我国农业保险利益关系研究
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摘要
农业丰则基础强,农民富则国家盛,农村稳则社会安,一直以来三农问题都是关系国计民生和社会利益和谐的重大问题,农业作为国民经济的支柱产业,为人类提供了赖以生存的衣食之源,也直接影响到其他产业的健康发展。由于农业生产具有特殊的复杂性,是一个自然再生产和社会再生产的交织过程,农业风险相对于一般风险而言发生频率更高,损失程度更大,农业保险就成为农业风险管理的重要工具,也是各国政府支持农业发展的重要补贴对象。从建国后我国对农业保险进行试办开始,农业保险在我国的发展可谓是坎坷不断,时兴时衰,经历了兴办、停办、恢复又停顿,再恢复的波动历程。伴随着2004年中央一号文件的出台,新一轮政策性农业保险试验正式启动,此后连续七年中央一号文件都着力强调了政策性农业保险制度的发展,地方政府也响应中央号召,积极组织推动本地区政策性农业保险的试点工作。时至今日,政策性农业保险虽取得了一定的阶段性成果,却依然没有走出经营困境,还在挫折中不断探索。与此同时,对农业保险的学术研究也不断向前推进,特别是近几年对政策性农业保险发展模式的探讨更加丰富,各界学者基于不同的研究视角在不同层面都提出了很多政策建议,但这些研究不免陷入就问题来解决问题的思路,严重脱离规范的理论基础的支撑。寻根探源,本文认为政治经济学的利益分析方法能够帮助我们从本质上把握农业保险发展的机理和规律,政治经济学是研究人类社会当中各个利益主体的利益及其之间利益关系的科学,农业保险的一切问题归根结底都是利益问题。因此,本文尝试在政治经济学视角下,深入剖析农业保险利益属性和利益关系,以期能够弥补现有农业保险理论研究匮乏的不足。
本文的研究共分为八个部分,主要论点如下：1.界定了农业保险的利益属性,提出农业保险利益是期待利益、补偿利益、射幸利益、弱可保利益、溢出利益和多元利益。2.运用经济学的历史方法,沿着建国后农业保险制度变迁的四段轨迹分别进行梳理,详细分析了每个时期各利益主体之间利益关系的特点,即1950年到1958年的国家利益高度统合；1982年到1992年的利益分化初步显现；1993年到2003年的利益分化迅速升级；2004年至今的利益主体多元化,协调利益关系的探索。3.分析了农业保险中农民、保险机构与政府之间的利益关系,借助利益曲线得出无政府参与下保险机构与农民利益分立的结论,进一步论述了引入政府主体后供需利益主体的利益共容。4.分别分析了中央政府与地方政府在不同时期的利益关系对农业保险发展的影响以及农业保险行业内部的利益关系,后者又包涵了保险机构内部的利益关系、保险机构之间的利益关系、原保险机构与再保险机构之间的利益关系。5.对于如何协调现阶段农业保险的利益关系,首先提出了政府对保险机构和农民扶持的对策建议,促使利益曲线右移,二者在更高的利益水平上实现均衡,包括积极推进农业保险的专业法律法规出台、尽快确定政策性农业保险的组织管理机构、优化财政补贴机制、健全对保险机构的扶持政策、构建农业再保险动态体系；其次提出了保险机构和农民自身利益增进的对策建议,通过改变利益曲线的斜率,供需主体的均衡利益得到进一步提高,主要包括开发区域性特色农业保险、创新农业保险产品、充分发挥农民合作组织在农业保险市场的载体作用、加快农业保险人才队伍建设、加强政府对农业保险的宣传引导以及提升保险机构的服务质量。
Good harvests makes a strong foundation,farmers'well-being makes a prosperous nation.and rural stability makes a safe society. The problem of Farmers. Rural Areas and Agriculture Production has always been a big problem in relation to national well-fare and social harmony.As a pillar industry in national economy, agricultural industry provides the source of subsistence and affects directly the healthy development of other industries.With the special complexity,agricultural production is an interlacing of natural reproduction and social reproduction.In comparison with general risk,agricultural risk has a higher occurrence and loss severity.so agricultural insurance become an important instrument of agricultural risk management and obtained an important subsidy from governments.From the attempt after national founding, China's agricultural insurance has experienced a fluctuating process. With the issue of No.1Central Document in2004.the new policy-oriented agricultural insurance experiment had officially launched.Since then.No.1Central Document had emphasized the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance for seven years, and local government also promoted actively the local agricultural insurance pilot in response to the central call. By now,also policy-oriented agricultural insurance has earned some achievements.it still didn't extricate from management predicament and explored without cease.at the same time, academic research on agricultural insurance are also promoted constantly.In special,rencently,discussions on developmental pattern of policy-oriented agricultural insurance become richer.on which scholars in all walks of life have put forward lots of policy proposals based on different angles of view. Hower, these studies unavoidably fell into a thought of problem solving only from problems and broke away from the support of theoretical basis.Exploring the root,this article suggests that interest analysis of political economy would help us grasp the mechanism and law of agricultural insurance development. Political economy is a science about interest of interest subjects in human society and about the interest relationship among them, and all agricultural insurance problems are,in the final analysis, interest problems.so this article try to analyse interest attributes and interest relationship of agricultural insurance.hoping to make up for existing scarcity of its theoretical researches.
