商业现金垫款下的中小企业融资运营策略研究
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摘要
2007年,全球性金融海啸对全球经济造成了严重的影响,不管是制造业还是服务业都面临着需求减少和融资困难的问题。中小企业由于受自身资产的限制,运转严重依赖银行贷款,更是面临信贷危机的困扰。许多证据表明,自金融海啸爆发以来,银行业为规避风险普遍收紧了贷款政策。尽管世界各国都在相关政策方面做了很多努力,但是仍不能完全解决中小企业的融资难题。在这种形势下,许多中小企业不得不寻求可以替代贷款的非传统融资手段。与此同时,近年来人们逐渐认识到在市场不完美的情况下,亟需对企业运营管理和财务决策两方面的问题联合起来进行研究。例如,在不同融资方式下考虑现金流计划的集成库存控制问题。
商业现金垫款(MCA)作为一种新兴的融资方式,特别适用于资金不足的中小型生产(零售)商。本文将首次尝试将MCA融资决策与企业的运营生产决策联合起来进行研究,从而为中小企业财务管理和运营管理、金融机构产品创新提供理论支持。
本文首先从中小企业融资难题出发,分析了现有融资方式在中小企业获得和使用方面的优势与不足,总结和定性分析了几种适合中小企业使用的新型融资方式,并对其中的MCA融资方式进行了详细定量研究。具体而言,本文的研究工作包括以下四个方面：
第一,从企业资源理论入手,阐明了属于财务资源的资金在企业生存发展中的重要作用。分析了几种适合中小企业使用并且易于获得的新型融资方式,包括应收账款保理、资产融资、客户融资以及MCA。其中MCA融资方式是本文的重点研究对象,并根据融资机构对于风险的偏好程度和具体交易模式,将其分为基本模式和有最低销量限制模式。
第二,在确定性产品需求下,分别建立了生产企业在MCA基本模式和有最低销量限制模式下进行融资和定价的联合决策模型,以及融资机构确定销售额分配比例的优化模型,得到了融资双方的Stackelberg博弈均衡解。揭示了双方最优决策之间的相互关系,并对比了两种模式下双方在达到均衡时的最优决策。结果表明：通过引入最低销量限制,融资机构不但能将利润控制在自己期望的回报率之上,还能提高系统的总收益。
第三,在不确定需求下,首先得到了生产企业与融资机构在MCA基本模式下的Stackelberg均衡,并将该结果与同等条件下贷款融资的均衡解进行了比较。接着,在有最低销量限制模式下,对企业融资和生产联合决策问题进行了研究。区别于贷款模式下的融资报童模型,有最低销量限制的MCA模式下报童问题的目标函数不再能转化为单决策变量模型。为得到问题的最优解,文中分析了模型在不同参数条件下的可行域,得到了不同参数情况下企业最优融资决策和生产决策,发现企业最优解存在四种可能性,即企业最多有四种策略。而企业所面临的具体策略数与自身参数条件有关。数值实验表明企业的销售价格／单位成本或融资机构无风险回报率的增大,都会使企业参数依次经历四种参数情况的结论；此外,还分析了企业最优决策与分配比例之间的关系,得到了使企业最优生产量最大的分配比例,而这个比例也正是使融资机构利润率和系统总利润达到最大的比例。
第四,对MCA实际应用时所涉及的法律政策方面的问题进行了研究。通过研究发现,在这些法律法规中,高利贷法会对融资双方的最终利润产生重要影响。因此,为解决MCA模式下有高利贷法约束的企业融资生产定价联合优化问题,本文在不确定需求下建立了中小企业融资定价生产联合决策模型。该模型有三个决策变量,通过对模型的分析简化将其转变为两个双决策变量的子问题,并给出了子问题的具体求解方法。最后通过算例分析了企业自有资金对于自身决策的影响。
In2007, the global financial tsunami has severely affected the economy worldwide. In both manufacturing and service sectors, companies have encountered various difficulties such as reduced demands and financing problems. The obstacle of accessing credit is especially worse for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which usually with limited self capital, heavily rely on bank loans for their operations. There has been lots of evidence showing that banks have tightened credit standards to SMEs since the onset of the financial turmoil. Various efforts have been made to help SMEs access more credits, but it cannot completely solve the SME financing problems. Consequently, many SMEs have to seek some alternative nontraditional financing tools. Meanwhile, in recent years, people have realized that it is necessary to integrate the operation management (OM) and financial decisions when market imperfection exists, for example, the problems of integrating inventory control with cash flows planning under different financing terms.
