企业目标优化考量下的转移定价决策研究
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摘要
转移定价长期以来一直被认为,是分权公司中一个普遍的管理控制工具,吸引了广泛背景研究者的关注,在实务界和理论界受到热议。伴随着决策制定的分权化和多部门组织中利润中心产生,以及组织形式的多样化,转移定价系统设计日渐成为一个现实而尖锐的问题。管理会计教科书中,通常将转移定价描绘成分权和多部门公司的协同工具,其作用是通过提供中间产品和服务等的估价,来有效促进公司内部利润中心间的交易,对跨国公司,在选择转移价格时,也强调税负优化和税收遵从的重要性。而分权的成功和协同的实现,有赖于正确转移定价系统的建立。
管理控制工具,是为企业目标服务的,转移定价也不例外。本文分析设定企业目标为利润满意,为实现该目标,试图构建这样的转移定价决策路径：分析中间产品有无外部市场或市场结构情况,借助转移定价的资源配置、税负最小化、盈余管理、少数股东权益、市场策略以及调整方法等多个影响因素,它们能作用到的多个具体目标有利润最大化、子单元利润计划、收入最大化(市场占有率)、税收遵从等,所要研究的就是通过怎样的定价策略同时优化达成之,这些具体目标的折衷即为利润满意的企业目标。一个优秀的转移定价系统应该满足若干要求：目标一致,即转移定价系统必须激励利润中心经理追逐其自身利益时的行为能引导公司作为一个整体获得成功；绩效评价,即转移价格必须使得总部管理层根据利润中心对公司利润的各自贡献,尽可能准确评价其绩效；子单元自治,即系统必须激励经理提高效率,并且不削弱利润中心的部门自治。此外,系统还应易于应用。
转移定价,这是一个会计人员、管理学者和经济学家都在关注的话题。为达到一个最优解决方案,或达到一个接近方案,诸多方法被尝试。本文综合定性分析与定量分析、理论探讨与实践应用,具体研究方法有：定性方法——文献分析法,搜集、鉴别、整理、分析、研究国内外文献；定量方法——数学模型法——线性规划方法,运用线性规划方法的对偶原理求解影子价格,计算机会成本,确定转移价格；分析式研究,探讨如何以现行市场价格为基准,实施一定的内部折扣,实现有效产出；定量方法——数学模型法——目标规划方法,构建转移定价数学模型,求解转移价格,实现多重目标优化以达成企业目标；经验研究——案例研究,构建目标规划模型,结合一家中国跨国公司进行实际应用及分析。
全文提出并试图回答转移定价的四个理论问题,中间产品市场具有买方垄断势力下的定价决策；无外部市场时的竞争使用中间产品的机会成本；市场不完全时基于市价基准的内部折扣定价策略；如何折衷实现多重目标。具体研究所依据的是这样的转移定价决策路径：根据转移物有无市场或市场结构,结合企业的组织形式,分析多个转移定价影响因素对各个具体目标的作用,研究怎样的转移定价策略能同时实现这些具体目标,即意味着达成利润满意的企业目标。
(1)中间产品市场竞争不完全时,下游子单元从内部转移的同时,又从外部市场购买。为实现企业目标,如何决策转移数量、价格和外购数量、价格。以单一企业为例,设有上游和下游两个利润中心,下游购买部门具有买方垄断努力,来说明定价决策及目标实现。
为达成公司整体收益最大化,以边际分析技术确定下游部门需使用的最优中间产品数量及数量处对应的转移价格,及最优内部转移数量和外部采购数量,并对买方垄断势力下的定价决策与卖方垄断势力下的定价决策进行对比分析。研究的不足之处在于,完全、对称的信息状态假设,忽视了道德风险、投资套牢等激励问题；子单元自治权削弱,总部介入定价有违分权理念；未考虑上游部门与外部市场在中间产品市场上的竞争。
(2)中间产品无外部市场,考虑中间产品有竞争使用时的机会成本,以线性规划技术求解影子价格,作为转移价格的重要组成部分。稀缺资源机会成本的定价问题,有两种情况,一是利润中心以中间产品生产这种最终产品、而不是其他最终产品的机会成本,最终产品均有外部市场；二是利润中心以原材料等生产这种中间产品(无外部市场)、而不是另一种中间产品(有外部市场)的机会成本。
以企业利润最大化为目标,采用线性规划计算中间产品影子价格,在影子价格基础上确定机会成本进行最优转移定价决策。为了解转移价格的适用范围,对影子价格灵敏度分析,判断影子价格保持不变时、收益系数和资源约束所允许的变化区间。研究存在的不足有,机会成本具有时变性,因为影子价格可能是变化的,必须持续关注机会成本的适用性和恰当性；模型需设置多重假设,包括：需求曲线已知且呈现静态,成本函数是线性的,而且可以事先估计最终产品的替代用途和盈利能力；完全、对称信息状态,没有考虑公司总部、转入方和转出方三者之间的信息不对称、不完全情况,也就没有分析目标不一致。
(3)中间产品市场不完全时,基于市价基准上的最优内部折扣定价策略。公司为内部转移定价之目的,可否依靠外部市场价格,施以内部折扣的形式对其调节,来改善乃至最大化公司期望总体利润。问题分为两个步骤按序分析：一是内部交易会否受折扣的影响；二是设计的折扣规则所计算得出的销售量和最终价格能否最大化公司总体利润。
