负债结构与企业经济增加值的关系研究
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摘要
现行我国企业内部业绩评价指标体系主要是以会计利润为基础,以财务报表的相关指标为核心,这种一味追求资本与利润并增,忽略了价值创造的做法显然与以股东最大化为目标实施管理的现代企业制度实质背离。EVA财务管理系统是由美国纽约斯特恩·斯图尔特咨询公司所提出的一种业绩评价与激励系统,它的目的在于使公司管理者以股东价值最大化作为其行为准则。而企业的两大利益相关者债权人以及股东是两大矛盾统一的主体,对企业的生存发展起着决定性的作用。EVA是对企业资产负债表和利润表的综合考核,其核心在于资本投入是有成本的,企业的盈利只有高于资本成本时才会为股东创造价值。而股东权益又可以很好地用EVA指标来反映,因此,研究负债结构与企业经济增加值之间的关系就能全面的反映企业债权人与股东之间的关系。正是基于这种必要性,本文引入EVA方法,通过对国内外相关探究成果的梳理,探讨了目前评价指标体系的不足,以委托代理理论、行为科学理论、系统理论和经济利润理论为指导,以我国上市公司为研究对象,提出假设,探讨负债结构与EVA之间的关系。这对制造业内部业绩评价体系的完善、企业经营者及各个业务部门做出正确的决策有着重要意义。首先,本文系统地总结了目前国内外对企业内部业绩评价和EVA的研究现状,并在此基础上对相关理论进行融合,形成了本文的理论基础,为下文的研究提供了理论支撑与指导。其次,提出三个假设,检验资产负债率与企业的经济增加值、负债比例与企业的经济增加值、商业信用与企业的经济增加值之间的关系。然后进行指标的设计并建模,通过多元线性回归验证。最后,得出结论并对负债结构与EVA的关系进行合理解释,提出政策建议并展望未来发展方向。
Our Present internal performance evaluation index system mainly based on accounting profit to the financial statements of the relevant indicators as the core, this totally pursuit of profits and increased capital ignoring of the value creation obviously deviate maximizing interest of shareholders and the implementation of management of real departure from the modern enterprise system. The two major stakeholders in the enterprise creditors and shareholders are the two contradictory unity of the body, survival and development of enterprises play a decisive role. EVA is a corporate balance sheet and income statement of the comprehensive examination, the core is the capital investment has a cost, corporate earnings is only higher than the cost of capital will create value for shareholders. The shareholder rights and interests can be well reflected by EVA indicators, therefore, research and corporate debt structure the relationship between economic value added will be able to reflect an enterprise's overall relationship between the creditors and shareholders. It is with this need, we introduce the EVA approach, focusing on internal performance evaluation of the design study to examine the current lack of evaluation index system to agency theory, behavioral science theory, systems theory and the theory of economic profit guidance to study China's listed companies to explore the balance between structure and EVA. This performance evaluation system within the manufacturing sector improved, business owners and various business units to make the right decisions is of great significance.
Firstly, the paper summarizes the results at home and abroad on the internal status of evaluation and research EVA, forming the theoretical foundation for the study below, which Provides the theoretical support and guidance.
Secondly, the three hypotheses test asset-liability ratio and EVA, debt ratio and EVA and commercial credit and business relationship between EVA. And then using multiple linear regression verification design and modeling.
Finally, the paper get a conclusion and application prospects of EVA, and raise Policy recommendations.
Our Present internal performance evaluation index system mainly based on accounting profit to the financial statements of the relevant indicators as the core, this totally pursuit of profits and increased capital ignoring of the value creation obviously deviate maximizing interest of shareholders and the implementation of management of real departure from the modern enterprise system. The two major stakeholders in the enterprise creditors and shareholders are the two contradictory unity of the body, survival and development of enterprises play a decisive role. EVA is a corporate balance sheet and income statement of the comprehensive examination, the core is the capital investment has a cost, corporate earnings is only higher than the cost of capital will create value for shareholders. The shareholder rights and interests can be well reflected by EVA indicators, therefore, research and corporate debt structure the relationship between economic value added will be able to reflect an enterprise's overall relationship between the creditors and shareholders. It is with this need, we introduce the EVA approach, focusing on internal performance evaluation of the design study to examine the current lack of evaluation index system to agency theory, behavioral science theory, systems theory and the theory of economic profit guidance to study China's listed companies to explore the balance between structure and EVA. This performance evaluation system within the manufacturing sector improved, business owners and various business units to make the right decisions is of great significance.
