中国商品住宅市场与开发商行为的治理和规制研究
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摘要
中国房地产业经过十多年的发展,已经成为国民经济的基础性和支柱性产业。近年来,中国商品住宅价格整体升温,引起投资增长过快过猛、供需结构严重失衡、空置面积不断增加以及开发商捂盘惜售、虚假信息等不正当竞争行为,而保障性住宅的供给却严重不足。这些问题己危及产业健康发展,引发了一系列不良社会后果,加剧了社会矛盾冲突,成为社会各界关注的热点。解决好这些问题,仅仅依靠市场机制自发调节难以奏效,必须借助政府力量。为此,政府如何运用经济手段和行政手段来治理商品房市场环境,加强对开发商不良行为的规制是一个有研究价值的重要课题。住宅市场由相互联系和影响、但又各自独立运行的保障性住宅市场和商品性住宅市场两个子系统组成。其中商品住宅社会矛盾最集中最尖锐,是住宅市场的“牛鼻子”,分析和解决好它所存在的问题,整个住宅市场的问题可以提纲挈领,迎刃而解。基于此,本文把保障性住宅市场与商品住宅市场隔离开,将保障性住宅市场视为影响住宅市场的重要因素,而单独集中地对商品住宅市场存在的问题、解决的途径措施,作系统深入的分析。以期使分析对象相对集中,能够把问题分析得更全面和透彻。
产业规制是基于市场失灵下的政府干预行为,是市场经济的辅助功能,其目的在于使市场回归正常、理性的运行轨道。针对目前中国商品住宅市场呈现的高房价、高空置率、供需结构失衡等特征,及其引发一系列严重的不良社会后果,本文主要从中观的产业视角,运用产业组织理论中哈佛学派的SCP范式设计了论文的分析框架,即首先分析中国商品住宅市场区域性寡头垄断市场结构的形成机理；然后分析在需求过旺的区域性寡头垄断市场结构中开发商的行为和不良倾向,及其引发的不良社会后果；最后,针对所揭示出来的问题,提出治理商品住宅市场环境、规制开发商不良行为的思路和措施。
论文由六章构成。第一章绪论,介绍了选题的研究价值、论文的分析框架、各章的主要内容,以及论文的创新点和不足之处。
第二章,介绍和评述本文分析时使用的相关理论,回顾和评述了国内外与本选题相关的研究文献,为本文的后续奠定了理论基础。
第三、四、五章是本文的核心。论文在第三章中揭示商品住宅及商品住宅市场的特性；分析土地财政导致政府规制缺位；保障性住宅供给严重不足,使中低收入者涌入商品住宅市场,造成需求持续过旺；投资渠道狭窄导致大量炒房资金涌入,推高房价节节上涨等市场环境缺陷的基础上,指出开发商的经济人自利性,促使其利用商品住宅及商品住宅市场的特性和市场环境缺陷,谋求垄断地位,从而导致了商品住宅市场区域性寡头垄断结构形成,并且揭示了区域性寡头垄断市场的基本特征。
论文第四章,分析了在需求持续过旺、政府规制缺失和区域性寡头垄断’市场结构中,开发商的价格竞争和非价格竞争行为,指出非价格竞争行为是开发商的优先策略,并揭示了其中存在的不良倾向,如追求垄断定价、屯积土地、捂盘惜售、利用“托儿”制造购房热假象等等。论文指出,市场缺陷和开发商的不良行为和倾向,引发了一系列严重的不良后果,加剧了社会矛盾和冲突,破坏了社会的和谐稳定。
论文第五章,在第四章的基础上,首先论述由于商品住宅市场环境存在明显缺陷,开发商行为有明显不良倾向,因而运用政府力量治理市场环境,纠正其缺陷,加强规制,抑制开发商不良行为具有必要性和紧迫性。然后,分别就如何治理市场环境,规制开发商不良行为倾向,提出了具体的思路和措施。
第六章是本文的结论及展望。
本文探索如下几个方面以求有所创新：
(1)分析论证了中国商品住宅市场区域性寡头垄断市场结构的形成机理,并揭示了它的基本特征。首先论证了住宅具有空间位置的固定性、使用价值的多重异质性、耐久性和昂贵性等特性。其次,分析了中国商品住宅市场环境存在土地财政导致政府规制松弛、保障性住宅供给严重不足,将中低收入者挤入商品住宅市场、投资渠道狭窄,导致大量炒房资金涌入,推动房价高涨等缺陷。最后,指出开发商在经济人自利性驱动下,利用住宅的特性和市场环境缺陷,谋取垄断市场地位,形成了区域性寡头垄断市场结构,并揭示了该市场结构的基本特征。
(2)分析了在需求过旺、规制松弛和有明显缺陷的市场环境中,开发商的价格竞争和非价格竞争行为,提出并论证了非价格竞争行为是开发商优先策略的理论观点,揭露了开发商不正当行为其引发的严重不良社会后果,如垄断定价、虚假信息、囤积土地、捂盘惜售以及加速土地资源占用、滋生腐败、引发严重分配不公、扭曲投资分配使实体经济空心化等,这些不良社会后果危及社会的和谐和稳定。
(3)论证了治理市场环境缺陷和规制开发商不良行为的必要性和紧迫性,并针对市场环境缺陷和开发商不正当行为,提出加强治理和规制的思路和对策措施。如改革中央与地方政府的事权划分和税收分配比例,以及政绩考核方法；消除土地财政；把保障性住宅建设和供给,列为对地方政府政绩的主要考核指标；通过增加保障性住宅供给,消除由于中低收入者挤入而引起的商品住宅市场过旺需求；治理商品住宅市场中的过度投机行为；规制开发商垄断定价行为与利用虚假信息和广告,夸大住宅商品差别和性能、囤积土地、捂盘惜售哄抬价格等不正当行为。以期通过加强治理和规制,使商品住宅市场健康而平稳地发展。
(4)揭示了住宅商品和市场的特征。论文认为土地资源的有限性和商品住宅不可移动构成了商品住宅市场的垄断性特征,信息不对称性、房地产市场价格垄断定价政策是造成房地产暴利、商品住宅价格居高不下、投机炒楼与投资热潮的原因。
(5)构建了开发商之间的博弈模型。论文综合运用博弈模型分析中国商品住宅市场经济现实,构建开发商与开发商之间的博弈模型,通过对商品住宅价格构成及其影响因素的分析,指出开发商之间的市场竞争行为不仅仅表现为价格竞争,更重要的是非价格竞争行为。非价格竞争是中国房地产业市场竞争的主要形式,是房地产企业的优先策略。
受学养和研究能力所限,论文还存在一些不足之处,如商品住宅市场数据难以获得、政府规制的运行机制如何与市场机制进行融合衔接等问题,这些问题有待今后进一步探讨。
