用装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式考察3-5岁儿童心理理论的发展
摘要
自1978年Premack和Woodruff在对黑猩猩的研究中首次提出“心理理论”{theory of mind}的概念以来，许多研究者对儿童心理理论进行了大量的理论探讨和实证研究，使该领域成为近20年来发展心理学中最活跃最多产的研究课题之一。
所谓心理理论是指个体对自己和他人的心理状态(需要、信念、意图、感觉等)的认识，并由此对相应的行为作出因果性的解释和预测。根据认知领域特殊性观，这种关于心理状态的知识是人类最基本的认知领域之一。在我们的日常生活中具有举足轻重的影响，与儿童的道德、社会性及交流能力的发展密切关联，并对儿童在日常生活中与他人的互动有重要意义。
20世纪80年代早期，心理学家Wimmer和Perner首创“错误信念”的研究范式。研究者把儿童是否能通过错误信念任务作为儿童拥有心理理论的标志。这里所指的信念是指对某事信以为真，它反映客观世界的情形，是我们对世界的心理表征，人们以此获得对世界的认识。如果信念内容与客观世界相符合，则信念就是真实的；若不符合就是错误信念。经典的误念任务研究表明4岁左右儿童对心理的认识有了一个质的飞跃或显著的变化。4岁儿童能论证他人如何拥有和他们自己不同的信念并按照这种信念行动。基于上述的观察和实验事实，研究者试图对这些事实提供理论上的解释。其中有代表性的是以下几个理论：模块论、模拟论和理论论。模块论强调了心理理论的生理基础。模拟论说明了儿童最初是如何获得对他人心理的理解的。而理论论强调了我们关于心理知识的系统性、关联性和一致性。
随着儿童心理理论研究的不断深入，有些研究者对经典的实证研究方法和结果提出了置疑，认为经典的实证研究方法误表了儿童心理理论的能力。建立在实证研究基础上的理论解释也面临着挑战。首先，经典的错误
信念任务通常是向儿童讲述一个故事，即使反应方式不需要语言，但只有
当儿童理解这个故事和实验者的问题时儿童才有可能回答正确。所以儿童
不能完成任务也许时语言能力障碍，这一点是经典误念任务最大的不足。
其次，任务模式的改变会影响儿童在心理理论任务中的表现。
在任务模式的改变中对儿童欺骗行为的研究已成为一个新的趋势，而
且这方面的研究也己成了心理理论研究中的一个特殊领域。所谓欺骗是指
意图培养他人的错误信念，以至于使他人产生错误或进入某一误区的行
为。如果儿童能够成功的欺骗，首先必须推测被骗者的心理状态，同时明
确自己的心理状态于对方心理状态之间的差距，并具有明确的误导对方的
目的。儿童心理理论的发展是欺骗行为成熟的关键。许多心理学研究者已
明确指出:欺骗能力是儿童的一种十分重要的能力，儿童只有获得了一种
完整的心理理论之后才能获得欺骗能力，有些研究者甚至把欺骗视为是错
误信念理解的一个明确标志。
本文试图把欺骗任务置于装扮游戏中。因为，在理论探讨方面，有研
究者提出装扮游戏和心理理论都依赖于对心理表征的理解。从研究实践来
看，许多研究发现装扮游戏和社会理解之间存在正相关，并认为装扮游戏
可能是心理理论发展的动因。
本研究在以往研究的理论和实证研究基础之上，以3一5岁儿童为研究
对象，试图考察(1)3一5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式下完成心
理理论任务的一般状况。(2)3一5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式
下完成心理理论任务的年龄及性别差异。(3)与国外同类研究结果相比
较，心理理论的实证研究和理论解释的跨文化一致性。研究使用卡方检验
和方差分析的方法对数据进行了分析，结果发现:
(1)3到5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式下对错误信念问题的理
解情况不存在显著的性别差异。
(2)3到5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式下对错误信念问题的理
解情况存在显著的年龄差异。随着年龄的增长，儿童正确回答错误信念问
题的比例不断提高，表明儿童心理理论能力是随着年龄的增长而不断发展
的。
(3)儿童从4岁开始能够比较普遍的通过错误信念任务，这与国外
的同类研究结果相一致。儿童心理理论能力的发展具有跨文化的一致性。
西方文化和中国文化文化下的儿童大致在相同的年龄达到了对信念一愿
望推理的认识，拥有了心理理论能力。
Premack and Woodruff first presented the concept of "theory of mind" in 1978 in their research of chapineezes. From then on, lots of researchers did research on the theoretical and empirical aspects of theory of mind, which made it one of the most active areas of developmental psychology during the resent 20 years.