Firstly, the paper summarizes the results at home and abroad on the internal status of evaluation and research EVA, forming the theoretical foundation for the study below, which Provides the theoretical support and guidance.
Secondly, the three hypotheses test asset-liability ratio and EVA, debt ratio and EVA and commercial credit and business relationship between EVA. And then using multiple linear regression verification design and modeling.
Finally, the paper get a conclusion and application prospects of EVA, and raise Policy recommendations.
引文
[1]辛焕平,丕禅.债权人在公司治理中的作用及其作用机制分析[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2007:25-36
[2]吕玉芹.论公司的债权人治理[J].中央财经大学学报,2011:33-38
[3]苏正建,牛成喆.债权人财务治理研究基于利益相关者合作博弈的分析[J].审计与经济研究,2006:46-52
[4] R.科斯,A.阿尔钦,D.诺斯.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联出版社,2004:15-22
[5]宋巾.传统企业财务分析指标体系的局限性[J].合作经济与科技,2010:22-27
[6] PaulK , Chaney , Mara Faccio, David Parsley. The Quality of Accounting information in Political Connected Firms[J].Work Paper,2008:44-49
[7] Shleifer,Andrei,Robert Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[M].Journal of Finance, 1997:737-783.
[8]毕波.浅析经济增加值与财务管理目标[J].现代经济信息,2010:12-17
[9]斯腾斯特公司.价值管理之应用[J].商学院,2007a:123-145
[10] Jeffrey M. Bacidore, John A. Boquist, Todd T.Milbourn, Anjan V. Tbakor. EVA and Total Quality Management[J].Journal of applied corporate finance.1997(2):81-90
[11] G. Biddle. Evidence on the relative and incremental information content of EVA, residual income, earning and operating cash flow[J].Delhi business review.1996(1):49-51
[12]李春瑜,黄卫伟.EVA计算所涉及调整事项的必要性分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版) ,2003,18(1):25-29
[13] O’Byrne. EVA and market value[J]. Journal of applied corporate finance.1996(9):116-128
[14] Storrie M,Sinclair D.Is EVA equivalent to DCF? [J]. CPS Aclair Global Review,2007:5-6
[15] Ronald E. Shrieves, John M. Wachowicz JR. Free cash flow(FCF), Economic value added(EVA) , and net present value(NPV): A reconciliation of variations of discounted-cash-flow valuation[J].The Engineering Economist.2001(1):33-52
[16] Fernandez, Pablo. EVA, Economic profit and cash value added do not measure shareholder value creation[J].IESE research papers.2006(2):57-79
[17] S. David young, Stephen F. O’Byrne. Incentives and investor expectations[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.2006(2):98-105
[18] Mihir A. Desal. Understanding Economic value added[J].The financial review.2006(11):87-108
[19] Wallace JS. Adopting residual income-based compensation plans:do you get what you pay for? [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics ,2007:23-35
[20] Sunil Dutta, Stefan Reichelstein. Controlling investment decisions: depreciation-and capital charges[J]. Review of Accounting Studies.2002(7):253-281
[21] David Glassman, Pine Valley. Value creation through the management of corporate real estate[J]. Practice briefing Corporate real estate.2003(2):61-72
[22] Stewart, G. Bennett. The quest for value: a guide for senior managers[M].1991(1):202-243
[23] Stanley Paulo. Operating income,residual income and EVA: which metric is more value relevant a comment[J]. Journal of Managerial Issues.2002(4):43-61
[24]胡继之,吕一凡.EVA在中国证券市场实践中的应用[J].深证深研字第0018号,2002 :32-38
[25]王化成,程小可,佟岩.经济增加值的价值相关性--与盈余、现金流量、剩余收益指标的对比[J].会计研究,2004:12-17
[26]孙铮,吴茜.经济增加值:盛誉下的思索[J].会计研究,2003,(3) : 56-67
[27]王化成,刘俊勇.客户赢利性分析--支持客户满意战略的方法[J].外国经济与管理,2001,23(3):44-47
[28]王斌,高晨.论管理会计工具整合系统[J].会计研究,2004,(4):23-28
[29]黄晓楠,瞿宝忠,丁平.基于EVA的企业并购定价改进模型研究[J].会计研究,2007, (3):38-43
[30]田雪峰.EVA研究文献综述[J].中国石油大学(华东),2011:70-76
[31] Kleinman. Private Placements and managerial entrenchment[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2007,(13):461 484.
