首都圈省际经济利益协调机制研究
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摘要
区域协调发展,既包括区域内部诸要素(资源、环境、人口、产业等)之间的可持续发展,即区域协调；也包括减少区域间发展差距,消除区域间利益冲突,即区际协调(魏后凯2009,范恒山,孙久文2011)。本文的研究属于区际协调。区际协调要以区际利益协调为主线(陈秀山,杨艳2008)。为简化研究,本文站在政府的层面,仅研究不同省(直辖市)之间的经济利益协调。如无特殊说明,本文所涉及的省际协调均指省际经济利益协调。
首都圈范围界定为：北京市、天津市、河北省全境,即京津冀三省市全域(李国平2004；谭维克,赵弘2011；祝尔娟2012)。本文所提首都圈均指京津冀三省市全域。
省际经济利益非均衡是首都圈区域协同发展面临的核心矛盾,具体表现为：产业同构与恶性竞争、区域市场分割与地方保护、省际公共物品供给不足、贫富分化与生态恶化、政绩竞争与重复建设等若干方面。造成首都圈省际经济利益非均衡的直接原因是区域经济一体化的客观要求同行政边界刚性约束的矛盾,根本原因是地方政府的有限理性和市场的不完全性。基于上述原因,省际经济利益协调机制的建立显得尤为必要。省际经济利益协调机制是一种区域利益再分配机制。这种机制不仅对于缩小省际差距十分重要,还是化解省际经济利益矛盾,推进区域经济一体化必不可少的工具。本文的理论意义旨在突破行政边界刚性约束的羁绊,冲破地方政府利益固化的藩篱,破除制约首都圈区域协同发展的机制障碍,以经济的内在联系为基石,进行省际经济利益协调。
本文使用空间计量经济学局域自相关(Moran指数Ii)方法,通过实证分析发现：2004年至2012年间,首都圈地区经济空间溢出效应明显。首都圈的经济空间溢出效应已经突破了省际行政边界,如果再基于行政边界研究省际利益协调,可能并不十分合理,而是亟需建立能够突破行政边界羁绊的省际协调机制。经济的空间溢出是经济的客观规律。它说明了省际协调需要突破行政边界羁绊的必要性。
省际经济利益强调区际关系,它侧重于经济利益的再分配。省际经济利益是指特定的省(直辖市)从其他省(直辖市)或国家获得的排他性收益,属于社会福利再分配范畴；是生产要素不完全流动性,市场不完全竞争性,地方政府不完全理性所表现出的空间优势。省际经济利益具体表现为产业省际转移税收分享、省际基础设施共建成本分摊、省际生态补偿等。
省际经济利益协调机制是以专门联合委员会制度为协调形式的一种省际经济利益让度与分配的长效机制,是解决省际经济利益冲突的规则,是地方政府间的合同,是一类利益分配函数,是一个省际经济利益再分配的过程；在此过程中,区域经济协调权威机构被国家授权对各区域利益主体的立场加以评定,并作出对各方在执行过程中具有法律约束力的量化仲裁决定。
省际经济利益协调是一场博弈,是策略依存的。首都圈省际经济利益博弈主体是京津冀三地政府。省际经济利益协调机制不需要每个博弈主体的策略在任何情况下均是最优的,只要博弈主体的策略是针对对手采取策略基础上的最优策略即可,则省际纳什均衡是省际经济利益协调机制突破行政边界刚性约束的理论基础。省际纳什均衡是指省际经济利益协调中每个博弈主体都不能也不想单方面改变自己的策略而增加收益；每个博弈主体所选策略均是对其他区域所选策略的最佳利益分配。省际纳什均衡是各省间相互让渡利益的结果；区域考核指标一体化是省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态的前提条件；当且仅当区域考核指标一体化时,省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态。
首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的顶层设计包括五个分机制,分别是协商机制、仲裁机制、分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制。基于经济空间溢出效应的视角,京津冀三地政府可以通过市长联席会议进行跨界横向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即协商机制；基于地方政府有限理性和市场不完全性的视角,当地方政府自组织式的横向协调无法达到省际纳什均衡时,中央政府通过设立超越地方行政区划的权威仲裁机构进行纵向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即仲裁机制；基于财税机制改革的视角,首都圈产业转移的省际纳什均衡是横向分税制,即分享机制；基于投资机制改革的视角,首都圈跨界基础设施共建的省际纳什均衡是横向成本分摊制,即分摊机制；基于自然资源资产产权制度改革的视角,首都圈生态联防联控的省际纳什均衡是财政横向转移支付制,即补偿机制。五个分机制中,协商机制、仲裁机制体现协调的形式和程序,而分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制体现协调的具体内容。仲裁机制属于纵向协调,保证了协调的公平；协商机制属于横向协调,保证了协调的效率。首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的路径选择是纵横结合。五个分机制共同作用发挥合力,才能突破行政边界羁绊,促进区域协同发展。
Regional coordinated development includes the sustainable development of the internal factors (like resources, environment, population, industry), which is regional coordination. It also includes the narrowing of inter-regional development gap and the elimination of inter-regional interest conflict, which is inter-regional coordination (Wei Hou-kai2009, Fan Heng-shan, Sun Jiu-wen2011). The coordination of inter-provincial economic interest in this paper belongs to inter-regional coordination, focusing on the governmental level. Inter-regional interest coordination should be the main theme of inter-regional coordination (Chen Xiu-shan, Yang Yan2008). To simplify research, this paper will analyze the coordination of economic interest in the provincial (or municipal) governmental level. Without special mention, the inter-provincial coordination in this paper refers to the coordination of inter-provincial economic interest.