Chinese real estate undergoes more than ten years of development, and has already become the basic and pillar industry of national economy. In recent years, the Chinese commercial residential building price intensifies wholly, causing the increase in investment be too fast and too quickly, the supply and demand structure seriously out-of-balance, the constant increase of idle areas, and some illegitimate competition behaviors. Meanwhile the supply of ensuring houses is seriously insufficient. These problems have already jeopardized the industry, initiated a series of bad social consequences, and aggravated social conflicts. Indeed they are now the concerned focus of various circles of society. To settle these problems well, we must draw support from the government, rather than rely only on the market mechanism for spontaneous adjustment. Here we see the importance for the government to use economic means and administrative means to manage the market environment of commodity apartment, and to strengthen the regulation on the bad behaviors of the developers. The market of house is divided into two sub-systems:the guarantee house market and the commercial house market. They have connection to each other and operate independently. Among them commercial house market is the ox muzzle of the housing market, and the primary cause for social conflicts. If we can solve the problems in this market, all the troubles in the housing market can be easily solved. Because of this, this dissertation takes the market of guarantee houses as an important influencing factor of the housing market. In this way, we can go deep into the commercial housing market, analyzing the problems and solutions systematically, so as to get a better and more comprehensive understanding of the subject.
Industry regulation is a kind of government interference behavior in case of market failure. As an assisting function of market economy, it aims to draw the market back on the normal and rational orbit. The dissertation uses the SCP model of Harvard school for the analysis framework, from the aspect of industry, to solve the coexistence high price and high emptiness, and the relative severe social consequence. It first analyzes the formation mechanism of regional oligarch in Chinese commercial residential housing market. Then it analyzes, based on the over-prosperous demand in the regional oligarch structure, the behavior and harmful trend of developers, as well as its bad social sequences. Finally it puts forward measures to rule the environment of commercial residential housing market and to regulate the misbehavior of developers, so as to solve the problems discussed above.