This research falls into eight parts, the main arguments are as follows:First, defines interest attributes of agricultural insurance.and puts forward that agricultural insurance interests are expected interest, compensation interest, contigency interest, weak insurability interest, spillover interest and pluralistic interest. Second, uses historical approach in economics to analyse in detail the characteristics of interest relationship among interest subjects during four different periods after national founding.Third, analyses the interest relationship of farmers、insurance organizations and government in agricultural insurance. With the aid of interest curve.this article gets a conclusion of interest separation between insurance organizations and farmers without government's participation and further discusses the interest encompassing of supplying and demanding interest subjects after introducing government subject. Fourth,analyses respectively the influence of interest relationship between central and local government during different periods on agricultural insurance development and the internal interest relationship of agricultural insurance industry.The latter includes internal interest relationship in insurance organization, interest relationship between insurance organizations.and interest relationship between insurance organization and reinsurance organization.Fifth,with regard to how to coordinate present interest relationship in agricultural insurance.this article first advances proposals about government's support for insurance organizations and farmers which will cause interest curve's right shift and higher balanced interest level. These proposals include: positively push on issue of agricultural insurance's specialized laws and regulations;acertain management organization for policy-oriented agricultural insurance as quickly as possible; optimize financial subsidies system;improve support policies for insurance organizations; and build dynamic system of agricultural reinsurance.Next.this article puts forward proposals about self-interest enhancing of insurance organizations and farmers which will lead interest curve's slope change and further higer balanced interest level.These proposals include:develop regional characteristic agricultural insurance; innovate agricultural insurance products; bring into full play Farmer Cooperation Organization as carrier in agricultural insurance market:accelerate construction of agricultural insurance talent team; enhance government's propaganda and guidance for agricultural insurance;and improve the quality of insurance organization service.
本文的研究共分为八个部分,主要论点如下：1.界定了农业保险的利益属性,提出农业保险利益是期待利益、补偿利益、射幸利益、弱可保利益、溢出利益和多元利益。2.运用经济学的历史方法,沿着建国后农业保险制度变迁的四段轨迹分别进行梳理,详细分析了每个时期各利益主体之间利益关系的特点,即1950年到1958年的国家利益高度统合；1982年到1992年的利益分化初步显现；1993年到2003年的利益分化迅速升级；2004年至今的利益主体多元化,协调利益关系的探索。3.分析了农业保险中农民、保险机构与政府之间的利益关系,借助利益曲线得出无政府参与下保险机构与农民利益分立的结论,进一步论述了引入政府主体后供需利益主体的利益共容。4.分别分析了中央政府与地方政府在不同时期的利益关系对农业保险发展的影响以及农业保险行业内部的利益关系,后者又包涵了保险机构内部的利益关系、保险机构之间的利益关系、原保险机构与再保险机构之间的利益关系。5.对于如何协调现阶段农业保险的利益关系,首先提出了政府对保险机构和农民扶持的对策建议,促使利益曲线右移,二者在更高的利益水平上实现均衡,包括积极推进农业保险的专业法律法规出台、尽快确定政策性农业保险的组织管理机构、优化财政补贴机制、健全对保险机构的扶持政策、构建农业再保险动态体系；其次提出了保险机构和农民自身利益增进的对策建议,通过改变利益曲线的斜率,供需主体的均衡利益得到进一步提高,主要包括开发区域性特色农业保险、创新农业保险产品、充分发挥农民合作组织在农业保险市场的载体作用、加快农业保险人才队伍建设、加强政府对农业保险的宣传引导以及提升保险机构的服务质量。
Good harvests makes a strong foundation,farmers'well-being makes a prosperous nation.and rural stability makes a safe society. The problem of Farmers. Rural Areas and Agriculture Production has always been a big problem in relation to national well-fare and social harmony.As a pillar industry in national economy, agricultural industry provides the source of subsistence and affects directly the healthy development of other industries.With the special complexity,agricultural production is an interlacing of natural reproduction and social reproduction.In comparison with general risk,agricultural risk has a higher occurrence and loss severity.so agricultural insurance become an important instrument of agricultural risk management and obtained an important subsidy from governments.From the attempt after national founding, China's agricultural insurance has experienced a