Theory of mind refers to the understanding of the mental state of oneself or others and the causal explanation and prediction of the sequent behaviors. According to the opinion of domain specificity theory, the knowledge of mental state is one of the basic cognitive domains of humanbeings. It has important influnce on our daily life and has connection with the development of children's moral, social and communicative abilities.
In the early 80s of the 20th century, psychologist Wimmer and Perner first suggested the research method of "false belief. Researchers believed that passing the false belief task is the sign of children's obtaining of the ability of theory of mind. Here, "belief refers that one thinks something is true , it reflects the outside world and it is the mental representation of the outside world. From this belief one obtain the understanding of the world. If the belief is correspondent with the objective world, it is true. Otherwise, it is false. The classical researches using the false belief task suggest that children obtain the ability of theory of mind at about 4 years old. 4 year-old children can explain how other people can hold beliefs different from their own and that people's behavior is based on their beliefs. Based on the empirical research result, researcher tried to provide the theoretical explanations, among which the following three are the most representative ones: modularity theory, simulation the
ory and theory theory. Modularity theory emphasizes the physiological basis of theory of mind, simulation theory explains how children first obtain the understanding of others' mind, and theory theory emphasizes the systematization, continuity and consistency of our knowledge about mind.
With the development of the research on theory of mind, some researcher begin to question about the research method and the result of the classical false belief tasks. They argue that the classical false belief task misjudged children's ability of theory of mind. The theoretical explanations based on the empirical results also faced great challenge. First, they argue that children's failure on false belief task is probably because of the deficiency of language ability since usually the false belief task is telling a story to children. Only when children understand the story and the questions of the researchers can they answer the questions correctly. Second, the change of task mode can influence children's performance on the false belief task.
Among the changed forms of task mode, the research of children's deceptive behavior has become a new trend and a specific research area of theory of mind. Deception here refers to the behavior aims at creating other people's false belief hence to make them behave wrongly. If children can deceive successfully, they first have to predict the mental state of the person they want to deceive and at the same time know the difference between other people's mental state and their own, also they must have clear purpose to deceive others. The development of children's theory of mind is the key factor of the maturation of their deceptive behavior. Many researchers have pointed out that deceptive ability is one of the most important, ability of children. Only after obtaining a complete theory of mind can children obtain the ability to deceive. Some researchers even look on deception as a sign of the understanding of theory of mind.
The present study attempts to put the deceptive task in the pretend play. From theoretical perspective, some researchers suggest that both pretend play and theory of mind depend on the understanding of mental representation. In the empirical studies, many researchers find that pretend play has positive relation to social understanding
所谓心理理论是指个体对自己和他人的心理状态(需要、信念、意图、感觉等)的认识，并由此对相应的行为作出因果性的解释和预测。根据认知领域特殊性观，这种关于心理状态的知识是人类最基本的认知领域之一。在我们的日常生活中具有举足轻重的影响，与儿童的道德、社会性及交流能力的发展密切关联，并对儿童在日常生活中与他人的互动有重要意义。
20世纪80年代早期，心理学家Wimmer和Perner首创“错误信念”的研究范式。研究者把儿童是否能通过错误信念任务作为儿童拥有心理理论的标志。这里所指的信念是指对某事信以为真，它反映客观世界的情形，是我们对世界的心理表征，人们以此获得对世界的认识。如果信念内容与客观世界相符合，则信念就是真实的；若不符合就是错误信念。经典的误念任务研究表明4岁左右儿童对心理的认识有了一个质的飞跃或显著的变化。4岁儿童能论证他人如何拥有和他们自己不同的信念并按照这种信念行动。基于上述的观察和实验事实，研究者试图对这些事实提供理论上的解释。其中有代表性的是以下几个理论：模块论、模拟论和理论论。模块论强调了心理理论的生理基础。模拟论说明了儿童最初是如何获得对他人心理的理解的。而理论论强调了我们关于心理知识的系统性、关联性和一致性。
随着儿童心理理论研究的不断深入，有些研究者对经典的实证研究方法和结果提出了置疑，认为经典的实证研究方法误表了儿童心理理论的能力。建立在实证研究基础上的理论解释也面临着挑战。首先，经典的错误
信念任务通常是向儿童讲述一个故事，即使反应方式不需要语言，但只有
当儿童理解这个故事和实验者的问题时儿童才有可能回答正确。所以儿童
不能完成任务也许时语言能力障碍，这一点是经典误念任务最大的不足。
其次，任务模式的改变会影响儿童在心理理论任务中的表现。
在任务模式的改变中对儿童欺骗行为的研究已成为一个新的趋势，而
且这方面的研究也己成了心理理论研究中的一个特殊领域。所谓欺骗是指
意图培养他人的错误信念，以至于使他人产生错误或进入某一误区的行
