目前,我国已经相继组建了80多家农村商业银行。有关方面在农村商业银行的管理体制、运行机制等方面做出了许多积极的探索,取得了一定的成效。但是,’如何看待农村商业银行发展的内在要求,如何让农村商业银行真正成为拥有独立法人地位和运行高效、风险可控、适应农村经济发展的现代农村金融企业,在内部运行机制和外部政策环境方面还存在许多缺陷。从内部来看,农村商业银行所有者主体缺位的情况十分突出,产权功能的发挥还缺乏必要的基础和条件,公司治理中委托代理关系的割裂和股东监督成本、代理成本过高的问题相当突出。从外部来看,在过去农村信用社管理混乱,经营粗放、道德风险突出的情况下,过于行政化的农村信用社管理体制在短期虽然能够取得明显效果,但长期却不利于促进基层农村商业银行效率的提升。因此,研究农村信用社的股份制改革问题,既要研究农村信用社股份制后的内部运行机制,也要研究其外部管理体制。
本文试图运用合作金融理论、现代产权理论、公司治理理论和制度经济学等,在博弈分析和实证研究的基础上,对农村信用社改革的路径和方向进行论述,并从农村信用社股份制改革最基础的产权制度、最关键的公司治理和最复杂的外部管理体制入手,提出一些对农村信用社改革实践有参考价值的思路和观点。本文的创新主要体现在：一是从农村信用社现有股金构成、业务规模、资产构成、管理体制等方面进行了规范分析,从现实角度阐述了我国农村信用社难以走合作制道路的原因,提出基层农村信用社已经不具备合作制改造条件,应当按照股份制方向改制为农村商业银行。二是农村信用社股份制改革的基础在于产权制度。但是当前农村信用社合格投资者的匮乏以及没有建立必要的市场约束,严重影响了农村信用社产权功能的发挥,提出要通过稳定产权制度、构建适度集中的股权结构、选择合适的法人层级、调整行业管理、强化市场约束等方面为农村信用社产权改革创造条件,进而对农村信用社法人层级问题(即农村商业银行应当设在县级或者市级、省级)、发展专业的农村信用社股权投资机构、建立农村信用社股权流转机制进行了探讨。尤其指出在当前农村信用社加快改制组建农村商业银行的情况下,迫切需要尽快建立公开、透明的发起人征集平台。三是从农村信用社股份制改革的内在需要和当前的外部管理体制出发,提出了按照“政企分开、职能分离”的原则推进省联社的改革,为农村信用社股份制改革创造有利的外部条件,探讨了按照合作制原则把省联社改造成为真正为基层农村商业银行服务的系统联合体。
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) have become the most important component of rural finance, the reform of RCCs is directly related to financial efficiency in rural areas, related to the construction of new socialist countryside, also related to our social political and overall national economic development Strategy. Since the founding of our country, the RCCs, after several rounds of reform, its internal mechanisms and external systems are constantly changing, RCCs have become a term of economy with Chinese characteristics.
Currently, both the theorists and the practitioners consider as not only need the commercial finance, but also need to co-finance and financial policy in rural areas. It can be fully meet through various forms of financial institutions. Central Government also proposed to "establish and improve the financial basis of cooperation, commercial finance, financial policy division of labor in the rural financial system ". I agree with this view. However, the direction of the reform of RCCs is still controversial, some scholars believe that the RCCs system shall be regulated in a cooperative way for rural financial services to provide financing; some scholars believe that the RCCs should be regulated in a stock cooperative system in accordance with the manner. Which direction of reform is more practical to adapt to RCCs?
In 2003, the reform policy of RCCs is issued in a balance of different views, both the proposed overall goal of clear property rights, but also allows to choose all over the cooperative system, stock cooperative system and the stock of three Property form. The resulting cooperative system of reservation are rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), the country-level RCUs and rural commercial banks (RCBs). However, the initial set of market-oriented reform, the principles and objectives of clear property rights did not realize that the existing types of rural cooperative financial institutions (including RCCs, country-level RCUs and RCBs) is still far away from modern financial. And because of the mandatory system of government-led changes in the formation of path dependence, the RCCS will inevitably produce a new provincial RCUs, formed a strong sense of administrative management system of RCCs. Under these conditions, the nature of different kinds of grass-roots rural cooperative financial institutions, the basic operation mode of convergence, the gap does not reflect the nature of their property rights different effect on the market, and the absence of property rights is still very serious. Therefore, how to understand the nature of existing rural RCCs, which type of reform is still an important issue to be studied.
In this regard, the paper describes the process of reform and development of RCCs, and the characteristics and effects of institutional change were evaluated. I believe that RCCs was originally established in accordance with the principles of cooperative financial organization, but after several rounds of reform, the history and reality driven by multiple factors, already seriously out of the cooperative financial orbit, the nature of property has been a fundamental changed. Existing RCCs in name only credit cooperatives, cooperative financial areas should not be classified as RCCs has become the de facto commercial operations. Source of the money paid for shares and generalization, the scale is too large, higher levels of legal, administrative and other practical obstacles to institutional constraints, the existing rural credit cooperatives have been impossible to return to the cooperative financial system, with the cooperative nature of the reform of property rights is difficult to achieve Clear, well-functioning property rights reform objectives, it is difficult to adapt to the actual development of the current rural credit cooperatives. Realistic option is to further the existing RCCs on the basis of clear property rights, real reinvented according to the direction of stock, making the rural commercial finance. For the rural areas of cooperation remain the financial needs of the cooperative movement only with the depth of expertise in the market based on the re-generation (such as rural credit union funds, etc.), policy financial requirements are mainly to be met by policy banks. Joint-stock reform of rural credit cooperatives at the same time, the state can still be from the policy level, through the window guidance, financial subsidies, tax concessions to the commercial banks to make farmers and small agricultural producers involved in financial operations to guide and inspire. This article focused on the research of existing RCCs.