As a new way of financing, Merchant Cash Advances (MCA), is especially suitable for the underfunded, small and medium-sized manufactures (retailers). This paper is the first attempt to incorporate Merchant Cash Advances financing decision into production decisions, expecting to contribute some theoretical studies on financial management and OM for SMEs, and to theoretically support the product innovation for financial institutions.
This dissertation proceeds from the financing problem of SMEs, analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the existing financing tools on availability and application for SMEs, summaries and qualitative analyses several new financial tools suitable for SMEs, and one of which named MCA has been quantitative studied in detail. More specifically, the studies in this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
First, based on enterprise resource theory, we illuminate that capital, the basic of financial resource, playing an important role in the survival and development of enterprises; and then discuss some new financial tools which are suitable and available for SMEs, including Factoring, Asset-based Financing, Customer Financing and MCA. MCA is the focus of this study, which is divided into the basic MCA and MCA with minimum sales restrictions, according to risk preference of the finance companie and the trade mode actual used.
Second, under the deterministic demand assumption, the financing decision and pricing decision are integrated into SME's optimization model based on the two MCA modes respectively, and the optimization model of financial institute is also formulated to determine the optimal allocation rate, and Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained. The relationship between the optimal decisions of both sides is revealed and the optimal solutions of both MCA modes are compared. The result demonstrates that by restricting the minimum sales, financial institution can not only get the expected rate of return, but also can improve the total profit of the system.
Third, under uncertain demand, we first get the Stackelberg equilibrium of SME and the finance company under basic MCA mode, and compare it with the Stackelberg equilibrium obtained under loan mode with the same condition. And then, we study the problem of coordinating financing decision and production decision for SME with minimum sales restriction. Different from the financing newsboy model under loan, the objective function of the proposed model cannot be rewriten into one with single decision variable. To find the optimal solution of this problem, we analyze the feasible regions under different parameter situations; get the optimal solution for each situation. In the matter of fact, the optimal decision has only four possible expressions. Correspondingly, the SME has four policies at most, and how many policies SME has depends on its parameters. Experimental results demonstrate that both the increase of the ratio of price and unit cost and the allocation rate given by the finance company will make the SME experience four situations in proper order. Furthermore, the relationship between the optimal decisions of the enterprise and the allocation rate has been discussed, which lead us finding out the specific allocation rate that makes enterprise produce most. This rate can also lead both the finance company's profit margin and system profit to maximal value.
Last, the legal issues involved in the actual application of MCA are studied. During the research, we note that usury laws may have an important impact on the profits of both parties. Therefore, in order to solve the optimization problem of coordinating financing, pricing and production decisions under the constraint of usury laws, a model with uncertain demand is formulated. There are three decision variables in this model, which can be simplified into two sub-problems with two decision variables. The specific method to solve the sub-problems is given. Numerical experiments are conducted to evaluate the influence of the amount of enterprise funds on their decisions.
商业现金垫款(MCA)作为一种新兴的融资方式,特别适用于资金不足的中小型生产(零售)商。本文将首次尝试将MCA融资决策与企业的运营生产决策联合起来进行研究,从而为中小企业财务管理和运营管理、金融机构产品创新提供理论支持。
本文首先从中小企业融资难题出发,分析了现有融资方式在中小企业获得和使用方面的优势与不足,总结和定性分析了几种适合中小企业使用的新型融资方式,并对其中的MCA融资方式进行了详细定量研究。具体而言,本文的研究工作包括以下四个方面：
第一,从企业资源理论入手,阐明了属于财务资源的资金在企业生存发展中的重要作用。分析了几种适合中小企业使用并且易于获得的新型融资方式,包括应收账款保理、资产融资、客户融资以及MCA。其中MCA融资方式是本文的重点研究对象,并根据融资机构对于风险的偏好程度和具体交易模式,将其分为基本模式和有最低销量限制模式。
第二,在确定性产品需求下,分别建立了生产企业在MCA基本模式和有最低销量限制模式下进行融资和定价的联合决策模型,以及融资机构确定销售额分配比例的优化模型,得到了融资双方的Stackelberg博弈均衡解。揭示了双方最优决策之间的相互关系,并对比了两种模式下双方在达到均衡时的最优决策。结果表明：通过引入最低销量限制,融资机构不但能将利润控制在自己期望的回报率之上,还能提高系统的总收益。
第三,在不确定需求下,首先得到了生产企业与融资机构在MCA基本模式下的Stackelberg均衡,并将该结果与同等条件下贷款融资的均衡解进行了比较。接着,在有最低销量限制模式下,对企业融资和生产联合决策问题进行了研究。区别于贷款模式下的融资报童模型,有最低销量限制的MCA模式下报童问题的目标函数不再能转化为单决策变量模型。为得到问题的最优解,文中分析了模型在不同参数条件下的可行域,得到了不同参数情况下企业最优融资决策和生产决策,发现企业最优解存在四种可能性,即企业最多有四种策略。而企业所面临的具体策略数与自身参数条件有关。数值实验表明企业的销售价格／单位成本或融资机构无风险回报率的增大,都会使企业参数依次经历四种参数情况的结论；此外,还分析了企业最优决策与分配比例之间的关系,得到了使企业最优生产量最大的分配比例,而这个比例也正是使融资机构利润率和系统总利润达到最大的比例。
第四,对MCA实际应用时所涉及的法律政策方面的问题进行了研究。通过研究发现,在这些法律法规中,高利贷法会对融资双方的最终利润产生重要影响。因此,为解决MCA模式下有高利贷法约束的企业融资生产定价联合优化问题,本文在不确定需求下建立了中小企业融资定价生产联合决策模型。该模型有三个决策变量,通过对模型的分析简化将其转变为两个双决策变量的子问题,并给出了子问题的具体求解方法。最后通过算例分析了企业自有资金对于自身决策的影响。
