基于博弈分析的企业并购定价策略及实施机制研究
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摘要
随着我国经济的快速发展，并购在企业扩大生产、提高经营效率和市场竞争力方面，起到越来越重要的作用。而要顺利实现这些目标，并购方需要综合考虑企业实际情况及限制条件的基础上，针对并购各环节活动的不同特点，再做出相应决策，以顺利实现既定的并购目标，同时也使自身收益最大化。
针对并购方在并购决策中面临的诸多问题，比如参与人的有限理性和信息不对称导致的并购定价难以确定、并购支付涉及的资金借贷平衡等问题，本文从并购方的角度出发，通过使用博弈论、信息经济学等工具，分别探讨了并购方在并购定价谈判、并购支付谈判、并购整合谈判中，为使自身收益最大化而采取的最优行动，以及为营造良好并购环境，并购方如何通过采取最优行动，对产业链施加影响而间接促进自身并购活动开展的问题。
本文的研究主要包括以下内容：
（1）通过引入博弈学习理论，建立了一个存在破裂风险的有限回合条件下企业并购定价谈判模型，并且从并购方角度，讨论了影响其最优行动使用效果的主要因素及应对措施。结论表明，并购方最优行动的使用效果与其对谈判中确定性期望收益观察到的可能性以及被并购方对谈判破裂风险的判断紧密相关。因此，并购方可以在谈判中根据自身对期望收益观察到的程度，通过操纵被并购方对谈判破裂风险变化趋势的认知，而对被并购方不断施加压力，使其做出让步，从而使自身期望收益最大化。
（2）研究了信息不对称和参与人有限理性条件下，并购方以债转股形式进行并购支付的最优行动过程。结论表明，并购方可以通过影响和操纵外部投资者和被并购方对谈判破裂风险的判断，同时将并购方股权融资比例和债转股比例控制在一定范围内，就可以顺利融入外部资金以实现对被并购方的并购支付，同时也能从被并购方获取更多利益，从而使自身利益最大化。
（3通过使用随机进化动力学理论，对并购整合绩效的实现方式进行了分析。结论表明，在并购方和目标市场规模有限的情况下，并购方可以通过整合资源，支持其采用低价低成本的竞争策略，同时将不同策略下的成本之差的变动范围控制在一定范围内。这样不仅可以有效减小来自竞争对手的压力，也能有效降低来自目标市场原有企业的抵御力量，更能推进其顺利进入目标市场的步伐，最终实现其既定的战略目的。
（4）利用博弈论相关知识，分析了信息不对称和参与人有限理性条件下纵向并购对产业链产生的影响，并提出并购方的应对策略。结论表明，纵向并购对产业链的影响主要体现为并购方对其上游企业数量和同游企业行动策略的影响。而并购方的最优行动与产业链总价值、并购方原有产业链份额及并购方为使用资源传输渠道而支付的追加固定成本紧密相关。并购方只要使其支付的追加固定成本的数额低于两倍的其原有产业链份额乘以产业链总价值之积，就可以通过最优行动控制有利传输渠道，阻止产业链上同游企业的模仿行为并加速其策略转换速度，以降低来自产业链其它企业的阻力，顺利实现并购目标。
With the rapid development of our national economy, M&A actions play the more importantrole on the aspects of expanding productivity, improving operational efficiency and the marketcompetitiveness. To get the goals, the merger needs to consider the influence of many factors, such asthe actual situations of the enterprises and decisions’ restrictions of the merger, and makes decisionsto realize the M&A target and maximize its own income on the basis of the characteristics of variousM&A actions.
According to the problem of current M&A research problems, such as limited rationality ofM&A participants and asymmetric information in the decision-making process, the article studiesthese problems by using the game theory and information economics etc. and investigates themerger’s optimal actions on the aspects of negotiations about pricing, payment and integration ofM&A from the viewpoint of the merger. Later the article provides the relevant solutions. At last, thearticle studies the conditions under which the merger can take actions to affect the industry chain andcreate a better atmosphere to its M&A actions.
The main study contents include five parts:
(1)The paper, based on the framework involving bounded rationality and asymmetric information,introduces the theory of learning in games and then creates an enterprise’s M&A pricing modelfeatured by risk of breakdown and of limited rounds’ duration. And it analysises from the point of themerger and discusses the main factors which affect its optional decisions and the correspondingmeasures. The result shows that the optimal use of the optimal operational actions of the merger areclosely related to the possibility of being observed of its optimal operational effectiveness and theattitude of the target enterprise to the assessment of the risks. So the merger can exercise pressure onthe target enterprise and attempt to force it to make concession through the manipulation of the targetenterprise’s cognitive which relates to the risk of breakdown of negotiations and maximize themerger’s expected return..
