发电市场中的规制理论与应用研究
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摘要
电力行业的市场化改革在不断深入,目前改革的重点是厂网分开,目的是在发电环节打破垄断、放松规制、引入竞争,提高效率、降低电价。放松规制并不意味着不规制,有效的规制才能更好地发挥市场机制的作用,而改革的实践反映出电力市场中还存在很多市场机制失灵的现象,那么如何避免这些现象,引导市场成员的有效竞争,就成为政府规制机构关注的重点。规制机构需要明确发电市场的规制目标、内容和方法是什么,什么样的规制政策才是合理的,还需要对规制的效果进行评估,进而改进当前的规制措施。
论文在分析了自然垄断行业的特性和电力行业特有的技术经济特性的基础上,说明了对其进行政府规制的必要性;从有效竞争的角度,系统地分析了在放松规制,引入竞争的发电环节,政府规制的目标、内容和方法;根据规制目标,论文分别研究了政府在发电市场的市场条件构建、市场秩序和市场力的规制及发电商生产经营效率的提高等几个方面中应该发挥的作用,并提出了改进、优化的方法和模型。
论文首先分析了规制机构在发电市场的市场结构、电源投资、厂网协调发展等方面应该起到的作用。从供需平衡和有效竞争的角度,提出了发电市场的市场条件合理性的判定原则,并在考虑断面约束的情况下,采用模糊可拓的综合评估模型对市场条件的合理性进行评估,结果不仅反映了政府规制的效果,而且还为规制机构及时采取措施提供了参考。其次,分析了发电市场中不利于市场有效竞争的持留、投机、串谋等有害的竞价行为,分析了这些行为产生的原因和危害。在此基础上,总结了对这些行为的主要规制措施和方法。由于受到信息不对称、技术因素及规制成本等的限制,发电商在竞价中所获得回报具有不确定性,基于此探讨了不确定回报下竞价规制的博弈均衡,给出了判断规制机制是否有效的方法,并提出了改进优化规制机制的模型和方法。第三,进一步研究了发电市场中市场力的识别问题,采用集对分析和马尔可夫链模型的动态评估方法,分析了发电商市场力的动态变化和趋势,从而为更好地对其进行规制提供了参考。最后,论文从促进发电商提高生产经营效率的角度,对我国发电市场中电价规制的设计展开研究。本文认为环境因素和发电可靠性也对发电商的经营效率产生影响,提出在标尺竞争规制的设计中也应该将这两方面因素考虑进来。通过运用数据包络方法和层次分析法,可以灵活根据政府规制的重点来调整电价规制中效率因子的确定。
电力市场改革的顺利实施,离不开政府规制的作用,在放松规制的同时还要改进规制的方法、提高规制的效率。论文的研究对于实现发电市场的有效规制具有理论和实践的意义。
With the deepened reform of the electricity industry,the apartment of generation and power grid has become the highlight of the reform,which aims to smash up the monopoly, relax regulation,introduce competitive mechanism,and raise efficiency and lower electricity price.Relax regulation does not mean non-regulation,effective regulation will play the important role of market function.However,there are many phenomenon of“market failure”in reform.How to avoid the market failure and how to lead the market members to effective competition have become the focus which the government regulatory organization pays close attention to.The regulatory organization needs to make sure the objective,subject and method, to certain which policy is reliable,to evaluate the effect and improve them.
Through analyzing the characteristics of natural monopoly and electricity technology economy,this article emphasizes the necessity of government regulatory.From the viewpoint of effective competition,this article analyzes the objective,subject and method of government regulatory in the generation sector.According to the regulatory objective of power generation market,the article respectively analyzes the roles which the government plays on the construction of market condition,the regulation of market order and market power,and the improving management efficiency of generation companies and so on.Based on these,the improved and optimized methods and models are brought up.
First,the article analyzes the roles which regulatory organization plays on the aspects of market structure,generation investment,coordination development between power network and power plants etc.The principles for judgment of generation market structure are put forward from the terms of effective competition.Considering the constraint of cross-section,the article assesses the market condition reliability based on extension and fuzzy theory.The result has not only reflected the effect of the government regulatory but also offered effective reference for the regulatory organization.Second, this article analyzes the harmful bidding behaviors like holding,speculation and collusion,etc,and their causing reasons and danger.On the base of this,it summarizes the main regulatory measures.Due to the limit of asymmetric information,technology factor and regulatory cost and so on,the return of generation companies in bidding will be indefinite.Based on this,the article confers the game equilibrium from the perspective of indefinite return of bidding behavior regulation and promotes the improving model and method of regulatory mechanism.Third,the article further researches the discrimination of market power and analyzes their dynamic change and tendency based on the dynamic assessment method of set pair analysis and Markov chain model.At last,it studies the price regulatory design in China from the viewpoint of promotion management efficiency.Due to the environment factor and generation steadily influencing the management efficiency,they should be taken into account in the designing of Yardstick Competition regulation.Based on the Data Envelopment Analysis and hierarchy process analysis,the efficiency factor of price regulation can be adjusted with the importance of government regulatory.
