巴基斯坦非金融上市公司的资本结构实证探析
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摘要
资本结构管理活动是指使企业价值最大化的债务和权益性证券(equity securities)的选择。在他们的论文中,Modigliani和Miller(1958)提出,在完美的资本市场下,债务和权益间的选择不会对公司价值产生实质性的影响。尽管他们的“债务不相关理论”(debt irrelevance theorem)是基于现实世界中并不存在的假设建立的,但当考虑到现实情况时,资本结构的选择就成为了价值最大化的重要因素。大多数关于资本结构的研究,通常是以发达国家的相关数据为基础而展开的。对于发展中国家企业的融资行为的研究则关注较少,特别是对于巴基斯坦企业的财务行为的定量研究则显得尤为缺乏。因此,本文试图通过调查一些和资本结构相关的重要因素来完善现有关于巴基斯坦的公司资本结构的研究。首先,本文研究了公司特有因素对资本结构的影响；其次,本文研究了公司治理因素对公司资本结构的影响；最后,本文研究了公司资本结构对公司绩效的影响。
为了本文找出最能影响巴基斯坦公司资本结构选择的特有因素,本文采用了巴基斯坦卡拉奇证券交易所(Karachi Stock Exchange, KSE)260家非金融上市公司2000年至2009年的数据来分析公司资本结构的影响因素,并由此对公司绩效产生的影响。研究结果显示,盈利能力和非债务税盾(non-debt tax shields)间关系是负相关,而企业规模同总债务比例以及长期债务比例成正相关。特别需要指出的是,有形资产和流动性同总资产比例是负相关关系,公司的增长机会同总债务比例及长期债务比例负相关,其中,公司的增长机会同前者的相关性是显著的。盈利波动率与总债务比例是负相关关系,而和长期债务比率正相关,其中,盈利波动率与和长期债务比率相关性是显著的。在能源,造纸,制糖,以及纺织产业,总债务比率明显偏高。而水泥、化工、制造业,及纺织产业的长期债务比率明显偏高。这些研究发现揭示出我们的公司资本结构模型具有预测功能。巴基斯坦公司的债务比例和发达国家的公司一样,受到了一些变量的影响。然而,一些变量的符号,如流动性比例、有形资产比例、盈利波动性符号与我们期望的相反。这可能是由于巴基斯坦公司比较侧重于短期融资。
关于公司治理内部属性和资本结构的研究,我们运用KSE中155家非金融上市企业2004-2008年的数据,进行实证分析。结果显示,董事会规模,独立董事,以及所有权集中度都会和总债务比率和长期债务比率负相关,而董事会报酬则和总债务比率以及长期债务比率正相关。经理持股与公司长期债务比例负相关,CEO两职合一在所有回归中几乎没有显著性。控制变量中,盈利能力和流动性与总债务比率、长期债务比率负相关；而公司规模同总债务比率、长期债务比率正相关。需要指出的是,有形资产同长期债务比率正相关,而同总债务比率负相关。总之,实证结果证实公司治理因素能够影响资本结构的选择。
本文运用KSE的240家上市非金融公司2004-2009年的数据对资本结构和企业绩效的相关性进行了研究。实证结果表明,衡量公司资本结构的主要指标,例如总债务比例、长期债务比例、短期债务比例和公司绩效指标,如ROA和市值面值比附相关。公司资本结构和绩效的负相关说明代理冲突导致公司过度的使用负债。这种过度的使用负债会使得公司债权人有能力限制公司经理做出关键性的决策,影响公司绩效。重要的是,这一结论和Modigliani and Miller(1958)关于资本结构对公司绩效无影响的结论相反。对于控制变量来说,公司规模、增长机会是正的显著相关,有形资产比例则是负的显著相关。这些发现说明,除了资本结构,其他因素也会对公司绩效产生影响。
Capital structure management involves the selection of debt and equity securities in a way that will maximize the value of the firm. In a seminal study, Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved that in perfect capital markets the choice between debt and equity has no material effects on the value of the firm. Their irrelevance proposition is based on restrictive assumptions which do not hold in the real world, when these assumptions are removed then choice of capital structure becomes an important value determining factor. Majority of empirical research on capital structure has been derived from data from developed countries that have many institutional similarities. Alternatively, research to understand the financing behavior of firms in developing countries has received much less attention. In particular, little is empirically known about the financing behavior of firms in Pakistan. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to fill a gap in the literature by exploring three key issues relevant to capital structure using the data of Pakistani firms. Firstly, this study investigates the most significant firm-specific factors that affect the capital structure. Secondly, this study explores the effect of internal attributes of corporate governance on capital structure. Finally, this study analyzes the effect of capital structure on firm performance.