[32]陈共荣,谢建宏,胡振国.中国转轨经济中资本结构与企业价值的相关性分析[J].系统工程,2005, 23(1):67-69
[33]匡海波,陈树文.企业的负债经营与每股收益的相关性[J].科学与管理,2006:56-65
[34]胡继之,吕一凡.EVA在中国证券市场实践中的应用[R].深证深研字第0018号,2002:12-18
[35]郑萌萌.负债率水平对企业经济增加值影响的实证研究[J].管理科学文摘,2008:70-76
[36] Fama E. F. Agency Problems and Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No.21, 1980:12-17
[37] Ross S A.The Determination of Financial Structure:The Incentive Signalling Approach[J].Bell journal of Economics,1997:12-16
[38] Moon Christopher J,Mike Otley. Corporate governance in the Asia Pacific Region: Mechanism for Reconciling Stakeholder Interest[J].Asia Journal of Management, 1997:12-16
[39] La Porta and Andrei Shleifer,Law and Finance [M].Journal of Political Economy 106, 1998,1113-1155
[40] Gordon, L. and Pound.Governance Matters:An Empirical Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Performance[J].Harvard University Press,1997:23-27
[41] Prowse,Stephen.Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Lessons from East Asia[J].World Bank,1998:56-58
[42] Baker Malcolm,Jeremy C. Stein,Jeffrey Wurgler. When does the Market Matter?Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-dependent Firms[J].NBER Working Paper Series, 2002:12-17
[43] Cronqvist and Nilsson. The choice between rights offerings and private equity placements[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005:23-26
[44]龚丽.利益相关者参与企业剩余分配的理论基础[J].财会研究,2011:23-26
[45] Shleifer,ndrei and Robert Vishny.A survey of corporate governance, [J].Journal of Finance,2009: 737-783.
[46]胡玉明.中国国有企业债务问题的制度性分析[J].经济评论,2011:44-47
[47] Raj·M·Desai and Anders Olofsgard. The role of state-owned enterprises and improved governance structure[J]. Brookings Global Economy and Development working Paper,2008:55-57
[48]吴敬琏.公司治理结构债务重组和破产程序[M].中央翻译出版,2009:178-179
[49] Jenson M C.Agency.Corprate Finance and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986:22-26
[50]张春霖.企业组织与市场体制[M].上海人民出版社,2009:279-286
[51] Jensen,Michael C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review.1986,76(2):323-329
[52]张小玲.谈核心企业与供应商的关系[J].环球市场信息导报,2011:57-58
[53]薛薇.统计计算分析与SPSS的应用(第二版)[M].中国人民大学出版社,2008:277-312
[54]徐拯声.财务报表阅读与分析指南[M].机械工业出版社,2010:346-347
[2]吕玉芹.论公司的债权人治理[J].中央财经大学学报,2011:33-38
[3]苏正建,牛成喆.债权人财务治理研究基于利益相关者合作博弈的分析[J].审计与经济研究,2006:46-52
[4] R.科斯,A.阿尔钦,D.诺斯.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联出版社,2004:15-22
[5]宋巾.传统企业财务分析指标体系的局限性[J].合作经济与科技,2010:22-27
[6] PaulK , Chaney , Mara Faccio, David Parsley. The Quality of Accounting information in Political Connected Firms[J].Work Paper,2008:44-49
[7] Shleifer,Andrei,Robert Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[M].Journal of Finance, 1997:737-783.
