股份合作制下农村信用社利益相关者的协调机制研究
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摘要
随着管理科学的不断发展,利益相关者理论日益得到我国学术界的高度重视,利益相关者利益冲突的协调问题更是备受我国实践所关注。近年来,农村信用社以股份合作制改革为基础,形成了农村信用社股东、农村信用社经营管理者以及政府等利益相关者关系;农村信用社股份合作制被赋予协调“扶持三农”和“商业化运作”双重目标的使命。在农村信用社试点股份合作制度中,实现双重目标的实质就是协调好核心利益相关者关系,双重目标下的利益相关者协调机制成为利益相关者理论及其协调机制研究和运用的新领域。
本文通过对农村信用社发展历程考察,以及对农村信用社股份合作制业已存在的利益相关者协调机制的实证分析,认为合作制难以实现农村信用社“商业化运作”与“扶持三农”双重目标,并指出农村信用社的股份合作制路径依赖是其核心利益相关者的依存关系所致。在此基础上,对农村信用社股份合作制度及其利益相关者协调机制展开研究,研究工作主要集中在以下几个方面:
一、根据利益相关者所有权分布特点、核心利益相关者投入要素组合特征,运用交易效率理论对股份合作制的协调效率进行帕累托效率研究,建立了股份合作制的利益相关者交易模型;优化资本类要素和非资本类要素的组合,并进行了要素弹性分析;引入控制权系数,建立了股份合作制交易效率模型;分析了交易成本的不同变化与控制权系数的组合对农村信用社利益相关者效用的影响。
二、针对农村信用社股份合作制设计的特点和股东产权设置不足的现状,借助资产专用性理论和机会主义行为理论的新思路,研究了股份合作制稳定性问题,建立了股份合作制内部稳定均衡的演化博弈模型,并通过某银行的数据对演化博弈模型进行实证研究,证明了该模型的有效性,并得出以下结论:
1.实现股东获得的股权收益大于社会平均资本收益,是保持股份合作制股权稳定性的充分条件。
2.实现同股不同权下的股东合作和保持股权稳定性,法人股东机会主义行为的收益小于互惠主义行为的收益是必要条件。
3.在自然人股东获获取的资产专用性收益中,可占用准租的取值范围应在农村信用社股本收益与社会平均资本收益之间寻找一个合理定位。
4.若机会主义行为对股权收益没有影响,则需通过股东之间的合作产生合作剩余来保持股份合作制股权稳定性;若机会主义行为对股权收益有一定程度影响,法人股东获取的可占用准租小于因机会主义行为减少的股权收益时,股份合作制股权能够实现稳定均衡。
三、针对股份合作制协调利益相关者过程中出现的政府失灵问题,通过描述股东与政府在二元化目标冲突时实现均衡的区域,建立起基于利他主义的农村信用社核心利益相关者策略选择模型,提出提高股东精神收益可以协调利益相关者的利益冲突,从而为农村信用社二元化目标的均衡发展提供新的协调思路。实证研究表明:
1.在股东精神收益、股东偏好、正向激励和行政惩罚等因素影响下,需要充分考虑农村信用社股东精神收益和股东的不同偏好对政府公共目标的影响程度,才能保证政府正向激励和行政惩罚策略的有效性,实现农村信用社股东行为和政府行为的进化稳定均衡(ESS)。
2.股东利他偏好较利己偏好更有利于股东行为和政府行为实现进化稳定均衡;行政惩罚策略对股东偏好的影响程度大于正向激励策略,更有利于股东行为和政府行为实现进化稳定均衡。
3.政府最好的稳定策略(ESS)是实现股东的精神收益大于其成本支出以及股东偏好在不同政府策略下保持一致,若能如此,不管情况发生任何变化,股东均能表现出利他偏好;
四、在总结共同治理理论及其实践发展模式的基础上,通过分析有限理性、信息不对称等影响共同治理模式因素,建立股份合作制治理模式,并指出:职工参与的多边制衡模式可以遏止控制权,减少交易成本;建立利他主义的投票权平衡机制可以激励公司治理中“利他惩罚”行为,减少交易成本。
With development of the management science, Stakeholder Theory is highly valued by our country academic circles, the coordination problem of benefits conflict among stakeholders is fully pay attention to by China's practice. In recent years, based on the reform of share cooperation, the rural credit cooperatives came forth stakeholder such as shareholder, manager and government etc. New share cooperation system of the rural credit cooperatives is given the dual target of "support three agricultures" and "business operation". In the rural credit share cooperation system, harmonizing stakeholder and coordinating the dual target became a new research realm in the stakeholder coordination mechanism theories and usage of.
