私募股权基金与中国中小企业公司治理研究
|
摘要
中小企业(SMEs)作为创新主体，在中国经济和社会发展占据着重要地位，但是由于现有金融体制的束缚，中国中小企业相比国有垄断企业而言，仍然处于弱势地位。一方面由于自身出身、资产和规模等方面的劣势，中小企业在直接融资和间接融资方面均更为困难；另一方面由于发展历史较短，家族化、个人化色彩浓厚，中小企业往往难以形成有效的公司治理结构，也严重制约了中小企业的经营能力提升。尤其是像中国这种转型国家中，市场体制尚未成熟，大多数中小企业不是严格按照市场化要素构建的经济组织，而关系文化渗透到企业行为及所有权配置过程中，因此公司治理方面具有更大的特殊性。
由于私募股权基金研究最早起步于发达欧美国家，在一个相对完善的市场经济体制下，大多数经济学和金融学学者的研究重点集中在私募股权基金的契约关系、被投资企业绩效改进、利益相关者治理等领域，缺乏把私募股权基金跟中小企业治理进行一个整体性研究。无论是传统的中小企业理论和私募股权基金理论都忽视了在一个转型经济体内，私募股权基金对被投资中小企业公司治理的全面深刻影响。本文把私募股权基金与中国中小企业公司治理作为研究主题，目的是依托企业融资理论、公司治理理论、关系网络和资源基础观等理论为基础，尝试从新制度学派的视角出发，目的是试图回答这样几个研究问题：（1）中国私募股权基金的起源、特点和问题是怎样？（2）面临转型经济和关系文化背景下，中国中小企业的关系治理的特征和影响是怎样？（3）私募股权基金的进入是否对中小企业的公司治理产生影响？（4）中国中小企业的公司治理中私募股权基金的角色和影响是什么？
虽然从创业理论角度，还是公司治理角度，许多学者围绕私募股权基金对中小企业的融资障碍及公司治理进行了一些分散研究，但是对于把私募股权基金对中小企业治理进行系统性研究尚属开端。本文的重要结构安排如下：
首先对中国私募股权基金的起源、特点、问题进行系统分析，其次基于关系主义导向对中国中小企业的关系治理特征及其影响进行博弈建模分析，然后探讨了私募股权投资的引入对改善中小企业治理的效果，最后通过案例研究的方式进行探索性研究。从而一方面推动私募股权基金和本土化嵌入情景管理学研究的发展，另一方面也为后来的政府决策者和企业家的管理实践提供一些必要的借鉴。
通过本研究，可以得出如下结论。（1）中国私募股权基金虽然产生历史较短且存在种种不足，但已经成为中国中小企业发展和资本市场繁荣的重要动力。（2）关系主义导向都促使中国中小企业具有先天的关系治理特征，而复杂的经营环境和自身的弱势地位使得中小企业企业家有意识的把关系治理作为提升内部凝聚力和应对外部挑战的重要治理制度安排。（3）关系治理作为一种非正式制度安排，深刻地影响到中国中小企业的经营行为。在该机制影响下，企业家具有为追求家族收益最大化而对企业自身及小股东、供应商、社会等在内的其他利益相关者造成利益损害，并破坏市场公平竞争和交易机制的冲动。（4）关系治理是困绕大多数具有鲜明家族特征中小企业的治理难题，而私募股权基金作为一种新兴的金融投资模式有助于解决这一治理顽疾。
本文的创新如下：（1）基于转型经济和关系文化背景下，本文对关系主义及对中国中小企业治理的影响进行了深入的分析，并且从制度视角对关系治理进行了定义，推动了中国本土管理学研究的进展。（2）把比较制度分析的方法引入私募股权基金与中小企业治理研究，把关系看作一种非正式制度安排，从而探讨了制度关联和内生规则下的关系治理和董事会正式治理机制的博弈演进和均衡。（3）通过本文的研究，首次指出了私募股权基金不仅能够对中国中小企业提供融资支持，而且是改善中国中小企业存在的关系治理不良状况的有效手段。（4）通过对中国中小企业的实地案例访谈和分析，验证了本文中的一些有关私募股权对中国中小企业治理影响的理论假说，同时有效补充了该研究领域中相对缺乏的本土化实证研究成果。
Small and Middle Enterprises (SMEs) are a major innovator in China's economic andsocial development, but because of the shackles of the existing financial system, SMEs inChina compared to state-owned corporation, are still in a weak position. On the one hand, dueto the disadvantage of their own origin, assets and size, small and medium enterprises aremore difficult in direct financing and indirect financing; the other hand, SMEs are oftendifficult to form effective corporate governance structure, but also serious constraints of theoperating capacity. Especially like the Chinese of this transition, the market system is not yetmature, most SMEs are not in strict accordance with the market-oriented elements to build theeconomic organization, and because the influence of culture, corporate governance of SMEsare particularity.
As the private equity fund research started in the developed countries of Europe andAmerica, in a relatively complete system of market economy, most of economists and financescholars focused on the following areas: the contractual relations in the private equity funds;performance improvement of the invested entity; stakeholders’ governance. Obviously, only afew people make an entire study about the private equity funds with SMEs management. Boththe traditional theory of SMEs and the private equity funds theory neglect that, in thetransitional economy body, private equity funds have a comprehensive influence on theinvested SMEs corporate government. This paper put the private equity funds and SMSEcorporate government as a research subject, basing on enterprise financing theory, corporategovernance theory, network Guanxi theory, and try to answer such several research problemsfrom a new perspective of neo-institutional theory:(1) What is the development history,present situation and the trend of private equity funds in China?(2) What is the characteristicsand impacts of Confucian culture and Guanxi to the SMSE governance in China?(3) How toweaken the effect of Guanxi governance of SMEs in China private equity funds?(4) What isthe application of mechanisms of private equity fund in the governance of SMEs in China?
Although from viewpoints of entrepreneurship theory or the corporate governance, manyscholars make some scattered research about the financing obstacle and corporate governancewhat private equity funds could make for the SMEs, but the systematic research on variousaspects of financing, corporate governance what private equity funds could make for theSMEs is still in the beginning. This important arrangement of this paper is as following:
First of all, the systematic review of the history issues and trend of private equity fundsin China. Secondly under the Guanxi-oriented management, we build up the game modelinganalysis on the features and its influence of the SMEs Guanxi corporate governance in China.Thirdly we discuss how the private equity investment improves the governance of SMEs afterintroduction of private equity investment. Finally we use some case study to show theexploratory research. On the one hand, we promote the development of private equity fundsand localization studies to sneak into the scenario management. On the other hand, we alsoprovide some necessary reference for the government policymakers and entrepreneurs aboutthe management practice.
Through this research, the author draws some conclusion:(1) Due to the state systematictransition and the market economy developing status, China's private equity has manydeficiencies compared with western countries, but its positively financing and governancerole for the SMEs still get recognised.(2) The guanxi culture and complex environment makethe SME entrepreneurs use the guanxi governance to enhance the internal cohesion andrespond to external challenges.(3) The guanxi governance as an informal system has aprofound impact on the operating behavior of SMEs in China. In the mechanism entrepreneurfor the pursuit of maximum family income caused by damage to the interests and otherstakeholders, undermine fair market competition and trading mechanism.(4) The privateequity funds as a new mode of financial investment to help solve this guanxi governance ills.