为。如果儿童能够成功的欺骗，首先必须推测被骗者的心理状态，同时明
确自己的心理状态于对方心理状态之间的差距，并具有明确的误导对方的
目的。儿童心理理论的发展是欺骗行为成熟的关键。许多心理学研究者已
明确指出:欺骗能力是儿童的一种十分重要的能力，儿童只有获得了一种
完整的心理理论之后才能获得欺骗能力，有些研究者甚至把欺骗视为是错
误信念理解的一个明确标志。
本文试图把欺骗任务置于装扮游戏中。因为，在理论探讨方面，有研
究者提出装扮游戏和心理理论都依赖于对心理表征的理解。从研究实践来
看，许多研究发现装扮游戏和社会理解之间存在正相关，并认为装扮游戏
可能是心理理论发展的动因。
本研究在以往研究的理论和实证研究基础之上，以3一5岁儿童为研究
对象，试图考察(1)3一5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式下完成心
理理论任务的一般状况。(2)3一5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式
下完成心理理论任务的年龄及性别差异。(3)与国外同类研究结果相比
较，心理理论的实证研究和理论解释的跨文化一致性。研究使用卡方检验
和方差分析的方法对数据进行了分析，结果发现:
(1)3到5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式下对错误信念问题的理
解情况不存在显著的性别差异。
(2)3到5岁儿童在装扮游戏中的欺骗任务模式下对错误信念问题的理
解情况存在显著的年龄差异。随着年龄的增长，儿童正确回答错误信念问
题的比例不断提高，表明儿童心理理论能力是随着年龄的增长而不断发展
的。
(3)儿童从4岁开始能够比较普遍的通过错误信念任务，这与国外
的同类研究结果相一致。儿童心理理论能力的发展具有跨文化的一致性。
西方文化和中国文化文化下的儿童大致在相同的年龄达到了对信念一愿
望推理的认识，拥有了心理理论能力。
Premack and Woodruff first presented the concept of "theory of mind" in 1978 in their research of chapineezes. From then on, lots of researchers did research on the theoretical and empirical aspects of theory of mind, which made it one of the most active areas of developmental psychology during the resent 20 years.
Theory of mind refers to the understanding of the mental state of oneself or others and the causal explanation and prediction of the sequent behaviors. According to the opinion of domain specificity theory, the knowledge of mental state is one of the basic cognitive domains of humanbeings. It has important influnce on our daily life and has connection with the development of children's moral, social and communicative abilities.
In the early 80s of the 20th century, psychologist Wimmer and Perner first suggested the research method of "false belief. Researchers believed that passing the false belief task is the sign of children's obtaining of the ability of theory of mind. Here, "belief refers that one thinks something is true , it reflects the outside world and it is the mental representation of the outside world. From this belief one obtain the understanding of the world. If the belief is correspondent with the objective world, it is true. Otherwise, it is false. The classical researches using the false belief task suggest that children obtain the ability of theory of mind at about 4 years old. 4 year-old children can explain how other people can hold beliefs different from their own and that people's behavior is based on their beliefs. Based on the empirical research result, researcher tried to provide the theoretical explanations, among which the following three are the most representative ones: modularity theory, simulation the
ory and theory theory. Modularity theory emphasizes the physiological basis of theory of mind, simulation theory explains how children first obtain the understanding of others' mind, and theory theory emphasizes the systematization, continuity and consistency of our knowledge about mind.
With the development of the research on theory of mind, some researcher begin to question about the research method and the result of the classical false belief tasks. They argue that the classical false belief task misjudged children's ability of theory of mind. The theoretical explanations based on the empirical results also faced great challenge. First, they argue that children's failure on false belief task is probably because of the deficiency of language ability since usually the false belief task is telling a story to children. Only when children understand the story and the questions of the researchers can they answer the questions correctly. Second, the change of task mode can influence children's performance on the false belief task.
Among the changed forms of task mode, the research of children's deceptive behavior has become a new trend and a specific research area of theory of mind. Deception here refers to the behavior aims at creating other people's false belief hence to make them behave wrongly. If children can deceive successfully, they first have to predict the mental state of the person they want to deceive and at the same time know the difference between other people's mental state and their own, also they must have clear purpose to deceive others. The development of children's theory of mind is the key factor of the maturation of their deceptive behavior. Many researchers have pointed out that deceptive ability is one of the most important, ability of children. Only after obtaining a complete theory of mind can children obtain the ability to deceive. Some researchers even look on deception as a sign of the understanding of theory of mind.
