中国自然保护区社区共管模式研究
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摘要
我国自然保护区主要分布在自然环境特殊和生物资源非常丰富,但交通不便、经济不发达、少数民族比较集中的边远山区,自然保护区内及周边人口众多,保护区与当地社区的矛盾冲突普遍存在,因此引入了社区共管的管理方法。目前,自然保护区社区共管这一全新的管理模式在我国还处于探索阶段,无论实践上还是理论研究上都很不完善,需要进行深入的分析和研究。
本文从共管直接推动力的来源、共管中经济收益的分享以及主要参与者的角度,将口前我国自然保护区社区共管的实践模式分为五种,并对每一种模式都选取了一个典型案例进行了深入的分析。本文的分析表明,目前自然保护区社区共管在中国的实践,基本是保护区及国际援助机构对社区提供资金、寻找替代生计来扶持社区经济发展。几种模式中基本都存在一些共同问题：基本都是集权式管理的模式,社区及居民在共管中并没有真正的平等。基本没有共管的资源,普遍参与性不够,参与人数少,分权不够,民间组织普遍没有得到重视,社区能力建设没有得到足够的重视。
已有的理论和实践都已证明了,对于我国自然保护区这样的具有正的外部性的准公共物品来说,资源的社区共管存在着市场失灵和政府失灵。本文应用奥斯特罗姆教授自主治理的八项原则分析我国自然保护区社区共管实践中五个模式的典型案例,通过模式的解构分析结果表明,正如市场失灵与政府失灵,我国自然保护区社区共管同样存在着社区失灵。
本文分析了自然保护区社区共管中三个主要内部制约因素：社区参与、产权以及组织结构。分析表明,从社区参与来看,在我国自然保护区的社区共管中,普遍参与性不够,社区参与人数少,分权和赋权在实践中也不够,社区在共管中基本没有决策权、没有参与制定和修改规则的权利。从产权来看,我国自然保护区社区共管中,没有真正的共管的资源,权属不清晰。从组织结构分析来看,基本都没有形成多层次的组织结构,组织结构的欠缺也是制约着我国自然保护区社区共管的有效性。
在分析的基础上,本文提出了我国自然保护区社区共管的新的模式：以自主治理为基础的“2+X”模式。本模式的主要内容是：自然保护区为主导的,集权与分权相结合的共管模式,笔者用模拟分权制来描述这种制度：在社区共管中,保护区为主导,社区是主要的参与方,各利益方平等合作,分享权利承担义务。此外,本文还从社区共管系统的外部,对有关政策、法律方面建立提出了建议。
Compared with the amount of natural conservation area, most of the natural conservation zones are located at the undeveloped, remote area, with unique natural environment and abundant biological resources, poor transportation condition, and where many minority people live in. The contradictions between the natural conservation zone and local people are prominent. For this reason, the method of community co-management was introduced. Up to now, the application of community co-management method in China's natural conservation zone is still under first stage, which is necessary for further studying both in practically and theoretically.
From the point view of stakeholder, motivation mechanism, and share of benefit, this paper classifies the managing models of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone with 5 types. For each type, a typical case-study is selected for further analysis. Analysis shows, the current practice of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone belongs to the models of improving livelihood with the help of the natural conservation zones or international organizations. Those models have common issues:basically all models are centralized authority management. Residents in the community have no true equality, neither co-management resources, participation not enough, number of participants small, lack of decentralization, non-government organizations are not well developed, and community capacity building has not been given sufficient attention.
Existing theory and practice proved that, natural conservation zone is quasi-public goods, which has positive externalities. Resources community co-management faces both market failure and government failure. In this paper, Professor Ostrom's eight principles of self-governance are introduced to the analysis of five models of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone.Mode decomposition analysis results show that similar to the market failure and government failure, communities co-management in China's natural conservation zone also faces failures.
This paper analyzes three constraint factors of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone:community participation, ownership and organizational structure. From the view of community participation in community co-management of China's natural conservation zone, analysis shows that, the community participation is not enough, the number of community participation too small, decentralization and empowerment is not enough in practice, little decision-making power in the community co-management and no right in the development and the right to modify the rule. From the perspective of property rights, community co-management of natural conservation zone, there is no real resources of co-management, ownership is unclear. From the organizational structure analysis, basically there is no multi-level organizational structure. Lack of organizational structure also restricts the effectiveness of community co-management of natural conservation zone.