Innovation of this paper as follows:(1)Basing on the background of the transitioneconomy, combining with the newest study of worldwide scholars, this paper analyzed theGuanxi governance and its influence on SMEs,and proposed the new conception of Guanxigovernance and made the progress of Chinese local management study.(2) Introducingcomparative institutional analysis into the study of private equity and SMEs corporategovernance. Defining Guanxi governance embedded as an informal institutional arrangement,thus under the institutionalized linkage and internal rules, we discuss the game evolution andequilibrium of the formal board of director’s governance mechanism and Guanxi governance.(3) Through this study, we find that private equity funds not only to provide financing supportfor SMEs in China, and is an effective means to improve the bad governance of SMEs inChina.(4) By the way of the case interview and analysis of the local SMEs, the paper verifiessome hypothesis about the influence of private equity on SMEs corporate governance, andcontributes to the relative-lacking empirical research in this study field in this institutionaltransformation country.
由于私募股权基金研究最早起步于发达欧美国家，在一个相对完善的市场经济体制下，大多数经济学和金融学学者的研究重点集中在私募股权基金的契约关系、被投资企业绩效改进、利益相关者治理等领域，缺乏把私募股权基金跟中小企业治理进行一个整体性研究。无论是传统的中小企业理论和私募股权基金理论都忽视了在一个转型经济体内，私募股权基金对被投资中小企业公司治理的全面深刻影响。本文把私募股权基金与中国中小企业公司治理作为研究主题，目的是依托企业融资理论、公司治理理论、关系网络和资源基础观等理论为基础，尝试从新制度学派的视角出发，目的是试图回答这样几个研究问题：（1）中国私募股权基金的起源、特点和问题是怎样？（2）面临转型经济和关系文化背景下，中国中小企业的关系治理的特征和影响是怎样？（3）私募股权基金的进入是否对中小企业的公司治理产生影响？（4）中国中小企业的公司治理中私募股权基金的角色和影响是什么？
虽然从创业理论角度，还是公司治理角度，许多学者围绕私募股权基金对中小企业的融资障碍及公司治理进行了一些分散研究，但是对于把私募股权基金对中小企业治理进行系统性研究尚属开端。本文的重要结构安排如下：
首先对中国私募股权基金的起源、特点、问题进行系统分析，其次基于关系主义导向对中国中小企业的关系治理特征及其影响进行博弈建模分析，然后探讨了私募股权投资的引入对改善中小企业治理的效果，最后通过案例研究的方式进行探索性研究。从而一方面推动私募股权基金和本土化嵌入情景管理学研究的发展，另一方面也为后来的政府决策者和企业家的管理实践提供一些必要的借鉴。
通过本研究，可以得出如下结论。（1）中国私募股权基金虽然产生历史较短且存在种种不足，但已经成为中国中小企业发展和资本市场繁荣的重要动力。（2）关系主义导向都促使中国中小企业具有先天的关系治理特征，而复杂的经营环境和自身的弱势地位使得中小企业企业家有意识的把关系治理作为提升内部凝聚力和应对外部挑战的重要治理制度安排。（3）关系治理作为一种非正式制度安排，深刻地影响到中国中小企业的经营行为。在该机制影响下，企业家具有为追求家族收益最大化而对企业自身及小股东、供应商、社会等在内的其他利益相关者造成利益损害，并破坏市场公平竞争和交易机制的冲动。（4）关系治理是困绕大多数具有鲜明家族特征中小企业的治理难题，而私募股权基金作为一种新兴的金融投资模式有助于解决这一治理顽疾。
本文的创新如下：（1）基于转型经济和关系文化背景下，本文对关系主义及对中国中小企业治理的影响进行了深入的分析，并且从制度视角对关系治理进行了定义，推动了中国本土管理学研究的进展。（2）把比较制度分析的方法引入私募股权基金与中小企业治理研究，把关系看作一种非正式制度安排，从而探讨了制度关联和内生规则下的关系治理和董事会正式治理机制的博弈演进和均衡。（3）通过本文的研究，首次指出了私募股权基金不仅能够对中国中小企业提供融资支持，而且是改善中国中小企业存在的关系治理不良状况的有效手段。（4）通过对中国中小企业的实地案例访谈和分析，验证了本文中的一些有关私募股权对中国中小企业治理影响的理论假说，同时有效补充了该研究领域中相对缺乏的本土化实证研究成果。
Small and Middle Enterprises (SMEs) are a major innovator in China's economic andsocial development, but because of the shackles of the existing financial system, SMEs inChina compared to state-owned corporation, are still in a weak position. On the one hand, dueto the disadvantage of their own origin, assets and size, small and medium enterprises aremore difficult in direct financing and indirect financing; the other hand, SMEs are oftendifficult to form effective corporate governance structure, but also serious constraints of theoperating capacity. Especially like the Chinese of this transition, the market system is not yetmature, most SMEs are not in strict accordance with the market-oriented elements to build theeconomic organization, and because the influence of culture, corporate governance of SMEsare particularity.
As the private equity fund research started in the developed countries of Europe andAmerica, in a relatively complete system of market economy, most of economists and financescholars focused on the following areas: the contractual relations in the private equity funds;performance improvement of the invested entity; stakeholders’ governance. Obviously, only afew people make an entire study about the private equity funds with SMEs management. Boththe traditional theory of SMEs and the private equity funds theory neglect that, in thetransitional economy body, private equity funds have a comprehensive influence on theinvested SMEs corporate government. This paper put the private equity funds and SMSEcorporate government as a research subject, basing on enterprise financing theory, corporategovernance theory, network Guanxi theory, and try to answer such several research problemsfrom a new perspective of neo-institutional theory:(1) What is the development history,present situation and the trend of private equity funds in China?(2) What is the characteristicsand impacts of Confucian culture and Guanxi to the SMSE governance in China?(3) How toweaken the effect of Guanxi governance of SMEs in China private equity funds?(4) What isthe application of mechanisms of private equity fund in the governance of SMEs in China?
Although from viewpoints of entrepreneurship theory or the corporate governance, manyscholars make some scattered research about the financing obstacle and corporate governancewhat private equity funds could make for the SMEs, but the systematic research on variousaspects of financing, corporate governance what private equity funds could make for theSMEs is still in the beginning. This important arrangement of this paper is as following:
First of all, the systematic review of the history issues and trend of private equity fundsin China. Secondly under the Guanxi-oriented management, we build up the game modelinganalysis on the features and its influence of the SMEs Guanxi corporate governance in China.Thirdly we discuss how the private equity investment improves the governance of SMEs afterintroduction of private equity investment. Finally we use some case study to show theexploratory research. On the one hand, we promote the development of private equity fundsand localization studies to sneak into the scenario management. On the other hand, we alsoprovide some necessary reference for the government policymakers and entrepreneurs aboutthe management practice.
Through this research, the author draws some conclusion:(1) Due to the state systematictransition and the market economy developing status, China's private equity has manydeficiencies compared with western countries, but its positively financing and governancerole for the SMEs still get recognised.(2) The guanxi culture and complex environment makethe SME entrepreneurs use the guanxi governance to enhance the internal cohesion andrespond to external challenges.(3) The guanxi governance as an informal system has aprofound impact on the operating behavior of SMEs in China. In the mechanism entrepreneurfor the pursuit of maximum family income caused by damage to the interests and otherstakeholders, undermine fair market competition and trading mechanism.(4) The privateequity funds as a new mode of financial investment to help solve this guanxi governance ills.