Investigation relevant to most significant firm-specific factors that affect the capital structure is performed using the data of 260 non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Pakistan during 2000-2009. Empirical results indicate that profitability and non-debt tax shields are negatively, whereas firm size is positively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio. Notably, asset tangibility and liquidity are negatively related to the total debt ratio, and positively related to the long-term debt ratio. Although growth is negatively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio but the relationship is found significant only with the total debt ratio. Earnings volatility is negatively related to the total debt ratio but the relationship is insignificant. Alternatively, earnings volatility is significantly and positively related to the long-term debt ratio. As far as the impact of industry classification on capital structure is concerned, energy & fuel, paper & board, sugar & allied, and textile industries have a significant positive affect on the total debt ratio. On the other hand, cement, chemical, engineering, and textile industries have a significant positive influence on the long-term debt ratio. These findings indicate that capital structure models do have predictive power. Moreover, debt ratios in Pakistani firms seem to be affected in the same way and by the same types of variables that are significant in developed countries. However, the signs on some of the coefficients, particularly liquidity, asset tangibility, and earnings volatility are sometimes the opposite of what we would expect. This might be due to profound dependence of firms in Pakistan on short-term debt which have different determinants than long-term debt.
Investigation concerning the effect of internal attributes of corporate governance on capital structure is performed using the data of 155 non-financial firms listed on KSE during 2004-2008. The results indicate that board size, outside directors, and ownership concentration are positively; whereas, director remuneration is negatively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio. Managerial ownership is negatively related to the long-term debt ratio. CEO duality is negatively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio but relationship is found insignificant in all regressions. The control variables such as profitability and liquidity are negatively, whereas firm size is positively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio. Notably, asset tangibility is positively related to the long-term debt ratio and negatively related to the total debt ratio. In sum, empirical findings indicate that internal measures of corporate governance have material effects on capital structure.
Investigation concerning the impact of capital structure on firm performance is made using the data of 240 non-financial firms listed on KSE during 2004-2009. The empirical results indicate that all measures of capital structure (i.e., the total debt ratio, the long-term debt ratio, and the short-term debt ratio) are negatively related to the firm performance (i.e., the return on assets and the market-to-book ratio). The negative relationship between capital structure and performance indicates that the agency issues may lead the firms to use higher than appropriate levels of debt in their capital structure. This overleveraging may increase the lenders'influence which in turn limits the strategic choice of managers, thus affecting their ability to carry out critical strategic decisions. As far as control variables are concerned, firm size and growth are positively, whereas tangibility is negatively related to the return on assets and the market-to-book ratio. This finding indicates that variables other than capital structure also influence the firm performance.
Finally, empirical results of this dissertation have some policy implications for professional managers, lenders, investors, and market analysts. For instance, empirical results indicate that financial managers should consider various costs and benefits combined with debt and equity capital before establishing an optimal capital structure. Lenders should tenderly inflict debt covenants considering their affect on firm performance because in the event of poor performance they will have to bear the consequences due to limited liability of the shareholders. Investors and market analysts should consider the debt levels before investing their resources in the firms.
为了本文找出最能影响巴基斯坦公司资本结构选择的特有因素,本文采用了巴基斯坦卡拉奇证券交易所(Karachi Stock Exchange, KSE)260家非金融上市公司2000年至2009年的数据来分析公司资本结构的影响因素,并由此对公司绩效产生的影响。研究结果显示,盈利能力和非债务税盾(non-debt tax shields)间关系是负相关,而企业规模同总债务比例以及长期债务比例成正相关。特别需要指出的是,有形资产和流动性同总资产比例是负相关关系,公司的增长机会同总债务比例及长期债务比例负相关,其中,公司的增长机会同前者的相关性是显著的。盈利波动率与总债务比例是负相关关系,而和长期债务比率正相关,其中,盈利波动率与和长期债务比率相关性是显著的。在能源,造纸,制糖,以及纺织产业,总债务比率明显偏高。而水泥、化工、制造业,及纺织产业的长期债务比率明显偏高。这些研究发现揭示出我们的公司资本结构模型具有预测功能。巴基斯坦公司的债务比例和发达国家的公司一样,受到了一些变量的影响。然而,一些变量的符号,如流动性比例、有形资产比例、盈利波动性符号与我们期望的相反。这可能是由于巴基斯坦公司比较侧重于短期融资。
关于公司治理内部属性和资本结构的研究,我们运用KSE中155家非金融上市企业2004-2008年的数据,进行实证分析。结果显示,董事会规模,独立董事,以及所有权集中度都会和总债务比率和长期债务比率负相关,而董事会报酬则和总债务比率以及长期债务比率正相关。经理持股与公司长期债务比例负相关,CEO两职合一在所有回归中几乎没有显著性。控制变量中,盈利能力和流动性与总债务比率、长期债务比率负相关；而公司规模同总债务比率、长期债务比率正相关。需要指出的是,有形资产同长期债务比率正相关,而同总债务比率负相关。总之,实证结果证实公司治理因素能够影响资本结构的选择。
本文运用KSE的240家上市非金融公司2004-2009年的数据对资本结构和企业绩效的相关性进行了研究。实证结果表明,衡量公司资本结构的主要指标,例如总债务比例、长期债务比例、短期债务比例和公司绩效指标,如ROA和市值面值比附相关。公司资本结构和绩效的负相关说明代理冲突导致公司过度的使用负债。这种过度的使用负债会使得公司债权人有能力限制公司经理做出关键性的决策,影响公司绩效。重要的是,这一结论和Modigliani and Miller(1958)关于资本结构对公司绩效无影响的结论相反。对于控制变量来说,公司规模、增长机会是正的显著相关,有形资产比例则是负的显著相关。这些发现说明,除了资本结构,其他因素也会对公司绩效产生影响。
