我国建设监理执业行为及行业委托代理机制的优化研究
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摘要
借鉴于西方的建设监理制度25年来为我国工程建设综合管理水平的提高发挥了巨大作用，但监理人员素质低下、责任心不强、注册人员数量不足的行业问题始终未能解决。
本文紧密结合工程实践对影响监理执业的制度框架、组织体系和相关主体的利益最大化行为进行分析，修正“经济人”假设，将监理人员所受的传统观念约束纳入西方经济学理论框架，充分考虑我国“和谐中庸”、“重义轻利”与“无讼是求”等传统观念对监理制度运行的深刻影响，根据中西方文化差异，把文化观念约束细分为“竞争”与“和谐”、“重义轻利”与“重利轻义”两个维度，将监理人员分为竞争式努力尽职、竞争式权力寻租、和谐式努力尽职与和谐式权力寻租4种类型，拓展并修正层级代理理论的P-S-A模型，对监理人员基于项目主管代理人行为导向的三类八种执业模式进行规范性研究后认为：在项目法人或承包商为了自身利益最大化必然采取有限度质量违规策略的前提下，监理人员受传统文化观念影响难以选择“独立”和“尽职”两种最符合社会公众工程质量安全利益的执业行为模式，而是无奈选择“默许”、“无讼”、“放任”三种执业行为模式，各类工程事故并非监理人员主观故意以“敲诈”、“合谋”、“同谋”违规执业模式谋取寻租利益所致。文章对国内重大工程事故判决法律卷宗和相关工程事故调查结论进行实证分析，证明监理人员通常采取“默许”、“无讼”、“放任”三种执业行为模式，说明强制监理制度客观上是一种强迫监理人员在工程验收环节“说假话”的机制，是对项目法人或承包商质量安全违规行为的“不可置信威胁”。
本文依据研究结论对监理机制进行优化设计，建议立法允许监理人员对工程或工序验收出具“不合格”的评价意见，实施监理有条件免责机制和以承包商的质量安全履约保证金对监理“说真话”损失的补偿机制，能有效地将强制监理制度转变为“可置信威胁”，扭转工程领域验收环节集体“说假话”的现状，迅速建立承包商的市场声誉机制，彻底杜绝“非合格”工程与工程事故的出现。
文章运用博弈论对监理企业派驻无资质人员开展监理业务的的利益最大化行为进行规范性分析，并利用监理行业有关统计数据进行实证研究，说明监理企业是监理行业人员数量不足、素质低下的获利推手。文章建议本着客观务实的原则，通过立法允许有一定专业资质的非注册人员进行监理执业并赋予其签字权来建立监理企业的行为显示机制，立法由监理协会获取部分监理酬金的歧视性收益分配规则，和由监理企业法定代表人代替非注册从业人员承担包括刑事责任在内的全部法律责任的事故责任分担机制，能够有效地促进监理行业整体素质的快速提高。
China's construction supervision system, borrowed from the westernconstruction supervision system, has exerted a huge influence over the improvementof project construction comprehensive management after more than20yearsdevelopment. However, frequently happened engineering accidents shows that theproblems of the supervision industry, which is the lower quality of wholesupervision business, the shortage of registered supervision practitioner, andirresponsibility of the employees, has not been solved.
This thesis, based on the practice of China's engineering, illustrates theframework of law and rules which influence the performance of supervisionpractitioners, analyze the multi-level principal-agent relationship in the projectmanagement system, especially analyzes the benefit maximization behaviors ofrelative engineering subjects theoretically. In consideration of the culturalcharacteristics of China, which is harmony and middle, valuing morality, againstusing laws, etc. The thesis, regarding the traditional concept as a constraint of theconstruction supervision system, modifying the rational-economic man hypothesis oftraditional principal-agent theory, taking profound impacts of traditional ideas onconstruction supervision system fully into account, divides the cultural constraintsunder the supervision practitioners' practice into two dimensions: competition andharmony, that is to say, hard work on one's duty based on justice instead of benefitsand power rent-seeking based on benefits instead of justice. The thesis divided thesupervision practitioners into4types: competitive hard working supervision practitioners on duty, competitive power rent-seeking supervision practitioner,harmonious hard working supervision practitioners on duty, harmonious powerrent-seeking supervision practitioners. After expanding and modifying P-S-A model,analyzing eight practice behavior patterns of three categories by means of normativeresearch method theoretically, the analyzed results are as follows: Because of thenecessary limited violation to the rules for the sake of the maximization of theirbenefits under the influence of Chinese traditional culture, it is difficult to chooseindependent and diligent mode if the supervision practitioners are paid by thecorporation of the project. Instead, the supervision practitioner would choose one ofthree type of performance modes such as acquiescence, non-litigation and nointerference. The various accidents are not due to the supervisor’s idea of stressingon benefits rather than justice, or due to negative modes like extortion model,collusion model and accessory model which aiming at maximization of benefitsfrom power rent-seeking. This thesis analyzes the difference between the Chineseculture and western culture based on cultural sociology. The deep roots ofsupervision industry problem which is cultural lack resulted from the disconnectionbetween the Chinese culture and western supervision system after introduced fromwestern country since its development from the western cultural environment.