Innovation of this paper as follows:(1)Basing on the background of the transitioneconomy, combining with the newest study of worldwide scholars, this paper analyzed theGuanxi governance and its influence on SMEs,and proposed the new conception of Guanxigovernance and made the progress of Chinese local management study.(2) Introducingcomparative institutional analysis into the study of private equity and SMEs corporategovernance. Defining Guanxi governance embedded as an informal institutional arrangement,thus under the institutionalized linkage and internal rules, we discuss the game evolution andequilibrium of the formal board of director’s governance mechanism and Guanxi governance.(3) Through this study, we find that private equity funds not only to provide financing supportfor SMEs in China, and is an effective means to improve the bad governance of SMEs inChina.(4) By the way of the case interview and analysis of the local SMEs, the paper verifiessome hypothesis about the influence of private equity on SMEs corporate governance, andcontributes to the relative-lacking empirical research in this study field in this institutionaltransformation country.
引文
[1] Bacon, N.,Wright, M., Scholes, L. and Meuleman, M. Assessing the Impact of Private Equity onIndustrial Relations in Europe[J]. CMBOR Working Paper,2009.
[2] Barney, J.B. Is the Resource-Based Theory a Useful Perspective for Strategic Management Research?Yes [J]. Academy of Management Review;2001,26(1):41–56.
[3] Bebchuk et al. What Matters in Corporate Governance?[J].The Review of FinancialStudies,2009,22(2):783-827.
[4] Ben. Hamad. Financial decisions and global financial behaviour of Tunisian small and mediumenterprises [J]. Thesis of doctorate,2004.
[5] Ben. Hamad, Afef. Karoui. The SMEs Governance Mechanisms Practices and Financial Performance:Case of Tunisian Industrial SMEs[J].International Journal of Business and Management,2011,6(7):216-225.
[6] Bernard S.Black,Ronald J.Gilson.Venture Capial and the structure of capital markerts;banks versusstock[J].Journal of Fiancial Economics,1998,47:243-277.
[7] Black,Bernard S., and Ronald J.Gilson. Venture Capital and the Stucture of Capital Markets:Banksversus Stock Markets[J]. Jouranl of Financial Economic,1998,47,243-277.
[8] Bygrave,W.D.The structure of investment networks of venture capital firms[J].Journal of BusinessVenturing,1988,3(2):137-157.
[9] Chen, M. Guanxi and the Chinese art of network building [J]. New Asia Review,1994, summer:40–43.
[10] Cumming D.J.,Maclntash J.G.,Venture capital exits in Canada and the United Stated[J].WorkingPaper,2000.
[11] Cumming, D., Siegel, D. S. and Wright, M. Private equity, leveraged buyouts, andgovernance[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2007,13:439–60.
[12] Davies, H., Leung, K.P., Luk, T.K.&Wong, Y. The benefits of ‘‘Guanxi’’: The value of relationshipsin developing the Chinese market [J]. Industrial Marketing Management1995,24(3):207–214.
[13] Diller C, Kaserer C. What Drives Private Equity Returns?-Fund Inflows,Skilled GPs, and/or Risk.SSRN Working Paper,2009,1-33.
[14] Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. Agency problems and residual claims[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:327–49.
[15] Filatotchev I, Wright M. The Life-cycle of Corporate Governance[M]. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham,U.K,2005.
[16] Fried and Hisrich.Towards a model of venture capital investment decision making[J].FinancialManagement,1994,23[3]:28-37.
[17] Gibbon R. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career conerns:theory and evidence [J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100:468-505
[18] Gibbons, R. Game Theory for Applied Economists [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1992.
[19] Gifford S. On the relationship between the Venture capitalist and the entrepreneur[M],BostonUniversity unpubished manuscript,1995.
[20] Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. Demystifying Private Equity[M],2009, London: ICAEW.
[21] Gompers P, Lerner J. The Venture Capital Cycle [M].2nd edition, Cambridge: MIT Press,2004.
[22] Gompers P,,Lerner J.The Challenge of Performance Assessment in Private Equity and Venture Capital:A Practical Guide for Investors and Practitioners, ed.by R Lake&R A Lake, London,2000,249-259.
[23] Gompers P,Lerner J.An analysis of compensation in the US venture capital partnership,Journal ofFinancial Economic,1999,51(1):3-44.
[24] Gompers, P.A.,&Lerner, J. The Venture Capital Cycle [M]. The MIT Press, Cambridge,1999.
[25] Gompers,P. Grandstanding in the venure capital industry[J].Journal of FianceEconomics,1996(42):133-156.
[26] Gottschalg, Oliver.Comparing PE Returns to the Stock Markets: What we know and what we do notknow [J]. Private Equity International,2007,1,321-334.
[27] Granovetter, M. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness [J]. AmericanJournal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481–510.
[28] Greif, A. Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical refection oncollectivist and individualist societies [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1994,102:912–50.
[29] Hall,J.,and Hofer,C.W.Venture capitalists’decision criteria in new venture evaluation.Journal ofBusiness Venturing,1993,8(1):25-42.
[30] Hart, O. Corporate governance: Some theory and implications[J]. Economic Journal,1995,105:678–89.
[31] Hart, O. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure [M]. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1995.
[32] Hayek, F. A. Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order, vol.1.[M]. Chicago: University ofChicago Press,1973.
[33] Hayek, F. A. The Fatal Conceit [M]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1988.
[34] Heinkel R., Stoughton N. M. The dynamics of portfolio management contracts [J]. Review ofFinancial Studies,1994,7:351-388
[35] Hitt, M. A., Ahlstrom, D., Dacin, A. T., Levitas, E.,&Svobodina, L. The institutional effects onstrategic alliance partner selection in transition economies: China vs. Russia [J]. Organization Science,2004,15(2):173-185.
[36] Houben, E. Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection and double-sided moralhazard[R].working paper,University of Kiel,2002.
[37] Howorth, C., Westhead, P. and Wright, M. Buyouts, information asymmetry, and the familymanagement [J].Journal of Business Venturing,2004,19(4):509–34.
[38] IBRF. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank’ WorldDevelopment Report2002[R]. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
[39] Jensen, Michael C., Corporate control and the politics of finance[J].Journal of Applied CorporateFinance,1991,4:13-33.
[40] Joanthan Acelrad,Eric Wright, Distribution provision in venture capital funds agreements[J].TheVenture Capital Reviews,1997,11:1-12.
[41] Kaiser, K. and C. Westarp. Value Creation in the Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry[J].INSEAD Working Papers Collection,2010,19:1-66.
[42] Kaplan, Steven N. and Schoar, Antoinette. Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, andCapital Flows[J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60:1791–1823
[43] Kate Litvak, Venture capital limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding CompensationArrangements [R], University of Texas working paper,2004.
[44] Kerr, I. R. Leadership strategies for sustainable SME operation. Business Strategy and theEnvironment,2006,15(1):30–39.
[45] Klapper, L. Corporate Governance,Investor Protection and Performance in Emerging Markets[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,10:181-233.
[46] Kut C, Smolarski J,Risk Management in Private Equity Funds: A Comparativw Study of Indian andFranco-German Funds[J]. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship,2006,11(1):35-55.
[47] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F.&Shleifer, A. Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[48] Lerner,J. Venture capitalists and oversight of privately-held firm[J].Journal ofFiance,1995,50(1):301-318.
[49] Lin T H, Smith R L. Insider Reputation and Selling Decisions: the Unwinding of Venture CapitalInvestments during Equity IPOs [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,1998,4:241-263.
[50] Lin, N. Guanxi: A Conceptual Analysis [A], in A. So, N. Lin, and D. Poston (eds.) the ChineseTriangle of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong: Comparative Institutional Analysis
[M].Greenwood Press: London,2001a:153–166.
[51] Lin， N. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action [M]. Cambridge University Press:Cambridge,2001b.