In2007, the global financial tsunami has severely affected the economy worldwide. In both manufacturing and service sectors, companies have encountered various difficulties such as reduced demands and financing problems. The obstacle of accessing credit is especially worse for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which usually with limited self capital, heavily rely on bank loans for their operations. There has been lots of evidence showing that banks have tightened credit standards to SMEs since the onset of the financial turmoil. Various efforts have been made to help SMEs access more credits, but it cannot completely solve the SME financing problems. Consequently, many SMEs have to seek some alternative nontraditional financing tools. Meanwhile, in recent years, people have realized that it is necessary to integrate the operation management (OM) and financial decisions when market imperfection exists, for example, the problems of integrating inventory control with cash flows planning under different financing terms.
As a new way of financing, Merchant Cash Advances (MCA), is especially suitable for the underfunded, small and medium-sized manufactures (retailers). This paper is the first attempt to incorporate Merchant Cash Advances financing decision into production decisions, expecting to contribute some theoretical studies on financial management and OM for SMEs, and to theoretically support the product innovation for financial institutions.
This dissertation proceeds from the financing problem of SMEs, analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the existing financing tools on availability and application for SMEs, summaries and qualitative analyses several new financial tools suitable for SMEs, and one of which named MCA has been quantitative studied in detail. More specifically, the studies in this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
First, based on enterprise resource theory, we illuminate that capital, the basic of financial resource, playing an important role in the survival and development of enterprises; and then discuss some new financial tools which are suitable and available for SMEs, including Factoring, Asset-based Financing, Customer Financing and MCA. MCA is the focus of this study, which is divided into the basic MCA and MCA with minimum sales restrictions, according to risk preference of the finance companie and the trade mode actual used.
Second, under the deterministic demand assumption, the financing decision and pricing decision are integrated into SME's optimization model based on the two MCA modes respectively, and the optimization model of financial institute is also formulated to determine the optimal allocation rate, and Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained. The relationship between the optimal decisions of both sides is revealed and the optimal solutions of both MCA modes are compared. The result demonstrates that by restricting the minimum sales, financial institution can not only get the expected rate of return, but also can improve the total profit of the system.
Third, under uncertain demand, we first get the Stackelberg equilibrium of SME and the finance company under basic MCA mode, and compare it with the Stackelberg equilibrium obtained under loan mode with the same condition. And then, we study the problem of coordinating financing decision and production decision for SME with minimum sales restriction. Different from the financing newsboy model under loan, the objective function of the proposed model cannot be rewriten into one with single decision variable. To find the optimal solution of this problem, we analyze the feasible regions under different parameter situations; get the optimal solution for each situation. In the matter of fact, the optimal decision has only four possible expressions. Correspondingly, the SME has four policies at most, and how many policies SME has depends on its parameters. Experimental results demonstrate that both the increase of the ratio of price and unit cost and the allocation rate given by the finance company will make the SME experience four situations in proper order. Furthermore, the relationship between the optimal decisions of the enterprise and the allocation rate has been discussed, which lead us finding out the specific allocation rate that makes enterprise produce most. This rate can also lead both the finance company's profit margin and system profit to maximal value.
Last, the legal issues involved in the actual application of MCA are studied. During the research, we note that usury laws may have an important impact on the profits of both parties. Therefore, in order to solve the optimization problem of coordinating financing, pricing and production decisions under the constraint of usury laws, a model with uncertain demand is formulated. There are three decision variables in this model, which can be simplified into two sub-problems with two decision variables. The specific method to solve the sub-problems is given. Numerical experiments are conducted to evaluate the influence of the amount of enterprise funds on their decisions.
引文
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