The present study attempts to put the deceptive task in the pretend play. From theoretical perspective, some researchers suggest that both pretend play and theory of mind depend on the understanding of mental representation. In the empirical studies, many researchers find that pretend play has positive relation to social understanding
引文
[1] Flavell J. H.. Cognitive development: Children's knowledge about the mind. Annual Review Psychology, 1999, 50: 21-45.
[2] Premack D., Woodruff G.. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?The Behavior and Brain Science, 1978, 4: 515-526.
[3] 黄天元，林崇德。关于儿童特质理解的心理理论研究。心理科学进展，2003(2)：85-87。
[4] Wimmer H., Perner J.. Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 1983, 13, 103-128.
[5] Hogrefe G. J., Wimmer H. and Perner j.. Ignorance versus false belief: A development lag in attribution of epistemid states. Child Development, 1986, 57, 567-582.
[6] Flavell J. H., Flavell E. R., Green F. L.. Development of the appearance-reality distinction. Cognitive Psychology, 1983, 15, 95-120.
[7][9] Bron-Cohen S.. Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1995: 4-28.
[8][10] Leslie A. M.. Pretending and believing: Issues in the theory of TOMM. Cognition, 1994, 50, 211-238.
[11] Harris P. L.. From simulation to folk psychology: The case for development. Mind and language, 1992, 7, 120-144.
[12] Wellman H. M.. The child's theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1990.
[13] Perner J.. Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford books: MIT press, 1991.
[14] Jenkins J. M., and Astington J. W.. Cogniton factors and family structure associated with theory of mind development in youngchildren. DevelopmentPsychology, 1996, 32, 70-78.
[15] Astington J. W., and Jenkins J. M.. A longitudinal study of the relation between language and theory of mind development. Development Psychology, 1999, 35, 1311-1320.
[16] Baron-Cohen S., Leslie A. M. and Frith U.. Does the autistic child have a theory of mind?Cognition, 1985, 21, 37-46.
[17][18] 徐芬，包雪华。儿童“心理理论”及其有关欺骗研究的新进展。心理发展与教育，2002(2)：53-56。
[19] Chander M., Fritz A. S. and Hala S.. Small-scale deceit: Deception as a marker of two-, three-and four-year-old's early theories of mind. Child Development, 1989, 60, 1263-1277.
[20] Sodian B., Taylor C., Harris P. L. and Perner j.. Early deception and the child's theory of mind: False trails and genuine markers. Child Development, 1991, 62, 468-483.
[21] Hala S., Chandler M. and Fritz A. S.. Fledgling theories of mind: Deception as a marker of 3-year-old's understanding of false belief. Child Development, 1991, 61, 83-97.
[22] Dunn J., Brown J., Slomkowski C., Tesla c. and Youngblade L.. Young children's understanding of other PeOPle's feelings and beliefs: Individual difference and their antecedents. Child Development, 1991, 62, 1352-1366.
[23] Taylor M., Carlson S. M.. The relation between individual difference in fantasy and theory of mind. Child Development, 1997, 68, 435-455,
[24] Jenkins J. M., Astington J. W.. Cognitive factors and family stucture associated with theory of mind development in young, children. Development Psychology, 1996, 32, 70-78.
[25] 郭力平，许冰灵，李琳。游戏对于促进儿蕈心理发展的作用。心理科学，2001(6)：749-751。
[26] Sodian B., Schneider W.. Children's understanding of cognitive cuing: How to manipulate cue to fool a compitor. Child Development, 1990, 61, 697-704.
[27] Peskin J.. Guise and guile: Children's understanding of narrative in which the purpose of pretense is deception. Child Development, 1996, 67, 1735-1751.
[28] 隋晓爽，苏彦捷。对心理理论两成分认知模型的验证。心理学报，2003(1)：56-62。
[29] Kamiloff-Smith A.. Beyond modularity: A development perspective on cognitive science. Cambrige: MIT press, 1992.