研究发现,转移物内部定价如按市价扣除适当的折扣,可避免边际定价方法的不足以及市场价格定价可能导致的双重边际化；内外部交易存在的成本差异,对实现最优资源配置的折扣确实存在影响,但影响并不能完全传递。局限之处,忽略了下游部门和外部购买者在最终产品市场上的相互替代或竞争；不可行性,参数化部门的收益和成本函数时,如果相关领域的状态是多维的,难以推断需求的价格弹性；代理成本欠缺,这是由于忽略了道德风险,从而导致模型中设定的成本不包含代理成本。
(4)定价如何决策,折衷实现更多转移定价影响因素下的多重且相互冲突目标。考虑更加完备、周全的转移定价影响因素,分析其对企业目标中若干具体目标的综合作用,以目标规划技术通过定价影响因素同时实现多个目标。
研究中,以一跨国公司为例,根据跨国公司的内外部环境,确定多重具体目标,分析其实现的优先顺序,构建转移定价目标规划模型,求解并存且可能冲突的多个目标的满意解。研究发现,以目标规划方法达成利润满意的企业目标是可行的。但同时也存在着这样的一些不足,众多条件要求已知,不同国家(地区)子单元的税收、关税、转移产品的成本函数及数量、风险损失率、市场价格等均可知或可估算；信度存疑,部分参数属企业商业秘密,无法通过公开渠道获取,只能合理估计赋值,这直接影响转移定价决策结论的客观和准确；损害子单元自治,目标规划技术确定转移价格时,主要由总部有关人员建立模型、输入数据,子公司管理者的话语权就是与总部协商本部门利润目标和权因子等的赋值,分权有所忽视；效度存疑，会计等管理人员缺乏相应知识、技能,通常不具备建立转移定价模型之能力,而且信息不对称下的各单元的利已行为,其他部门没有全面、准确信息,影响实践应用。
全文研究还存在着某些限制,诸如,设定技术表现出规模报酬不变的特点,未考虑规模报酬递减或递增的情况；忽视了可能的优先寻求外部合作的心理,如果完全自由选择,某些公司的采购或销售子单元更愿意与外部渠道交易,原因之一是外部渠道能提供更令人满意的服务或更市场化的合作,原因之二是分权制公司中经常存在的内部竞争。总部管理者应该充分意识到可能出现的强烈政治色彩对转移价格的影响,这种情况下,最高管理者无法保证生产能力空闲时,采购或销售子单元会自愿在内部渠道交易。
设定的前提、条件,及存在的限制、不足,使得进一步深入研究有了必要。即使解决了这些问题,也不意味着转移定价解决方案是完美的。迄今为止,尚不存在一个使组织整体做出最合适的转移定价决策的通用原则,对任何一种转移定价方法,都不能说是绝对正确。正如诸多学者认为的,公司对转移价格选择的问题是出了名的困难,转移定价方略的研究仍需上下而求索。
Transfer pricing system has become a realistic and acute problem, companying with decentralization and profit centers occured in a firm, as well as diversification of organization form. It is always described as a tool for transfer pricing to coordinate decentralization and firm with multidivisions. However, the success of decentralization strictly depends on the correct pricing system. The role of transfer price is to provide price for intermediate goods and service, moreover, promote trade among profit centers in one company or group. For multinational enterprise, it also pays more attention to the importance of tax minimization and tax compliance. It has been believed for long time that transfer pricing is means of management and control in decentralized company. So researchers focus on this issue, which argued strongly throughout the practical and theoretical circle.