The Capital Metropolis area includes Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province, or the so called The Capital Metropolis (Li Guo-ping2004; Tan Wei-ke, Zhao Hong2011; Zhu Er-zhuang2012).
The key conflict of the Capital Metropolis is the imbalance of inter-provincial economic interest, which is demonstrated in the following: similar industries and vicious competition, regional market segmentation and local protection, insufficient supply of inter-provincial public goods, polarization between the rich and the poor, ecological deterioration, political performance competition and repeated construction, etc. The direct reason for the imbalance of inter-provincial economic interest is the conflict between the objective needs of regional economic integration and the administrative boundary segmentation, and the basic reason is the bounded rationality of local governments and the imperfections of market. Based on what's mentioned above, it's obviously important to set up the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest among the Capital Metropolis. The theoretical significance of this paper is to break the regional administrative boundary segmentation and the interest curing of local governments, and design the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest by the intrinsic link of economy to balance the inter-provincial economic interest.
This paper uses spatial econometrics Moran's I and finds out by empirical analysis that in2004, economic spatial agglomeration of the Capital Metropolis only fell on some individual areas like Xicheng district, Haidian district, Chaoyang district, Binhai New Area, Tangshan, Langfang, etc., but in2012, it fell on Haidian district, Chaoyang district, Dongcheng district, Xicheng district, Fengtai district, Shi Jingshan district, Changping district, Shunyi district, Tongzhou district, Daxing district, Gu'an county, Langfang, Wuqing district, Beichen district, Hedong district, Hexi district, Hebei district, Heping district, Nankai district, Hongqiao district, Dongli district, Xiqing district, Jinnan district, Baodi county, Binhai New Area, Tangshan, Zunhua, Xianxi county, Xian'an, Qin Huangdao. Chengde, Shi Jiazhuang, Baoding, etc. In just8years, the spatial spillover effect of the economy of the Capital Metropolis was quite obvious, which has broken the inter-provincial administrative boundaries. Therefore, it seems not reasonable to research on the distribution and coordination of inter-provincial interest based on the research on administrative boundaries but to set up immediately an inter-provincial coordination mechanism which breaks the barriers of administrative boundaries. The spatial spillover is the objective law of economy, which illustrates the necessity of breaking administrative boundaries when doing inter-provincial coordination.
Inter-provincial economic interest stresses the inter-regional relationship, focusing on the redistribution of economic interest. It means the exclusive benefits that a specific province (or municipality) gets from other provinces (or municipalities), and falls on the category of the redistribution of social benefits. It is the spatial advantage demonstrated by the incomplete liquidity of productive factors, incomplete competition of the market and the incomplete rationality of local governments, and it takes the form of tax sharing for inter-provincial industry transfer, cost amortization of inter-provincial infrastructure co-building, inter-provincial ecological compensation, etc.
Coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interests is a long-term mechanism for the transfer and distribution of inter-provincial economic interest, which takes the form of specific joint committee system. It is the rule to solve the dispute of inter-provincial economic interest, the contract among local governments and a function for interest distribution. It is also a process for the redistribution of inter-provincial economic interest where the reputed agency for regional economic coordination is authorized by the country to evaluate the position of region and make quantitative legally decisions. Coordination for inter-provincial economic interest is the redistribution of inter-provincial economic interest, so the equilibrium of this coordination is the equilibrium of this redistribution. The integration of regional evaluation indicators is the precondition of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest to break the barriers of administrative boundaries.
