基于不确定性的企业内资本定价机制研究
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摘要
企业是现代经济生活中最重要的微观经济主体,企业的运行效率将对一个国家的国民经济发展产生重大影响,而企业运行效率又受制于企业的制度安排,对企业制度安排的研究将有助于优化资源配置,提高生产力。在企业产权改革渐次深入的今天,对企业制度安排的研究就更具有实践意义。从个人的角度上,无论是在市场上还是企业中,个人追求的目标都是效用最大化,而效用最大化最直接的体现无疑就是收益最大化,企业内收益的产生和分配也受制于企业的制度安排。
企业理论正是这样一种以企业为研究对象、探讨与企业有关的制度安排的经济学理论。在现有的企业理论研究中,不同流派的经济学家从不同角度对企业的各个方面进行了阐释,这其中,最有代表性的有不确定性理论、交易成本理论、不完全合约理论、团队生产理论以及委托代理理论等等,然而,没有任何一种理论能够提供一个逻辑一致的分析框架来解释和分析与企业有关的各种经济现象。人们往往习惯用一种理论解释与企业有关的其中一种特性,在解释企业另外的特性时,又不得不求助于另外一种理论。由于不同流派关注的重点不同,理论赖以成立的假设不同,导致不同的理论流派之间并不兼容。如何将企业理融会贯通,建立一个逻辑一致的理论体系,指导企业内的制度安排,本文将对此做一个尝试。
本文以不确定性为主要变量,以企业内的定价为主线,将全文贯穿起来。具体地,本文对以下几个方面的内容进行了研究:
本文首先对现有的企业理论研究现状进行了系统的回顾和评述。在重新认识和界定不确定性的基础上,本文从企业的起源、企业的收益分配、企业的权威配置和企业边界的决定因素几个方面对企业理论进行了梳理。从不确定性来源上,本文将不确定性分为内生的不确定性和外生的不确定性,其中外生的不确定性表现为环境的不确定性,内生的不确定性表现为人的不确定性,而人的不确定性又表现为人力资本存量的不确定性和人力资本使用量的不确定性。由于以预见和整合资源为主要特点的企业家型人力资本需要通过整合其他资源来实现自身的人力资本交易,而由于不确定性的存在,导致产出收益并不必然大于投入要素的机会成本,因此需要非人力资本来对企业家的人力资本提供担保,这样,以担保要素为核心,由企业家将其他要素整合起来,就产生了企业。由于产出收益的不确定以及权益资本担保的特性,使得权益资本只能以剩余来定价。由于不确定性导致合约不完全,因此权益资本所有者要保证自己的收益得以实现,还必须赋予对其他要素所有者的权威,这是企业内权益资本所有者享有对其他要素所有者权威的逻辑。由于人力资本的异质性,不同的人具有不同性质和不同大小的能力,预见不确定性和整合资源能力更强的人力资本所有者将拥有能力弱于他们的人的权威。对于企业的边界,与企业承担不确定性的能力有关,与不确定的环境有关,与人力资本的不确定性有关。本文还对交易成本与不确定性的关系进行了探讨。
人力资本定价同样与不确定性有关。在总结人力资本特性的基础上,本文对人力资本定价进行了探讨。虽然企业与人力资本交易是为了获得人力资本创造的绩效,但是如果绩效测度成本过高或者由于外生环境导致绩效不稳定,从而导致以绩效定价的讨价还价成本过高,在这种情况下,企业将不得不采用替代指标来对人力资本定价。如果外生环境稳定而且人力资本绩效易于测度,绩效将作为人力资本定价的依据。随着外生环境稳定程度的下降或者绩效测度成本的上升,人力资本定价将越来越依赖于其存量所隐含的机会成本,而当期绩效在定价中所占的比例则逐渐降低;同时,为了防止人力资本的机会主义行为,人力资本当期的绩效将作为一个变量修正人力资本存量,并在下一个定价期体现出来。当人力资本所创造的绩效在跨期才能测度时,人力资本的定价将依赖于人力资本存量和跨期实现的绩效,采用这种定价方法,将可以有效地防止人力资本的逆向选择和道德风险。
对于专用性人力资本,虽然其专用性部分无法通过市场交易,但是由于具有相同机会成本的替代人力资本无法达到相同的绩效,因此专用性人力资本所有者可以通过降低使用人力资本来迫使企业出让部分组织租金,换取企业的合作,形成共同创造和分配组织租金的局面。同时,本文还对目前人力资本分享组织租金认识上的分歧进行了辨析。
论文具有以下创新:
①在吸收现有研究成果的基础上,本文逻辑一致地回答了与企业理论有关的基本问题。从不确定性的视角重新认识和解读企业的起源、企业内的收益分配和权威配置,以及企业边界的决定因素。
②以测度成本和讨价还价成本为主要变量,构建了一个一般性人力资本定价模型,解释现有企业内之所以对不同人力资本分别采用绩效工资、固定报酬、股票或股票期权定价的原因。
③与合作博弈理论不同,本文的研究表明,专用性人力资本所有者分享组织租金的原因是因为能创造出替代者无法产生的绩效,而且可以控制自己的努力,因而可以通过调整努力程度来与企业讨价还价,达到分享组织租金的目的。
Firm is the most important economic part of modern life and its running efficiency has a great influence on the economy development of country. The running efficiency of the firm is controlled by the arrangement of the institution of a firm, so the research of the system arrangement of the firm will optimze the allocation of resources and improve productive forces. As the deepening reform of the property rights, the research of the arrangement of the firm institution will have practise meaning. In perspective of individual, no matter in the market or in the firm, utility maximization is the goal everyone tries to persue. The directest display of utility maximization is profit maximization. The generation and distribution of profit is controlled by the arrangement of institution relating to the firm.