[52] Ljungqvist A, Richardson M. The Investment Behavior of Private Equity Fund Managers.WorkingPaper, RICAFE,2003.
[53] Luo, Y. Guanxi and Business [M]. World Scientific: Singapore,2000.
[54] Luo, Y. Guanxi and performance of foreign-invested enterprises in China: an empirical inquiry [J].Management International Review,1997,37(1):51–70.
[55] Luo, Y. Industrial dynamics and managerial networking in an emerging market: the case of China [J].Strategic Management Journal,2003,24(13):1315–1327.
[56] M Wright, K Amess, C Weir and S Girma. Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Retrospect andProspect [J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2009,17(3)：353-375.
[57] Macmillan,I.C.,Siegel,R.and Subbaidarasimha,P.Id.Criteriaused by venture capital is to ecaluate newventure proposals[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1985,1(1):119-123.
[58] March, J. G.,&J. P. Olsen. Rediscovering Institutions [M]. New York: Free Press,1989.
[59] Mason,C.,and Harrison,R,Why “business angels” say no. a case study of opportunitics rejected by aninformal investor syndicate[J]. Interational Small Business Journal,1996,14[2]:25-51.
[60] Masulis, R. W. and R. S. Thomas.Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equityand Derivatives on Corporate Governance [J].University of Chicago Law Review,2009,76(1):219-259.
[61] Metrick, Yasuda. The Economics of Private Equity Funds[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(6):2303-2341.
[62] Meyer, K. a. M. W. P. Probing theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: Transactions, resources,and institutions [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2005,36:600-621.
[63] North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance [M]. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,1990.
[64] OECD. OECD Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook [R]. OECD, Head of Publications Service,Paris,2000.
[65] Oliver, C. Sustainable Competitive Advantage: Combining Institutional and Resource-Based Views[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1997,18(9):697-713.
[66] Park, S. H.,&Luo, Y. D. Guanxi and organizational dynamics: Organizational networking in Chinesefirms [J].. Strategic Management Journal,2001,22(5):455-477.
[67] Peng, M. W.&Luo, Y. D. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The natureof a micro-macro link [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):486-501
[68] Peng, M. W. Toward an institution-based view of business strategy [J]. Asia Pacific Journal ofManagement,2002,19:251-267.
[69] Peng, M. W.,&Pleggenkuhle-Miles, E. G. Current debates in global strategy [J]. International Journalof Management Reviews2009,11(1):51-68.
[70] Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y. L.,&Jiang, Y. An institution-based view of international business strategy:A focus on emerging economies [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2008,39(5):920-936.
[71] Penrose, E. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm [M]. Basil Blackwell: London,1959.
[72] Petty J., Bygrave W., Shulman J. Harvesting the Entrepreneurial Venture: A Time for Creating Value[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1993,21.
[73] Phalippou, Ludovic and Gottschalg, Oliver.The Performance of Private Equity Funds[J]. Review ofFinancial Studies,2007,6,202-251.
[74] Porter, M.E. Competitive Advantage [M]. The Free Press: New York,1985.
[75] Poterba J. Venture capital and capital gains taxation, Tax Policy and the Economy [M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1989.
[76] Poterba J.How burdensome are capital gains taxes? Evidence from the United States [J].Journal ofPubilc Economics,1987,33:157-172.
[77] Povaly S. Private Equity Exits Divestment Process Mangement for Leveraged Buyouts.BerlinHeidelberg: Springer Press,2007.
[78] Prahalad, C.K.&Hamel, G. The core competence of the corporation [J]. Harvard Business Review,1990,68(3):79–91.
[79] PSE Group in European Parliament Hedge Funds and Private Equity-A Critical Analysis [R].Report ofthe PSE-Group in European Parliament,2007.
[80] Qian, Y. The institutional foundations of China’s market transition [Z]. Presented at the World Bank’sAnnual Bank Conference on Development Economics, April1999.
[81] Qian, Y.,&B. Weingast. Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives [J]. Journal ofEconomic Perspectives,1997,11:83–92.
[82] Redding SG,&Ng M. The role of face in the organizational perceptions of Chinese managers [J].Organizational Studies,1982,3:204-209.
[83] Roberts,E.B. High stakes for high-tech entrepreneurs;Understanding venture capital decisionmaking[J].Sloan Management Review,Winter1991,32[2]:9-20.
[84] Robertson, J. Private Equity Funds [J]. New Political Economy,2009,14(4):545-555.
[85] Sahlman,William A.The structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations[J].Journal ofFiancical Economics.1990,27:473-521.
[86] SBA Office of Advocacy. The Sma ll Business Economy2008[R]. United States Government PrintingOffice,2009.
[87] Schmidt, K. Convertible Securites and Venture Capital Finacnce [J]. The Journal of Fiance,2003,3,1139-1165.
[88] Scholes, L., M. Wright, et al. Family-Firm Buyouts, Private Equity, and Strategic Change[J].Journalof Private Equity,2009,12(2):7-18.
[89] Schumpeter, J. Business Cycles, Vol.1[M]. McGraw-Hill: New York,1939.
[90] Schumpeter, J. Capitalism, Socialism,&Democracy [M]. Harper&Brothers Publishers: New York,1942.
[91] Schumpeter, J. The Theory of Economic Development [M]. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,1934.
[92] Thomson,Richard Charles,The influence of venture capital funding on firm performance and time toInitial public offerings,Dissertation for Ph.D degree[J].University of Colorado,1993:56～58
[93] Tyebjee, T.T., and Bruno, A.V.Amodel of Venture capitalist investment activity, Management Science,1984,30(9):1051-1066.
[94] Weir, C., Laing, D. and Wright, M. Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms, and the threat from themarket for corporate control: An analysis of the factors affecting public to private transactions in theUK [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2005,32:909–44.
[95] Wells, W.A., Venture capital decision making, Doctoral Dissertatic [D].Carnegic-Mellon University,1974.
[96] Wood, G. and M. Wright. Private equity: A review and synthesis [J]. International Journal ofManagement Reviews,2009，11(4):361-380.
[97] Wouter Dessein, Information and Control in Ventures and Alliances[J],The Journal ofFinace,2005,5:251-254.
[98] Wright M, Robbie K.Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Review and Synthesis. Journal ofBusiness Finance&Accounting,1998,25(5-6):521-570.
[99] Wruck, K. H. Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Reinvention of the Market for CorporateControl [J]. Journal of Applide Corporate Finance,2008,20(3):8-21.
[100] OECD.(2004).公司治理原则（2004年修订版）[M].中国财政经济出版社，2005.
[101]彼得·F·德鲁克著(1985),张炜译.创新与创业精神[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2002.
[102]蔡宁,徐梦周.中国创投机构投资阶段选择及其绩效影响的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2009,10:86-95.
[103]蔡月锋.中小企业治理结构与绩效的实证研究—以中小企业板为例[J].上海商学院学报,2006,12:14-18.
[104]常忠义.中国私募股权投资中的估值问题研究[D].中国科学技术大学博士论文,2008.
[105]陈芳.中国VC、私募投资基金及产业投资基金的联系及发展中的对策研究[J].金融理论与实践,2010,01:86-90.
[106]陈家洪.江西科技型中小企业发展中的风险投资与私募股权投资支持研究[J].求实,2009,03:60-63.
[107]陈晓萍、徐淑英、樊景立.组织与管理研究的实证方法[M].北京大学出版社,2008.
[108]陈宗胜,沈扬扬.有效监管与私募股权基金的发展[J].中国金融,2010,17:75-76.