After investigated the development of the rural credit cooperatives, and empirical research on the stakeholder coordination mechanism with already exist rural credit share cooperation system, this paper proposed cooperation system is hardly to coordinated the dual target of "support three agricultures" and "business operation", and pointed out the path dependence of the rural credit share cooperation system came from depended relation among its main stakeholder. More over, this paper research mainly on the rural credit share cooperation system and its stakeholder coordination mechanism, the study include four parts.
Firstly, based on the ownership configuration characteristics of the stakeholder, combination of resource proffered by "core stakeholder" , this paper researched Pareto Optimality of bargain relation in the share cooperation system with bargain efficiency theories, and established stakeholder bargain model of the share cooperation system. We optimize portfolio of capital resource and non-capital resource, and analyzed elasticity of resource. This paper used coefficient of control power to build up the bargain efficiency model of the share cooperation system. Considered the influence from the variety of the trade cost and the different combination of the control power coefficient, this paper analyzed the effect of rural credit cooperatives stakeholder.
Secondly, this paper based on new ways of Asset Special Purpose Theory and Opportunism Behavior Theory, aimed at the design produce of rural credit share cooperation system and the present condition that shareholder's property right was insufficiency, studied the stability problem of the share cooperation system and built up an evolve game model about internal stability balanced of the share cooperation system, and empirical studied with a bank's data show the model is availability. We get some conclusions as follows.
1. It is a full and needed condition to keep share stability of the share cooperation system that the share income of shareholder is bigger than the average income of society capital.
2. It is a needed condition to implement cooperation while stockholders are same share but different right and to keep share stability that corporation stockholder's opportunism behavior income smaller their reciprocity behavior income.
3. In asset-special-purpose income that natural person stockholder acquired, extension of impropriate quasi-rent in reason should be a location that restricted by the share income of rural cooperation and the average income of society capital.
4. If the opportunism behavior no influenced to the share income, it need the cooperation surplus that came from the cooperation of shareholders to keep the share stability of the share cooperation system. If the opportunism behavior has certain degree influence to the share income, the ownership structure of share cooperation system can carry out stability balanced while the impropriate quasi-rent of the legal person shareholder smaller than the share income decreased by opportunism behavior.
Thirdly, this paper descript balanced district that shareholder and government are faced with confliction of twain targets, built up the benefits related strategy choice model of the rural credit cooperation core stakeholder with altruism, put forward that raising shareholder spirit income can moderate benefits conflict of stakeholders, thus provide new coordination thinking for the twain targets balanced development of the rural cooperation. The empirical research got some conclusions as follow.
1. Because stakeholder under the influence of factors, such as shareholder spirit income, shareholder preference, positive inspirit and the administration punish etc, we must full consideration the different influence degree on government public target by the spirit income of rural cooperation shareholder and different the preference of shareholder, then all that government positive inspirit and administration punish strategy were surely effectual, so it would implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium between rural credit cooperatives shareholder behavior and the government behavior.
2. The shareholder's altruism preference was more benefit to implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium than self-regard preference. For shareholder preference, the administration punishment strategy has more influence than administration positive inspirit strategy, so it was more benefit to implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium between rural credit cooperatives shareholder behavior and the government behavior.
3. Best equilibrium stable strategy of government were to carries out that the shareholder spirit income is big at its cost expenditure and the shareholder preference keep consistently under the different government strategy, if so, no matter what the shareholder can express altruism preference.
