主导型零售商的纵向控制对生产商的影响研究
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摘要
最近二十年多来,世界范围内大型零售商的出现及崛起,使得零售商占据供应链主导地位的趋势愈加凸显出来。主导型零售商的优势地位不仅压制了中小型零售商,并且因其对生产商的纵向控制手段而引发的各方面矛盾也不断增加,这已经引起越来越多学者的关注。研究主导型零售商对生产商以及供应链的影响对反垄断法的制定、维持公平有序竞争的市场环境具有重要意义。
本研究的问题直接来源于摩托罗拉与中国大型家电零售商(国美、苏宁等)的关系现状。本文以摩托罗拉为切入点,在深入的实地调研基础上,结合广泛的文献阅读,建立了主导型零售商和生产商关系的系统仿真模型,具体的研究内容包括:
(1)在大量文献回顾的基础上明确了本文的研究方法和目标:将系统动力学这一分析方法引入该问题,并从主导型零售商的纵向控制对生产商的影响机理的角度进行研究,这是本文的主要创新之处。
(2)以摩托罗拉为例,同时融合短生命周期产品的一些特点,建立了一个零售商占主导的供应链系统的仿真模型。通过运行Vensim系统仿真程序,从订单量、交货提前期、独有信息三个角度,分别分析了单一手段对生产商的影响,以及多个手段的综合影响。
本文最后对主导型零售商的影响进行了整理概括,并对生产商提供了一定的对策建议。本研究仅以摩托罗拉为例建立了系统仿真模型,希望今后的研究从更多角度进行研究,深度上也有待进一步提高,为深入理解主导型零售商的整体影响提供帮助。
During the last two decades, large retailers have grown quickly and become dominant in the supply chains of various industries all over the world. The dominant retailers not only impede the development of small and medium retailers, but also have more and more conflicts with manufacturers by way of vertical restrains. Researchers worldwide have increasingly paid heed on the influence of dominant retailers on manufacturers and supply chains. The study has significant meanings on legislation of anti-poly law and maintenances of fairly-competing market.
The dissertation directly delivers from the difficulties of Motorola on dealing with complicated relationship between it and Chinese powerful retailers, such as Gome, Suning, etc. The paper has much endeavor on field study on Motorola (Tianjin) and literature review. The main contents are as followed:
(1) This paper analyzed the contents and methodology of research on dominant retailers and verified the research method and goal of the paper: introducing the System Dynamics into the subject and studying the logic relationship between dominant retailers and manufacturers, which is the main innovation of the paper.
(2) Based on the case of Motorola, this paper built a simulation model of a supply chain including a dominant retailer and a manufacturer, combining the attributes of production with short life cycle; After running simulation software, analyzed the single effect on manufacturer from three specific perspectives respectively: order quantity, delivery lead time and exclusive information and the comprehensive influence of the three factors.
In the end, the paper summarized the influence of dominant retailers and provided some suggestions to manufacturers. Based on the case of Motorola, the findings of this study is limited in supply chain of the industry itself and others. More jobs should be done in future research in order to provide a guideline for understanding the influence of dominant retailers wholly.
本研究的问题直接来源于摩托罗拉与中国大型家电零售商(国美、苏宁等)的关系现状。本文以摩托罗拉为切入点,在深入的实地调研基础上,结合广泛的文献阅读,建立了主导型零售商和生产商关系的系统仿真模型,具体的研究内容包括:
(1)在大量文献回顾的基础上明确了本文的研究方法和目标:将系统动力学这一分析方法引入该问题,并从主导型零售商的纵向控制对生产商的影响机理的角度进行研究,这是本文的主要创新之处。
(2)以摩托罗拉为例,同时融合短生命周期产品的一些特点,建立了一个零售商占主导的供应链系统的仿真模型。通过运行Vensim系统仿真程序,从订单量、交货提前期、独有信息三个角度,分别分析了单一手段对生产商的影响,以及多个手段的综合影响。
本文最后对主导型零售商的影响进行了整理概括,并对生产商提供了一定的对策建议。本研究仅以摩托罗拉为例建立了系统仿真模型,希望今后的研究从更多角度进行研究,深度上也有待进一步提高,为深入理解主导型零售商的整体影响提供帮助。
During the last two decades, large retailers have grown quickly and become dominant in the supply chains of various industries all over the world. The dominant retailers not only impede the development of small and medium retailers, but also have more and more conflicts with manufacturers by way of vertical restrains. Researchers worldwide have increasingly paid heed on the influence of dominant retailers on manufacturers and supply chains. The study has significant meanings on legislation of anti-poly law and maintenances of fairly-competing market.