[109]储小平.家族企业研究：一个具有现代意义的话题[J].中国社会科学,2000(5).
[110]丁响.私募股权资本退出与公司治理因素关系的实证研究[J].上海金融,2009,1:33-37.
[111]窦尔翔,何小锋,李萌.私募股权基金型企业融资:资本市场定位及双刃效应[J].金融理论与实践,2010,09:87-94.
[112]范俏燕.私募股权投资的战略选择[J].财经科学,2009,09:18-25.
[113]冯根福,赵健.现代公司治理结构新分析—兼评国内外现代公司治理结构研究的新进展[J].中国工业经济，2002，11：75-83。
[114]弗鲁博顿,芮切特著(2001),姜建强,罗长远译.新制度经济学:一个交易费用分析范式[M].上海人民出版社,2006.
[115]弗洛德·J·福勒著(2002),孙振东等译.调查研究方法[M],重庆大学出版社,2004.
[116]龚鹤强,林健.关系认知、关系运作和企业绩效:来自广东省私营中小企业的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2007,02:45-53.
[117]顾建波.私募股权基金与中小企业融资法律问题研究[J],法制与社会.2010(35):93-94.
[118]郭毅,朱熹.企业家的社会资本——对企业家研究的深化[J].外国经济与管理2002,01:13-16.
[119]何梦杰,汪进.中国私募股权投资估值困境的产生机理及解决思路[J].学术月刊,2009,05:88-94.
[120]黄光国.儒家关系文化：文化反思与典范重建[M].北京大学出版社,2006.
[121]黄亚玲,赖建平,赵忠义.中国私募股权基金监管刍议[J].证券市场导报,2010,04:67-72.
[122]黄亚玲.私募股权基金文献综述[J].国际金融研究,2009,03:88-96.
[123]蒋悦炜.基于私募股权投资的科技型中小企业成长性研究[J].现代管理科学,2011(3):88-90.
[124]蒋悦炜.中国私募股权投资的定价方法研究[J].价格理论与实践,2011(4):65-66.
[125]金永红,何鹏.民营企业公司治理与企业绩效：以中小板上市公司为例[J].软科学，2009，6：88-92.
[126]劳剑东,李湛.控制权的相机分配与创业企业融资[J].财经研究，2004;12.
[127]李俊江,范思琦.中小企业自主创新与风险投资的关系——美国小企业的经验与启示[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2010,05:62-69.
[128]李维安.公司治理学[M].高等教育出版社，2005.
[129]李学峰,刘洋.场外交易市场、私募股权基金与中小企业融资——基于博弈论的分析[J].南方金融,2009,06:29-32.
[130]李亚.中国民营中小企业公司治理研究[J].管理评论，2007,9:55-61.
[131]李曜.私募股权投资浪潮及其前沿研究问题[J].证券市场导报,2010,06:4-13.
[132]李曜.私募股权投资浪潮及其前沿研究问题[J].证券市场导报，2010，9:4-13.
[133]李友梅.组织社会学及其决策分析[M].上海大学出版社,2001.
[134]刘贵斌.转轨时期中国风险投资业发展模式研究[D].西北大学，2008.
[135]刘世定.占有、认知与人际关系—对中国乡村制度变迁的经济社会学分析[M].华夏出版社,2003.
[136]刘旸.私募权益资本的循环增值和宏观经济效应[J].中央财经大学学报,2010,07:44-49.
[137]鲁亚曦.中国家族企业的背景与前景[J].四川改革,2001(7).
[138]路运锋,汪来喜,朱东华.私募股权投资基金委托代理关系分析[J].南方金融,2010,09:53-56.
[139]马跃如，段斌.事会特征、高管激励方式与中小企业成长———基于国有样本与民营样本数据的对比研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010,10:180-185.
[140]聂辉华.新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合：以威廉姆森和哈特为代表的两种进路[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,01:81-87.
[141]平新乔.私募股权与治理权价值[J].经济学动态,2011,1:36-39.
[142]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[M].经济研究.1995(1):8-16.
[143]青木昌彦著,周黎安译.比较制度分析[M].上海远东出版社,2001.
[144]邱国栋,马鹤丹.创新孵化与风险投资互联的区域创新系统研究[J].中国软科学,2010,02,97-106.
[145]盛立军.私募股权与资本市场[M].上海交通大学出版社，2003.
[146]宋晓燕.私募股权投资基金组织模式分析——一个治理结构的视角[J].上海财经大学学报,2008,05:41-48.
[147]孙宏友.私募股权投资基金投资主体法律问题研究[J].南开学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,05:123-129.
[148]田增瑞.创业投资中的显性与隐性激励机制研究[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2009,06:801-806.
[149]王崇.上市公司股权融资选择：私募还是公募?[J].经济管理,2008,17:54-59.
[150]王雷,党兴华,贺利平.基于不完全契约的高新技术风险企业控制权结构选择及其影响因素研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,05:166-174.
[151]王磊,邓戎,郭立宏.私募股权投资研究综述[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,04:103-107.
[152]王磊.中国私募股权投资的融资研究[D].西北大学博士论文,2009.
[153]王明琳，周生春.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006,08:83-103.
[154]王宣喻,储小平,私营企业内部治理结构演变模式研究[J].经济科学,2002(3):89-931
[155]王燕辉.私人股权基金[M].经济管理出版社，2009.
[156]王永钦.市场互联性、关系型合约与经济转型[J].经济研究,2006,06:79-91.
[157]威廉姆森著(1985),段毅才,王伟译.资本主义经济制度[M].商务印书馆,2002.
[158]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津人民出版社,1994.
[159]项卫星,刘旸.全球私募权益资本发展的特点和新趋势[J].世界经济研究,2010,03:20-25.
[160]杨大楷,蔡菊芳.中小企业公司治理结构及其融资研究[J].经济经纬,2004,1:81-85.
[161]杨丹辉,渠慎宁.私募基金参与跨国并购:核心动机、特定优势及其影响[J].中国工业经济,2009,03:120-129.
[162]杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论：一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,02:104-115.
[163]杨旭才.中国创业投资的资金来源与委托代理问题研究[D].天津大学，2008.
[164]杨忠,张骁,陈扬,廖文彦.“天生全球化”企业持续成长驱动力研究——企业生命周期不同阶段差异性跨案例分析[J].管理世界,2007,06:122-136.
[165]姚益龙,姚莉.美英-日德公司治理模式比较——兼论中国民营企业的治理结构[J].中山大学学报论丛,2003(2):1-4.
[166]臧展.私募股权投资理论与中国的实践[J].经济理论与经济管理,2009,11:64-68.
[167]张继袖、陆宇建.中小企业公司治理与盈利能力—来自深市中小盘的证据[J].南京审计学院学报,2007,2:42-48.
[168]张蓝中、刘浩.中小企业板上市公司治理模式与治理要点[J].西南金融,2009,8:59-60.
[169]张彤璞,王铁山.中小企业公司治理与融资问题探究[J].陕西科技大学学报,2006,4:140-143.
[170]张晓晴.中国创业投资公司治理机制研究[D].西北大学博士论文,2006.
[171]郑志刚.公司治理机制理论研究文献综述[J].南开经济评论,2004,5:26-33.
[172]周传丽.成长型企业的私募股权融资、对赌协议与财务绩效的路径依赖[J].学术研究,2009,09:89-93.
[173]周业安,赖步连.认知、学习和制度研究：新制度经济学的困境和发展[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,01:74-80.
[174]周永坤,王国建.外资私募股权投资基金问题研究[J].上海金融,2009,02:53-55.