Fourly, Summarized Common Governance Theory and its fulfillment development, this paper built up the share cooperation government mode with analyzed bound rational and information asymmetry that influence on common government mode. More conclusions were that the multilateral inter-restrict mode that the employee participate can hold back control-power and decrease trade cost, that the vote equilibrium mechanism of altruism can encourage a " altruism punishment" behavior in company government and decrease trade cost.
本文通过对农村信用社发展历程考察,以及对农村信用社股份合作制业已存在的利益相关者协调机制的实证分析,认为合作制难以实现农村信用社“商业化运作”与“扶持三农”双重目标,并指出农村信用社的股份合作制路径依赖是其核心利益相关者的依存关系所致。在此基础上,对农村信用社股份合作制度及其利益相关者协调机制展开研究,研究工作主要集中在以下几个方面:
一、根据利益相关者所有权分布特点、核心利益相关者投入要素组合特征,运用交易效率理论对股份合作制的协调效率进行帕累托效率研究,建立了股份合作制的利益相关者交易模型;优化资本类要素和非资本类要素的组合,并进行了要素弹性分析;引入控制权系数,建立了股份合作制交易效率模型;分析了交易成本的不同变化与控制权系数的组合对农村信用社利益相关者效用的影响。
二、针对农村信用社股份合作制设计的特点和股东产权设置不足的现状,借助资产专用性理论和机会主义行为理论的新思路,研究了股份合作制稳定性问题,建立了股份合作制内部稳定均衡的演化博弈模型,并通过某银行的数据对演化博弈模型进行实证研究,证明了该模型的有效性,并得出以下结论:
1.实现股东获得的股权收益大于社会平均资本收益,是保持股份合作制股权稳定性的充分条件。
2.实现同股不同权下的股东合作和保持股权稳定性,法人股东机会主义行为的收益小于互惠主义行为的收益是必要条件。
3.在自然人股东获获取的资产专用性收益中,可占用准租的取值范围应在农村信用社股本收益与社会平均资本收益之间寻找一个合理定位。
4.若机会主义行为对股权收益没有影响,则需通过股东之间的合作产生合作剩余来保持股份合作制股权稳定性;若机会主义行为对股权收益有一定程度影响,法人股东获取的可占用准租小于因机会主义行为减少的股权收益时,股份合作制股权能够实现稳定均衡。
三、针对股份合作制协调利益相关者过程中出现的政府失灵问题,通过描述股东与政府在二元化目标冲突时实现均衡的区域,建立起基于利他主义的农村信用社核心利益相关者策略选择模型,提出提高股东精神收益可以协调利益相关者的利益冲突,从而为农村信用社二元化目标的均衡发展提供新的协调思路。实证研究表明:
1.在股东精神收益、股东偏好、正向激励和行政惩罚等因素影响下,需要充分考虑农村信用社股东精神收益和股东的不同偏好对政府公共目标的影响程度,才能保证政府正向激励和行政惩罚策略的有效性,实现农村信用社股东行为和政府行为的进化稳定均衡(ESS)。
2.股东利他偏好较利己偏好更有利于股东行为和政府行为实现进化稳定均衡;行政惩罚策略对股东偏好的影响程度大于正向激励策略,更有利于股东行为和政府行为实现进化稳定均衡。
3.政府最好的稳定策略(ESS)是实现股东的精神收益大于其成本支出以及股东偏好在不同政府策略下保持一致,若能如此,不管情况发生任何变化,股东均能表现出利他偏好;
四、在总结共同治理理论及其实践发展模式的基础上,通过分析有限理性、信息不对称等影响共同治理模式因素,建立股份合作制治理模式,并指出:职工参与的多边制衡模式可以遏止控制权,减少交易成本;建立利他主义的投票权平衡机制可以激励公司治理中“利他惩罚”行为,减少交易成本。
With development of the management science, Stakeholder Theory is highly valued by our country academic circles, the coordination problem of benefits conflict among stakeholders is fully pay attention to by China's practice. In recent years, based on the reform of share cooperation, the rural credit cooperatives came forth stakeholder such as shareholder, manager and government etc. New share cooperation system of the rural credit cooperatives is given the dual target of "support three agricultures" and "business operation". In the rural credit share cooperation system, harmonizing stakeholder and coordinating the dual target became a new research realm in the stakeholder coordination mechanism theories and usage of.