1．陈英和，姚端维，郭向和，儿童心理理论的发展及其影响因素的研究进展。心理发展与教育，2001(3)：56-59。
2．邓赐平，桑标，缪小春。儿童早期“心理理论”发展研究中的几个基本问题。心理科学，2000(4)：399-404。
3．郭力平，冯君萍。早期儿童的游戏与心理理论的发展。心理科学，2003(5)：804-807。
4．郭力平，张晔。试论儿童装扮游戏与心理理论的关系。心理科学，2002(2)：228-230。
5．李佳，苏彦捷。儿童心理理论能力中的情绪理解。心理科学进展，2004(1)：37-41。
6．林崇德，发展心理学，北京：人民教育出版社，1995。
7．林美珍，儿童认知发展，台北：心理出版社有限公司。1996。
8．刘明，邓赐平，桑标。幼儿心理理论与社会行为发展关系的初步研究。心理发展与教育，2002(2)：39-42。
9．刘焱。儿童游戏的当代理论研究。成都：四川教育出版社，1998。
10．李燕、桑标。影响儿童心理理论发展的家庭因素。心理科学，2003(6)：1108-1109。
11．莫书亮，苏彦捷，心理理论和语言能力的关系。心理发展与教育，2002(2)：85-91
12．让．皮亚杰。儿童智慧的起源。北京：北京师范大学出版社，1999。
13．任真，桑标。毕生发展心理学的新进展。心理科学，2003(4)：634-637。
14．王桂琴，方格。3-5岁儿童对假装的辨认和对假装者的心理推断。心理学报，2003(5)662-668。
15．王桂琴，方格，杨小冬。儿童对假装的认知发展的研究进展。心理
科学，2003(5)：898-900。
16．王桂琴，方格，毕鸿燕，杨小冬。儿童心理理论的研究进展。心理学动态，2001(2)：129-135。
17．汪美芳，陈会昌。错误信念理解后儿童心理理论的发展。心理发展与教育，2001(2)：45-49。
18．汪益文，张文新。3-6岁儿童心理理论的发展。心理发展与教育，2002(1)：11-15。
19．熊哲宏，李其维。模拟论、模块论、与理论论：儿童“心理理论”发展的三大解释理论。华东师范大学学报，2001(2)：70-77。
20．周念丽，方俊明。自闭症幼儿的情感认知特点的实验研究。心理科学，2003(3)：407-410。
21．朱智贤。儿童心理发展的基本理论。北京：北京师范大学出版社，1982。
22. Astington, J. W.. The child's discovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 1993.
23. Astington, J. W., Harris, P. L. and Olson, D. R.. Development theories of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
24. Broomfield, K. A., Robinson, E. J. and Robinson, W. P.. Children's understanding about white lies. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 67-76.
25. Carpenter, M., Call j. and Tomasell M.. A new false belief test for 36-month-olds. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 393-420.
26. Cole K., Mitchell P.. Siblings in the development of executive control and a theory of mind. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2000, 18, 279-295.
27. Couillard N. L. Woodward A. L.. Children's comprehension of deceptive
points. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1999, 17, 515-521.
28. David D. L., Woolley J. D. and Bruell M. C.. Young children's understanding of the roles of knowledge and thinking in pretense. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 25-45.
29. David T.. Children's understanding of false beliefs in different domains: affective vs. physical. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2001, 19, 47-58.
30. Depaulo B. M. Jordan A. and Laser P.. Age chang in the detection of deception. Child Development, 1982, 53, 701-709.
31. Feldman R., Jenkins L. and Popoola O.. Deteetion of deception in adults and children via facial expression. Child Development, 1979, 50, 350-355.
32. Feldman R., White J.. Detectin deception in children. Journal of Communication, 1980, 30, 121-129.
33. Flavell J. H., FlavelI, E. R. and Green F. L.. Transitional period in the development of the appearance-reality distinction. International Journal of Behavior Development, 1989, 12, 509-526.
34. Flavell J. H., Green F. L. and Flavell, E. R.. The effect of question clarification and memory aids on young children's performance on appearance-reality tasks. Cognitive Development, 1987, 2, 127-144.
35. Garnham W. A., Perner J.. Actions really do speak louder than words——but only implicitly: yong children's understanding of false belief in action. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2001, 19, 413-432,
36. German T. P., Leslie A. M.. Children's inferences from 'knowing' to 'pretending' and 'believing'. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2001, 19, 59-83.
37. Gopnik A., Astington J. W.. Children's understanding of representational chang and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the
appearance-reality distinction. Child Development, 1988, 59, 26-37.
38. Gopnik A., Graf P.. Knowing how to know: young children's ability to identify and remember the source of their beliefs. Child Development, 1998, 59, 1366-1371.
39. Gopnik A., Slaughter V. N.. Young children's understanding of changes in their mental states. Child Development, 1991, 12, 332-336.
40. Hobson R. P.. Against the theory of 'theory of mind'. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, , 1991, 9, 33-51.
41. Josef P., Sandra S., Manuel S. and Matin D.. Theory of mind and its Piagetian perspective: Why alternative naming with understanding belies. Cognitive Development, 2002, 17, 1451-1472.
42. Leslie A. M.. Pretense and representation: the origins of "theory of mind". Psychological Review, 1987, 94, 412-426.
43. Leslie A. M.. Some implications of pretense for mechanisms underlying the child's theory of mind. In J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris, and D. R. Olson Eds., Developing theories of mind, l 9-46. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
44. Lewis C., Osbore a.. Three-year-olds' problem with false belief: Conceptual defict or linguistic artefact?Child Development, 1990, 61, 1514-1519.