The inter-provincial economic interest game is strategy dependent, and the coordination for inter-provincial economic interest is just a game. The coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest doesn't require that the strategy of each region is the best under any circumstance, but is the best compared with that of the opponent. Therefore, Inter-provincial Nash Equilibrium is the path choice of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest to break the barriers of administrative boundaries. Inter-provincial Nash equilibrium means that in coordination for inter-provincial economic interest, each game subject cannot and wouldn't like to change its own strategy unilaterally to increase benefits; each strategy chosen by the individual game subject is the optimal interest distribution compared with those of other regions. In other words, the Nash Equilibrium point must be found to break the segmentation and barriers of administrative boundaries and realize the coordination for inter-provincial economic interest in the market with imperfect competition. It is a good strategy for all.
The top-level design of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest includes five sub-mechanisms, namely arbitrage mechanism, negotiation mechanism, sharing mechanism, amortization mechanism and compensation mechanism. From the perspective of spatial spillover of regional economies, local governments need to make cross-border and horizontal negotiation through joint meeting of mayors, which is negotiation mechanism; based on incomplete rationality of local governments and the incompleteness of market, the central government needs to set up an authoritative arbitrage authority above local administrative boundaries to make vertical coordination when self-motivated negotiation of local governments cannot reach consensus on some cross-border cooperation and key projects, which is arbitrage mechanism; from the perspective of fiscal and taxation system reform, the horizontal tax sharing mechanism should be set up for cooperation on profitable products, like inter-provincial transfer of industries, which is sharing mechanism; from the perspective of investment and financing mechanism reform, cost amortization mechanism should be established for cooperation on quasi-public goods, like co-building of cross-border infrastructure, which is amortization mechanism; from the perspective of reform on property right system of natural resources, ecological compensation mechanism should be set up through horizontal financial transfer payment for pure public goods, like water, ecological environment, etc., which is compensation mechanism. Among the five sub-mechanisms, arbitrage mechanism and negotiation mechanism demonstrate the form and procedure of coordination while sharing mechanism, amortization mechanism and compensation mechanism show the contents of coordination. Arbitrage mechanism belongs to vertical coordination, ensuring its fairness; negotiation mechanism belongs to horizontal coordination, ensuring its efficiency. Coordination for inter-provincial economic interest should be both vertical and horizontal. The path choice for the inter-provincial economic interest coordination mechanism is vertical and horizontal integration. Only when the five sub-mechanisms work together can they break the barriers of administrative boundaries and make inter-provincial coordination. To ensure its effectiveness, coordination mechanism should be designed in the form of contracts, which endows legal effect on it and ensures its enforceability and rigid binding force.
首都圈范围界定为：北京市、天津市、河北省全境,即京津冀三省市全域(李国平2004；谭维克,赵弘2011；祝尔娟2012)。本文所提首都圈均指京津冀三省市全域。
省际经济利益非均衡是首都圈区域协同发展面临的核心矛盾,具体表现为：产业同构与恶性竞争、区域市场分割与地方保护、省际公共物品供给不足、贫富分化与生态恶化、政绩竞争与重复建设等若干方面。造成首都圈省际经济利益非均衡的直接原因是区域经济一体化的客观要求同行政边界刚性约束的矛盾,根本原因是地方政府的有限理性和市场的不完全性。基于上述原因,省际经济利益协调机制的建立显得尤为必要。省际经济利益协调机制是一种区域利益再分配机制。这种机制不仅对于缩小省际差距十分重要,还是化解省际经济利益矛盾,推进区域经济一体化必不可少的工具。本文的理论意义旨在突破行政边界刚性约束的羁绊,冲破地方政府利益固化的藩篱,破除制约首都圈区域协同发展的机制障碍,以经济的内在联系为基石,进行省际经济利益协调。