Being a management and control tool, transfer pricing serves for the corporate goal, In the dissertation, a path of transfer pricing decision will be constructed to realize it. According to the situation of outside market or market structure, by virtue of some factors influenced by transfer pricing, such as resource allocation, taxation minimization, earning management, minority equity, market strategy, then we can reach goals as follows, profit maximization, subdivision profit target, tax compliant, revenue maximization (market shares), etc. What we will study is which strategy should be taken advantage of to realize the above objects simultaneously, meaning tradeoff or profit satisficing. An excellent system should satisfy several requirements, goal congruence, profit evaluation and subdivision autonomy. In addition, it is convenient to use in practice.
Accountants, managerialist and economists all focus on transfer pricing problem, and try many methods to acquire or approach an optimal solution. In this paper, we comprises the research methods, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis, as well as theoretical discussion and practical application. There are some typical ways as follows, references analysis method, collecting, identifying, arranging, analyzing and researching papers inside and outside countries; mathematical model; analytical research; case study, et al.
A path of pricing decision has been setup, considering outside market or market structure of transfers and organization form, each goal will be realized via factors transfer pricing can influence. The corporate goal, profit satisficing, then achieve. Four issues, decision making under monopsony power, opportunity cost of intermediate goods without external market, discount based on market price under imperfect market, achieving a compromise of multiobjectives, will be presented and solved depending on above path.
(1) When market of intermediate goods being incomplete, such as monopsony power, downstream division purchases it both from internal and external. Then, how to make decisions about the quantity and price of transferring and buying in order to reach corporate goal. Taking single company, having two profit centers, for example to illustrate theprocess.
The marginal analysis technique is used to find the quantity downstream needs and its corresponding price, as well as transaction quantity purchased both from internal and external traders. Only in this way can a firm get the highest benefit with the lowest cost. Furthermore, the character of transfer pricing both under monopoly power and monopsony power was discussed, analyzed and compared. During the study, there are some following shortages. Firstly, moral hazard and investment hold-up is ignored because of complete and symmetric information hypothesis in advance. Secondly, it is conflict with decentralization conception when headquarter interferes in pricing decision, followed with autonomy weakened. Finally, the competition between upstream and outside market doesn't considered.
(2) The opportunity cost of intermediate product without outside market is taken into accountant. This problem, divided to two kinds of situations, could be solved by linear programming technique. The one is that opportunity cost of intermediate be used by this final good not others, all with external price. Another is that opportunity cost of raw materials be used by this intermediate good without market price not the other one having it.
Opportunity cost could be decided based on shadow price calculated by linear programming. Then, it is possible that transfer pricing decision having considered opportunity cost could result in profit maximization. For sake of controlling the bound of transfer prices, sensitivity analysis about shadow price will be undertaken. In this way can allowable changeable interval of earning factor and resource constraint be judged while transfer price keeping unchanged. The shortcomings about analysis are as follows. Firstly, the suitability of opportunity cost must continue to watch because it is always changing accompanied with shadow price. Secondly, some hypothesis should be set up, including given and static demand curve, linear cost function, as well as substitution usage and earning capability ex ante estimation. Finally, system design doesn't put the asymmetric information between headquarter and profit centers into consideration, so nor does goal mcongruence.
(3) Pricing strategy of transfer in incomplete market, internal discount based on market, is presented. Whether profit can be increased, even maximized, depending upon interior discount based on external market price. Problem is discussed from two procedures in sequence:(1) whether interior transaction is influenced by discount;(2) whether or not the sale quantity and final price resulted from discount rule can maximize the total profit achieved by the firm as a whole.
Research result is a intrafirm price, market price less suitable discount, could alleviate the weakness brought by marginal pricing method and double-marginalization problem. Cost difference between interior and exterior trade has infection to the discount which can achieve the optimization of resource allocation. The weakness is described below. Firstly, competition or substitution between downstream and outside purchaser in the final product market is ignored. Secondly, it is hard to infer the price elastic of demand if the state parameterized division's earning and cost function is multidimensional. Finally, the cost in the model excludes the agent cost because of ignoring the moral hazard.