Without the government regulatory,power market reform can not smoothly develop. The regulatory method and efficiency needs to be improved while it is relaxed.This article has the significance in theory and practice to study effective regulatory of generation market.
论文在分析了自然垄断行业的特性和电力行业特有的技术经济特性的基础上,说明了对其进行政府规制的必要性;从有效竞争的角度,系统地分析了在放松规制,引入竞争的发电环节,政府规制的目标、内容和方法;根据规制目标,论文分别研究了政府在发电市场的市场条件构建、市场秩序和市场力的规制及发电商生产经营效率的提高等几个方面中应该发挥的作用,并提出了改进、优化的方法和模型。
论文首先分析了规制机构在发电市场的市场结构、电源投资、厂网协调发展等方面应该起到的作用。从供需平衡和有效竞争的角度,提出了发电市场的市场条件合理性的判定原则,并在考虑断面约束的情况下,采用模糊可拓的综合评估模型对市场条件的合理性进行评估,结果不仅反映了政府规制的效果,而且还为规制机构及时采取措施提供了参考。其次,分析了发电市场中不利于市场有效竞争的持留、投机、串谋等有害的竞价行为,分析了这些行为产生的原因和危害。在此基础上,总结了对这些行为的主要规制措施和方法。由于受到信息不对称、技术因素及规制成本等的限制,发电商在竞价中所获得回报具有不确定性,基于此探讨了不确定回报下竞价规制的博弈均衡,给出了判断规制机制是否有效的方法,并提出了改进优化规制机制的模型和方法。第三,进一步研究了发电市场中市场力的识别问题,采用集对分析和马尔可夫链模型的动态评估方法,分析了发电商市场力的动态变化和趋势,从而为更好地对其进行规制提供了参考。最后,论文从促进发电商提高生产经营效率的角度,对我国发电市场中电价规制的设计展开研究。本文认为环境因素和发电可靠性也对发电商的经营效率产生影响,提出在标尺竞争规制的设计中也应该将这两方面因素考虑进来。通过运用数据包络方法和层次分析法,可以灵活根据政府规制的重点来调整电价规制中效率因子的确定。
电力市场改革的顺利实施,离不开政府规制的作用,在放松规制的同时还要改进规制的方法、提高规制的效率。论文的研究对于实现发电市场的有效规制具有理论和实践的意义。
With the deepened reform of the electricity industry,the apartment of generation and power grid has become the highlight of the reform,which aims to smash up the monopoly, relax regulation,introduce competitive mechanism,and raise efficiency and lower electricity price.Relax regulation does not mean non-regulation,effective regulation will play the important role of market function.However,there are many phenomenon of“market failure”in reform.How to avoid the market failure and how to lead the market members to effective competition have become the focus which the government regulatory organization pays close attention to.The regulatory organization needs to make sure the objective,subject and method, to certain which policy is reliable,to evaluate the effect and improve them.
Through analyzing the characteristics of natural monopoly and electricity technology economy,this article emphasizes the necessity of government regulatory.From the viewpoint of effective competition,this article analyzes the objective,subject and method of government regulatory in the generation sector.According to the regulatory objective of power generation market,the article respectively analyzes the roles which the government plays on the construction of market condition,the regulation of market order and market power,and the improving management efficiency of generation companies and so on.Based on these,the improved and optimized methods and models are brought up.
First,the article analyzes the roles which regulatory organization plays on the aspects of market structure,generation investment,coordination development between power network and power plants etc.The principles for judgment of generation market structure are put forward from the terms of effective competition.Considering the constraint of cross-section,the article assesses the market condition reliability based on extension and fuzzy theory.The result has not only reflected the effect of the government regulatory but also offered effective reference for the regulatory organization.Second, this article analyzes the harmful bidding behaviors like holding,speculation and collusion,etc,and their causing reasons and danger.On the base of this,it summarizes the main regulatory measures.Due to the limit of asymmetric information,technology factor and regulatory cost and so on,the return of generation companies in bidding will be indefinite.Based on this,the article confers the game equilibrium from the perspective of indefinite return of bidding behavior regulation and promotes the improving model and method of regulatory mechanism.Third,the article further researches the discrimination of market power and analyzes their dynamic change and tendency based on the dynamic assessment method of set pair analysis and Markov chain model.At last,it studies the price regulatory design in China from the viewpoint of promotion management efficiency.Due to the environment factor and generation steadily influencing the management efficiency,they should be taken into account in the designing of Yardstick Competition regulation.Based on the Data Envelopment Analysis and hierarchy process analysis,the efficiency factor of price regulation can be adjusted with the importance of government regulatory.
Without the government regulatory,power market reform can not smoothly develop. The regulatory method and efficiency needs to be improved while it is relaxed.This article has the significance in theory and practice to study effective regulatory of generation market.
引文
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