After investigated the development of the rural credit cooperatives, and empirical research on the stakeholder coordination mechanism with already exist rural credit share cooperation system, this paper proposed cooperation system is hardly to coordinated the dual target of "support three agricultures" and "business operation", and pointed out the path dependence of the rural credit share cooperation system came from depended relation among its main stakeholder. More over, this paper research mainly on the rural credit share cooperation system and its stakeholder coordination mechanism, the study include four parts.
Firstly, based on the ownership configuration characteristics of the stakeholder, combination of resource proffered by "core stakeholder" , this paper researched Pareto Optimality of bargain relation in the share cooperation system with bargain efficiency theories, and established stakeholder bargain model of the share cooperation system. We optimize portfolio of capital resource and non-capital resource, and analyzed elasticity of resource. This paper used coefficient of control power to build up the bargain efficiency model of the share cooperation system. Considered the influence from the variety of the trade cost and the different combination of the control power coefficient, this paper analyzed the effect of rural credit cooperatives stakeholder.
Secondly, this paper based on new ways of Asset Special Purpose Theory and Opportunism Behavior Theory, aimed at the design produce of rural credit share cooperation system and the present condition that shareholder's property right was insufficiency, studied the stability problem of the share cooperation system and built up an evolve game model about internal stability balanced of the share cooperation system, and empirical studied with a bank's data show the model is availability. We get some conclusions as follows.
1. It is a full and needed condition to keep share stability of the share cooperation system that the share income of shareholder is bigger than the average income of society capital.
2. It is a needed condition to implement cooperation while stockholders are same share but different right and to keep share stability that corporation stockholder's opportunism behavior income smaller their reciprocity behavior income.
3. In asset-special-purpose income that natural person stockholder acquired, extension of impropriate quasi-rent in reason should be a location that restricted by the share income of rural cooperation and the average income of society capital.
4. If the opportunism behavior no influenced to the share income, it need the cooperation surplus that came from the cooperation of shareholders to keep the share stability of the share cooperation system. If the opportunism behavior has certain degree influence to the share income, the ownership structure of share cooperation system can carry out stability balanced while the impropriate quasi-rent of the legal person shareholder smaller than the share income decreased by opportunism behavior.
Thirdly, this paper descript balanced district that shareholder and government are faced with confliction of twain targets, built up the benefits related strategy choice model of the rural credit cooperation core stakeholder with altruism, put forward that raising shareholder spirit income can moderate benefits conflict of stakeholders, thus provide new coordination thinking for the twain targets balanced development of the rural cooperation. The empirical research got some conclusions as follow.
1. Because stakeholder under the influence of factors, such as shareholder spirit income, shareholder preference, positive inspirit and the administration punish etc, we must full consideration the different influence degree on government public target by the spirit income of rural cooperation shareholder and different the preference of shareholder, then all that government positive inspirit and administration punish strategy were surely effectual, so it would implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium between rural credit cooperatives shareholder behavior and the government behavior.
2. The shareholder's altruism preference was more benefit to implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium than self-regard preference. For shareholder preference, the administration punishment strategy has more influence than administration positive inspirit strategy, so it was more benefit to implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium between rural credit cooperatives shareholder behavior and the government behavior.
3. Best equilibrium stable strategy of government were to carries out that the shareholder spirit income is big at its cost expenditure and the shareholder preference keep consistently under the different government strategy, if so, no matter what the shareholder can express altruism preference.
Fourly, Summarized Common Governance Theory and its fulfillment development, this paper built up the share cooperation government mode with analyzed bound rational and information asymmetry that influence on common government mode. More conclusions were that the multilateral inter-restrict mode that the employee participate can hold back control-power and decrease trade cost, that the vote equilibrium mechanism of altruism can encourage a " altruism punishment" behavior in company government and decrease trade cost.
引文
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