45. Lewis m., Stanger C., and. Sullivan M. W.. Deception in 3-year-olds. Developmental Psychology, 1989, 25, 439-443.
46. Lillard S., Flavell J.. Young children's understanding of different mental states. Developmental Psyvhology, 1992, 28, 626-634.
47. Malinda C., Josep C. and Michael T.. A new false belief test for 36-month-olds. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 392-420.
48. Moore C., Frge D. Eds. Children's theory of mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbqum Associates, 1991.
49. Nielsen M., Dissanayake C.. An investigation of pretend play, mental state terms and false belies understanding: in search of a metarepresentational link. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2000, 18, 609-624.
50. Perner J.. Is "thinking"belies?Reply to Wellman and Bartsch. Cognition, 1990, 33, 315-319.
51. Perner J., Frith U., and Leslie A. M.. Exploration of the autistic child's theory of mind: knowledge, belief and communication. Child Development, 1989, 60, 689-700.
52. Perner J., Leekman S. and Wimmer H.. Three-year-olds'difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1987, 5, 125-137.
53. Petter C., Perterson L. and Seeto D.. Developmental chang in ideas about lying. Child Development, 1983, 54, 1529-1535.
54. Rice C., Koinis D., Sullivan K. Tager-Flusberg H. and Winner E.. When three-year-olds pass the appearance-reality test. Developmental Psychology, 1997, 33, 54-61.
55. Sapp F., Lee K. and Muri D.. Three-year-olds'diffieulty with the appearance-reality distinction is it real or is it apparent?Developmental Psychology, 2000, 36, 547-560.
56. Scholi B. J., Leslie A. M.. Modularity development and 'theory of mind'. Mind and Language, 1999, 14, 131-153.
57. Sodian B., Wimmer H.. Children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge. Child Development, 1987, 58, 424-433.
58. Wellman E., Cross D. and Watson J.. Meta-analysis of theory of mind development: the truth about false belief. Child Development, 2001, 72, 655-684.
59. Zaitchik D. When representations conflict with reality: The preschoolers'problem with false belif and "false" photographs. Cognition, 1990, 35, 41-68.
60. Zaitchik D.. Is only seeing believing?: Sources of the true belief in the false belief task. Cognitive Development, 1991, 6, 91-103.
[2] Premack D., Woodruff G.. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?The Behavior and Brain Science, 1978, 4: 515-526.
[3] 黄天元，林崇德。关于儿童特质理解的心理理论研究。心理科学进展，2003(2)：85-87。
[4] Wimmer H., Perner J.. Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 1983, 13, 103-128.
[5] Hogrefe G. J., Wimmer H. and Perner j.. Ignorance versus false belief: A development lag in attribution of epistemid states. Child Development, 1986, 57, 567-582.
[6] Flavell J. H., Flavell E. R., Green F. L.. Development of the appearance-reality distinction. Cognitive Psychology, 1983, 15, 95-120.
[7][9] Bron-Cohen S.. Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1995: 4-28.
[8][10] Leslie A. M.. Pretending and believing: Issues in the theory of TOMM. Cognition, 1994, 50, 211-238.
[11] Harris P. L.. From simulation to folk psychology: The case for development. Mind and language, 1992, 7, 120-144.
[12] Wellman H. M.. The child's theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1990.
[13] Perner J.. Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford books: MIT press, 1991.
[14] Jenkins J. M., and Astington J. W.. Cogniton factors and family structure associated with theory of mind development in youngchildren. DevelopmentPsychology, 1996, 32, 70-78.
[15] Astington J. W., and Jenkins J. M.. A longitudinal study of the relation between language and theory of mind development. Development Psychology, 1999, 35, 1311-1320.
[16] Baron-Cohen S., Leslie A. M. and Frith U.. Does the autistic child have a theory of mind?Cognition, 1985, 21, 37-46.
[17][18] 徐芬，包雪华。儿童“心理理论”及其有关欺骗研究的新进展。心理发展与教育，2002(2)：53-56。
[19] Chander M., Fritz A. S. and Hala S.. Small-scale deceit: Deception as a marker of two-, three-and four-year-old's early theories of mind. Child Development, 1989, 60, 1263-1277.
[20] Sodian B., Taylor C., Harris P. L. and Perner j.. Early deception and the child's theory of mind: False trails and genuine markers. Child Development, 1991, 62, 468-483.