This thesis analyzes the data collected from2005to2011by means of casestudy. It is proved that the lack of supervision practitioners, poor quality ofsupervision staff and poor sense of duty of the supervision practitioners had resultedfrom the benefit maximization seeking of the supervision corporate body.
Based on the conclusion to the theoretical analyses and case study, an optimizedsupervision mechanism in this thesis, which allows supervision practitioners todeclare the project or the process of the project unqualified, is suggested. Themechanism of conditioned responsibility exemption to supervision practitioners forunqualified projects and the compensation mechanism to the loss of the supervisionpractitioners who tell the truth about the project by means of the contractors'performance bond to engineering quality and safety will transform "incrediblethreat" to "credible threat" to those who violate the rules and regulations. As a result,to lie collectively in supervision business will vanish. Meanwhile, the mechanism of information disclosure to "unqualified projects" would soon establish scientificreputation evaluation system and constraint mechanism in contractors' market. Thelegislation, which allow the owner of the project to use unqualified engineering, willresolutely curb “unqualified projects" and severe accident of engineering. Then theoriginal aim of mandatory supervision system will be reached.
As for the problem that supervision practitioner who have no relativecertification carry out supervision business, based on the principle of objective andpractical,a display mechanism recording misbehavior of supervision enterprisesestablished by means of legislation which allow unregistered supervisionpractitioners with certain qualification to run supervision business, a discriminatoryincome distribution rule by which supervision association get part of supervision feeestablished by legislation, and a sharing mechanism of responsibility to accidentsthat the legal representative of supervision enterprises assume all legalresponsibilities including criminal responsibility in place of unregistered supervisionpractitioners established by means of legislation, all these measures will urge thesupervision corporate bodies to supervise the employees effectively and develophuman resources enthusiastically so that the comprehensive quality of supervisionindustry will be improved soon.
Finally this thesis sets forth culture construction in supervision sector.
本文紧密结合工程实践对影响监理执业的制度框架、组织体系和相关主体的利益最大化行为进行分析，修正“经济人”假设，将监理人员所受的传统观念约束纳入西方经济学理论框架，充分考虑我国“和谐中庸”、“重义轻利”与“无讼是求”等传统观念对监理制度运行的深刻影响，根据中西方文化差异，把文化观念约束细分为“竞争”与“和谐”、“重义轻利”与“重利轻义”两个维度，将监理人员分为竞争式努力尽职、竞争式权力寻租、和谐式努力尽职与和谐式权力寻租4种类型，拓展并修正层级代理理论的P-S-A模型，对监理人员基于项目主管代理人行为导向的三类八种执业模式进行规范性研究后认为：在项目法人或承包商为了自身利益最大化必然采取有限度质量违规策略的前提下，监理人员受传统文化观念影响难以选择“独立”和“尽职”两种最符合社会公众工程质量安全利益的执业行为模式，而是无奈选择“默许”、“无讼”、“放任”三种执业行为模式，各类工程事故并非监理人员主观故意以“敲诈”、“合谋”、“同谋”违规执业模式谋取寻租利益所致。文章对国内重大工程事故判决法律卷宗和相关工程事故调查结论进行实证分析，证明监理人员通常采取“默许”、“无讼”、“放任”三种执业行为模式，说明强制监理制度客观上是一种强迫监理人员在工程验收环节“说假话”的机制，是对项目法人或承包商质量安全违规行为的“不可置信威胁”。
本文依据研究结论对监理机制进行优化设计，建议立法允许监理人员对工程或工序验收出具“不合格”的评价意见，实施监理有条件免责机制和以承包商的质量安全履约保证金对监理“说真话”损失的补偿机制，能有效地将强制监理制度转变为“可置信威胁”，扭转工程领域验收环节集体“说假话”的现状，迅速建立承包商的市场声誉机制，彻底杜绝“非合格”工程与工程事故的出现。
文章运用博弈论对监理企业派驻无资质人员开展监理业务的的利益最大化行为进行规范性分析，并利用监理行业有关统计数据进行实证研究，说明监理企业是监理行业人员数量不足、素质低下的获利推手。文章建议本着客观务实的原则，通过立法允许有一定专业资质的非注册人员进行监理执业并赋予其签字权来建立监理企业的行为显示机制，立法由监理协会获取部分监理酬金的歧视性收益分配规则，和由监理企业法定代表人代替非注册从业人员承担包括刑事责任在内的全部法律责任的事故责任分担机制，能够有效地促进监理行业整体素质的快速提高。
China's construction supervision system, borrowed from the westernconstruction supervision system, has exerted a huge influence over the improvementof project construction comprehensive management after more than20yearsdevelopment. However, frequently happened engineering accidents shows that theproblems of the supervision industry, which is the lower quality of wholesupervision business, the shortage of registered supervision practitioner, andirresponsibility of the employees, has not been solved.