fluctuating process. With the issue of No.1Central Document in2004.the new policy-oriented agricultural insurance experiment had officially launched.Since then.No.1Central Document had emphasized the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance for seven years, and local government also promoted actively the local agricultural insurance pilot in response to the central call. By now,also policy-oriented agricultural insurance has earned some achievements.it still didn't extricate from management predicament and explored without cease.at the same time, academic research on agricultural insurance are also promoted constantly.In special,rencently,discussions on developmental pattern of policy-oriented agricultural insurance become richer.on which scholars in all walks of life have put forward lots of policy proposals based on different angles of view. Hower, these studies unavoidably fell into a thought of problem solving only from problems and broke away from the support of theoretical basis.Exploring the root,this article suggests that interest analysis of political economy would help us grasp the mechanism and law of agricultural insurance development. Political economy is a science about interest of interest subjects in human society and about the interest relationship among them, and all agricultural insurance problems are,in the final analysis, interest problems.so this article try to analyse interest attributes and interest relationship of agricultural insurance.hoping to make up for existing scarcity of its theoretical researches.
This research falls into eight parts, the main arguments are as follows:First, defines interest attributes of agricultural insurance.and puts forward that agricultural insurance interests are expected interest, compensation interest, contigency interest, weak insurability interest, spillover interest and pluralistic interest. Second, uses historical approach in economics to analyse in detail the characteristics of interest relationship among interest subjects during four different periods after national founding.Third, analyses the interest relationship of farmers、insurance organizations and government in agricultural insurance. With the aid of interest curve.this article gets a conclusion of interest separation between insurance organizations and farmers without government's participation and further discusses the interest encompassing of supplying and demanding interest subjects after introducing government subject. Fourth,analyses respectively the influence of interest relationship between central and local government during different periods on agricultural insurance development and the internal interest relationship of agricultural insurance industry.The latter includes internal interest relationship in insurance organization, interest relationship between insurance organizations.and interest relationship between insurance organization and reinsurance organization.Fifth,with regard to how to coordinate present interest relationship in agricultural insurance.this article first advances proposals about government's support for insurance organizations and farmers which will cause interest curve's right shift and higher balanced interest level. These proposals include: positively push on issue of agricultural insurance's specialized laws and regulations;acertain management organization for policy-oriented agricultural insurance as quickly as possible; optimize financial subsidies system;improve support policies for insurance organizations; and build dynamic system of agricultural reinsurance.Next.this article puts forward proposals about self-interest enhancing of insurance organizations and farmers which will lead interest curve's slope change and further higer balanced interest level.These proposals include:develop regional characteristic agricultural insurance; innovate agricultural insurance products; bring into full play Farmer Cooperation Organization as carrier in agricultural insurance market:accelerate construction of agricultural insurance talent team; enhance government's propaganda and guidance for agricultural insurance;and improve the quality of insurance organization service.