本文使用空间计量经济学局域自相关(Moran指数Ii)方法,通过实证分析发现：2004年至2012年间,首都圈地区经济空间溢出效应明显。首都圈的经济空间溢出效应已经突破了省际行政边界,如果再基于行政边界研究省际利益协调,可能并不十分合理,而是亟需建立能够突破行政边界羁绊的省际协调机制。经济的空间溢出是经济的客观规律。它说明了省际协调需要突破行政边界羁绊的必要性。
省际经济利益强调区际关系,它侧重于经济利益的再分配。省际经济利益是指特定的省(直辖市)从其他省(直辖市)或国家获得的排他性收益,属于社会福利再分配范畴；是生产要素不完全流动性,市场不完全竞争性,地方政府不完全理性所表现出的空间优势。省际经济利益具体表现为产业省际转移税收分享、省际基础设施共建成本分摊、省际生态补偿等。
省际经济利益协调机制是以专门联合委员会制度为协调形式的一种省际经济利益让度与分配的长效机制,是解决省际经济利益冲突的规则,是地方政府间的合同,是一类利益分配函数,是一个省际经济利益再分配的过程；在此过程中,区域经济协调权威机构被国家授权对各区域利益主体的立场加以评定,并作出对各方在执行过程中具有法律约束力的量化仲裁决定。
省际经济利益协调是一场博弈,是策略依存的。首都圈省际经济利益博弈主体是京津冀三地政府。省际经济利益协调机制不需要每个博弈主体的策略在任何情况下均是最优的,只要博弈主体的策略是针对对手采取策略基础上的最优策略即可,则省际纳什均衡是省际经济利益协调机制突破行政边界刚性约束的理论基础。省际纳什均衡是指省际经济利益协调中每个博弈主体都不能也不想单方面改变自己的策略而增加收益；每个博弈主体所选策略均是对其他区域所选策略的最佳利益分配。省际纳什均衡是各省间相互让渡利益的结果；区域考核指标一体化是省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态的前提条件；当且仅当区域考核指标一体化时,省际纳什均衡达到帕累托最优状态。
首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的顶层设计包括五个分机制,分别是协商机制、仲裁机制、分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制。基于经济空间溢出效应的视角,京津冀三地政府可以通过市长联席会议进行跨界横向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即协商机制；基于地方政府有限理性和市场不完全性的视角,当地方政府自组织式的横向协调无法达到省际纳什均衡时,中央政府通过设立超越地方行政区划的权威仲裁机构进行纵向协调以达到省际纳什均衡,即仲裁机制；基于财税机制改革的视角,首都圈产业转移的省际纳什均衡是横向分税制,即分享机制；基于投资机制改革的视角,首都圈跨界基础设施共建的省际纳什均衡是横向成本分摊制,即分摊机制；基于自然资源资产产权制度改革的视角,首都圈生态联防联控的省际纳什均衡是财政横向转移支付制,即补偿机制。五个分机制中,协商机制、仲裁机制体现协调的形式和程序,而分享机制、分摊机制和补偿机制体现协调的具体内容。仲裁机制属于纵向协调,保证了协调的公平；协商机制属于横向协调,保证了协调的效率。首都圈省际经济利益协调机制的路径选择是纵横结合。五个分机制共同作用发挥合力,才能突破行政边界羁绊,促进区域协同发展。
Regional coordinated development includes the sustainable development of the internal factors (like resources, environment, population, industry), which is regional coordination. It also includes the narrowing of inter-regional development gap and the elimination of inter-regional interest conflict, which is inter-regional coordination (Wei Hou-kai2009, Fan Heng-shan, Sun Jiu-wen2011). The coordination of inter-provincial economic interest in this paper belongs to inter-regional coordination, focusing on the governmental level. Inter-regional interest coordination should be the main theme of inter-regional coordination (Chen Xiu-shan, Yang Yan2008). To simplify research, this paper will analyze the coordination of economic interest in the provincial (or municipal) governmental level. Without special mention, the inter-provincial coordination in this paper refers to the coordination of inter-provincial economic interest.
The Capital Metropolis area includes Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province, or the so called The Capital Metropolis (Li Guo-ping2004; Tan Wei-ke, Zhao Hong2011; Zhu Er-zhuang2012).
The key conflict of the Capital Metropolis is the imbalance of inter-provincial economic interest, which is demonstrated in the following: similar industries and vicious competition, regional market segmentation and local protection, insufficient supply of inter-provincial public goods, polarization between the rich and the poor, ecological deterioration, political performance competition and repeated construction, etc. The direct reason for the imbalance of inter-provincial economic interest is the conflict between the objective needs of regional economic integration and the administrative boundary segmentation, and the basic reason is the bounded rationality of local governments and the imperfections of market. Based on what's mentioned above, it's obviously important to set up the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest among the Capital Metropolis. The theoretical significance of this paper is to break the regional administrative boundary segmentation and the interest curing of local governments, and design the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest by the intrinsic link of economy to balance the inter-provincial economic interest.