The dissertation directly delivers from the difficulties of Motorola on dealing with complicated relationship between it and Chinese powerful retailers, such as Gome, Suning, etc. The paper has much endeavor on field study on Motorola (Tianjin) and literature review. The main contents are as followed:
(1) This paper analyzed the contents and methodology of research on dominant retailers and verified the research method and goal of the paper: introducing the System Dynamics into the subject and studying the logic relationship between dominant retailers and manufacturers, which is the main innovation of the paper.
(2) Based on the case of Motorola, this paper built a simulation model of a supply chain including a dominant retailer and a manufacturer, combining the attributes of production with short life cycle; After running simulation software, analyzed the single effect on manufacturer from three specific perspectives respectively: order quantity, delivery lead time and exclusive information and the comprehensive influence of the three factors.
In the end, the paper summarized the influence of dominant retailers and provided some suggestions to manufacturers. Based on the case of Motorola, the findings of this study is limited in supply chain of the industry itself and others. More jobs should be done in future research in order to provide a guideline for understanding the influence of dominant retailers wholly.
引文
[1]国美格力大掰手腕:格力必败无疑.来自百度贴吧:品牌吧2008,7-28.http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=445324466
[1]数字时代:摩托罗拉和国美电器宣布建立战略合作伙伴关系。2006-12-04http://media.ccidnet.com/art/3783/20061204/966947_1.html
[2]通信世界网:摩托罗拉苏宁建立战略合作伙伴关系 与国美合作不冲突。2007-4-12http://www.cww.net.cn/article/article.asp?id=61436&bid=2722
[3]网易科技:摩托罗拉深陷亏损泥淖。2009-2-3http://tech.163.com/special/000935RK/MOTOROLA2009.html
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[30] Chen ZhiQi. Buyer power: economic theory and antitrust policy[R]. working paper, Carleton university, 2006.
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[1]数字时代:摩托罗拉和国美电器宣布建立战略合作伙伴关系。2006-12-04http://media.ccidnet.com/art/3783/20061204/966947_1.html
[2]通信世界网:摩托罗拉苏宁建立战略合作伙伴关系 与国美合作不冲突。2007-4-12http://www.cww.net.cn/article/article.asp?id=61436&bid=2722
[3]网易科技:摩托罗拉深陷亏损泥淖。2009-2-3http://tech.163.com/special/000935RK/MOTOROLA2009.html
[1]巴比.社会研究方法(邱泽奇等).北京:华夏出版社,2000.
[2]曹铿,杜跃平,彭兴.供应链信息共享中的博弈分析.情报杂志,2005,24(1)
[3]陈长彬,杨忠,卢若.供应链信息共享理论的研究综述.管理科学文摘,2007,S1(76)
[4]范小军,陈宏民.零售商差异条件下的渠道价格决策研究.中国管理科学,2008(2)
[5]顾国建,吴建国等.中国连锁超市通道费研究报告.中国商贸,2003,(2)
[6]郭光.我国零售行业价格歧视行为的深层分析.兰州学刊,2008(5)
[7]侯强.独占交易的经济分析与反垄断政策.产业经济研究,2007(1)
[8]洪夙,郁义鸿.排他性合约下的纵向控制:关于独占交易理论的研究评述.产业经济研究,2005(4)
[9]骆品亮,陈连权.零售商关于售前服务的搭便车行为与RPM制度研究.产业经济研究,2008,(1)
[10]孟园.供应链信息共享模式及其比较分析.物流科技,2008,112(3)
[11]潘俊,郝杨威.国外通道费研究的理论综述.经济师,2007(9)
[12]孙斌艺.垂直关系中产品信誉效应的博弈分析.经济经纬,2008(4)
[13]谭国富.纵向约束的经济理论.产业经济评论,2004(12).