Capital structure management involves the selection of debt and equity securities in a way that will maximize the value of the firm. In a seminal study, Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved that in perfect capital markets the choice between debt and equity has no material effects on the value of the firm. Their irrelevance proposition is based on restrictive assumptions which do not hold in the real world, when these assumptions are removed then choice of capital structure becomes an important value determining factor. Majority of empirical research on capital structure has been derived from data from developed countries that have many institutional similarities. Alternatively, research to understand the financing behavior of firms in developing countries has received much less attention. In particular, little is empirically known about the financing behavior of firms in Pakistan. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to fill a gap in the literature by exploring three key issues relevant to capital structure using the data of Pakistani firms. Firstly, this study investigates the most significant firm-specific factors that affect the capital structure. Secondly, this study explores the effect of internal attributes of corporate governance on capital structure. Finally, this study analyzes the effect of capital structure on firm performance.
Investigation relevant to most significant firm-specific factors that affect the capital structure is performed using the data of 260 non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Pakistan during 2000-2009. Empirical results indicate that profitability and non-debt tax shields are negatively, whereas firm size is positively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio. Notably, asset tangibility and liquidity are negatively related to the total debt ratio, and positively related to the long-term debt ratio. Although growth is negatively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio but the relationship is found significant only with the total debt ratio. Earnings volatility is negatively related to the total debt ratio but the relationship is insignificant. Alternatively, earnings volatility is significantly and positively related to the long-term debt ratio. As far as the impact of industry classification on capital structure is concerned, energy & fuel, paper & board, sugar & allied, and textile industries have a significant positive affect on the total debt ratio. On the other hand, cement, chemical, engineering, and textile industries have a significant positive influence on the long-term debt ratio. These findings indicate that capital structure models do have predictive power. Moreover, debt ratios in Pakistani firms seem to be affected in the same way and by the same types of variables that are significant in developed countries. However, the signs on some of the coefficients, particularly liquidity, asset tangibility, and earnings volatility are sometimes the opposite of what we would expect. This might be due to profound dependence of firms in Pakistan on short-term debt which have different determinants than long-term debt.
Investigation concerning the effect of internal attributes of corporate governance on capital structure is performed using the data of 155 non-financial firms listed on KSE during 2004-2008. The results indicate that board size, outside directors, and ownership concentration are positively; whereas, director remuneration is negatively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio. Managerial ownership is negatively related to the long-term debt ratio. CEO duality is negatively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio but relationship is found insignificant in all regressions. The control variables such as profitability and liquidity are negatively, whereas firm size is positively related to the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio. Notably, asset tangibility is positively related to the long-term debt ratio and negatively related to the total debt ratio. In sum, empirical findings indicate that internal measures of corporate governance have material effects on capital structure.
Investigation concerning the impact of capital structure on firm performance is made using the data of 240 non-financial firms listed on KSE during 2004-2009. The empirical results indicate that all measures of capital structure (i.e., the total debt ratio, the long-term debt ratio, and the short-term debt ratio) are negatively related to the firm performance (i.e., the return on assets and the market-to-book ratio). The negative relationship between capital structure and performance indicates that the agency issues may lead the firms to use higher than appropriate levels of debt in their capital structure. This overleveraging may increase the lenders'influence which in turn limits the strategic choice of managers, thus affecting their ability to carry out critical strategic decisions. As far as control variables are concerned, firm size and growth are positively, whereas tangibility is negatively related to the return on assets and the market-to-book ratio. This finding indicates that variables other than capital structure also influence the firm performance.
Finally, empirical results of this dissertation have some policy implications for professional managers, lenders, investors, and market analysts. For instance, empirical results indicate that financial managers should consider various costs and benefits combined with debt and equity capital before establishing an optimal capital structure. Lenders should tenderly inflict debt covenants considering their affect on firm performance because in the event of poor performance they will have to bear the consequences due to limited liability of the shareholders. Investors and market analysts should consider the debt levels before investing their resources in the firms.
引文
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