This thesis, based on the practice of China's engineering, illustrates theframework of law and rules which influence the performance of supervisionpractitioners, analyze the multi-level principal-agent relationship in the projectmanagement system, especially analyzes the benefit maximization behaviors ofrelative engineering subjects theoretically. In consideration of the culturalcharacteristics of China, which is harmony and middle, valuing morality, againstusing laws, etc. The thesis, regarding the traditional concept as a constraint of theconstruction supervision system, modifying the rational-economic man hypothesis oftraditional principal-agent theory, taking profound impacts of traditional ideas onconstruction supervision system fully into account, divides the cultural constraintsunder the supervision practitioners' practice into two dimensions: competition andharmony, that is to say, hard work on one's duty based on justice instead of benefitsand power rent-seeking based on benefits instead of justice. The thesis divided thesupervision practitioners into4types: competitive hard working supervision practitioners on duty, competitive power rent-seeking supervision practitioner,harmonious hard working supervision practitioners on duty, harmonious powerrent-seeking supervision practitioners. After expanding and modifying P-S-A model,analyzing eight practice behavior patterns of three categories by means of normativeresearch method theoretically, the analyzed results are as follows: Because of thenecessary limited violation to the rules for the sake of the maximization of theirbenefits under the influence of Chinese traditional culture, it is difficult to chooseindependent and diligent mode if the supervision practitioners are paid by thecorporation of the project. Instead, the supervision practitioner would choose one ofthree type of performance modes such as acquiescence, non-litigation and nointerference. The various accidents are not due to the supervisor’s idea of stressingon benefits rather than justice, or due to negative modes like extortion model,collusion model and accessory model which aiming at maximization of benefitsfrom power rent-seeking. This thesis analyzes the difference between the Chineseculture and western culture based on cultural sociology. The deep roots ofsupervision industry problem which is cultural lack resulted from the disconnectionbetween the Chinese culture and western supervision system after introduced fromwestern country since its development from the western cultural environment.
This thesis analyzes the data collected from2005to2011by means of casestudy. It is proved that the lack of supervision practitioners, poor quality ofsupervision staff and poor sense of duty of the supervision practitioners had resultedfrom the benefit maximization seeking of the supervision corporate body.
Based on the conclusion to the theoretical analyses and case study, an optimizedsupervision mechanism in this thesis, which allows supervision practitioners todeclare the project or the process of the project unqualified, is suggested. Themechanism of conditioned responsibility exemption to supervision practitioners forunqualified projects and the compensation mechanism to the loss of the supervisionpractitioners who tell the truth about the project by means of the contractors'performance bond to engineering quality and safety will transform "incrediblethreat" to "credible threat" to those who violate the rules and regulations. As a result,to lie collectively in supervision business will vanish. Meanwhile, the mechanism of information disclosure to "unqualified projects" would soon establish scientificreputation evaluation system and constraint mechanism in contractors' market. Thelegislation, which allow the owner of the project to use unqualified engineering, willresolutely curb “unqualified projects" and severe accident of engineering. Then theoriginal aim of mandatory supervision system will be reached.
As for the problem that supervision practitioner who have no relativecertification carry out supervision business, based on the principle of objective andpractical,a display mechanism recording misbehavior of supervision enterprisesestablished by means of legislation which allow unregistered supervisionpractitioners with certain qualification to run supervision business, a discriminatoryincome distribution rule by which supervision association get part of supervision feeestablished by legislation, and a sharing mechanism of responsibility to accidentsthat the legal representative of supervision enterprises assume all legalresponsibilities including criminal responsibility in place of unregistered supervisionpractitioners established by means of legislation, all these measures will urge thesupervision corporate bodies to supervise the employees effectively and develophuman resources enthusiastically so that the comprehensive quality of supervisionindustry will be improved soon.
Finally this thesis sets forth culture construction in supervision sector.
引文
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