(4) How to make decision when multiple and conflict objectives influenced by much more factors can achieve simultaneously. Taking complete factors into accountant, analyzing comprehensive role about several subgoals, pricing strategy obtained by virtue of project programming method realizes multigoals effectively.
Taking a multinational enterprise located in Shenzhen for example. Mulitgoals are introduced according to business environment, the sequence of them is also considered. Project programming model of transfer pricing is set up and satisfying solution about those subgoals is resolved. It is feasible that the corporate goal can fully be achieved with above method. There are some shortages in study,(1) many given prerequisite, such as tax rate in different countries (districts), import duty rate, cost function and quantity, risk lost, market price;(2) autonomy damage. It seems that the only thing department managers can do is negotiating profit plan and weights with headquarters;(3) doubt validity. Generally, management is unable to construct pricing model as a result of lacking relative knowledge and technique. At the same time, selfish divisions acting in favour of their benefits hide information so that other centers have not complete and precise information, which infect practice application naturally.
In addition, some limits exist in this paper. The hypothesis about return to scale is always constant, letting alone increasing or decreasing. The motivation that purchase or sell division, making decision freely, perhaps prefers to cooperate with outside dealer is neglected. There are two good reasons for taking exterior firms precedence over interior transaction. One is external partner may provide more satisfying service or better cooperation. Another'is that interior competition always exists in a decentralized firm. Whatever, headquarters should consider the intense political tint that acts on transfer pricing. So, it is not guaranteed that division volunteers to trade with other one when resource is idle.
For long time, accounting theoretical and practical circle advocates transfer price is a management and control tool wildly used in decentralized company and concerned by researchers from extensive background. So far, there doesn't exist a principle by which firm can make the most appropriate transfer pricing decision in all surroundings. Never have a method been perfectly sound. It is necessary to continue studying on transfer pricing for its well known difficulty.
管理控制工具,是为企业目标服务的,转移定价也不例外。本文分析设定企业目标为利润满意,为实现该目标,试图构建这样的转移定价决策路径：分析中间产品有无外部市场或市场结构情况,借助转移定价的资源配置、税负最小化、盈余管理、少数股东权益、市场策略以及调整方法等多个影响因素,它们能作用到的多个具体目标有利润最大化、子单元利润计划、收入最大化(市场占有率)、税收遵从等,所要研究的就是通过怎样的定价策略同时优化达成之,这些具体目标的折衷即为利润满意的企业目标。一个优秀的转移定价系统应该满足若干要求：目标一致,即转移定价系统必须激励利润中心经理追逐其自身利益时的行为能引导公司作为一个整体获得成功；绩效评价,即转移价格必须使得总部管理层根据利润中心对公司利润的各自贡献,尽可能准确评价其绩效；子单元自治,即系统必须激励经理提高效率,并且不削弱利润中心的部门自治。此外,系统还应易于应用。
转移定价,这是一个会计人员、管理学者和经济学家都在关注的话题。为达到一个最优解决方案,或达到一个接近方案,诸多方法被尝试。本文综合定性分析与定量分析、理论探讨与实践应用,具体研究方法有：定性方法——文献分析法,搜集、鉴别、整理、分析、研究国内外文献；定量方法——数学模型法——线性规划方法,运用线性规划方法的对偶原理求解影子价格,计算机会成本,确定转移价格；分析式研究,探讨如何以现行市场价格为基准,实施一定的内部折扣,实现有效产出；定量方法——数学模型法——目标规划方法,构建转移定价数学模型,求解转移价格,实现多重目标优化以达成企业目标；经验研究——案例研究,构建目标规划模型,结合一家中国跨国公司进行实际应用及分析。
