携号转网对移动通讯运营商竞争与合作的影响研究
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摘要
未来的移动通讯市场实施携带号码转网政策是大势所趋,中国政府正在研究实施携带号码转网政策。从发达国家的经验来看,该政策会强化运营商之间的竞争,对竞争性运营商的生产与经营产生重要影响,但是中国的移动通讯需要运营商之间开展战略合作,避免重复建设,提高质量和服务水平,培育新兴的移动通讯市场。研究携带号码转网政策对运营商之间的竞争与合作有什么影响,该政策会不会促进运营商之间的有效竞争与合作,将是一个具有重要意义的课题。
本文以移动通讯运营商之间的竞争与可能存在的合作为研究对象,根据网络经济特征:转移成本、自然垄断和外部性特征,运用竞争动力学模型、古诺模型、转换成本理论和机制设计理论等理论方法,建立了基于转换成本的移动通讯运营商竞争与合作框架模型。讨论携带号码转网政策对市场竞争的影响、对通讯质量与价格竞争策略、对携带号码转网对网络共享、对建立统一业务平台等合作中利益博弈的影响。设计了合作机制促进运营商之间有效竞争与合作。
在讨论携带号码转网政策对市场竞争的影响时,本文建立了一个客户在网络间转移的微观概念模型,描述了存在转换成本和外部性特征时,运营商的客户转移规律。采用竞争动力学模型刻画了存在转换成本、双向携带号转网和单向携带号转网政策下,运营商的产量、价格、运营商的利润和社会福利的变化。研究结果表明:携号转网能大幅降低消费者的转换成本,促进消费者在运营商之间流动,从而促进运营商之间的竞争,改变市场结构、改变运营商的收益,改变运营商的竞争行为、增加社会福利。双向携带号政策下,规模相当的运营商之间竞争导致各个运营商的市场份额增加,形成一种有效竞争的格局;而规模不对等的运营商之间竞争导致垄断,形成一种非有效的竞争。单向携带号码转网能有效防止垄断。携号转网政策只要实施步骤得当,能促进运营商增加投资,提高服务水平、提高质量、而不是搞价格的合谋、通过侵占消费者剩余的方式获得更多利润。
本文进一步讨论了携带号码转网政策对质量与价格竞争的影响,采用新产品扩散理论建立了一个质量与价格竞争的分析框架。研究结果表明:移动通讯运营商必须保持质量除以消费者实际支付价格的商相等,否则会被淘汰。存在转换成本的时候,消费者实际支付的价格等于运营商的供给价格加转换成本,当实施携带号码转网政策后,消费者实际支付的价格和运营商的实际供给价格相等。这样导致了质量和价格比的不相等,引起运营商之间的新一轮质量和价格水平的调整。携带号码转网政策促进了运营商之间的质量竞争,减少了竞争壁垒。
本文接下来讨论了携带号码转网政策对网络共享的影响,建立了一个考虑转换成本和外部性特征的网络共享博弈模型,对网络共享效应做了刻画,针对携号转网政策下运营商之间的网络共享可能产生的利益博弈做研究,发现携号转网政策能促进网络共享,移动通讯运营商网络共享效应来自于减少了重复建设,减少了资源的浪费,降低了运营商的成本,使得运营商有了降价的空间。运营商可以通过降低价格的办法,间接提高质量和需求价格之比、提高了运营商的利润水平,合作有利于社会福利的提高。共享的网络升级过程中,存在“搭便车”的现象,而携带号码转网政策不能根本上协调网络升级中的利益冲突,本文设计了一种携带号码转网政策下的惩罚机制,促进网络共享合作。惩罚费用(或税收)的收取与运营商的用户数(需求量)、市场潜力和能够共享的资源成正比,与运营商的学习能力差距成反比。惩罚机制中运营商在合作与不合作时所得到的利润无差异,保证每个运营商采取合作的态度,杜绝社会资源的浪费。
最后,本文分析了携带号码转网政策对建设统一业务平台的影响,建立了一个基于转换成本的统一业务平台的竞争博弈模型,对统一业务平台的合作效应做了刻画,研究发现携带号码转网政策对建立统一业务平台的影响具有不确定性,当携带号码转网政策使得均衡产量和合作边界都变大,当均衡产量的增量大于合作边界的增量时,该政策促进合作;如果均衡的产量增量小于合作边界的增量,则抑制合作。对运营商的合作行为进行激励补偿(或征税),能保证移动通讯运营商报真实平均成本,合作建设统一业务平台。
本研究创新点在建立了携带号码转网环境下的用户转移机制模型,描述了运营商的合作边界,能在理论上解释该政策背景下的竞争与合作现象,指导运营商之间的合作实践。
The implementation of Number Portability is a general trend, Chinese government is gradually implementing the policy of Number Portability. The experience from developed countries shows that the policy will strengthen the competition between operators, Number Portability have an important impact on the competitive operators’production and operation, however , Chinese telecommunications industry is in the initial stage , which need to carry out strategic cooperation between operators, because the cooperation can avoid duplication、improve the quality and service level、and cultivate the emerging telecommunications market. Then what effect would happen to the operator of competition and cooperation if Number Portability is carried out, which will be a significant issue. This paper focuses on the impact of competition and cooperation ,which is made by Number Portability among telecommunications operators, and explore how the telecommunications operators to carry out effective competition and cooperation.