Based at the analysis above, the paper proposes a new model of community co-management:2+X model from the perspective of self-management. The main content of this model is:natural conservation zone-oriented, the combination of centralization and decentralization of management model. The author use simulation of decentralization to describe the system:The community management, protected area-oriented community is the main participants, equal cooperation of all stakeholders to share rights, and obligations. In addition, from the outside of community co-management system, this article proposes some suggestions about policies, legal aspects of community co-management.
本文从共管直接推动力的来源、共管中经济收益的分享以及主要参与者的角度,将口前我国自然保护区社区共管的实践模式分为五种,并对每一种模式都选取了一个典型案例进行了深入的分析。本文的分析表明,目前自然保护区社区共管在中国的实践,基本是保护区及国际援助机构对社区提供资金、寻找替代生计来扶持社区经济发展。几种模式中基本都存在一些共同问题：基本都是集权式管理的模式,社区及居民在共管中并没有真正的平等。基本没有共管的资源,普遍参与性不够,参与人数少,分权不够,民间组织普遍没有得到重视,社区能力建设没有得到足够的重视。
已有的理论和实践都已证明了,对于我国自然保护区这样的具有正的外部性的准公共物品来说,资源的社区共管存在着市场失灵和政府失灵。本文应用奥斯特罗姆教授自主治理的八项原则分析我国自然保护区社区共管实践中五个模式的典型案例,通过模式的解构分析结果表明,正如市场失灵与政府失灵,我国自然保护区社区共管同样存在着社区失灵。
本文分析了自然保护区社区共管中三个主要内部制约因素：社区参与、产权以及组织结构。分析表明,从社区参与来看,在我国自然保护区的社区共管中,普遍参与性不够,社区参与人数少,分权和赋权在实践中也不够,社区在共管中基本没有决策权、没有参与制定和修改规则的权利。从产权来看,我国自然保护区社区共管中,没有真正的共管的资源,权属不清晰。从组织结构分析来看,基本都没有形成多层次的组织结构,组织结构的欠缺也是制约着我国自然保护区社区共管的有效性。
在分析的基础上,本文提出了我国自然保护区社区共管的新的模式：以自主治理为基础的“2+X”模式。本模式的主要内容是：自然保护区为主导的,集权与分权相结合的共管模式,笔者用模拟分权制来描述这种制度：在社区共管中,保护区为主导,社区是主要的参与方,各利益方平等合作,分享权利承担义务。此外,本文还从社区共管系统的外部,对有关政策、法律方面建立提出了建议。
Compared with the amount of natural conservation area, most of the natural conservation zones are located at the undeveloped, remote area, with unique natural environment and abundant biological resources, poor transportation condition, and where many minority people live in. The contradictions between the natural conservation zone and local people are prominent. For this reason, the method of community co-management was introduced. Up to now, the application of community co-management method in China's natural conservation zone is still under first stage, which is necessary for further studying both in practically and theoretically.
From the point view of stakeholder, motivation mechanism, and share of benefit, this paper classifies the managing models of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone with 5 types. For each type, a typical case-study is selected for further analysis. Analysis shows, the current practice of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone belongs to the models of improving livelihood with the help of the natural conservation zones or international organizations. Those models have common issues:basically all models are centralized authority management. Residents in the community have no true equality, neither co-management resources, participation not enough, number of participants small, lack of decentralization, non-government organizations are not well developed, and community capacity building has not been given sufficient attention.
Existing theory and practice proved that, natural conservation zone is quasi-public goods, which has positive externalities. Resources community co-management faces both market failure and government failure. In this paper, Professor Ostrom's eight principles of self-governance are introduced to the analysis of five models of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone.Mode decomposition analysis results show that similar to the market failure and government failure, communities co-management in China's natural conservation zone also faces failures.
This paper analyzes three constraint factors of community co-management in China's natural conservation zone:community participation, ownership and organizational structure. From the view of community participation in community co-management of China's natural conservation zone, analysis shows that, the community participation is not enough, the number of community participation too small, decentralization and empowerment is not enough in practice, little decision-making power in the community co-management and no right in the development and the right to modify the rule. From the perspective of property rights, community co-management of natural conservation zone, there is no real resources of co-management, ownership is unclear. From the organizational structure analysis, basically there is no multi-level organizational structure. Lack of organizational structure also restricts the effectiveness of community co-management of natural conservation zone.
Based at the analysis above, the paper proposes a new model of community co-management:2+X model from the perspective of self-management. The main content of this model is:natural conservation zone-oriented, the combination of centralization and decentralization of management model. The author use simulation of decentralization to describe the system:The community management, protected area-oriented community is the main participants, equal cooperation of all stakeholders to share rights, and obligations. In addition, from the outside of community co-management system, this article proposes some suggestions about policies, legal aspects of community co-management.
引文
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