The dissertation is formed by six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, with the value of the study, the framework of the dissertation, the main idea of all the chapters, and the innovative points as well as the weak points.
Chapter two introduces the theories employed in this thesis, with literature review, both at home and abroad, as the theoretical foundation for herein follow-up study.
Chapters three, four, and five are cores herein. Chapter three clarifies the characteristics of commercial residential buildings and the market; It is analyzed that the land finance leads to the lack of government regulation; Persons with low and middle income pours into the commercial housing market, because there are not enough ensuring houses for them, thus makes the market demand grows too prosperously; Investment channels are so narrow that hot money runs into the sousing market and put the prices goes up continuously. The dissertation also points out that developers, out of the self-interested economic person, seeks monopoly position by utilizing these characteristics and defects of market environment, which helps the formation of the regional oligopoly commercial housing market. It also reveals the features of the oligopoly.
Chapter four analyzes the price competition and non-rice competition behaviors of developers, complicated by the continuously prosperous demand, the lack of government regulation, and regional oligopoly. It points out that non-price competition is the developer's preferential tactics, and that there are harmful trends existing among them, such as running after monopolizing pricing, hoarding the land, sealing a rare sale, making the hot false appearance of purchasing house with " salesperson's decoy " etc. The dissertation points out that the market defects and the developer's bad behavior and inclination have initiated a series of serious bad consequences, aggravate social contradiction and conflict, and destroyed the harmonious stability of the society.
Chapter five, on the basis of chapter four, expounds the fact that because of the obvious defects existing in the market environment of commercial residential building, the developer's behavior has obvious harmful trends. Therefore it necessary and urgent for the government to regulate the market environment, correct its defect, strengthen the regulation, and inhibit developer's bad behaviors Then, it puts forward concrete measures to solves all the problems.
Chapter six is the conclusion and outlook.
This dissertation explores the following aspects in order to be innovative:
(1) It analyses and appraises the formation mechanism of Chinese commercial housing market and the regional oligopoly market structure, and reveals its basic features. It argues that residential buildings have such characteristics as spatial fixity, heterogeneous multi-use value, durability and high resistance and expensiveness. The land lax in the commercial housing market causes the government to loosen regulation; the serious shortage of ensuring residential buildings pushes many persons with low and middle income into the commercial housing market, and thus causes continuous prosperous demand; The narrow investment channel lures a lot of speculators into real estate market, pushing prices soaring. Finally the developers, motivated by the self interest of economic persons, make use of the residential properties and market environmental shortcomings, to seek monopoly status, and thus form a regional oligopoly market structure, the feature of which is revealed.
(2) It analyses the price competition and non-price competition of developers, in the situation of overheated demand, defected regulation, and significant deficiencies in the market environment, and proves that non-price competition is the priority strategic point of the developers. It also exposes the serious misconduct of the developers, together with the adverse social consequences, such as monopoly pricing, false information, hoarding land, protected reluctant sellers, speeding up the occupation of land resources, corruption, unfair distribution, distorted, investment allocation that causing the real economy hollow. All these adverse social consequences will definitely affect the social harmony and stability.
(3) It proves the necessity and urgency for us to improve the defect market environment and to regulate the bad behaviors of developers, and puts forward countermeasures and solutions, such as reforming the division of power between central and local governments, tax distribution ratio, and the performance evaluation methods; eliminating land finance; taking constructing and supplying ensuring residential buildings as the main assessment indicators of local government performance; eliminating the overheated demand in commercial housing market by increasing the supply of ensuring residential buildings; controlling over the over-speculation in commercial housing market; regulating the misconducts of developers, like monopoly pricing behavior, false advertisements, exaggerating differences between domestic goods and performance, hoarding land and reluctant selling. Hopefully all these measures, focusing on strengthening the governance and regulation, will ensure the commercial housing market of healthy and stable development.
(4) It reveals the characteristics of housing commodities and its market. The dissertation insists that limited land resources and the immovable commercial residential buildings constitute the monopoly of commodity housing market. Information asymmetries and the monopoly pricing explains the excessive profits of the housing industry, the high prices of commercial residential buildings, the abnormal boom of property speculation and investment.