The theory of the firm is such kind of the economics theory studies the firm and explores the institution arrangement relating to the firm. Of the research work available in the field of the theory of the firm, economists of different schools explain all the aspects of the firm from different perspective, and the most reprsentative theories are uncertainty theory, transaction costs theroy, incomplete contract theory, team production theory and principal-agent theory. Unfortunately, none of them can provide a logic consistency analytical framework to explain and analysis the economic phenomenon relating to the firm. We get used to explain one character of the firm with a theory and explain some other characters with another theory. Since different school focuses on different aspect and the hypothesis which is need to prove the theory is ture is different, theories of different school are not compitable. It is the responsibility for everybody who researches the theory of the firm to formulate a logic consistency theory, the author will have a try in this field.
Uncertainty is the main variable and the pricing within the firm is the main thread in this dissertation.The main contents are as follow:
As a foundation work, the author has a systematic review and commentary of the study of the theory of the firm.On the basis of recognition and definition of uncertainty, the the author discusses the origination, income distribution, authority allocation and determinant elements of the firm boundary respectively. The author classifies the uncertainty into endogenesis factors and exogenesis factors. The endogemous uncertainty is the environment uncertainty, the exogenous uncertaity is the stock and application amount uncertainty of human capital. Since the enterpreneur human capital characterised with foresight and integration of resources has to trade his human capital with the integration of other resources, but the existence of uncertainty results in the situation that the income may be smaller than the opportunity costs of the factor involved in, so non-human capital is needed to guarantee the enterpreneur human capital. The firm forms with the core of guarantor factor and the integration of resource by the entrepreneurs. As the uncertainty of income and the guarantor character, the equity capital has to be priced by the residual. Furthmore, since the imcomplete contractor caused by uncertainty, the owner of the equity capital need the authority over other factor owners to make sure their income can be realized. This is the logic that the equity capital owner has authority over other factor owners. In perspective of human capital, since the heterogenicity of human capital, different individual has different character and magnitude of ability, individual with higher ability of foresight and integration of resources will have authority over somebody who is inferior in this aspect. The boundary of the firm is in connection with the abilty to bearance the uncertainty environment and the uncertainty of human capital as well. At last, the relation of transaction and uncertainty is discussed, in this way the the author tries to integrate transaction costs theory and uncertainty theory.
Still the pricing of human capital is in connexion with uncertainty. On the basis of summarizing the character of human capital, the author explores the pricing mechanism of human capital. Though firm’s goal to trade with human capital is to get the performance created by human capital, if the performance measuring costs is too high, or the bargaining costs is too high because of the uncertainty enviroment, firm has to find some substitute index to price human capital. If the exogenous enviroment is stable ande the performance is easy to meause, performance is the proper index to price human capital. As the stablity of exogernous environment descends or the performance measuring costs ascends, the pricing of human capital will depend on human capital’s opportunity costs more, and depend on the current performance less. Furthermore, in order to prevent the opportunistic behavior, the current performance of human capital will be used as a variable to modify the human capital stock and this stock will be reflected during the next pricing period. When the performance created by human capital can only be measured after a few periods, the human capital pricing will depend on the human capital stock and the performance measured a few periods later. In this way, it will prevent the adverse selecting and moral hazard from human capital.
For the specific human capital, though the specific part can not be trade through the market, the substitute common human capital can not create the same performance, the owner of specific human capital can reduce performance through shirking to compel the firm to cooperate with him and share the organization rents together. At last the author discriminates the divergences of opinion if human capital has the right to share the organization rents.
The innovation of the dissertation lies in:
Firstly, on the basis of research results, the author answers the questions about the theory of the firm logically, relearns and explains the origin of the firm, the income allocation and the authority allocation within the firm, the determinants of the boundary of the firm;
Secondly, From the transaction costs caused by pricing with the performance, develop a general analysis framework of human capital pricing, explains why we price different human capital with salary according to the performance, fixed compensation and stock or stock options.