全文提出并试图回答转移定价的四个理论问题,中间产品市场具有买方垄断势力下的定价决策；无外部市场时的竞争使用中间产品的机会成本；市场不完全时基于市价基准的内部折扣定价策略；如何折衷实现多重目标。具体研究所依据的是这样的转移定价决策路径：根据转移物有无市场或市场结构,结合企业的组织形式,分析多个转移定价影响因素对各个具体目标的作用,研究怎样的转移定价策略能同时实现这些具体目标,即意味着达成利润满意的企业目标。
(1)中间产品市场竞争不完全时,下游子单元从内部转移的同时,又从外部市场购买。为实现企业目标,如何决策转移数量、价格和外购数量、价格。以单一企业为例,设有上游和下游两个利润中心,下游购买部门具有买方垄断努力,来说明定价决策及目标实现。
为达成公司整体收益最大化,以边际分析技术确定下游部门需使用的最优中间产品数量及数量处对应的转移价格,及最优内部转移数量和外部采购数量,并对买方垄断势力下的定价决策与卖方垄断势力下的定价决策进行对比分析。研究的不足之处在于,完全、对称的信息状态假设,忽视了道德风险、投资套牢等激励问题；子单元自治权削弱,总部介入定价有违分权理念；未考虑上游部门与外部市场在中间产品市场上的竞争。
(2)中间产品无外部市场,考虑中间产品有竞争使用时的机会成本,以线性规划技术求解影子价格,作为转移价格的重要组成部分。稀缺资源机会成本的定价问题,有两种情况,一是利润中心以中间产品生产这种最终产品、而不是其他最终产品的机会成本,最终产品均有外部市场；二是利润中心以原材料等生产这种中间产品(无外部市场)、而不是另一种中间产品(有外部市场)的机会成本。
以企业利润最大化为目标,采用线性规划计算中间产品影子价格,在影子价格基础上确定机会成本进行最优转移定价决策。为了解转移价格的适用范围,对影子价格灵敏度分析,判断影子价格保持不变时、收益系数和资源约束所允许的变化区间。研究存在的不足有,机会成本具有时变性,因为影子价格可能是变化的,必须持续关注机会成本的适用性和恰当性；模型需设置多重假设,包括：需求曲线已知且呈现静态,成本函数是线性的,而且可以事先估计最终产品的替代用途和盈利能力；完全、对称信息状态,没有考虑公司总部、转入方和转出方三者之间的信息不对称、不完全情况,也就没有分析目标不一致。
(3)中间产品市场不完全时,基于市价基准上的最优内部折扣定价策略。公司为内部转移定价之目的,可否依靠外部市场价格,施以内部折扣的形式对其调节,来改善乃至最大化公司期望总体利润。问题分为两个步骤按序分析：一是内部交易会否受折扣的影响；二是设计的折扣规则所计算得出的销售量和最终价格能否最大化公司总体利润。
研究发现,转移物内部定价如按市价扣除适当的折扣,可避免边际定价方法的不足以及市场价格定价可能导致的双重边际化；内外部交易存在的成本差异,对实现最优资源配置的折扣确实存在影响,但影响并不能完全传递。局限之处,忽略了下游部门和外部购买者在最终产品市场上的相互替代或竞争；不可行性,参数化部门的收益和成本函数时,如果相关领域的状态是多维的,难以推断需求的价格弹性；代理成本欠缺,这是由于忽略了道德风险,从而导致模型中设定的成本不包含代理成本。
(4)定价如何决策,折衷实现更多转移定价影响因素下的多重且相互冲突目标。考虑更加完备、周全的转移定价影响因素,分析其对企业目标中若干具体目标的综合作用,以目标规划技术通过定价影响因素同时实现多个目标。
研究中,以一跨国公司为例,根据跨国公司的内外部环境,确定多重具体目标,分析其实现的优先顺序,构建转移定价目标规划模型,求解并存且可能冲突的多个目标的满意解。研究发现,以目标规划方法达成利润满意的企业目标是可行的。但同时也存在着这样的一些不足,众多条件要求已知,不同国家(地区)子单元的税收、关税、转移产品的成本函数及数量、风险损失率、市场价格等均可知或可估算；信度存疑,部分参数属企业商业秘密,无法通过公开渠道获取,只能合理估计赋值,这直接影响转移定价决策结论的客观和准确；损害子单元自治,目标规划技术确定转移价格时,主要由总部有关人员建立模型、输入数据,子公司管理者的话语权就是与总部协商本部门利润目标和权因子等的赋值,分权有所忽视；效度存疑，会计等管理人员缺乏相应知识、技能,通常不具备建立转移定价模型之能力,而且信息不对称下的各单元的利已行为,其他部门没有全面、准确信息,影响实践应用。
全文研究还存在着某些限制,诸如,设定技术表现出规模报酬不变的特点,未考虑规模报酬递减或递增的情况；忽视了可能的优先寻求外部合作的心理,如果完全自由选择,某些公司的采购或销售子单元更愿意与外部渠道交易,原因之一是外部渠道能提供更令人满意的服务或更市场化的合作,原因之二是分权制公司中经常存在的内部竞争。总部管理者应该充分意识到可能出现的强烈政治色彩对转移价格的影响,这种情况下,最高管理者无法保证生产能力空闲时,采购或销售子单元会自愿在内部渠道交易。
设定的前提、条件,及存在的限制、不足,使得进一步深入研究有了必要。即使解决了这些问题,也不意味着转移定价解决方案是完美的。迄今为止,尚不存在一个使组织整体做出最合适的转移定价决策的通用原则,对任何一种转移定价方法,都不能说是绝对正确。正如诸多学者认为的,公司对转移价格选择的问题是出了名的困难,转移定价方略的研究仍需上下而求索。
Transfer pricing system has become a realistic and acute problem, companying with decentralization and profit centers occured in a firm, as well as diversification of organization form. It is always described as a tool for transfer pricing to coordinate decentralization and firm with multidivisions. However, the success of decentralization strictly depends on the correct pricing system. The role of transfer price is to provide price for intermediate goods and service, moreover, promote trade among profit centers in one company or group. For multinational enterprise, it also pays more attention to the importance of tax minimization and tax compliance. It has been believed for long time that transfer pricing is means of management and control in decentralized company. So researchers focus on this issue, which argued strongly throughout the practical and theoretical circle.