This paper uses spatial econometrics Moran's I and finds out by empirical analysis that in2004, economic spatial agglomeration of the Capital Metropolis only fell on some individual areas like Xicheng district, Haidian district, Chaoyang district, Binhai New Area, Tangshan, Langfang, etc., but in2012, it fell on Haidian district, Chaoyang district, Dongcheng district, Xicheng district, Fengtai district, Shi Jingshan district, Changping district, Shunyi district, Tongzhou district, Daxing district, Gu'an county, Langfang, Wuqing district, Beichen district, Hedong district, Hexi district, Hebei district, Heping district, Nankai district, Hongqiao district, Dongli district, Xiqing district, Jinnan district, Baodi county, Binhai New Area, Tangshan, Zunhua, Xianxi county, Xian'an, Qin Huangdao. Chengde, Shi Jiazhuang, Baoding, etc. In just8years, the spatial spillover effect of the economy of the Capital Metropolis was quite obvious, which has broken the inter-provincial administrative boundaries. Therefore, it seems not reasonable to research on the distribution and coordination of inter-provincial interest based on the research on administrative boundaries but to set up immediately an inter-provincial coordination mechanism which breaks the barriers of administrative boundaries. The spatial spillover is the objective law of economy, which illustrates the necessity of breaking administrative boundaries when doing inter-provincial coordination.
Inter-provincial economic interest stresses the inter-regional relationship, focusing on the redistribution of economic interest. It means the exclusive benefits that a specific province (or municipality) gets from other provinces (or municipalities), and falls on the category of the redistribution of social benefits. It is the spatial advantage demonstrated by the incomplete liquidity of productive factors, incomplete competition of the market and the incomplete rationality of local governments, and it takes the form of tax sharing for inter-provincial industry transfer, cost amortization of inter-provincial infrastructure co-building, inter-provincial ecological compensation, etc.
Coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interests is a long-term mechanism for the transfer and distribution of inter-provincial economic interest, which takes the form of specific joint committee system. It is the rule to solve the dispute of inter-provincial economic interest, the contract among local governments and a function for interest distribution. It is also a process for the redistribution of inter-provincial economic interest where the reputed agency for regional economic coordination is authorized by the country to evaluate the position of region and make quantitative legally decisions. Coordination for inter-provincial economic interest is the redistribution of inter-provincial economic interest, so the equilibrium of this coordination is the equilibrium of this redistribution. The integration of regional evaluation indicators is the precondition of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest to break the barriers of administrative boundaries.
The inter-provincial economic interest game is strategy dependent, and the coordination for inter-provincial economic interest is just a game. The coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest doesn't require that the strategy of each region is the best under any circumstance, but is the best compared with that of the opponent. Therefore, Inter-provincial Nash Equilibrium is the path choice of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest to break the barriers of administrative boundaries. Inter-provincial Nash equilibrium means that in coordination for inter-provincial economic interest, each game subject cannot and wouldn't like to change its own strategy unilaterally to increase benefits; each strategy chosen by the individual game subject is the optimal interest distribution compared with those of other regions. In other words, the Nash Equilibrium point must be found to break the segmentation and barriers of administrative boundaries and realize the coordination for inter-provincial economic interest in the market with imperfect competition. It is a good strategy for all.
The top-level design of the coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest includes five sub-mechanisms, namely arbitrage mechanism, negotiation mechanism, sharing mechanism, amortization mechanism and compensation mechanism. From the perspective of spatial spillover of regional economies, local governments need to make cross-border and horizontal negotiation through joint meeting of mayors, which is negotiation mechanism; based on incomplete rationality of local governments and the incompleteness of market, the central government needs to set up an authoritative arbitrage authority above local administrative boundaries to make vertical coordination when self-motivated negotiation of local governments cannot reach consensus on some cross-border cooperation and key projects, which is arbitrage mechanism; from the perspective of fiscal and taxation system reform, the horizontal tax sharing mechanism should be set up for cooperation on profitable products, like inter-provincial transfer of industries, which is sharing mechanism; from the perspective of investment and financing mechanism reform, cost amortization mechanism should be established for cooperation on quasi-public goods, like co-building of cross-border infrastructure, which is amortization mechanism; from the perspective of reform on property right system of natural resources, ecological compensation mechanism should be set up through horizontal financial transfer payment for pure public goods, like water, ecological environment, etc., which is compensation mechanism. Among the five sub-mechanisms, arbitrage mechanism and negotiation mechanism demonstrate the form and procedure of coordination while sharing mechanism, amortization mechanism and compensation mechanism show the contents of coordination. Arbitrage mechanism belongs to vertical coordination, ensuring its fairness; negotiation mechanism belongs to horizontal coordination, ensuring its efficiency. Coordination for inter-provincial economic interest should be both vertical and horizontal. The path choice for the inter-provincial economic interest coordination mechanism is vertical and horizontal integration. Only when the five sub-mechanisms work together can they break the barriers of administrative boundaries and make inter-provincial coordination. To ensure its effectiveness, coordination mechanism should be designed in the form of contracts, which endows legal effect on it and ensures its enforceability and rigid binding force.