[175]朱宏任，积极转变发展方式，促进非公有制经济平稳较快发展，中国非公有制经济发展论坛
[R]，陕西:西安，2010年9月26日。
[176]朱琳,潘敏.私募基金的组织形式差异及其完善[J].改革,2009,07:137-139.
[177]朱奇峰.中国私募股权基金发展论[R].厦门大学博士论文，2009.
[2] Barney, J.B. Is the Resource-Based Theory a Useful Perspective for Strategic Management Research?Yes [J]. Academy of Management Review;2001,26(1):41–56.
[3] Bebchuk et al. What Matters in Corporate Governance?[J].The Review of FinancialStudies,2009,22(2):783-827.
[4] Ben. Hamad. Financial decisions and global financial behaviour of Tunisian small and mediumenterprises [J]. Thesis of doctorate,2004.
[5] Ben. Hamad, Afef. Karoui. The SMEs Governance Mechanisms Practices and Financial Performance:Case of Tunisian Industrial SMEs[J].International Journal of Business and Management,2011,6(7):216-225.
[6] Bernard S.Black,Ronald J.Gilson.Venture Capial and the structure of capital markerts;banks versusstock[J].Journal of Fiancial Economics,1998,47:243-277.
[7] Black,Bernard S., and Ronald J.Gilson. Venture Capital and the Stucture of Capital Markets:Banksversus Stock Markets[J]. Jouranl of Financial Economic,1998,47,243-277.
[8] Bygrave,W.D.The structure of investment networks of venture capital firms[J].Journal of BusinessVenturing,1988,3(2):137-157.
[9] Chen, M. Guanxi and the Chinese art of network building [J]. New Asia Review,1994, summer:40–43.
[10] Cumming D.J.,Maclntash J.G.,Venture capital exits in Canada and the United Stated[J].WorkingPaper,2000.
[11] Cumming, D., Siegel, D. S. and Wright, M. Private equity, leveraged buyouts, andgovernance[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2007,13:439–60.
[12] Davies, H., Leung, K.P., Luk, T.K.&Wong, Y. The benefits of ‘‘Guanxi’’: The value of relationshipsin developing the Chinese market [J]. Industrial Marketing Management1995,24(3):207–214.
[13] Diller C, Kaserer C. What Drives Private Equity Returns?-Fund Inflows,Skilled GPs, and/or Risk.SSRN Working Paper,2009,1-33.
[14] Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. Agency problems and residual claims[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:327–49.
[15] Filatotchev I, Wright M. The Life-cycle of Corporate Governance[M]. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham,U.K,2005.
[16] Fried and Hisrich.Towards a model of venture capital investment decision making[J].FinancialManagement,1994,23[3]:28-37.
[17] Gibbon R. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career conerns:theory and evidence [J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100:468-505
[18] Gibbons, R. Game Theory for Applied Economists [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1992.
[19] Gifford S. On the relationship between the Venture capitalist and the entrepreneur[M],BostonUniversity unpubished manuscript,1995.
[20] Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. Demystifying Private Equity[M],2009, London: ICAEW.
[21] Gompers P, Lerner J. The Venture Capital Cycle [M].2nd edition, Cambridge: MIT Press,2004.
[22] Gompers P,,Lerner J.The Challenge of Performance Assessment in Private Equity and Venture Capital:A Practical Guide for Investors and Practitioners, ed.by R Lake&R A Lake, London,2000,249-259.
[23] Gompers P,Lerner J.An analysis of compensation in the US venture capital partnership,Journal ofFinancial Economic,1999,51(1):3-44.
[24] Gompers, P.A.,&Lerner, J. The Venture Capital Cycle [M]. The MIT Press, Cambridge,1999.
[25] Gompers,P. Grandstanding in the venure capital industry[J].Journal of FianceEconomics,1996(42):133-156.
[26] Gottschalg, Oliver.Comparing PE Returns to the Stock Markets: What we know and what we do notknow [J]. Private Equity International,2007,1,321-334.
[27] Granovetter, M. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness [J]. AmericanJournal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481–510.
[28] Greif, A. Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical refection oncollectivist and individualist societies [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1994,102:912–50.
[29] Hall,J.,and Hofer,C.W.Venture capitalists’decision criteria in new venture evaluation.Journal ofBusiness Venturing,1993,8(1):25-42.
[30] Hart, O. Corporate governance: Some theory and implications[J]. Economic Journal,1995,105:678–89.
[31] Hart, O. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure [M]. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1995.
[32] Hayek, F. A. Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order, vol.1.[M]. Chicago: University ofChicago Press,1973.
[33] Hayek, F. A. The Fatal Conceit [M]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1988.
[34] Heinkel R., Stoughton N. M. The dynamics of portfolio management contracts [J]. Review ofFinancial Studies,1994,7:351-388
[35] Hitt, M. A., Ahlstrom, D., Dacin, A. T., Levitas, E.,&Svobodina, L. The institutional effects onstrategic alliance partner selection in transition economies: China vs. Russia [J]. Organization Science,2004,15(2):173-185.
[36] Houben, E. Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection and double-sided moralhazard[R].working paper,University of Kiel,2002.
[37] Howorth, C., Westhead, P. and Wright, M. Buyouts, information asymmetry, and the familymanagement [J].Journal of Business Venturing,2004,19(4):509–34.
[38] IBRF. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank’ WorldDevelopment Report2002[R]. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
[39] Jensen, Michael C., Corporate control and the politics of finance[J].Journal of Applied CorporateFinance,1991,4:13-33.
[40] Joanthan Acelrad,Eric Wright, Distribution provision in venture capital funds agreements[J].TheVenture Capital Reviews,1997,11:1-12.
[41] Kaiser, K. and C. Westarp. Value Creation in the Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry[J].INSEAD Working Papers Collection,2010,19:1-66.
[42] Kaplan, Steven N. and Schoar, Antoinette. Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, andCapital Flows[J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60:1791–1823
[43] Kate Litvak, Venture capital limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding CompensationArrangements [R], University of Texas working paper,2004.
[44] Kerr, I. R. Leadership strategies for sustainable SME operation. Business Strategy and theEnvironment,2006,15(1):30–39.
[45] Klapper, L. Corporate Governance,Investor Protection and Performance in Emerging Markets[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,10:181-233.
[46] Kut C, Smolarski J,Risk Management in Private Equity Funds: A Comparativw Study of Indian andFranco-German Funds[J]. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship,2006,11(1):35-55.
[47] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F.&Shleifer, A. Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[48] Lerner,J. Venture capitalists and oversight of privately-held firm[J].Journal ofFiance,1995,50(1):301-318.
[49] Lin T H, Smith R L. Insider Reputation and Selling Decisions: the Unwinding of Venture CapitalInvestments during Equity IPOs [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,1998,4:241-263.
[50] Lin, N. Guanxi: A Conceptual Analysis [A], in A. So, N. Lin, and D. Poston (eds.) the ChineseTriangle of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong: Comparative Institutional Analysis
[M].Greenwood Press: London,2001a:153–166.
[51] Lin， N. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action [M]. Cambridge University Press:Cambridge,2001b.
[52] Ljungqvist A, Richardson M. The Investment Behavior of Private Equity Fund Managers.WorkingPaper, RICAFE,2003.
[53] Luo, Y. Guanxi and Business [M]. World Scientific: Singapore,2000.
[54] Luo, Y. Guanxi and performance of foreign-invested enterprises in China: an empirical inquiry [J].Management International Review,1997,37(1):51–70.