In this paper, we make a study of competition and cooperation among telecommunications operators, and use the competitive kinetic model, game models, switching costs theory and mechanism design theory to make a study framework to ananlyse the competition and cooperation among telecommunications operators. The study focuses on the effects of Number Portability to the competition market、quality and price competitive strategy、the effect of Number Portability to the network sharing、the impact of the interests game in cooperation of public service platform. Then a cooperative mechanisms is designed to promote effective competition and cooperation among the operators.
We make a discussion about the impact of Number Portability to the market, we establish a micro-conceptual model to describe the customers’transfering from a network to the other, and shows a customer transfering rules. Then estabilsh a dynamics model to depicts the changes of the production, prices, operators profit and social welfare, which are caused by two-way number portability and one-way number portability policy. The results show that: number portability can eliminate the switching costs of consumers, promote consumer flows between operators, promote competition among operators, and change the market structure, change the operator's revenue, change the operator's competitive behavior, increasee social welfare. Way to bring the policy number, if the strength of operators is considerable , the competition leads various operators to increase market share simultaneously, form a pattern of effective competition; and if strength is not considerable, a competition among operators will lead to monopoly, which is a non-effective competition. One-way bring numbers can effectively prevent a monopoly. A properly implemented number portability can promote the operators to increase investment, improve service levels, improve the quality, rather than engage in price collusion, through the invasion and occupation of the consumer surplus to obtain more profits.
We make a further discuss about the effect of quality and price competition in Number Portability policies, use a new product diffusion model to establish a model to analysis the quality and price competition. The results show that: telecommunications operators must maintain the ratio between quality and consumer price as the same, otherwise they will be eliminated. Existence of switching costs make the actual price ,which is paid by consumers, is equal to the operator's supply price plus the switching costs, when the implementation of number portability policy carry out, the actual price paid by consumers is equal to the operator's supply price. This lead to the changing of the ratio between quality and consumer price, cause a new adjustments between the quality and price level. Carrying Number Portability policies will promote the quality of competition among operators, reducing barriers to competition.
This paper then discusses the impact of the policy carrying to network share, and establish a network share game model. Then uses the model to discuss the specific effects on the network share,analyse the effect of the interests of game in for number portability policy. The results show that: number portability policies can promote the network share, the effect of sharing network comes from reducing duplication、reducing waste of resources、reducing the operator's costs, allowing operators to have a space for lower prices. operators can lower prices by indirectly improving the quality, and increase the ratio of quality to demand price, which can increase the operator's profit level, cooperation is conducive to social welfare. The coordination of upgrading the shared network is difficult, which make two operators are unlikely to cooperate together. As the number portability policy can not bring a fundamental coordination, which conflict of interest caused by sharing network. we design punitive mechanisms to promote co-operation in network share. Penalty cost (or tax) is in direct proportion with the number of users (demand)、market potential and the shared resources, is inversely proportional to the operator's ability if learning from each other. Punishment mechanisms make the the profit no difference, Whether the operators cooperate or not.which can ensure that each operator to adopt a cooperative attitude to eliminate the waste of social resources.
Finally, the paper analyzes the impact of number portability policy to public service platform. We establish competition game model of public service platform, which is based on a switching costs, then use the model to analysis the effect of number portability policy to public service platform. The results show that: the effect of number portability policy to public service platform is uncertainty, when the balance incremental output is greater than the incremental boundary co-operation, the number portability policy promote cooperation; if the balance incremental output is less than the incremental boundary co-operation,then the co-suppression. The incentive compensation (or taxes) for cooperation behavior can ensure that telecommunications operators to report the true average cost, make a cooperation and construction of public business platform.