(5) It constructs the game model between the developers. The dissertation uses integrated game models to analyze the economic realities in China residential housing market. It constructs the game model between developers, analyzing the ingredient of commercial housing prices and their impact factors, and points out that the market competition among developers is not just the price competition, but more importantly, the non-price competition, which now is the main form of competition in the real estate market, and is a priority strategy for the real estate industry.
Limited by the cultivation and research capacity of the author, there are still some shortcomings in this dissertation, such as the difficulties in obtaining the data of commercial housing market, the integration of the mechanism of government regulation and the market mechanism. All such issues will be further explored in the future.
产业规制是基于市场失灵下的政府干预行为,是市场经济的辅助功能,其目的在于使市场回归正常、理性的运行轨道。针对目前中国商品住宅市场呈现的高房价、高空置率、供需结构失衡等特征,及其引发一系列严重的不良社会后果,本文主要从中观的产业视角,运用产业组织理论中哈佛学派的SCP范式设计了论文的分析框架,即首先分析中国商品住宅市场区域性寡头垄断市场结构的形成机理；然后分析在需求过旺的区域性寡头垄断市场结构中开发商的行为和不良倾向,及其引发的不良社会后果；最后,针对所揭示出来的问题,提出治理商品住宅市场环境、规制开发商不良行为的思路和措施。
论文由六章构成。第一章绪论,介绍了选题的研究价值、论文的分析框架、各章的主要内容,以及论文的创新点和不足之处。
第二章,介绍和评述本文分析时使用的相关理论,回顾和评述了国内外与本选题相关的研究文献,为本文的后续奠定了理论基础。
第三、四、五章是本文的核心。论文在第三章中揭示商品住宅及商品住宅市场的特性；分析土地财政导致政府规制缺位；保障性住宅供给严重不足,使中低收入者涌入商品住宅市场,造成需求持续过旺；投资渠道狭窄导致大量炒房资金涌入,推高房价节节上涨等市场环境缺陷的基础上,指出开发商的经济人自利性,促使其利用商品住宅及商品住宅市场的特性和市场环境缺陷,谋求垄断地位,从而导致了商品住宅市场区域性寡头垄断结构形成,并且揭示了区域性寡头垄断市场的基本特征。
论文第四章,分析了在需求持续过旺、政府规制缺失和区域性寡头垄断’市场结构中,开发商的价格竞争和非价格竞争行为,指出非价格竞争行为是开发商的优先策略,并揭示了其中存在的不良倾向,如追求垄断定价、屯积土地、捂盘惜售、利用“托儿”制造购房热假象等等。论文指出,市场缺陷和开发商的不良行为和倾向,引发了一系列严重的不良后果,加剧了社会矛盾和冲突,破坏了社会的和谐稳定。
论文第五章,在第四章的基础上,首先论述由于商品住宅市场环境存在明显缺陷,开发商行为有明显不良倾向,因而运用政府力量治理市场环境,纠正其缺陷,加强规制,抑制开发商不良行为具有必要性和紧迫性。然后,分别就如何治理市场环境,规制开发商不良行为倾向,提出了具体的思路和措施。
第六章是本文的结论及展望。
本文探索如下几个方面以求有所创新：
(1)分析论证了中国商品住宅市场区域性寡头垄断市场结构的形成机理,并揭示了它的基本特征。首先论证了住宅具有空间位置的固定性、使用价值的多重异质性、耐久性和昂贵性等特性。其次,分析了中国商品住宅市场环境存在土地财政导致政府规制松弛、保障性住宅供给严重不足,将中低收入者挤入商品住宅市场、投资渠道狭窄,导致大量炒房资金涌入,推动房价高涨等缺陷。最后,指出开发商在经济人自利性驱动下,利用住宅的特性和市场环境缺陷,谋取垄断市场地位,形成了区域性寡头垄断市场结构,并揭示了该市场结构的基本特征。
(2)分析了在需求过旺、规制松弛和有明显缺陷的市场环境中,开发商的价格竞争和非价格竞争行为,提出并论证了非价格竞争行为是开发商优先策略的理论观点,揭露了开发商不正当行为其引发的严重不良社会后果,如垄断定价、虚假信息、囤积土地、捂盘惜售以及加速土地资源占用、滋生腐败、引发严重分配不公、扭曲投资分配使实体经济空心化等,这些不良社会后果危及社会的和谐和稳定。
(3)论证了治理市场环境缺陷和规制开发商不良行为的必要性和紧迫性,并针对市场环境缺陷和开发商不正当行为,提出加强治理和规制的思路和对策措施。如改革中央与地方政府的事权划分和税收分配比例,以及政绩考核方法；消除土地财政；把保障性住宅建设和供给,列为对地方政府政绩的主要考核指标；通过增加保障性住宅供给,消除由于中低收入者挤入而引起的商品住宅市场过旺需求；治理商品住宅市场中的过度投机行为；规制开发商垄断定价行为与利用虚假信息和广告,夸大住宅商品差别和性能、囤积土地、捂盘惜售哄抬价格等不正当行为。以期通过加强治理和规制,使商品住宅市场健康而平稳地发展。
(4)揭示了住宅商品和市场的特征。论文认为土地资源的有限性和商品住宅不可移动构成了商品住宅市场的垄断性特征,信息不对称性、房地产市场价格垄断定价政策是造成房地产暴利、商品住宅价格居高不下、投机炒楼与投资热潮的原因。
(5)构建了开发商之间的博弈模型。论文综合运用博弈模型分析中国商品住宅市场经济现实,构建开发商与开发商之间的博弈模型,通过对商品住宅价格构成及其影响因素的分析,指出开发商之间的市场竞争行为不仅仅表现为价格竞争,更重要的是非价格竞争行为。非价格竞争是中国房地产业市场竞争的主要形式,是房地产企业的优先策略。
受学养和研究能力所限,论文还存在一些不足之处,如商品住宅市场数据难以获得、政府规制的运行机制如何与市场机制进行融合衔接等问题,这些问题有待今后进一步探讨。