Being a management and control tool, transfer pricing serves for the corporate goal, In the dissertation, a path of transfer pricing decision will be constructed to realize it. According to the situation of outside market or market structure, by virtue of some factors influenced by transfer pricing, such as resource allocation, taxation minimization, earning management, minority equity, market strategy, then we can reach goals as follows, profit maximization, subdivision profit target, tax compliant, revenue maximization (market shares), etc. What we will study is which strategy should be taken advantage of to realize the above objects simultaneously, meaning tradeoff or profit satisficing. An excellent system should satisfy several requirements, goal congruence, profit evaluation and subdivision autonomy. In addition, it is convenient to use in practice.
Accountants, managerialist and economists all focus on transfer pricing problem, and try many methods to acquire or approach an optimal solution. In this paper, we comprises the research methods, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis, as well as theoretical discussion and practical application. There are some typical ways as follows, references analysis method, collecting, identifying, arranging, analyzing and researching papers inside and outside countries; mathematical model; analytical research; case study, et al.
A path of pricing decision has been setup, considering outside market or market structure of transfers and organization form, each goal will be realized via factors transfer pricing can influence. The corporate goal, profit satisficing, then achieve. Four issues, decision making under monopsony power, opportunity cost of intermediate goods without external market, discount based on market price under imperfect market, achieving a compromise of multiobjectives, will be presented and solved depending on above path.
(1) When market of intermediate goods being incomplete, such as monopsony power, downstream division purchases it both from internal and external. Then, how to make decisions about the quantity and price of transferring and buying in order to reach corporate goal. Taking single company, having two profit centers, for example to illustrate theprocess.
The marginal analysis technique is used to find the quantity downstream needs and its corresponding price, as well as transaction quantity purchased both from internal and external traders. Only in this way can a firm get the highest benefit with the lowest cost. Furthermore, the character of transfer pricing both under monopoly power and monopsony power was discussed, analyzed and compared. During the study, there are some following shortages. Firstly, moral hazard and investment hold-up is ignored because of complete and symmetric information hypothesis in advance. Secondly, it is conflict with decentralization conception when headquarter interferes in pricing decision, followed with autonomy weakened. Finally, the competition between upstream and outside market doesn't considered.
(2) The opportunity cost of intermediate product without outside market is taken into accountant. This problem, divided to two kinds of situations, could be solved by linear programming technique. The one is that opportunity cost of intermediate be used by this final good not others, all with external price. Another is that opportunity cost of raw materials be used by this intermediate good without market price not the other one having it.