(2)This paper uses learning theory of game to establish a model to analysis payment method inM&A actions on the condition of debt-to-equity swap, based on the framework involving boundedrationality and asymmetric information. It can be seen from the newly-developed model that themerger can affect and control the judgments of outside investors and target enterprise which relate tothe risk of breakdown. At the same time, the merger should control the rate of the proportion of equity financing and the rate of debt to equity. In this way, the merger can pay the M&A transaction by usingthese features to get its own optimal interest in the negotiations.
(3)The goal of M&A to an enterprise is to maxmize its profit by optimizing and using all theresources in the course og M&A intergration.So the earnings in the market becomes an importantindex to its M&A performance.The paper uses the theory of stochastic evolutionary dynamics toanalysis the realization of M&A performance.The result shows that on the background of limitedscale of the merger and the target market, the merger can support the use of lower price and lower coststrategies and keep the scope of the changes about the difference among the costs under differentstrategies in a certain range by the intergration of resources. In this way it can not only mixmize thepressures which come from its competitors, but also decrease the resistence from the target market.Atthe same time, it can speed up the pace to access to realize its strategic goals.
(4)The article thinks of the industrial chain as a vertical chain which consists channels whichtransmit resources and the influence of M&A actions to the industrial channel as the chain reaction ofthe merger and other enterprises on the industrial channel. And the article analysises the impact ofM&A actions to the industrial chain by using game theory from the viewpoint and puts forward usefuladvices on the background of asymmetric information and bounded rationality. The result shows thatthe actions of M&A only influence the number of the merger’s upstream enterprises and the strategiesof the merger’s peer enterprises. And the average level the optimal actions’ result of the merger hasclose relationship with the following factors: the total value of the industrial channel, the merger’s theoriginal share of the industrial chain and additional fixed cost which uses in the aspects of usingchannels to transmit resources. The merger can take effective actions to own beneficial transmissionchannels by making the number of additional fixed cost less than twice the product which multipliedby the total value of the industrial channel and the merger’s the original share of the industrial chain.These actions also can prevent the action of other enterprises and accelerate their strategiesconversion to reduce the resistance from other enterprises of the industrial chain and realize themerger’s strategic goals.
针对并购方在并购决策中面临的诸多问题，比如参与人的有限理性和信息不对称导致的并购定价难以确定、并购支付涉及的资金借贷平衡等问题，本文从并购方的角度出发，通过使用博弈论、信息经济学等工具，分别探讨了并购方在并购定价谈判、并购支付谈判、并购整合谈判中，为使自身收益最大化而采取的最优行动，以及为营造良好并购环境，并购方如何通过采取最优行动，对产业链施加影响而间接促进自身并购活动开展的问题。
本文的研究主要包括以下内容：
（1）通过引入博弈学习理论，建立了一个存在破裂风险的有限回合条件下企业并购定价谈判模型，并且从并购方角度，讨论了影响其最优行动使用效果的主要因素及应对措施。结论表明，并购方最优行动的使用效果与其对谈判中确定性期望收益观察到的可能性以及被并购方对谈判破裂风险的判断紧密相关。因此，并购方可以在谈判中根据自身对期望收益观察到的程度，通过操纵被并购方对谈判破裂风险变化趋势的认知，而对被并购方不断施加压力，使其做出让步，从而使自身期望收益最大化。
（2）研究了信息不对称和参与人有限理性条件下，并购方以债转股形式进行并购支付的最优行动过程。结论表明，并购方可以通过影响和操纵外部投资者和被并购方对谈判破裂风险的判断，同时将并购方股权融资比例和债转股比例控制在一定范围内，就可以顺利融入外部资金以实现对被并购方的并购支付，同时也能从被并购方获取更多利益，从而使自身利益最大化。
（3通过使用随机进化动力学理论，对并购整合绩效的实现方式进行了分析。结论表明，在并购方和目标市场规模有限的情况下，并购方可以通过整合资源，支持其采用低价低成本的竞争策略，同时将不同策略下的成本之差的变动范围控制在一定范围内。这样不仅可以有效减小来自竞争对手的压力，也能有效降低来自目标市场原有企业的抵御力量，更能推进其顺利进入目标市场的步伐，最终实现其既定的战略目的。
（4）利用博弈论相关知识，分析了信息不对称和参与人有限理性条件下纵向并购对产业链产生的影响，并提出并购方的应对策略。结论表明，纵向并购对产业链的影响主要体现为并购方对其上游企业数量和同游企业行动策略的影响。而并购方的最优行动与产业链总价值、并购方原有产业链份额及并购方为使用资源传输渠道而支付的追加固定成本紧密相关。并购方只要使其支付的追加固定成本的数额低于两倍的其原有产业链份额乘以产业链总价值之积，就可以通过最优行动控制有利传输渠道，阻止产业链上同游企业的模仿行为并加速其策略转换速度，以降低来自产业链其它企业的阻力，顺利实现并购目标。
With the rapid development of our national economy, M&A actions play the more importantrole on the aspects of expanding productivity, improving operational efficiency and the marketcompetitiveness. To get the goals, the merger needs to consider the influence of many factors, such asthe actual situations of the enterprises and decisions’ restrictions of the merger, and makes decisionsto realize the M&A target and maximize its own income on the basis of the characteristics of variousM&A actions.