[55] Luo, Y. Industrial dynamics and managerial networking in an emerging market: the case of China [J].Strategic Management Journal,2003,24(13):1315–1327.
[56] M Wright, K Amess, C Weir and S Girma. Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Retrospect andProspect [J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2009,17(3)：353-375.
[57] Macmillan,I.C.,Siegel,R.and Subbaidarasimha,P.Id.Criteriaused by venture capital is to ecaluate newventure proposals[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1985,1(1):119-123.
[58] March, J. G.,&J. P. Olsen. Rediscovering Institutions [M]. New York: Free Press,1989.
[59] Mason,C.,and Harrison,R,Why “business angels” say no. a case study of opportunitics rejected by aninformal investor syndicate[J]. Interational Small Business Journal,1996,14[2]:25-51.
[60] Masulis, R. W. and R. S. Thomas.Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equityand Derivatives on Corporate Governance [J].University of Chicago Law Review,2009,76(1):219-259.
[61] Metrick, Yasuda. The Economics of Private Equity Funds[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(6):2303-2341.
[62] Meyer, K. a. M. W. P. Probing theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: Transactions, resources,and institutions [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2005,36:600-621.
[63] North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance [M]. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,1990.
[64] OECD. OECD Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook [R]. OECD, Head of Publications Service,Paris,2000.
[65] Oliver, C. Sustainable Competitive Advantage: Combining Institutional and Resource-Based Views[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1997,18(9):697-713.
[66] Park, S. H.,&Luo, Y. D. Guanxi and organizational dynamics: Organizational networking in Chinesefirms [J].. Strategic Management Journal,2001,22(5):455-477.
[67] Peng, M. W.&Luo, Y. D. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The natureof a micro-macro link [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):486-501
[68] Peng, M. W. Toward an institution-based view of business strategy [J]. Asia Pacific Journal ofManagement,2002,19:251-267.
[69] Peng, M. W.,&Pleggenkuhle-Miles, E. G. Current debates in global strategy [J]. International Journalof Management Reviews2009,11(1):51-68.
[70] Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y. L.,&Jiang, Y. An institution-based view of international business strategy:A focus on emerging economies [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2008,39(5):920-936.
[71] Penrose, E. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm [M]. Basil Blackwell: London,1959.
[72] Petty J., Bygrave W., Shulman J. Harvesting the Entrepreneurial Venture: A Time for Creating Value[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1993,21.
[73] Phalippou, Ludovic and Gottschalg, Oliver.The Performance of Private Equity Funds[J]. Review ofFinancial Studies,2007,6,202-251.
[74] Porter, M.E. Competitive Advantage [M]. The Free Press: New York,1985.
[75] Poterba J. Venture capital and capital gains taxation, Tax Policy and the Economy [M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1989.
[76] Poterba J.How burdensome are capital gains taxes? Evidence from the United States [J].Journal ofPubilc Economics,1987,33:157-172.
[77] Povaly S. Private Equity Exits Divestment Process Mangement for Leveraged Buyouts.BerlinHeidelberg: Springer Press,2007.
[78] Prahalad, C.K.&Hamel, G. The core competence of the corporation [J]. Harvard Business Review,1990,68(3):79–91.
[79] PSE Group in European Parliament Hedge Funds and Private Equity-A Critical Analysis [R].Report ofthe PSE-Group in European Parliament,2007.
[80] Qian, Y. The institutional foundations of China’s market transition [Z]. Presented at the World Bank’sAnnual Bank Conference on Development Economics, April1999.
[81] Qian, Y.,&B. Weingast. Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives [J]. Journal ofEconomic Perspectives,1997,11:83–92.
[82] Redding SG,&Ng M. The role of face in the organizational perceptions of Chinese managers [J].Organizational Studies,1982,3:204-209.
[83] Roberts,E.B. High stakes for high-tech entrepreneurs;Understanding venture capital decisionmaking[J].Sloan Management Review,Winter1991,32[2]:9-20.
[84] Robertson, J. Private Equity Funds [J]. New Political Economy,2009,14(4):545-555.
[85] Sahlman,William A.The structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations[J].Journal ofFiancical Economics.1990,27:473-521.
[86] SBA Office of Advocacy. The Sma ll Business Economy2008[R]. United States Government PrintingOffice,2009.
[87] Schmidt, K. Convertible Securites and Venture Capital Finacnce [J]. The Journal of Fiance,2003,3,1139-1165.
[88] Scholes, L., M. Wright, et al. Family-Firm Buyouts, Private Equity, and Strategic Change[J].Journalof Private Equity,2009,12(2):7-18.
[89] Schumpeter, J. Business Cycles, Vol.1[M]. McGraw-Hill: New York,1939.
[90] Schumpeter, J. Capitalism, Socialism,&Democracy [M]. Harper&Brothers Publishers: New York,1942.
[91] Schumpeter, J. The Theory of Economic Development [M]. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,1934.
[92] Thomson,Richard Charles,The influence of venture capital funding on firm performance and time toInitial public offerings,Dissertation for Ph.D degree[J].University of Colorado,1993:56～58
[93] Tyebjee, T.T., and Bruno, A.V.Amodel of Venture capitalist investment activity, Management Science,1984,30(9):1051-1066.
[94] Weir, C., Laing, D. and Wright, M. Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms, and the threat from themarket for corporate control: An analysis of the factors affecting public to private transactions in theUK [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2005,32:909–44.
[95] Wells, W.A., Venture capital decision making, Doctoral Dissertatic [D].Carnegic-Mellon University,1974.
[96] Wood, G. and M. Wright. Private equity: A review and synthesis [J]. International Journal ofManagement Reviews,2009，11(4):361-380.
[97] Wouter Dessein, Information and Control in Ventures and Alliances[J],The Journal ofFinace,2005,5:251-254.
[98] Wright M, Robbie K.Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Review and Synthesis. Journal ofBusiness Finance&Accounting,1998,25(5-6):521-570.
[99] Wruck, K. H. Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Reinvention of the Market for CorporateControl [J]. Journal of Applide Corporate Finance,2008,20(3):8-21.
[100] OECD.(2004).公司治理原则（2004年修订版）[M].中国财政经济出版社，2005.
[101]彼得·F·德鲁克著(1985),张炜译.创新与创业精神[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2002.
[102]蔡宁,徐梦周.中国创投机构投资阶段选择及其绩效影响的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2009,10:86-95.
[103]蔡月锋.中小企业治理结构与绩效的实证研究—以中小企业板为例[J].上海商学院学报,2006,12:14-18.
[104]常忠义.中国私募股权投资中的估值问题研究[D].中国科学技术大学博士论文,2008.
[105]陈芳.中国VC、私募投资基金及产业投资基金的联系及发展中的对策研究[J].金融理论与实践,2010,01:86-90.
[106]陈家洪.江西科技型中小企业发展中的风险投资与私募股权投资支持研究[J].求实,2009,03:60-63.
[107]陈晓萍、徐淑英、樊景立.组织与管理研究的实证方法[M].北京大学出版社,2008.
[108]陈宗胜,沈扬扬.有效监管与私募股权基金的发展[J].中国金融,2010,17:75-76.
[109]储小平.家族企业研究：一个具有现代意义的话题[J].中国社会科学,2000(5).
[110]丁响.私募股权资本退出与公司治理因素关系的实证研究[J].上海金融,2009,1:33-37.
[111]窦尔翔,何小锋,李萌.私募股权基金型企业融资:资本市场定位及双刃效应[J].金融理论与实践,2010,09:87-94.