引文
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57孙蓉,杨立旺：《农业保险新论》,西南财经大学出版社,1994年版,215页。庹国柱,王国军：《中国农业保险与农村社会保障制度研究》,首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002年版,45页。
58孙蓉,杨立旺：《农业保险新论》,西南财经大学出版社,1994年版,218页。
59庹国柱,李军：《农业保险》,中国人民大学出版社,2005年版,119页。
60净赔付率是赔付金额与保费收入之比,是简单赔付率。
61参见《中国人民银行总行呈财委会“为呈请核准设立中国人民保险公司并附呈公司条例组织系统表”请鉴核备案由》(1949年9月17日)
62王安：《中国保险200年》,中国言实出版社,2008年版,162页。
64谢永刚：《对有关历史水旱灾年统计成果的比较分析》,古今农业,2000年第1期,35-43页。
65周县华：《民以食为天：关于农业保险研究的一个文献综述》,保险研究,2010年第5期,119-127页。
67方伶俐：中国农业保险需求与补贴问题研究,华中农业大学,2009。
68“三农”保险是指与农业、农村、农民相关的一切保险,主要包括农村的农业保险、财产保险、人身保险等。
69《国家计委通报当前国家鼓励、控制发展的产业和产品》,宏观经济管理,1992年06期,4页。
70庞立听：《当前中国中央与地方利益关系研究》[D],山东大学,2007。
71郭为桂：《当代中国中央地方政治关系稳定性因素分析》,中共福建省委党校学报,2001年第11期,32-36页。
72中国保险学会、中国保险史编审委员会：《中国保险史》,中国金融出版社,1998,441页。
73庹国柱,朱俊生：《相互制与股份制保险公司差异何在》,中国保险报,2007年9月17日第007版。
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45李轶男：《对农业保险利益属性的再探讨》,《财经科学》,2012年第1期,31-38页。
46王伟光：《利益论》,人民出版社,2001年版,134页。
47逢锦聚：.政治经济学(第二版),高等教育出版社,2003年版,322-323页。
48王伟光,《利益论》,人民出版社,2001年版,98页。
49胡寄窗：《中国经济思想史》上,上海人民出版社,1962年版,15页。
50诸子集成本《荀子集解》。
51《晏子春秋内篇向上》,第三章,第26章。
52常平仓是中国古代仓储制度之一,常平源于战国时李悝在魏所行的平籴,即政府于丰年购进粮食储存,以免谷贱伤农,欠年卖出所储粮食以稳定粮价。范蠡和《管子》也有类似的思想。汉武帝时,桑弘羊发展了上述思想,创立平准法,依仗政府掌握的大量钱帛物资,在京师贱收贵卖以平抑物价。宣帝元康年间连年丰收,谷价有贱到一石五钱的,“农人少利”。大约就在这以后,大司农中丞耿寿昌把平准法着重施之于粮食的收贮,在一此地区设立了粮仓,收购价格过低的粮食入官,以“利百姓”,这种粮仓已有常平仓之名。耿寿昌又于五风四年奏请在边郡普遍设置粮仓,“以谷贱时增其贾而籴,以利农,谷贵时减贾 而粜,名曰常平仓。民便之”。常平仓遂作为一项正式的制度推行于较大范围之内。
53义仓是中国古代一种实物形式的仓储制度,起源于汉代,发展成熟于北齐,兴盛于隋唐。隋开皇三年(583)长孙平被徵拜为度支尚书,他见天下州县多罹水旱,百姓不给,奏令民间每秋家出粟麦一石以下,贫富差等,储之闾巷,以备凶年,名曰“义仓”。
54虞和平：《以国家力量为主导的早期现代化建设—南京国民政府时期的国营经济与民营经济》,现代化研究,2004年第2期,35-44页。寿勉成：《中国合作经济政策研究》,中国合作事业协会,1994年版,146页。
55庹国柱,李军：《农业保险》,中国人民大学出版社,2005年第一版,114页。
56中国保险学会、中国保险史编审委员会：《中国保险史》,中国金融出版社,1998年第一版,140-141页。
57孙蓉,杨立旺：《农业保险新论》,西南财经大学出版社,1994年版,215页。庹国柱,王国军：《中国农业保险与农村社会保障制度研究》,首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002年版,45页。
58孙蓉,杨立旺：《农业保险新论》,西南财经大学出版社,1994年版,218页。
59庹国柱,李军：《农业保险》,中国人民大学出版社,2005年版,119页。
60净赔付率是赔付金额与保费收入之比,是简单赔付率。
61参见《中国人民银行总行呈财委会“为呈请核准设立中国人民保险公司并附呈公司条例组织系统表”请鉴核备案由》(1949年9月17日)
62王安：《中国保险200年》,中国言实出版社,2008年版,162页。
64谢永刚：《对有关历史水旱灾年统计成果的比较分析》,古今农业,2000年第1期,35-43页。
65周县华：《民以食为天：关于农业保险研究的一个文献综述》,保险研究,2010年第5期,119-127页。
67方伶俐：中国农业保险需求与补贴问题研究,华中农业大学,2009。
68“三农”保险是指与农业、农村、农民相关的一切保险,主要包括农村的农业保险、财产保险、人身保险等。
69《国家计委通报当前国家鼓励、控制发展的产业和产品》,宏观经济管理,1992年06期,4页。
70庞立听：《当前中国中央与地方利益关系研究》[D],山东大学,2007。
71郭为桂：《当代中国中央地方政治关系稳定性因素分析》,中共福建省委党校学报,2001年第11期,32-36页。
72中国保险学会、中国保险史编审委员会：《中国保险史》,中国金融出版社,1998,441页。
73庹国柱,朱俊生：《相互制与股份制保险公司差异何在》,中国保险报,2007年9月17日第007版。
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