[14]王芳,吴祈宗.惩罚契约下零售商占主导地位的供应链协调研究.科学技术与工程,2008(23)
[15]汪浩.通道费与零售商市场力量.经济评论,2006(1)
[16]吴清萍,忻红.上游市场价格歧视的形成机理及影响——大型零售商买方势力的水床效应分析.价格理论与实践,2008(4)
[17]徐贤浩,宋奇志.短生命周期产品的预测方法.统计与决策,2006(12)
[18]徐贤浩,余双琪.短生命周期产品的三种库存模型的比较.管理科学学报,2007(10)
[19]徐杨,管锡展.企业独占交易策略的基本理论及其反垄断政策意义.财经问题研究,2006(04)
[20]杨辉,刘世宽.大型零售商限制竞争行为的法律规制.行政与法,2008(2)
[21]岳中刚.基于零售商主导的纵向约束研究述评.产业经济研究,2008(1)
[22]张力菠 等.供应链管理的系统动力学研究综述.系统工程,2005(23)
[23]张赞.基于零售商垄断势力的纵向关系理论研究评述.财经问题研究,2007(9)
[24]周良,徐国华.供应链协调机制的研究.西安电子科技大学学报,2004,14(1)
[25]A.A.Kurawarwala,H.Matsuo.Product Growth Models for Medium-Term Forecasting of Short Life Cycle Products.Technological Forecasting and Social Change,1998,78(57)
[26]Amy Hing Ling Lau 等,Pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information.European Journal of Operational Research,2007,118(183)
[27] Bloom Paul, Gregory Gundlach. Slotting allowances and the retail sale of alcohol beverages . Journal of Public Policy & Manufacturing, 1998, 46 (2)
[28] Bloom Paul, Gregory Gundlach, Joseph Cannon. Slotting allowances and fees: schools of thought and the views of practicing managers. Journal of Marketing, 2000, 132 (64)
[29] Cachon, G The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts. Management Science, 2004, 137 (50)
[30] Chen ZhiQi. Buyer power: economic theory and antitrust policy[R]. working paper, Carleton university, 2006.
[31] Comanor William S., Patrick Rey. Vertical restraints and the market power of large distributors. Review of Industrial Organization, 2000 (17) : 135-153
[32] Demand signaling and screening in channels of distribution. Market Science, 1992 (11)
[33] Deloitte & Touche. "Managing the Process of Introducing and Deleting Products in the Grocery and Drug Industry, Washington, D.C.: Grocery Manufacturers of America." 1990.
[34] Desiraju, Ramarao. "New product introductions, slotting allowances, and retailer discretion." Journal of Retailing, 2001, 34 (77)
[35] Derek Baker. The Danish food marketing chain: development and policy choices [R]. working paper, EB/OL, 2003
[36] Dobson, Paul, Roger Clarke 等, Buyer power and impact on competition in the food retail distribution sector of the European Union. http://eurorpa.eu.int/comm/dg04/publications/studies, 2000
[37] Dutta S. Vertical territorial restrictions and public policy: theories and industry evidence. Journal of Marketing, 1999, 145 (4)
[38] Elizabeth M 等, Supermarkets and their impacts on the agri-food system of Brazil: the competition among retailers. Agribusiness, 2005, 105 (2)
[39] Farris P W, Ailawadi K. Retail power: monster or mouse? Journal of Retailing, 1992, 65 (4)
[40] Fox A Mark. Market power in music retailing: the case of Wal-Mart. Popular Music and Society, 2005, 133 (4)
[41 ] Galbraith, J.K. American Capitalism: The concept of Countervailing Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.
[42] Georgadisp, Vlachdsd, Lakovoue. A System Modeling Framework for the Strategic Supply Chain Management of Food Supply Chain Journal of Food Engineering, 2005, 116 (70 )
[43] Gilligan T. The competitive effects of resale price maintenance. Journal of Industrial Economics 1986, 220 (4)
[44] Guofu Tan. Report: The Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints. 2001.
[45] Hamid Mohtadi. Information Sharing in Food Supply Chains. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics. 2008, 96 (56)
[46] Hersch L. The effects of resale price maintenance on shareholder wealth: the consequence of Schwegmann. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1994, 230 (2)
[47] Ippolito P M, Overstreet T R. Resale price maintenance: an economic assessment of the Federal Trade Commission's case against the coming glass works. Journal of Law and Economics, 1996, 122 (39)
[48] Jagmohan Raju, Z. John Zhang. Channel Coordination in the presence of a dominant retailer. Marketing Science, 2005, 24 (2)
[49] Katz M L. The welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate goods markets. American Economic Review, 1987, 40 (77)
[50] Kelly, Kenneth H. The antitrust analysis of grocery slotting allowances: the precompetitive case. Journal of Public Policy &Marketing, 1991, 46 (17)
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