[21] Hala S., Chandler M. and Fritz A. S.. Fledgling theories of mind: Deception as a marker of 3-year-old's understanding of false belief. Child Development, 1991, 61, 83-97.
[22] Dunn J., Brown J., Slomkowski C., Tesla c. and Youngblade L.. Young children's understanding of other PeOPle's feelings and beliefs: Individual difference and their antecedents. Child Development, 1991, 62, 1352-1366.
[23] Taylor M., Carlson S. M.. The relation between individual difference in fantasy and theory of mind. Child Development, 1997, 68, 435-455,
[24] Jenkins J. M., Astington J. W.. Cognitive factors and family stucture associated with theory of mind development in young, children. Development Psychology, 1996, 32, 70-78.
[25] 郭力平，许冰灵，李琳。游戏对于促进儿蕈心理发展的作用。心理科学，2001(6)：749-751。
[26] Sodian B., Schneider W.. Children's understanding of cognitive cuing: How to manipulate cue to fool a compitor. Child Development, 1990, 61, 697-704.
[27] Peskin J.. Guise and guile: Children's understanding of narrative in which the purpose of pretense is deception. Child Development, 1996, 67, 1735-1751.
[28] 隋晓爽，苏彦捷。对心理理论两成分认知模型的验证。心理学报，2003(1)：56-62。
[29] Kamiloff-Smith A.. Beyond modularity: A development perspective on cognitive science. Cambrige: MIT press, 1992.
1．陈英和，姚端维，郭向和，儿童心理理论的发展及其影响因素的研究进展。心理发展与教育，2001(3)：56-59。
2．邓赐平，桑标，缪小春。儿童早期“心理理论”发展研究中的几个基本问题。心理科学，2000(4)：399-404。
3．郭力平，冯君萍。早期儿童的游戏与心理理论的发展。心理科学，2003(5)：804-807。
4．郭力平，张晔。试论儿童装扮游戏与心理理论的关系。心理科学，2002(2)：228-230。
5．李佳，苏彦捷。儿童心理理论能力中的情绪理解。心理科学进展，2004(1)：37-41。
6．林崇德，发展心理学，北京：人民教育出版社，1995。
7．林美珍，儿童认知发展，台北：心理出版社有限公司。1996。
8．刘明，邓赐平，桑标。幼儿心理理论与社会行为发展关系的初步研究。心理发展与教育，2002(2)：39-42。
9．刘焱。儿童游戏的当代理论研究。成都：四川教育出版社，1998。
10．李燕、桑标。影响儿童心理理论发展的家庭因素。心理科学，2003(6)：1108-1109。
11．莫书亮，苏彦捷，心理理论和语言能力的关系。心理发展与教育，2002(2)：85-91
12．让．皮亚杰。儿童智慧的起源。北京：北京师范大学出版社，1999。
13．任真，桑标。毕生发展心理学的新进展。心理科学，2003(4)：634-637。
14．王桂琴，方格。3-5岁儿童对假装的辨认和对假装者的心理推断。心理学报，2003(5)662-668。
15．王桂琴，方格，杨小冬。儿童对假装的认知发展的研究进展。心理
科学，2003(5)：898-900。
16．王桂琴，方格，毕鸿燕，杨小冬。儿童心理理论的研究进展。心理学动态，2001(2)：129-135。
17．汪美芳，陈会昌。错误信念理解后儿童心理理论的发展。心理发展与教育，2001(2)：45-49。
18．汪益文，张文新。3-6岁儿童心理理论的发展。心理发展与教育，2002(1)：11-15。
19．熊哲宏，李其维。模拟论、模块论、与理论论：儿童“心理理论”发展的三大解释理论。华东师范大学学报，2001(2)：70-77。
20．周念丽，方俊明。自闭症幼儿的情感认知特点的实验研究。心理科学，2003(3)：407-410。
21．朱智贤。儿童心理发展的基本理论。北京：北京师范大学出版社，1982。
22. Astington, J. W.. The child's discovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 1993.
23. Astington, J. W., Harris, P. L. and Olson, D. R.. Development theories of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
24. Broomfield, K. A., Robinson, E. J. and Robinson, W. P.. Children's understanding about white lies. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 67-76.
25. Carpenter, M., Call j. and Tomasell M.. A new false belief test for 36-month-olds. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 393-420.
26. Cole K., Mitchell P.. Siblings in the development of executive control and a theory of mind. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2000, 18, 279-295.
27. Couillard N. L. Woodward A. L.. Children's comprehension of deceptive
points. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1999, 17, 515-521.
28. David D. L., Woolley J. D. and Bruell M. C.. Young children's understanding of the roles of knowledge and thinking in pretense. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 25-45.