Opportunity cost could be decided based on shadow price calculated by linear programming. Then, it is possible that transfer pricing decision having considered opportunity cost could result in profit maximization. For sake of controlling the bound of transfer prices, sensitivity analysis about shadow price will be undertaken. In this way can allowable changeable interval of earning factor and resource constraint be judged while transfer price keeping unchanged. The shortcomings about analysis are as follows. Firstly, the suitability of opportunity cost must continue to watch because it is always changing accompanied with shadow price. Secondly, some hypothesis should be set up, including given and static demand curve, linear cost function, as well as substitution usage and earning capability ex ante estimation. Finally, system design doesn't put the asymmetric information between headquarter and profit centers into consideration, so nor does goal mcongruence.
(3) Pricing strategy of transfer in incomplete market, internal discount based on market, is presented. Whether profit can be increased, even maximized, depending upon interior discount based on external market price. Problem is discussed from two procedures in sequence:(1) whether interior transaction is influenced by discount;(2) whether or not the sale quantity and final price resulted from discount rule can maximize the total profit achieved by the firm as a whole.
Research result is a intrafirm price, market price less suitable discount, could alleviate the weakness brought by marginal pricing method and double-marginalization problem. Cost difference between interior and exterior trade has infection to the discount which can achieve the optimization of resource allocation. The weakness is described below. Firstly, competition or substitution between downstream and outside purchaser in the final product market is ignored. Secondly, it is hard to infer the price elastic of demand if the state parameterized division's earning and cost function is multidimensional. Finally, the cost in the model excludes the agent cost because of ignoring the moral hazard.
(4) How to make decision when multiple and conflict objectives influenced by much more factors can achieve simultaneously. Taking complete factors into accountant, analyzing comprehensive role about several subgoals, pricing strategy obtained by virtue of project programming method realizes multigoals effectively.
Taking a multinational enterprise located in Shenzhen for example. Mulitgoals are introduced according to business environment, the sequence of them is also considered. Project programming model of transfer pricing is set up and satisfying solution about those subgoals is resolved. It is feasible that the corporate goal can fully be achieved with above method. There are some shortages in study,(1) many given prerequisite, such as tax rate in different countries (districts), import duty rate, cost function and quantity, risk lost, market price;(2) autonomy damage. It seems that the only thing department managers can do is negotiating profit plan and weights with headquarters;(3) doubt validity. Generally, management is unable to construct pricing model as a result of lacking relative knowledge and technique. At the same time, selfish divisions acting in favour of their benefits hide information so that other centers have not complete and precise information, which infect practice application naturally.
In addition, some limits exist in this paper. The hypothesis about return to scale is always constant, letting alone increasing or decreasing. The motivation that purchase or sell division, making decision freely, perhaps prefers to cooperate with outside dealer is neglected. There are two good reasons for taking exterior firms precedence over interior transaction. One is external partner may provide more satisfying service or better cooperation. Another'is that interior competition always exists in a decentralized firm. Whatever, headquarters should consider the intense political tint that acts on transfer pricing. So, it is not guaranteed that division volunteers to trade with other one when resource is idle.
For long time, accounting theoretical and practical circle advocates transfer price is a management and control tool wildly used in decentralized company and concerned by researchers from extensive background. So far, there doesn't exist a principle by which firm can make the most appropriate transfer pricing decision in all surroundings. Never have a method been perfectly sound. It is necessary to continue studying on transfer pricing for its well known difficulty.
引文
① 现代汉语词典(第5版·大字本),商务印书馆(北京),2006年
① 国家税务总局关于印发《特别纳税调整实施办法(试行)》的通知,国税发[2009]2号文。
① 国家税务总局关于印发《特别纳税调整实施办法(试行)》的通知,国税发(2009)2号文。
① Ernst & Young,1997,pp.1-2。
① Waterhouse (1984), Borkowski (1999), Ernst和Young (1999),Tang (2002),以及Horngren, Datar,和Foster (2005)。
① 国家税务总局关于印发《特别纳税调整实施办法(试行)》的通知,国税发(2009]2号文。
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① 国家税务总局关于印发《特别纳税调整实施办法(试行)》的通知,国税发[2009]2号文。
① 国家税务总局关于印发《特别纳税调整实施办法(试行)》的通知,国税发(2009)2号文。
① Ernst & Young,1997,pp.1-2。
① Waterhouse (1984), Borkowski (1999), Ernst和Young (1999),Tang (2002),以及Horngren, Datar,和Foster (2005)。
① 国家税务总局关于印发《特别纳税调整实施办法(试行)》的通知,国税发(2009]2号文。
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