RCBs as the results of RCCs joint-stock reform in China. Up to now, China has successively set up more than 80 RCBs. The RCBs have made a number of active exploration on management system, operation mechanism, etc. However, how to look at the development of RCBs, the inherent requirements, how to make RCBs to truly become an independent legal person status and operation of efficient, risk control, to adapt to rural economic development of the modern rural financial enterprises in the internal operation mechanism and the external policy environment There are many defects. Internally, the principal owner of the RCBs, the situation is very conspicuous absence, lack of property rights play an essential function of the foundation and conditions for shareholder oversight of corporate governance in the high cost of high costs and agency problems are quite prominent. From an external point of view, chaotic management of RCCs in the past, management is extensive, prominent cases of moral hazard, over-administration and the management system of RCCs can be achieved remarkable results in the short term, but long term is not conducive to promoting grass-roots RCBs Improved efficiency. Therefore, the study of joint-stock reform of RCCs, needs to study both the internal operation mechanism, and the external management system.
This article attempts to use co-finance theory, modern property rights theory, corporate governance theory and institutional economics, etc. at the use of game analysis and empirical research, based on the reform of RCCs to discuss the path and direction, and most joint-stock reform of RCCs Based system of property rights, the most critical and most complex corporate governance external management system to start, some of the reform of RCCs have reference value ideas and perspectives. This innovation is mainly reflected in:First, the RCCs from the existing capital stock structure, business size, asset composition, management structure and other aspects of the empirical analysis, from a realistic perspective of the RCCs system is difficult to walk the road of reason Proposed grassroots RCCs system has been modified do not have the condition, only in accordance with the direction of the restructuring of joint-stock rural commercial bank. Second, the reform of RCCs is the key to stock ownership structure and corporate governance. In particular, pointed out that the current restructuring of rural.credit cooperatives, set up rural commercial banks to speed up the case of an urgent need to quickly establish an open, transparent platform for collecting sponsors. Third, in the use of game theory to analysis the model for RCCs, and point that the key is to reduce the costs of monitoring and control of agency costs. Fourth, joint-stock reforms of RCCs come from the internal needs and external management system.
引文
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5谢平,中国农村信用合作社体制改革的争论,金融研究,2001年01期
6曾康霖,我国农村金融模式的选择,金融研究,2001年10期
7马忠富,中国农村合作金融发展研究,2000
8费方域,企业的产权分析,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1998,
9 Andrel Shleifer and Robert. W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of finance, 1997
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13李维安、武立东,《公司治理教程》,上海人民出版社出版社,2002
14木人, 《大胆的探索成功的实践》, 《金融时报》,2005-08-18
18马忠富,中国农村金融发展研究,中国金融出版社,2001
19中国人民银行合作金融机构监管司赴德国考察团, 《德国合作金融的特点及启示》, 《中国金融》2000年02期
20马忠富,《中国农村金融发展研究》,中国金融出版社,2001
2111960年前,法国农业信贷银行得到国家的捐赠和拨款支持,中长期贷款几乎全由国家资金资助,享受税收优惠。但60年代后国家的投资逐渐减少,直至完全取消,1971年开始缴纳营业税。
22胡祥苏：交易成本与农民合作化；中国经济时报；2000年12月20日,第五版
23谢平, 《中国农村信用合作社体制改革的争论》,金融研究,2001
25卢现祥,马洪;西方新制度经济学；中国发展出版社；2006年
26卢现祥,马洪；西方新制度经济学；中国发展出版社；2006年
27赵晓雷,《产权——现代市场经济制度的核心权利》,文汇报,2003年11月10日
28何广文；农村信用社制度变迁：困境与路径选择；经济与管理研究;2009年第1期
29张乐柱,农村合作金融制度研究,中国农业出版社,2005
30郑立明,《国有商业银行治理结构研究—基于利益相关者理论视角》,2006
31苑德军、郭春丽、刘岱,上市公司股权结构与公司价值关系研究,上海证券报,2005年2月22日
32布莱尔,所有权与控制——面向21世纪的公司治理探索,中国社会科学出版社,1999
33青木昌彦、钱颗一主编,转轨经济中的公司治理结构,中国经济出版社,1995
34葛蓉蓉,《我国股份制商业银行治理有效性问题研究》,2006
35李维安、曹廷求,商业银行治理,南开学报,2005年第1期
36数据来自各行2010年度报告。
37鲍博.特里克(Bob Tricker),董事与公司治理,中信出版社,2005
38 Hernalin, Weisbach, Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO, The American Economic Review,1998
39 Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, Journal of Law and Economics,1983
40数据来自各行2010年度报告。
41谢增毅,董事会委员会与公司治理,法学研究,2005年第5期
42周素彦、周文平,论农村信用社“省联社”模式——理论依据、缺陷及实施建议, 《金融教学与研究》,2007年5期
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