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126 资料来源：北京市、天津市、河北省统计年鉴2012
127 作者很据祝尔娟等.天津滨海新区与北京产业对接的研究[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009：48插图绘制
130 资料来源http://www.cqn.com.cn/news/xfpd/szcj/cj/317665.html
131 史桂芬.政府间财政能力配置与区域经济协调发展研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010：135-138
132 张伦俊,王梅英.中央与地方税收分成问题的博弈分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003,(12)：75-78张伦伦.税收分成规则变化对我国财政收入格局的影响[J].税务研究,2006,(4)：3-7
133Tiebout. C. M., A Pure theory of local expenditures[J], Journal of Political Ecomony, 1956,(64):416-424
134Randall G. Holcombe and DeEdgra W. Williams, Randall G. Holcombe and DeEdgra W. Williams [J], Public Cho 2011.149:65-74
135Gordon R H, An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, (98):567-586.
136Zodrow. G. R, Mieszkowski. P., Pigou, property taxation and the under-provision of local public goods[J], Journal of Urban Economics, 1986,(19):356-370.
37Wildasin. D. E., Nash equilibrium in models of fiscal competition [J], Journal of Public Economics, 1988,(35):229-240.
138 张玉珂,马文秀.论国际经济政策协调的理论基础[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2011,(1)：75-77
139 Shapley L. S, A Value for N-person Games [J].//in:Kuhn H, Tucker A W. Eds. Contributions to the Theory of Games[M].Princeton University Press, 1953:307-312.
140 王文举.经济博弈论基础[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2010：129-137.
141http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_67e259380100pize.html
142Tobler, W.R., A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit Region [J]. Economic Geography, 1970,(46):234-240
143 数据来源：北京市、天津市、河北省统计年鉴2012,中国区域经济统计年鉴2012
44 图5-7至5-10由作者根据2012年北京、天津、河北统计年鉴绘制
*** 代表通过了显著性水平为1%的T检验,*代表通过了显著性水平为10%的T检验
145 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004：119-121
146 张强.乡村与城市融合发展的选择[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2006：90-91.
147 资料来源于国家统计局官方网站http://www.stats.gov.cn/.
148 图6-1、6-2由作者绘制
149 Krueman. P..1991. Increasing returns and economic eeoeraphy [J]. Journal of Political Economv.99:483-499
150 Baldwin, Richard E., The Core-Periphery Model with Forwarding-looking Expectations [J], Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2001,(31):21-49.
151 Christopher V. Hawkins, Competition and Cooperation: Local Government Joint Ventures for Economic Development [J], Journal of Urban Affairs, 2010,32(2):253-276
152 资料来源http://news.163.com/air/14/0105/15/9HR9PQGV00014P24.html
153 数据来源：中国统计年鉴2013,特别强调：台湾、香港、澳门、三沙、澎湖列岛及其附属岛屿,包括钓鱼岛、赤尾屿均是我国神圣而不可分割的领土,但由于数据可得性的原因,本文分析仅限我国大陆地区。
154 作者绘制。特别强调：台湾、香港、澳门、三沙、澎湖列岛及其附属岛屿,包括钓鱼岛、赤尾屿均是我国神圣而不可分割的领土,但由于数据可得性的原因,本文分析仅限我国大陆地区。
155 文魁,祝尔娟.首都圈蓝皮书2013[M].北京：社科文献出版社,2013.