29. David T.. Children's understanding of false beliefs in different domains: affective vs. physical. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2001, 19, 47-58.
30. Depaulo B. M. Jordan A. and Laser P.. Age chang in the detection of deception. Child Development, 1982, 53, 701-709.
31. Feldman R., Jenkins L. and Popoola O.. Deteetion of deception in adults and children via facial expression. Child Development, 1979, 50, 350-355.
32. Feldman R., White J.. Detectin deception in children. Journal of Communication, 1980, 30, 121-129.
33. Flavell J. H., FlavelI, E. R. and Green F. L.. Transitional period in the development of the appearance-reality distinction. International Journal of Behavior Development, 1989, 12, 509-526.
34. Flavell J. H., Green F. L. and Flavell, E. R.. The effect of question clarification and memory aids on young children's performance on appearance-reality tasks. Cognitive Development, 1987, 2, 127-144.
35. Garnham W. A., Perner J.. Actions really do speak louder than words——but only implicitly: yong children's understanding of false belief in action. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2001, 19, 413-432,
36. German T. P., Leslie A. M.. Children's inferences from 'knowing' to 'pretending' and 'believing'. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2001, 19, 59-83.
37. Gopnik A., Astington J. W.. Children's understanding of representational chang and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the
appearance-reality distinction. Child Development, 1988, 59, 26-37.
38. Gopnik A., Graf P.. Knowing how to know: young children's ability to identify and remember the source of their beliefs. Child Development, 1998, 59, 1366-1371.
39. Gopnik A., Slaughter V. N.. Young children's understanding of changes in their mental states. Child Development, 1991, 12, 332-336.
40. Hobson R. P.. Against the theory of 'theory of mind'. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, , 1991, 9, 33-51.
41. Josef P., Sandra S., Manuel S. and Matin D.. Theory of mind and its Piagetian perspective: Why alternative naming with understanding belies. Cognitive Development, 2002, 17, 1451-1472.
42. Leslie A. M.. Pretense and representation: the origins of "theory of mind". Psychological Review, 1987, 94, 412-426.
43. Leslie A. M.. Some implications of pretense for mechanisms underlying the child's theory of mind. In J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris, and D. R. Olson Eds., Developing theories of mind, l 9-46. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
44. Lewis C., Osbore a.. Three-year-olds' problem with false belief: Conceptual defict or linguistic artefact?Child Development, 1990, 61, 1514-1519.
45. Lewis m., Stanger C., and. Sullivan M. W.. Deception in 3-year-olds. Developmental Psychology, 1989, 25, 439-443.
46. Lillard S., Flavell J.. Young children's understanding of different mental states. Developmental Psyvhology, 1992, 28, 626-634.
47. Malinda C., Josep C. and Michael T.. A new false belief test for 36-month-olds. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2002, 20, 392-420.
48. Moore C., Frge D. Eds. Children's theory of mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbqum Associates, 1991.
49. Nielsen M., Dissanayake C.. An investigation of pretend play, mental state terms and false belies understanding: in search of a metarepresentational link. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2000, 18, 609-624.
50. Perner J.. Is "thinking"belies?Reply to Wellman and Bartsch. Cognition, 1990, 33, 315-319.
51. Perner J., Frith U., and Leslie A. M.. Exploration of the autistic child's theory of mind: knowledge, belief and communication. Child Development, 1989, 60, 689-700.
52. Perner J., Leekman S. and Wimmer H.. Three-year-olds'difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1987, 5, 125-137.
53. Petter C., Perterson L. and Seeto D.. Developmental chang in ideas about lying. Child Development, 1983, 54, 1529-1535.
54. Rice C., Koinis D., Sullivan K. Tager-Flusberg H. and Winner E.. When three-year-olds pass the appearance-reality test. Developmental Psychology, 1997, 33, 54-61.
55. Sapp F., Lee K. and Muri D.. Three-year-olds'diffieulty with the appearance-reality distinction is it real or is it apparent?Developmental Psychology, 2000, 36, 547-560.
56. Scholi B. J., Leslie A. M.. Modularity development and 'theory of mind'. Mind and Language, 1999, 14, 131-153.
57. Sodian B., Wimmer H.. Children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge. Child Development, 1987, 58, 424-433.
58. Wellman E., Cross D. and Watson J.. Meta-analysis of theory of mind development: the truth about false belief. Child Development, 2001, 72, 655-684.
59. Zaitchik D. When representations conflict with reality: The preschoolers'problem with false belif and "false" photographs. Cognition, 1990, 35, 41-68.
60. Zaitchik D.. Is only seeing believing?: Sources of the true belief in the false belief task. Cognitive Development, 1991, 6, 91-103.