Chinese real estate undergoes more than ten years of development, and has already become the basic and pillar industry of national economy. In recent years, the Chinese commercial residential building price intensifies wholly, causing the increase in investment be too fast and too quickly, the supply and demand structure seriously out-of-balance, the constant increase of idle areas, and some illegitimate competition behaviors. Meanwhile the supply of ensuring houses is seriously insufficient. These problems have already jeopardized the industry, initiated a series of bad social consequences, and aggravated social conflicts. Indeed they are now the concerned focus of various circles of society. To settle these problems well, we must draw support from the government, rather than rely only on the market mechanism for spontaneous adjustment. Here we see the importance for the government to use economic means and administrative means to manage the market environment of commodity apartment, and to strengthen the regulation on the bad behaviors of the developers. The market of house is divided into two sub-systems:the guarantee house market and the commercial house market. They have connection to each other and operate independently. Among them commercial house market is the ox muzzle of the housing market, and the primary cause for social conflicts. If we can solve the problems in this market, all the troubles in the housing market can be easily solved. Because of this, this dissertation takes the market of guarantee houses as an important influencing factor of the housing market. In this way, we can go deep into the commercial housing market, analyzing the problems and solutions systematically, so as to get a better and more comprehensive understanding of the subject.
Industry regulation is a kind of government interference behavior in case of market failure. As an assisting function of market economy, it aims to draw the market back on the normal and rational orbit. The dissertation uses the SCP model of Harvard school for the analysis framework, from the aspect of industry, to solve the coexistence high price and high emptiness, and the relative severe social consequence. It first analyzes the formation mechanism of regional oligarch in Chinese commercial residential housing market. Then it analyzes, based on the over-prosperous demand in the regional oligarch structure, the behavior and harmful trend of developers, as well as its bad social sequences. Finally it puts forward measures to rule the environment of commercial residential housing market and to regulate the misbehavior of developers, so as to solve the problems discussed above.
The dissertation is formed by six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, with the value of the study, the framework of the dissertation, the main idea of all the chapters, and the innovative points as well as the weak points.
Chapter two introduces the theories employed in this thesis, with literature review, both at home and abroad, as the theoretical foundation for herein follow-up study.