156 根据表8-2绘制
157http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20130220/155214596383.shtm
158 图7-2至7-7资料来源：《2012年环境统计年报》
159 资料来源：中国环保部《2011年中国环境状况公报》
160 资料来源：中华人民共和国环境保护部官方网站
161 作者绘制
162 约翰·伊特维尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼.《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》(中文版)[M].北京.经济科学出版社,1996：568-576
163 艾格特森.新制度经济学[M].北京：商务印书馆,1996：44
164 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004：235-265
165Wilson,R., The Structure of Incentive for Decentralization under Uncertainty [M], La Decision,1969:171 Spence,M. and R. Zechhauser, Insurance, Information and Individual Action [J], American Economic Review, 1971,(61):380-387 Ross,S., The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem [J], American Economic Review, 1973,(63):134-139
166M.Jenson and W.H.Mecking, Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Management Ownership Structure [J], Journal of Economic History, 1976,(1):307
167Myerson, R., Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem [J], Econometrica, 1979,(47):61-73
168Arrow,K., "The Economics of Agency" [J],in J.Pratt and R. Zeckhuaser(eds.), Principal and Agents: The Structure of Business [M]. Boston:Harvard Business School Press, 1985:37-51
169张可云,吴瑜燕.北京与周边地区基于环境保护的区域合作机制研究[J].北京社会科学,2009,(1):32-39
170李炜, 旧国双.生态补偿机制的博弈分析[J].学习与探索,2012,(6):106-108
171 徐大伟,涂少云,常亮,赵云峰.基十演化博弈的流域生态补偿利益冲突分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,(22)：8-14
172 洋河位于官厅水库的上游流域,流经河北张家口。官厅水库在位于河北省张家口市和北京市延庆县界内,于1951年10月动工,1954年5月竣工,是新中国成立后建设的第一座大型水库；主要水流为河北怀来水定河,水库运行40多年来,为防洪、灌溉、发电发挥了世大作用。官厅水库曾经是北京主要供水水源地之一。20世纪80年代后期,库区水受到严重污染,90年代水质继续恶化,1997年水库被迫退出城市生活饮用水体系。
173 官厅水库上游有多条河流,包括洋河、桑十河、妫水河等。
174Berliant, M. and Fujita, M., Dynamics of knowledge creation and transfer: The two person case [D], MPRA Paper,2007:4973
175 Fujita, M., Towards the new economic geography in the brain power society [J], Regional Science and Urba Economics,2007,(37):482-490
176 张玉珂,马文秀.论国际经济政策协调的理论基础[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2011,(1)：75-77
177 安虎森.新经济地理学原理(第二册)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2009：92-238
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106省际际帕累托最优状态是指这样一种状态: 在一个经济体中, 资源的任何一种重新配置,已经不可能在其他省的福利不减少的情况下使任何一个省的福利水平提高的状态。
107 陈斐,陈秀山.促进区域协调发展的两大重点----明确不同区域功能定位和健全区域协调互动机制[J].生产力研究,2007,(13)：70-88
108Jose Luis Crespo and Joao Cabral, LisboaThe institutional dimension to urban governance and territorial management in the Lisbonmetropolitan area [J], Urban Governance in Southern Europe, 2010, 45(197):639-662
109Barlow. Renort of the Roval Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population [R]. Cmnd.1940:6153
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113 周立群,夏良科.区域经济一体化的测度与比较：来自京津冀、长三角和珠三角的证据[J].江海学刊,2010,(4)：81-87
114 倪鹏飞等.中国城市竞争力报告9[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2011：336-377
115 倪鹏飞等.中国城市竞争力报告9[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2011：336-377
116 倪鹏飞等.中国城市竞争力报告9[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2011：336-377
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120 沈体雁,冯等田,孙铁山.空间计量经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2010：25-77
21 数据来源：中国区域经济统计年鉴2005
122 数据来源：北京市统计年鉴2013、天津市统计年鉴2013、河北省经济年鉴2013
123Kelly LeRoux, Paul W. Brandenburger and Sanjay K. Pandey, Interlocal Service Cooperation in U.S. Cities: A Social Network Explanation [J], Public Administration Review, 2010,(3):268-278
124Starrett, D., Market Allocations of Location Choice in a Model with Free Mobility [J], Journal of Economic Theory, 1978,(17):21-37.
125Syrquin, M. and H. B. Chenery/Three Decades of Industrialization [J], The World Bank Economic Review, 1989,(3): 145-181.
126 资料来源：北京市、天津市、河北省统计年鉴2012
127 作者很据祝尔娟等.天津滨海新区与北京产业对接的研究[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009：48插图绘制
130 资料来源http://www.cqn.com.cn/news/xfpd/szcj/cj/317665.html
131 史桂芬.政府间财政能力配置与区域经济协调发展研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010：135-138
132 张伦俊,王梅英.中央与地方税收分成问题的博弈分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003,(12)：75-78张伦伦.税收分成规则变化对我国财政收入格局的影响[J].税务研究,2006,(4)：3-7
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134Randall G. Holcombe and DeEdgra W. Williams, Randall G. Holcombe and DeEdgra W. Williams [J], Public Cho 2011.149:65-74
135Gordon R H, An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, (98):567-586.
136Zodrow. G. R, Mieszkowski. P., Pigou, property taxation and the under-provision of local public goods[J], Journal of Urban Economics, 1986,(19):356-370.
37Wildasin. D. E., Nash equilibrium in models of fiscal competition [J], Journal of Public Economics, 1988,(35):229-240.
138 张玉珂,马文秀.论国际经济政策协调的理论基础[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2011,(1)：75-77
139 Shapley L. S, A Value for N-person Games [J].//in:Kuhn H, Tucker A W. Eds. Contributions to the Theory of Games[M].Princeton University Press, 1953:307-312.