Thirdly, different from co-operative game theory, the author finds that the specific human capital enjoy the organization rents through control its effort level and bargin with the firm..
企业理论正是这样一种以企业为研究对象、探讨与企业有关的制度安排的经济学理论。在现有的企业理论研究中,不同流派的经济学家从不同角度对企业的各个方面进行了阐释,这其中,最有代表性的有不确定性理论、交易成本理论、不完全合约理论、团队生产理论以及委托代理理论等等,然而,没有任何一种理论能够提供一个逻辑一致的分析框架来解释和分析与企业有关的各种经济现象。人们往往习惯用一种理论解释与企业有关的其中一种特性,在解释企业另外的特性时,又不得不求助于另外一种理论。由于不同流派关注的重点不同,理论赖以成立的假设不同,导致不同的理论流派之间并不兼容。如何将企业理融会贯通,建立一个逻辑一致的理论体系,指导企业内的制度安排,本文将对此做一个尝试。
本文以不确定性为主要变量,以企业内的定价为主线,将全文贯穿起来。具体地,本文对以下几个方面的内容进行了研究:
本文首先对现有的企业理论研究现状进行了系统的回顾和评述。在重新认识和界定不确定性的基础上,本文从企业的起源、企业的收益分配、企业的权威配置和企业边界的决定因素几个方面对企业理论进行了梳理。从不确定性来源上,本文将不确定性分为内生的不确定性和外生的不确定性,其中外生的不确定性表现为环境的不确定性,内生的不确定性表现为人的不确定性,而人的不确定性又表现为人力资本存量的不确定性和人力资本使用量的不确定性。由于以预见和整合资源为主要特点的企业家型人力资本需要通过整合其他资源来实现自身的人力资本交易,而由于不确定性的存在,导致产出收益并不必然大于投入要素的机会成本,因此需要非人力资本来对企业家的人力资本提供担保,这样,以担保要素为核心,由企业家将其他要素整合起来,就产生了企业。由于产出收益的不确定以及权益资本担保的特性,使得权益资本只能以剩余来定价。由于不确定性导致合约不完全,因此权益资本所有者要保证自己的收益得以实现,还必须赋予对其他要素所有者的权威,这是企业内权益资本所有者享有对其他要素所有者权威的逻辑。由于人力资本的异质性,不同的人具有不同性质和不同大小的能力,预见不确定性和整合资源能力更强的人力资本所有者将拥有能力弱于他们的人的权威。对于企业的边界,与企业承担不确定性的能力有关,与不确定的环境有关,与人力资本的不确定性有关。本文还对交易成本与不确定性的关系进行了探讨。
人力资本定价同样与不确定性有关。在总结人力资本特性的基础上,本文对人力资本定价进行了探讨。虽然企业与人力资本交易是为了获得人力资本创造的绩效,但是如果绩效测度成本过高或者由于外生环境导致绩效不稳定,从而导致以绩效定价的讨价还价成本过高,在这种情况下,企业将不得不采用替代指标来对人力资本定价。如果外生环境稳定而且人力资本绩效易于测度,绩效将作为人力资本定价的依据。随着外生环境稳定程度的下降或者绩效测度成本的上升,人力资本定价将越来越依赖于其存量所隐含的机会成本,而当期绩效在定价中所占的比例则逐渐降低;同时,为了防止人力资本的机会主义行为,人力资本当期的绩效将作为一个变量修正人力资本存量,并在下一个定价期体现出来。当人力资本所创造的绩效在跨期才能测度时,人力资本的定价将依赖于人力资本存量和跨期实现的绩效,采用这种定价方法,将可以有效地防止人力资本的逆向选择和道德风险。
对于专用性人力资本,虽然其专用性部分无法通过市场交易,但是由于具有相同机会成本的替代人力资本无法达到相同的绩效,因此专用性人力资本所有者可以通过降低使用人力资本来迫使企业出让部分组织租金,换取企业的合作,形成共同创造和分配组织租金的局面。同时,本文还对目前人力资本分享组织租金认识上的分歧进行了辨析。
论文具有以下创新:
①在吸收现有研究成果的基础上,本文逻辑一致地回答了与企业理论有关的基本问题。从不确定性的视角重新认识和解读企业的起源、企业内的收益分配和权威配置,以及企业边界的决定因素。
②以测度成本和讨价还价成本为主要变量,构建了一个一般性人力资本定价模型,解释现有企业内之所以对不同人力资本分别采用绩效工资、固定报酬、股票或股票期权定价的原因。
③与合作博弈理论不同,本文的研究表明,专用性人力资本所有者分享组织租金的原因是因为能创造出替代者无法产生的绩效,而且可以控制自己的努力,因而可以通过调整努力程度来与企业讨价还价,达到分享组织租金的目的。
Firm is the most important economic part of modern life and its running efficiency has a great influence on the economy development of country. The running efficiency of the firm is controlled by the arrangement of the institution of a firm, so the research of the system arrangement of the firm will optimze the allocation of resources and improve productive forces. As the deepening reform of the property rights, the research of the arrangement of the firm institution will have practise meaning. In perspective of individual, no matter in the market or in the firm, utility maximization is the goal everyone tries to persue. The directest display of utility maximization is profit maximization. The generation and distribution of profit is controlled by the arrangement of institution relating to the firm.