Chapters three, four, and five are cores herein. Chapter three clarifies the characteristics of commercial residential buildings and the market; It is analyzed that the land finance leads to the lack of government regulation; Persons with low and middle income pours into the commercial housing market, because there are not enough ensuring houses for them, thus makes the market demand grows too prosperously; Investment channels are so narrow that hot money runs into the sousing market and put the prices goes up continuously. The dissertation also points out that developers, out of the self-interested economic person, seeks monopoly position by utilizing these characteristics and defects of market environment, which helps the formation of the regional oligopoly commercial housing market. It also reveals the features of the oligopoly.
Chapter four analyzes the price competition and non-rice competition behaviors of developers, complicated by the continuously prosperous demand, the lack of government regulation, and regional oligopoly. It points out that non-price competition is the developer's preferential tactics, and that there are harmful trends existing among them, such as running after monopolizing pricing, hoarding the land, sealing a rare sale, making the hot false appearance of purchasing house with " salesperson's decoy " etc. The dissertation points out that the market defects and the developer's bad behavior and inclination have initiated a series of serious bad consequences, aggravate social contradiction and conflict, and destroyed the harmonious stability of the society.
Chapter five, on the basis of chapter four, expounds the fact that because of the obvious defects existing in the market environment of commercial residential building, the developer's behavior has obvious harmful trends. Therefore it necessary and urgent for the government to regulate the market environment, correct its defect, strengthen the regulation, and inhibit developer's bad behaviors Then, it puts forward concrete measures to solves all the problems.
Chapter six is the conclusion and outlook.
This dissertation explores the following aspects in order to be innovative:
(1) It analyses and appraises the formation mechanism of Chinese commercial housing market and the regional oligopoly market structure, and reveals its basic features. It argues that residential buildings have such characteristics as spatial fixity, heterogeneous multi-use value, durability and high resistance and expensiveness. The land lax in the commercial housing market causes the government to loosen regulation; the serious shortage of ensuring residential buildings pushes many persons with low and middle income into the commercial housing market, and thus causes continuous prosperous demand; The narrow investment channel lures a lot of speculators into real estate market, pushing prices soaring. Finally the developers, motivated by the self interest of economic persons, make use of the residential properties and market environmental shortcomings, to seek monopoly status, and thus form a regional oligopoly market structure, the feature of which is revealed.
(2) It analyses the price competition and non-price competition of developers, in the situation of overheated demand, defected regulation, and significant deficiencies in the market environment, and proves that non-price competition is the priority strategic point of the developers. It also exposes the serious misconduct of the developers, together with the adverse social consequences, such as monopoly pricing, false information, hoarding land, protected reluctant sellers, speeding up the occupation of land resources, corruption, unfair distribution, distorted, investment allocation that causing the real economy hollow. All these adverse social consequences will definitely affect the social harmony and stability.
(3) It proves the necessity and urgency for us to improve the defect market environment and to regulate the bad behaviors of developers, and puts forward countermeasures and solutions, such as reforming the division of power between central and local governments, tax distribution ratio, and the performance evaluation methods; eliminating land finance; taking constructing and supplying ensuring residential buildings as the main assessment indicators of local government performance; eliminating the overheated demand in commercial housing market by increasing the supply of ensuring residential buildings; controlling over the over-speculation in commercial housing market; regulating the misconducts of developers, like monopoly pricing behavior, false advertisements, exaggerating differences between domestic goods and performance, hoarding land and reluctant selling. Hopefully all these measures, focusing on strengthening the governance and regulation, will ensure the commercial housing market of healthy and stable development.
(4) It reveals the characteristics of housing commodities and its market. The dissertation insists that limited land resources and the immovable commercial residential buildings constitute the monopoly of commodity housing market. Information asymmetries and the monopoly pricing explains the excessive profits of the housing industry, the high prices of commercial residential buildings, the abnormal boom of property speculation and investment.
(5) It constructs the game model between the developers. The dissertation uses integrated game models to analyze the economic realities in China residential housing market. It constructs the game model between developers, analyzing the ingredient of commercial housing prices and their impact factors, and points out that the market competition among developers is not just the price competition, but more importantly, the non-price competition, which now is the main form of competition in the real estate market, and is a priority strategy for the real estate industry.
Limited by the cultivation and research capacity of the author, there are still some shortcomings in this dissertation, such as the difficulties in obtaining the data of commercial housing market, the integration of the mechanism of government regulation and the market mechanism. All such issues will be further explored in the future.
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