According to the problem of current M&A research problems, such as limited rationality ofM&A participants and asymmetric information in the decision-making process, the article studiesthese problems by using the game theory and information economics etc. and investigates themerger’s optimal actions on the aspects of negotiations about pricing, payment and integration ofM&A from the viewpoint of the merger. Later the article provides the relevant solutions. At last, thearticle studies the conditions under which the merger can take actions to affect the industry chain andcreate a better atmosphere to its M&A actions.
The main study contents include five parts:
(1)The paper, based on the framework involving bounded rationality and asymmetric information,introduces the theory of learning in games and then creates an enterprise’s M&A pricing modelfeatured by risk of breakdown and of limited rounds’ duration. And it analysises from the point of themerger and discusses the main factors which affect its optional decisions and the correspondingmeasures. The result shows that the optimal use of the optimal operational actions of the merger areclosely related to the possibility of being observed of its optimal operational effectiveness and theattitude of the target enterprise to the assessment of the risks. So the merger can exercise pressure onthe target enterprise and attempt to force it to make concession through the manipulation of the targetenterprise’s cognitive which relates to the risk of breakdown of negotiations and maximize themerger’s expected return..
(2)This paper uses learning theory of game to establish a model to analysis payment method inM&A actions on the condition of debt-to-equity swap, based on the framework involving boundedrationality and asymmetric information. It can be seen from the newly-developed model that themerger can affect and control the judgments of outside investors and target enterprise which relate tothe risk of breakdown. At the same time, the merger should control the rate of the proportion of equity financing and the rate of debt to equity. In this way, the merger can pay the M&A transaction by usingthese features to get its own optimal interest in the negotiations.
(3)The goal of M&A to an enterprise is to maxmize its profit by optimizing and using all theresources in the course og M&A intergration.So the earnings in the market becomes an importantindex to its M&A performance.The paper uses the theory of stochastic evolutionary dynamics toanalysis the realization of M&A performance.The result shows that on the background of limitedscale of the merger and the target market, the merger can support the use of lower price and lower coststrategies and keep the scope of the changes about the difference among the costs under differentstrategies in a certain range by the intergration of resources. In this way it can not only mixmize thepressures which come from its competitors, but also decrease the resistence from the target market.Atthe same time, it can speed up the pace to access to realize its strategic goals.
(4)The article thinks of the industrial chain as a vertical chain which consists channels whichtransmit resources and the influence of M&A actions to the industrial channel as the chain reaction ofthe merger and other enterprises on the industrial channel. And the article analysises the impact ofM&A actions to the industrial chain by using game theory from the viewpoint and puts forward usefuladvices on the background of asymmetric information and bounded rationality. The result shows thatthe actions of M&A only influence the number of the merger’s upstream enterprises and the strategiesof the merger’s peer enterprises. And the average level the optimal actions’ result of the merger hasclose relationship with the following factors: the total value of the industrial channel, the merger’s theoriginal share of the industrial chain and additional fixed cost which uses in the aspects of usingchannels to transmit resources. The merger can take effective actions to own beneficial transmissionchannels by making the number of additional fixed cost less than twice the product which multipliedby the total value of the industrial channel and the merger’s the original share of the industrial chain.These actions also can prevent the action of other enterprises and accelerate their strategiesconversion to reduce the resistance from other enterprises of the industrial chain and realize themerger’s strategic goals.
引文
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