140 王文举.经济博弈论基础[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2010：129-137.
141http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_67e259380100pize.html
142Tobler, W.R., A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit Region [J]. Economic Geography, 1970,(46):234-240
143 数据来源：北京市、天津市、河北省统计年鉴2012,中国区域经济统计年鉴2012
44 图5-7至5-10由作者根据2012年北京、天津、河北统计年鉴绘制
*** 代表通过了显著性水平为1%的T检验,*代表通过了显著性水平为10%的T检验
145 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004：119-121
146 张强.乡村与城市融合发展的选择[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2006：90-91.
147 资料来源于国家统计局官方网站http://www.stats.gov.cn/.
148 图6-1、6-2由作者绘制
149 Krueman. P..1991. Increasing returns and economic eeoeraphy [J]. Journal of Political Economv.99:483-499
150 Baldwin, Richard E., The Core-Periphery Model with Forwarding-looking Expectations [J], Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2001,(31):21-49.
151 Christopher V. Hawkins, Competition and Cooperation: Local Government Joint Ventures for Economic Development [J], Journal of Urban Affairs, 2010,32(2):253-276
152 资料来源http://news.163.com/air/14/0105/15/9HR9PQGV00014P24.html
153 数据来源：中国统计年鉴2013,特别强调：台湾、香港、澳门、三沙、澎湖列岛及其附属岛屿,包括钓鱼岛、赤尾屿均是我国神圣而不可分割的领土,但由于数据可得性的原因,本文分析仅限我国大陆地区。
154 作者绘制。特别强调：台湾、香港、澳门、三沙、澎湖列岛及其附属岛屿,包括钓鱼岛、赤尾屿均是我国神圣而不可分割的领土,但由于数据可得性的原因,本文分析仅限我国大陆地区。
155 文魁,祝尔娟.首都圈蓝皮书2013[M].北京：社科文献出版社,2013.
156 根据表8-2绘制
157http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20130220/155214596383.shtm
158 图7-2至7-7资料来源：《2012年环境统计年报》
159 资料来源：中国环保部《2011年中国环境状况公报》
160 资料来源：中华人民共和国环境保护部官方网站
161 作者绘制
162 约翰·伊特维尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼.《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》(中文版)[M].北京.经济科学出版社,1996：568-576
163 艾格特森.新制度经济学[M].北京：商务印书馆,1996：44
164 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004：235-265
165Wilson,R., The Structure of Incentive for Decentralization under Uncertainty [M], La Decision,1969:171 Spence,M. and R. Zechhauser, Insurance, Information and Individual Action [J], American Economic Review, 1971,(61):380-387 Ross,S., The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem [J], American Economic Review, 1973,(63):134-139
166M.Jenson and W.H.Mecking, Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Management Ownership Structure [J], Journal of Economic History, 1976,(1):307
167Myerson, R., Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem [J], Econometrica, 1979,(47):61-73
168Arrow,K., "The Economics of Agency" [J],in J.Pratt and R. Zeckhuaser(eds.), Principal and Agents: The Structure of Business [M]. Boston:Harvard Business School Press, 1985:37-51
169张可云,吴瑜燕.北京与周边地区基于环境保护的区域合作机制研究[J].北京社会科学,2009,(1):32-39
170李炜, 旧国双.生态补偿机制的博弈分析[J].学习与探索,2012,(6):106-108
171 徐大伟,涂少云,常亮,赵云峰.基十演化博弈的流域生态补偿利益冲突分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,(22)：8-14
172 洋河位于官厅水库的上游流域,流经河北张家口。官厅水库在位于河北省张家口市和北京市延庆县界内,于1951年10月动工,1954年5月竣工,是新中国成立后建设的第一座大型水库；主要水流为河北怀来水定河,水库运行40多年来,为防洪、灌溉、发电发挥了世大作用。官厅水库曾经是北京主要供水水源地之一。20世纪80年代后期,库区水受到严重污染,90年代水质继续恶化,1997年水库被迫退出城市生活饮用水体系。
173 官厅水库上游有多条河流,包括洋河、桑十河、妫水河等。
174Berliant, M. and Fujita, M., Dynamics of knowledge creation and transfer: The two person case [D], MPRA Paper,2007:4973
175 Fujita, M., Towards the new economic geography in the brain power society [J], Regional Science and Urba Economics,2007,(37):482-490
176 张玉珂,马文秀.论国际经济政策协调的理论基础[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2011,(1)：75-77
177 安虎森.新经济地理学原理(第二册)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2009：92-238
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