The new ideals are the following:first,we establish a micro-conceptual model to describe the customers’transfering from a network to the other. Second, we give an boundary of co-operation.
本文以移动通讯运营商之间的竞争与可能存在的合作为研究对象,根据网络经济特征:转移成本、自然垄断和外部性特征,运用竞争动力学模型、古诺模型、转换成本理论和机制设计理论等理论方法,建立了基于转换成本的移动通讯运营商竞争与合作框架模型。讨论携带号码转网政策对市场竞争的影响、对通讯质量与价格竞争策略、对携带号码转网对网络共享、对建立统一业务平台等合作中利益博弈的影响。设计了合作机制促进运营商之间有效竞争与合作。
在讨论携带号码转网政策对市场竞争的影响时,本文建立了一个客户在网络间转移的微观概念模型,描述了存在转换成本和外部性特征时,运营商的客户转移规律。采用竞争动力学模型刻画了存在转换成本、双向携带号转网和单向携带号转网政策下,运营商的产量、价格、运营商的利润和社会福利的变化。研究结果表明:携号转网能大幅降低消费者的转换成本,促进消费者在运营商之间流动,从而促进运营商之间的竞争,改变市场结构、改变运营商的收益,改变运营商的竞争行为、增加社会福利。双向携带号政策下,规模相当的运营商之间竞争导致各个运营商的市场份额增加,形成一种有效竞争的格局;而规模不对等的运营商之间竞争导致垄断,形成一种非有效的竞争。单向携带号码转网能有效防止垄断。携号转网政策只要实施步骤得当,能促进运营商增加投资,提高服务水平、提高质量、而不是搞价格的合谋、通过侵占消费者剩余的方式获得更多利润。
本文进一步讨论了携带号码转网政策对质量与价格竞争的影响,采用新产品扩散理论建立了一个质量与价格竞争的分析框架。研究结果表明:移动通讯运营商必须保持质量除以消费者实际支付价格的商相等,否则会被淘汰。存在转换成本的时候,消费者实际支付的价格等于运营商的供给价格加转换成本,当实施携带号码转网政策后,消费者实际支付的价格和运营商的实际供给价格相等。这样导致了质量和价格比的不相等,引起运营商之间的新一轮质量和价格水平的调整。携带号码转网政策促进了运营商之间的质量竞争,减少了竞争壁垒。
本文接下来讨论了携带号码转网政策对网络共享的影响,建立了一个考虑转换成本和外部性特征的网络共享博弈模型,对网络共享效应做了刻画,针对携号转网政策下运营商之间的网络共享可能产生的利益博弈做研究,发现携号转网政策能促进网络共享,移动通讯运营商网络共享效应来自于减少了重复建设,减少了资源的浪费,降低了运营商的成本,使得运营商有了降价的空间。运营商可以通过降低价格的办法,间接提高质量和需求价格之比、提高了运营商的利润水平,合作有利于社会福利的提高。共享的网络升级过程中,存在“搭便车”的现象,而携带号码转网政策不能根本上协调网络升级中的利益冲突,本文设计了一种携带号码转网政策下的惩罚机制,促进网络共享合作。惩罚费用(或税收)的收取与运营商的用户数(需求量)、市场潜力和能够共享的资源成正比,与运营商的学习能力差距成反比。惩罚机制中运营商在合作与不合作时所得到的利润无差异,保证每个运营商采取合作的态度,杜绝社会资源的浪费。
最后,本文分析了携带号码转网政策对建设统一业务平台的影响,建立了一个基于转换成本的统一业务平台的竞争博弈模型,对统一业务平台的合作效应做了刻画,研究发现携带号码转网政策对建立统一业务平台的影响具有不确定性,当携带号码转网政策使得均衡产量和合作边界都变大,当均衡产量的增量大于合作边界的增量时,该政策促进合作;如果均衡的产量增量小于合作边界的增量,则抑制合作。对运营商的合作行为进行激励补偿(或征税),能保证移动通讯运营商报真实平均成本,合作建设统一业务平台。
本研究创新点在建立了携带号码转网环境下的用户转移机制模型,描述了运营商的合作边界,能在理论上解释该政策背景下的竞争与合作现象,指导运营商之间的合作实践。
The implementation of Number Portability is a general trend, Chinese government is gradually implementing the policy of Number Portability. The experience from developed countries shows that the policy will strengthen the competition between operators, Number Portability have an important impact on the competitive operators’production and operation, however , Chinese telecommunications industry is in the initial stage , which need to carry out strategic cooperation between operators, because the cooperation can avoid duplication、improve the quality and service level、and cultivate the emerging telecommunications market. Then what effect would happen to the operator of competition and cooperation if Number Portability is carried out, which will be a significant issue. This paper focuses on the impact of competition and cooperation ,which is made by Number Portability among telecommunications operators, and explore how the telecommunications operators to carry out effective competition and cooperation.