[8]毕波.浅析经济增加值与财务管理目标[J].现代经济信息,2010:12-17
[9]斯腾斯特公司.价值管理之应用[J].商学院,2007a:123-145
[10] Jeffrey M. Bacidore, John A. Boquist, Todd T.Milbourn, Anjan V. Tbakor. EVA and Total Quality Management[J].Journal of applied corporate finance.1997(2):81-90
[11] G. Biddle. Evidence on the relative and incremental information content of EVA, residual income, earning and operating cash flow[J].Delhi business review.1996(1):49-51
[12]李春瑜,黄卫伟.EVA计算所涉及调整事项的必要性分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版) ,2003,18(1):25-29
[13] O’Byrne. EVA and market value[J]. Journal of applied corporate finance.1996(9):116-128
[14] Storrie M,Sinclair D.Is EVA equivalent to DCF? [J]. CPS Aclair Global Review,2007:5-6
[15] Ronald E. Shrieves, John M. Wachowicz JR. Free cash flow(FCF), Economic value added(EVA) , and net present value(NPV): A reconciliation of variations of discounted-cash-flow valuation[J].The Engineering Economist.2001(1):33-52
[16] Fernandez, Pablo. EVA, Economic profit and cash value added do not measure shareholder value creation[J].IESE research papers.2006(2):57-79
[17] S. David young, Stephen F. O’Byrne. Incentives and investor expectations[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.2006(2):98-105
[18] Mihir A. Desal. Understanding Economic value added[J].The financial review.2006(11):87-108
[19] Wallace JS. Adopting residual income-based compensation plans:do you get what you pay for? [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics ,2007:23-35
[20] Sunil Dutta, Stefan Reichelstein. Controlling investment decisions: depreciation-and capital charges[J]. Review of Accounting Studies.2002(7):253-281
[21] David Glassman, Pine Valley. Value creation through the management of corporate real estate[J]. Practice briefing Corporate real estate.2003(2):61-72
[22] Stewart, G. Bennett. The quest for value: a guide for senior managers[M].1991(1):202-243
[23] Stanley Paulo. Operating income,residual income and EVA: which metric is more value relevant a comment[J]. Journal of Managerial Issues.2002(4):43-61
[24]胡继之,吕一凡.EVA在中国证券市场实践中的应用[J].深证深研字第0018号,2002 :32-38
[25]王化成,程小可,佟岩.经济增加值的价值相关性--与盈余、现金流量、剩余收益指标的对比[J].会计研究,2004:12-17
[26]孙铮,吴茜.经济增加值:盛誉下的思索[J].会计研究,2003,(3) : 56-67
[27]王化成,刘俊勇.客户赢利性分析--支持客户满意战略的方法[J].外国经济与管理,2001,23(3):44-47
[28]王斌,高晨.论管理会计工具整合系统[J].会计研究,2004,(4):23-28
[29]黄晓楠,瞿宝忠,丁平.基于EVA的企业并购定价改进模型研究[J].会计研究,2007, (3):38-43
[30]田雪峰.EVA研究文献综述[J].中国石油大学(华东),2011:70-76
[31] Kleinman. Private Placements and managerial entrenchment[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2007,(13):461 484.
[32]陈共荣,谢建宏,胡振国.中国转轨经济中资本结构与企业价值的相关性分析[J].系统工程,2005, 23(1):67-69
[33]匡海波,陈树文.企业的负债经营与每股收益的相关性[J].科学与管理,2006:56-65
[34]胡继之,吕一凡.EVA在中国证券市场实践中的应用[R].深证深研字第0018号,2002:12-18
[35]郑萌萌.负债率水平对企业经济增加值影响的实证研究[J].管理科学文摘,2008:70-76
[36] Fama E. F. Agency Problems and Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No.21, 1980:12-17
[37] Ross S A.The Determination of Financial Structure:The Incentive Signalling Approach[J].Bell journal of Economics,1997:12-16
[38] Moon Christopher J,Mike Otley. Corporate governance in the Asia Pacific Region: Mechanism for Reconciling Stakeholder Interest[J].Asia Journal of Management, 1997:12-16
[39] La Porta and Andrei Shleifer,Law and Finance [M].Journal of Political Economy 106, 1998,1113-1155
[40] Gordon, L. and Pound.Governance Matters:An Empirical Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Performance[J].Harvard University Press,1997:23-27
[41] Prowse,Stephen.Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Lessons from East Asia[J].World Bank,1998:56-58
[42] Baker Malcolm,Jeremy C. Stein,Jeffrey Wurgler. When does the Market Matter?Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-dependent Firms[J].NBER Working Paper Series, 2002:12-17
[43] Cronqvist and Nilsson. The choice between rights offerings and private equity placements[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005:23-26
[44]龚丽.利益相关者参与企业剩余分配的理论基础[J].财会研究,2011:23-26
[45] Shleifer,ndrei and Robert Vishny.A survey of corporate governance, [J].Journal of Finance,2009: 737-783.
[46]胡玉明.中国国有企业债务问题的制度性分析[J].经济评论,2011:44-47
[47] Raj·M·Desai and Anders Olofsgard. The role of state-owned enterprises and improved governance structure[J]. Brookings Global Economy and Development working Paper,2008:55-57
[48]吴敬琏.公司治理结构债务重组和破产程序[M].中央翻译出版,2009:178-179
[49] Jenson M C.Agency.Corprate Finance and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986:22-26
[50]张春霖.企业组织与市场体制[M].上海人民出版社,2009:279-286
[51] Jensen,Michael C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review.1986,76(2):323-329
[52]张小玲.谈核心企业与供应商的关系[J].环球市场信息导报,2011:57-58
[53]薛薇.统计计算分析与SPSS的应用(第二版)[M].中国人民大学出版社,2008:277-312
[54]徐拯声.财务报表阅读与分析指南[M].机械工业出版社,2010:346-347