[112]范俏燕.私募股权投资的战略选择[J].财经科学,2009,09:18-25.
[113]冯根福,赵健.现代公司治理结构新分析—兼评国内外现代公司治理结构研究的新进展[J].中国工业经济，2002，11：75-83。
[114]弗鲁博顿,芮切特著(2001),姜建强,罗长远译.新制度经济学:一个交易费用分析范式[M].上海人民出版社,2006.
[115]弗洛德·J·福勒著(2002),孙振东等译.调查研究方法[M],重庆大学出版社,2004.
[116]龚鹤强,林健.关系认知、关系运作和企业绩效:来自广东省私营中小企业的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2007,02:45-53.
[117]顾建波.私募股权基金与中小企业融资法律问题研究[J],法制与社会.2010(35):93-94.
[118]郭毅,朱熹.企业家的社会资本——对企业家研究的深化[J].外国经济与管理2002,01:13-16.
[119]何梦杰,汪进.中国私募股权投资估值困境的产生机理及解决思路[J].学术月刊,2009,05:88-94.
[120]黄光国.儒家关系文化：文化反思与典范重建[M].北京大学出版社,2006.
[121]黄亚玲,赖建平,赵忠义.中国私募股权基金监管刍议[J].证券市场导报,2010,04:67-72.
[122]黄亚玲.私募股权基金文献综述[J].国际金融研究,2009,03:88-96.
[123]蒋悦炜.基于私募股权投资的科技型中小企业成长性研究[J].现代管理科学,2011(3):88-90.
[124]蒋悦炜.中国私募股权投资的定价方法研究[J].价格理论与实践,2011(4):65-66.
[125]金永红,何鹏.民营企业公司治理与企业绩效：以中小板上市公司为例[J].软科学，2009，6：88-92.
[126]劳剑东,李湛.控制权的相机分配与创业企业融资[J].财经研究，2004;12.
[127]李俊江,范思琦.中小企业自主创新与风险投资的关系——美国小企业的经验与启示[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2010,05:62-69.
[128]李维安.公司治理学[M].高等教育出版社，2005.
[129]李学峰,刘洋.场外交易市场、私募股权基金与中小企业融资——基于博弈论的分析[J].南方金融,2009,06:29-32.
[130]李亚.中国民营中小企业公司治理研究[J].管理评论，2007,9:55-61.
[131]李曜.私募股权投资浪潮及其前沿研究问题[J].证券市场导报,2010,06:4-13.
[132]李曜.私募股权投资浪潮及其前沿研究问题[J].证券市场导报，2010，9:4-13.
[133]李友梅.组织社会学及其决策分析[M].上海大学出版社,2001.
[134]刘贵斌.转轨时期中国风险投资业发展模式研究[D].西北大学，2008.
[135]刘世定.占有、认知与人际关系—对中国乡村制度变迁的经济社会学分析[M].华夏出版社,2003.
[136]刘旸.私募权益资本的循环增值和宏观经济效应[J].中央财经大学学报,2010,07:44-49.
[137]鲁亚曦.中国家族企业的背景与前景[J].四川改革,2001(7).
[138]路运锋,汪来喜,朱东华.私募股权投资基金委托代理关系分析[J].南方金融,2010,09:53-56.
[139]马跃如，段斌.事会特征、高管激励方式与中小企业成长———基于国有样本与民营样本数据的对比研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010,10:180-185.
[140]聂辉华.新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合：以威廉姆森和哈特为代表的两种进路[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,01:81-87.
[141]平新乔.私募股权与治理权价值[J].经济学动态,2011,1:36-39.
[142]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[M].经济研究.1995(1):8-16.
[143]青木昌彦著,周黎安译.比较制度分析[M].上海远东出版社,2001.
[144]邱国栋,马鹤丹.创新孵化与风险投资互联的区域创新系统研究[J].中国软科学,2010,02,97-106.
[145]盛立军.私募股权与资本市场[M].上海交通大学出版社，2003.
[146]宋晓燕.私募股权投资基金组织模式分析——一个治理结构的视角[J].上海财经大学学报,2008,05:41-48.
[147]孙宏友.私募股权投资基金投资主体法律问题研究[J].南开学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,05:123-129.
[148]田增瑞.创业投资中的显性与隐性激励机制研究[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2009,06:801-806.
[149]王崇.上市公司股权融资选择：私募还是公募?[J].经济管理,2008,17:54-59.
[150]王雷,党兴华,贺利平.基于不完全契约的高新技术风险企业控制权结构选择及其影响因素研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,05:166-174.
[151]王磊,邓戎,郭立宏.私募股权投资研究综述[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,04:103-107.
[152]王磊.中国私募股权投资的融资研究[D].西北大学博士论文,2009.
[153]王明琳，周生春.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006,08:83-103.
[154]王宣喻,储小平,私营企业内部治理结构演变模式研究[J].经济科学,2002(3):89-931
[155]王燕辉.私人股权基金[M].经济管理出版社，2009.
[156]王永钦.市场互联性、关系型合约与经济转型[J].经济研究,2006,06:79-91.
[157]威廉姆森著(1985),段毅才,王伟译.资本主义经济制度[M].商务印书馆,2002.
[158]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津人民出版社,1994.
[159]项卫星,刘旸.全球私募权益资本发展的特点和新趋势[J].世界经济研究,2010,03:20-25.
[160]杨大楷,蔡菊芳.中小企业公司治理结构及其融资研究[J].经济经纬,2004,1:81-85.
[161]杨丹辉,渠慎宁.私募基金参与跨国并购:核心动机、特定优势及其影响[J].中国工业经济,2009,03:120-129.
[162]杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论：一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,02:104-115.
[163]杨旭才.中国创业投资的资金来源与委托代理问题研究[D].天津大学，2008.
[164]杨忠,张骁,陈扬,廖文彦.“天生全球化”企业持续成长驱动力研究——企业生命周期不同阶段差异性跨案例分析[J].管理世界,2007,06:122-136.
[165]姚益龙,姚莉.美英-日德公司治理模式比较——兼论中国民营企业的治理结构[J].中山大学学报论丛,2003(2):1-4.
[166]臧展.私募股权投资理论与中国的实践[J].经济理论与经济管理,2009,11:64-68.
[167]张继袖、陆宇建.中小企业公司治理与盈利能力—来自深市中小盘的证据[J].南京审计学院学报,2007,2:42-48.
[168]张蓝中、刘浩.中小企业板上市公司治理模式与治理要点[J].西南金融,2009,8:59-60.
[169]张彤璞,王铁山.中小企业公司治理与融资问题探究[J].陕西科技大学学报,2006,4:140-143.
[170]张晓晴.中国创业投资公司治理机制研究[D].西北大学博士论文,2006.
[171]郑志刚.公司治理机制理论研究文献综述[J].南开经济评论,2004,5:26-33.
[172]周传丽.成长型企业的私募股权融资、对赌协议与财务绩效的路径依赖[J].学术研究,2009,09:89-93.
[173]周业安,赖步连.认知、学习和制度研究：新制度经济学的困境和发展[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,01:74-80.
[174]周永坤,王国建.外资私募股权投资基金问题研究[J].上海金融,2009,02:53-55.
[175]朱宏任，积极转变发展方式，促进非公有制经济平稳较快发展，中国非公有制经济发展论坛
[R]，陕西:西安，2010年9月26日。
[176]朱琳,潘敏.私募基金的组织形式差异及其完善[J].改革,2009,07:137-139.
[177]朱奇峰.中国私募股权基金发展论[R].厦门大学博士论文，2009.