The theory of the firm is such kind of the economics theory studies the firm and explores the institution arrangement relating to the firm. Of the research work available in the field of the theory of the firm, economists of different schools explain all the aspects of the firm from different perspective, and the most reprsentative theories are uncertainty theory, transaction costs theroy, incomplete contract theory, team production theory and principal-agent theory. Unfortunately, none of them can provide a logic consistency analytical framework to explain and analysis the economic phenomenon relating to the firm. We get used to explain one character of the firm with a theory and explain some other characters with another theory. Since different school focuses on different aspect and the hypothesis which is need to prove the theory is ture is different, theories of different school are not compitable. It is the responsibility for everybody who researches the theory of the firm to formulate a logic consistency theory, the author will have a try in this field.
Uncertainty is the main variable and the pricing within the firm is the main thread in this dissertation.The main contents are as follow:
As a foundation work, the author has a systematic review and commentary of the study of the theory of the firm.On the basis of recognition and definition of uncertainty, the the author discusses the origination, income distribution, authority allocation and determinant elements of the firm boundary respectively. The author classifies the uncertainty into endogenesis factors and exogenesis factors. The endogemous uncertainty is the environment uncertainty, the exogenous uncertaity is the stock and application amount uncertainty of human capital. Since the enterpreneur human capital characterised with foresight and integration of resources has to trade his human capital with the integration of other resources, but the existence of uncertainty results in the situation that the income may be smaller than the opportunity costs of the factor involved in, so non-human capital is needed to guarantee the enterpreneur human capital. The firm forms with the core of guarantor factor and the integration of resource by the entrepreneurs. As the uncertainty of income and the guarantor character, the equity capital has to be priced by the residual. Furthmore, since the imcomplete contractor caused by uncertainty, the owner of the equity capital need the authority over other factor owners to make sure their income can be realized. This is the logic that the equity capital owner has authority over other factor owners. In perspective of human capital, since the heterogenicity of human capital, different individual has different character and magnitude of ability, individual with higher ability of foresight and integration of resources will have authority over somebody who is inferior in this aspect. The boundary of the firm is in connection with the abilty to bearance the uncertainty environment and the uncertainty of human capital as well. At last, the relation of transaction and uncertainty is discussed, in this way the the author tries to integrate transaction costs theory and uncertainty theory.
Still the pricing of human capital is in connexion with uncertainty. On the basis of summarizing the character of human capital, the author explores the pricing mechanism of human capital. Though firm’s goal to trade with human capital is to get the performance created by human capital, if the performance measuring costs is too high, or the bargaining costs is too high because of the uncertainty enviroment, firm has to find some substitute index to price human capital. If the exogenous enviroment is stable ande the performance is easy to meause, performance is the proper index to price human capital. As the stablity of exogernous environment descends or the performance measuring costs ascends, the pricing of human capital will depend on human capital’s opportunity costs more, and depend on the current performance less. Furthermore, in order to prevent the opportunistic behavior, the current performance of human capital will be used as a variable to modify the human capital stock and this stock will be reflected during the next pricing period. When the performance created by human capital can only be measured after a few periods, the human capital pricing will depend on the human capital stock and the performance measured a few periods later. In this way, it will prevent the adverse selecting and moral hazard from human capital.
For the specific human capital, though the specific part can not be trade through the market, the substitute common human capital can not create the same performance, the owner of specific human capital can reduce performance through shirking to compel the firm to cooperate with him and share the organization rents together. At last the author discriminates the divergences of opinion if human capital has the right to share the organization rents.
The innovation of the dissertation lies in:
Firstly, on the basis of research results, the author answers the questions about the theory of the firm logically, relearns and explains the origin of the firm, the income allocation and the authority allocation within the firm, the determinants of the boundary of the firm;
Secondly, From the transaction costs caused by pricing with the performance, develop a general analysis framework of human capital pricing, explains why we price different human capital with salary according to the performance, fixed compensation and stock or stock options.
Thirdly, different from co-operative game theory, the author finds that the specific human capital enjoy the organization rents through control its effort level and bargin with the firm..
引文
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