In this paper, we make a study of competition and cooperation among telecommunications operators, and use the competitive kinetic model, game models, switching costs theory and mechanism design theory to make a study framework to ananlyse the competition and cooperation among telecommunications operators. The study focuses on the effects of Number Portability to the competition market、quality and price competitive strategy、the effect of Number Portability to the network sharing、the impact of the interests game in cooperation of public service platform. Then a cooperative mechanisms is designed to promote effective competition and cooperation among the operators.
We make a discussion about the impact of Number Portability to the market, we establish a micro-conceptual model to describe the customers’transfering from a network to the other, and shows a customer transfering rules. Then estabilsh a dynamics model to depicts the changes of the production, prices, operators profit and social welfare, which are caused by two-way number portability and one-way number portability policy. The results show that: number portability can eliminate the switching costs of consumers, promote consumer flows between operators, promote competition among operators, and change the market structure, change the operator's revenue, change the operator's competitive behavior, increasee social welfare. Way to bring the policy number, if the strength of operators is considerable , the competition leads various operators to increase market share simultaneously, form a pattern of effective competition; and if strength is not considerable, a competition among operators will lead to monopoly, which is a non-effective competition. One-way bring numbers can effectively prevent a monopoly. A properly implemented number portability can promote the operators to increase investment, improve service levels, improve the quality, rather than engage in price collusion, through the invasion and occupation of the consumer surplus to obtain more profits.
We make a further discuss about the effect of quality and price competition in Number Portability policies, use a new product diffusion model to establish a model to analysis the quality and price competition. The results show that: telecommunications operators must maintain the ratio between quality and consumer price as the same, otherwise they will be eliminated. Existence of switching costs make the actual price ,which is paid by consumers, is equal to the operator's supply price plus the switching costs, when the implementation of number portability policy carry out, the actual price paid by consumers is equal to the operator's supply price. This lead to the changing of the ratio between quality and consumer price, cause a new adjustments between the quality and price level. Carrying Number Portability policies will promote the quality of competition among operators, reducing barriers to competition.
This paper then discusses the impact of the policy carrying to network share, and establish a network share game model. Then uses the model to discuss the specific effects on the network share,analyse the effect of the interests of game in for number portability policy. The results show that: number portability policies can promote the network share, the effect of sharing network comes from reducing duplication、reducing waste of resources、reducing the operator's costs, allowing operators to have a space for lower prices. operators can lower prices by indirectly improving the quality, and increase the ratio of quality to demand price, which can increase the operator's profit level, cooperation is conducive to social welfare. The coordination of upgrading the shared network is difficult, which make two operators are unlikely to cooperate together. As the number portability policy can not bring a fundamental coordination, which conflict of interest caused by sharing network. we design punitive mechanisms to promote co-operation in network share. Penalty cost (or tax) is in direct proportion with the number of users (demand)、market potential and the shared resources, is inversely proportional to the operator's ability if learning from each other. Punishment mechanisms make the the profit no difference, Whether the operators cooperate or not.which can ensure that each operator to adopt a cooperative attitude to eliminate the waste of social resources.
Finally, the paper analyzes the impact of number portability policy to public service platform. We establish competition game model of public service platform, which is based on a switching costs, then use the model to analysis the effect of number portability policy to public service platform. The results show that: the effect of number portability policy to public service platform is uncertainty, when the balance incremental output is greater than the incremental boundary co-operation, the number portability policy promote cooperation; if the balance incremental output is less than the incremental boundary co-operation,then the co-suppression. The incentive compensation (or taxes) for cooperation behavior can ensure that telecommunications operators to report the true average cost, make a cooperation and construction of public business platform.
The new ideals are the following:first,we establish a micro-conceptual model to describe the customers’transfering from a network to the other. Second, we give an boundary of co-operation.
引文
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